In the present paper, we shall discuss the notion of prototype and show its bene ts. First, we shall argue that the prototypes of common-sense concepts are necessary for making prompt and reliable categorisations and inferences. However, the features constituting the prototype of a particular concept are neither neces- sary nor suf cient conditions for determining category membership; in this sense, the prototype might lead to conclusions regarded as wrong from a theoretical per- spective. That being said, the prototype remains essential to handling most ordinary situations and helps us to perform important cognitive tasks. To exemplify this point, we shall focus on disease concepts. Our analysis concludes that the prototypical conception of disease is needed to make important inferences from a practical and clinical point of view. Moreover, it can still be compatible with a classical de nition of disease, given in terms of necessary and suf cient conditions. In the rst section, we shall compare the notion of stereotype, as it has been introduced in philosophy of language by Hilary Putnam, with the notion of prototype, as it has been developed in the cognitive sciences. In the second section, we shall discuss the general role of prototypical information in cognition and stress its centrality. In the third section, we shall apply our previous discussion to the speci c case of medical concepts, before brie y summarising our conclusions in section four.

The benefits of prototypes: The case of medical concepts

AMORETTI, MARIA CRISTINA;FRIXIONE, MARCELLO;
2017-01-01

Abstract

In the present paper, we shall discuss the notion of prototype and show its bene ts. First, we shall argue that the prototypes of common-sense concepts are necessary for making prompt and reliable categorisations and inferences. However, the features constituting the prototype of a particular concept are neither neces- sary nor suf cient conditions for determining category membership; in this sense, the prototype might lead to conclusions regarded as wrong from a theoretical per- spective. That being said, the prototype remains essential to handling most ordinary situations and helps us to perform important cognitive tasks. To exemplify this point, we shall focus on disease concepts. Our analysis concludes that the prototypical conception of disease is needed to make important inferences from a practical and clinical point of view. Moreover, it can still be compatible with a classical de nition of disease, given in terms of necessary and suf cient conditions. In the rst section, we shall compare the notion of stereotype, as it has been introduced in philosophy of language by Hilary Putnam, with the notion of prototype, as it has been developed in the cognitive sciences. In the second section, we shall discuss the general role of prototypical information in cognition and stress its centrality. In the third section, we shall apply our previous discussion to the speci c case of medical concepts, before brie y summarising our conclusions in section four.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/876262
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