The essay intends to underline in the philosophical thought of Nicholas of Autrecourt (1295/99-1369) the relationships with rhetorical and juridical traditions, focusing onthe way in which Autrecourt reworks some concepts and questions of legal nature. It emerges historical and theoretical importance of his legal studies at the University of Orléans. In his thought are probably present some reflections of Masters of Law of the 13th and 14th century, like Jacques de Revigny, Pierre de Belleperche and their successors. Paying attention to the Autrecourt’s concept of apparentia, thanks to the interrelation of juridical and rhetorical traditions, one outlines a theory that testifies the dialogue of different knowledge of several traditions, places and faculties. Affirming in a probabilistic way that all appearances are true, Nicholas distinguishes between full proofs and not-full poofs, appearances that are persuasive in themselves and appearances that permits to approximate to the true only if they are compared to each other and evaluated by the judgment. He drafts almost a theory of normal that brings to the rejection of not relevant proofs, until to reach to a theory of knowledge that opens to a collective dimension and that appears rhetorically founded.
Diritto e retorica in Nicola di Autrecourt
Amalia Salvestrini
2018-01-01
Abstract
The essay intends to underline in the philosophical thought of Nicholas of Autrecourt (1295/99-1369) the relationships with rhetorical and juridical traditions, focusing onthe way in which Autrecourt reworks some concepts and questions of legal nature. It emerges historical and theoretical importance of his legal studies at the University of Orléans. In his thought are probably present some reflections of Masters of Law of the 13th and 14th century, like Jacques de Revigny, Pierre de Belleperche and their successors. Paying attention to the Autrecourt’s concept of apparentia, thanks to the interrelation of juridical and rhetorical traditions, one outlines a theory that testifies the dialogue of different knowledge of several traditions, places and faculties. Affirming in a probabilistic way that all appearances are true, Nicholas distinguishes between full proofs and not-full poofs, appearances that are persuasive in themselves and appearances that permits to approximate to the true only if they are compared to each other and evaluated by the judgment. He drafts almost a theory of normal that brings to the rejection of not relevant proofs, until to reach to a theory of knowledge that opens to a collective dimension and that appears rhetorically founded.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.