Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing theories of reference. Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc replied with a survey aimed at providing evidence that referential intuitions are in sync with truth-value judgments and argued that truth-value judgments provide empirical data from linguistic usage. We present the results of a survey indicating that Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc's experiment fails to overcome Martí's objection: The truth-value judgements tested by Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc do not provide data relevant for testing theories of reference.

Reference and the ambiguity of truth‐value judgments

Domaneschi, Filippo;Vignolo, Massimiliano
2019-01-01

Abstract

Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing theories of reference. Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc replied with a survey aimed at providing evidence that referential intuitions are in sync with truth-value judgments and argued that truth-value judgments provide empirical data from linguistic usage. We present the results of a survey indicating that Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc's experiment fails to overcome Martí's objection: The truth-value judgements tested by Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc do not provide data relevant for testing theories of reference.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/966689
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