Feminist standpoint epistemologies must be acknowledged of some important merits which is hard to disregard: they correctly place their emphasis on the fact that knowledge is situated, and they rightly hold that there is no one single epistemic subject able to produce knowledge independently of other epistemic subjects. However, they also face a challenging dilemma: If they want to defend the better epistemic reliability, privilege, or advantage of the women's standpoint, they need to ground it in some social and/or natural facts, assuming the existence of a feminine "nature", and embracing essentialism (or at least its consequences); If they prefer to reject the notion of epistemic reliability, privilege or advantage, they have to consider all standpoints at the same level. We aim to demonstrate that such a dilemma is unavoidable, and to the extent that neither of the above option is positive for epistemology, no feminist standpoint epistemology can actually be endorsed.