The aim of this paper is to analyze some arguments against the coupling-constitution fallacy, one of the most common objection to the extended mind and the extended consciousness hypotheses. Along the way, I will try to emphasize two conflicting but essential requirements: on the one hand, many authors feel the need to identify an explicit criterion for recognizing what is really cognitive, conscious or mental; on the other hand, there is also the legitimate demand for establishing without any vicious circle where cognitive, conscious or mental states and processes are physically realized. As a conclusion, I will suggest that in order to bring together both the above constraints, it is necessary to adopt “tolerant” empirical individuation criteria defined in terms of “family resemblances”.
Alcune difficoltà legate ai criteri di individuazione di una mente e di una coscienza estesa
AMORETTI, MARIA CRISTINA
2012-01-01
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze some arguments against the coupling-constitution fallacy, one of the most common objection to the extended mind and the extended consciousness hypotheses. Along the way, I will try to emphasize two conflicting but essential requirements: on the one hand, many authors feel the need to identify an explicit criterion for recognizing what is really cognitive, conscious or mental; on the other hand, there is also the legitimate demand for establishing without any vicious circle where cognitive, conscious or mental states and processes are physically realized. As a conclusion, I will suggest that in order to bring together both the above constraints, it is necessary to adopt “tolerant” empirical individuation criteria defined in terms of “family resemblances”.
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