In this paper I wish to examine and discuss the specific contribution of philosophical and/or pre-philosophical intuitions, mental experiments as well as a priori arguments to the debate on the externalism about mental content, in relation to both semantic and phenomenal content. Throughout such an analysis, I would like to show that in order to effectively ground semantic and phenomenal externalism it is not sufficient to exploit solely philosophical and/or pre-philosophical intuitions, mental experiments as well as a priori arguments, but it is also necessary to intensely cooperate with cognitive sciences and take their empirical results into serious consideration.
Sul ruolo delle scienze cognitive nel dibattito relativo all’esternalismo del contenuto
AMORETTI, MARIA CRISTINA
2012-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I wish to examine and discuss the specific contribution of philosophical and/or pre-philosophical intuitions, mental experiments as well as a priori arguments to the debate on the externalism about mental content, in relation to both semantic and phenomenal content. Throughout such an analysis, I would like to show that in order to effectively ground semantic and phenomenal externalism it is not sufficient to exploit solely philosophical and/or pre-philosophical intuitions, mental experiments as well as a priori arguments, but it is also necessary to intensely cooperate with cognitive sciences and take their empirical results into serious consideration.
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