The paper surveys the model of legal science elaborated by Harold Berman, which is based on the distinction between methodological criteria, axiological criteria, and sociological criteria of what counts as science. Such a model is then compared to two models of legal science: Brian Leiter's naturalistic model and Alchourrón's and Bulygin's rationalistic model. In its final part, the essay identifies some of the most remarkable convergences and divergences between Berman's model and the two contemporary models of legal science.
LA CIENCIA JURÍDICA SEGÚN HAROLD BERMAN
RATTI, GIOVANNI BATTISTA
2015-01-01
Abstract
The paper surveys the model of legal science elaborated by Harold Berman, which is based on the distinction between methodological criteria, axiological criteria, and sociological criteria of what counts as science. Such a model is then compared to two models of legal science: Brian Leiter's naturalistic model and Alchourrón's and Bulygin's rationalistic model. In its final part, the essay identifies some of the most remarkable convergences and divergences between Berman's model and the two contemporary models of legal science.
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