An invaluable resource for correcting the limits of deontological and con-sequentialist theories, is given by the Aristotelian idea of φρόνησις(phrone-sis) or moral judgement, because it helps to free moral decision from stan-dard rules and principles and to give contextual justification. It is a very im-portant intuition that, however, has to be re-thought in the light of pluralismand heterogeneousness and complexity of morality. Therefore, I propose atheory of the moral decision able to see the judgement as the expression of aplurality of factors that our moral imagination organizes and composes. Inthis sense, it is possible to intend the moral judgement as as an expression ofethical competence.
|Titolo:||Il giudizio morale. Phronesis e complessità della moralità|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01.01 - Articolo su rivista|