The interface problem is the problem of accounting for the relations between the psychological notions of everyday discourse and scientific explanations of the mental. It is likely that in order to develop a scientific, naturalistic view of human beings we should dispense with many ordinary psychological notions that turn out to be inadequate for the aims and the methods of naturalistic inquiry. However, constructing simulative models of (parts of) a cognitive system in the form of artifacts and checking their performance through a form of Turing Test may, at least in principle, allow us to ‘plunge’ our naturalistic explanations of cognition back into the world of ordinary experience, in order to test their correspondence to the notions of our everyday mental discourse and to our common-sense intuitions.
Il problema dell’interfaccia (interface problem) consiste nel rendere conto delle relazioni che sussistono tra le nozioni psicologiche del discorso quotidiano e i resoconti scientifici del mentale. E’ probabile infatti che, nello sviluppo di una visione scientifica, naturalistica dell’uomo, saremo costretti ad abbandonare molte nozioni psicologiche ordinarie, che potrebbero risultare inadeguate rispetto agli scopi e ai metodi dell’indagine naturalistica. Tuttavia, la costruzione di modelli simulative di (parti di) un sistema cognitivo sotto la forma di artefatti e la verifica delle loro prestazioni attraverso una forma di test di Turing, potrebbe, almeno in linea di principio, consentirci di “reimmergere” le spiegazioni naturalistiche della cognizione nel mondo della nostra esperienza ordinaria, al fine di verificarne la corrispondenza con le nozioni del discorso mentale quotidiano e con le intuizioni del senso comune.
The turing test and the interface problem: a role for the imitation game in the methodology of cognitive science
FRIXIONE, MARCELLO
2015-01-01
Abstract
The interface problem is the problem of accounting for the relations between the psychological notions of everyday discourse and scientific explanations of the mental. It is likely that in order to develop a scientific, naturalistic view of human beings we should dispense with many ordinary psychological notions that turn out to be inadequate for the aims and the methods of naturalistic inquiry. However, constructing simulative models of (parts of) a cognitive system in the form of artifacts and checking their performance through a form of Turing Test may, at least in principle, allow us to ‘plunge’ our naturalistic explanations of cognition back into the world of ordinary experience, in order to test their correspondence to the notions of our everyday mental discourse and to our common-sense intuitions.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Frixione per paradigmi DEFINITIVA.pdf
accesso chiuso
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print
Dimensione
172.87 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
172.87 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.