In order to uphold the claim that referential intuitions are a reliable source ofevidence for theories of reference,Macheryet al.(2009) conducted an em-pirical research by testing truth-value judgments. First, we discuss a concep-tual limitation of Macheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments.Then, we present the data of an empirical survey that shows that people’struth-value judgments are not congruent with their use of proper names. Weexplain why the results of our empirical research refute the conclusions ofMacheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments. We conclude thatreferential intuitions are still problematic.
|Titolo:||Referential intuitions are still problematic|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01.01 - Articolo su rivista|