The paper critically discusses the purported solution to Jørgensen’s dilemma recently put forward by Daniel Mendonca. In particular, it aims at pointing up three difficulties of this proposal: (1) the apparent overcoming of the dilemma actually consists in simply embracing its first horn (i.e. norms have truth-values, albeit peculiar), (2) the three-valued logic which stems from the tables with two variables leads one to validate inferences which derive “ought” from “is” and vice versa, (3) such a logic also validates some implications between norms, which are completely at odds with our common definitions of the deontic modalities.
Lógica de tres valores y dilema de Jørgensen: Algunas dificultades básicas
RATTI, GIOVANNI BATTISTA
2013-01-01
Abstract
The paper critically discusses the purported solution to Jørgensen’s dilemma recently put forward by Daniel Mendonca. In particular, it aims at pointing up three difficulties of this proposal: (1) the apparent overcoming of the dilemma actually consists in simply embracing its first horn (i.e. norms have truth-values, albeit peculiar), (2) the three-valued logic which stems from the tables with two variables leads one to validate inferences which derive “ought” from “is” and vice versa, (3) such a logic also validates some implications between norms, which are completely at odds with our common definitions of the deontic modalities.
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