The present research analyses how different theories understand the meaning of statements that purport to describe what is permitted, obligatory or prohibited in a particular legal system. It is examined, in the first place, how classical legal positivism (Kelsen; von Wright; Guastini y Alchourrón y Bulygin) understands the meaning of legal statements. Then, an original interpretation of Hart's theory, based on some elements from Wittgenstein and the philosophy of ordinary language, is proposed. It is argued that Hart's theory introduces a new approach to the theory of law that changes how we should understand the meaning of legal statements. According to that interpretation, the description of what a legal system permits, obliges or prohibits to do is always internal to the practice. In this way, this research presents an specific epistemic frame for the description of positive law, defending, as the best alternative for legal positivism, a contextualist and normative approach, sensitive to the double face of language use: in one hand, its dependence on social practices constructions and, in the other hand, the intrinsic possibility of new uses in specific contexts.
|Titolo della tesi:||Positivismo jurídico y contexto. Un debate sobre los enunciados jurídicos.|
|Data di discussione:||5-nov-2019|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||Tesi di dottorato|