The impossiblity of a coherentist legal positivism. In reaction to Dworkin’s critique of legal positivism, Alonso claims that a positivist theory of implicit legal principles is possible. I argue, instead, that Alonso’s theory fails to satisfy some of the central tenets of legal positivism: the social sources thesis and the separation of law and morals.

L'impossibile giuspositivismo congruentista

Andrej Kristan
2020-01-01

Abstract

The impossiblity of a coherentist legal positivism. In reaction to Dworkin’s critique of legal positivism, Alonso claims that a positivist theory of implicit legal principles is possible. I argue, instead, that Alonso’s theory fails to satisfy some of the central tenets of legal positivism: the social sources thesis and the separation of law and morals.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1014600
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