In this paper we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs (Shapley, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is studied too.
" Multicriteria games and Potentials"
PUSILLO, ANGELA LUCIA;
2007-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs (Shapley, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is studied too.
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