The idea of equal respect for persons as a procedural ground for democracy runs into a dilemma: if understood in purely formal terms, it fails to account for the distinctive features of democratic political rights and the role they grant on citizens qua decision-makers; if the principle is filled with a more substantive content, pointing to some quality that is actually respected in the citizens as apt decision-makers, it becomes parasitic upon an instrumentalist justification of democracy, and looses its appeal as a purely procedural principle of legitimacy. As a solution to this dilemma, I propose the view that equal respect is a procedural principle of democracy because it requires to treat and publicly represent citizens as equally capable of making apt political choices, while not assuming that they actually are.
L'eguale rispetto come principio procedurale della democrazia
OTTONELLI, VALERIA
2010-01-01
Abstract
The idea of equal respect for persons as a procedural ground for democracy runs into a dilemma: if understood in purely formal terms, it fails to account for the distinctive features of democratic political rights and the role they grant on citizens qua decision-makers; if the principle is filled with a more substantive content, pointing to some quality that is actually respected in the citizens as apt decision-makers, it becomes parasitic upon an instrumentalist justification of democracy, and looses its appeal as a purely procedural principle of legitimacy. As a solution to this dilemma, I propose the view that equal respect is a procedural principle of democracy because it requires to treat and publicly represent citizens as equally capable of making apt political choices, while not assuming that they actually are.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
