Il Golem ambiguo. Sulla teoria dei disaccordi profondi

The paper contains three parts. The first part provides a survey of Vittorio Villa recently developed theory of “deep interpretive disagreements” (DID). The second part provides a critical evaluation of Villa’s theory of DID, focussing in turn on its theoretical outlook (“reconstructive meta-jurisprudence”), its critical side (the critique to “descriptive meta-jurisprudence” and the emotivist theory of practical disagreements), and its constructive side (centred on the notion of deep interpretive disagreement and its judicial phenomenology). It comes to the conclusion that the only reasonable (charitable) way of understanding Villa’s theory of DID consists in regarding it, pace Villa, not as a piece of (obscure) reconstructive meta-jurisprudence, but rather as a piece of prescriptive meta-jurisprudence. The third, and last, part, answering to Villa’s inadequacy critique concerning descriptive meta-jurisprudence, outlines a descriptive theory of the sort of interpretive disagreement Villa considers under the “DID” label.