In order to uphold the claim that referential intuitions are a reliable source ofevidence for theories of reference,Macheryet al.(2009) conducted an em-pirical research by testing truth-value judgments. First, we discuss a concep-tual limitation of Macheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments.Then, we present the data of an empirical survey that shows that people’struth-value judgments are not congruent with their use of proper names. Weexplain why the results of our empirical research refute the conclusions ofMacheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments. We conclude thatreferential intuitions are still problematic.

Referential intuitions are still problematic

massimiliano vignolo;filippo domaneschi
2018-01-01

Abstract

In order to uphold the claim that referential intuitions are a reliable source ofevidence for theories of reference,Macheryet al.(2009) conducted an em-pirical research by testing truth-value judgments. First, we discuss a concep-tual limitation of Macheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments.Then, we present the data of an empirical survey that shows that people’struth-value judgments are not congruent with their use of proper names. Weexplain why the results of our empirical research refute the conclusions ofMacheryet al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments. We conclude thatreferential intuitions are still problematic.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/894947
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