The aim of this paper is to discuss a new concept of well-posedness for non cooperative games. Starting from the definition of (e,k)- equilibrium as the point where every player either guarantees at least ''k'' or he (she) does not lose more than ''e'', we introduce an original definition of well-posedness. We study characterizations of this well-posedness and its relations with the more known Tikhonov well-posedness. We prove that this well-posedness is an ordinal property if the payoff functions are bounded from below.
(epsilon,k) Equilibria and Well-posedness
PUSILLO, ANGELA LUCIA
2006-01-01
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss a new concept of well-posedness for non cooperative games. Starting from the definition of (e,k)- equilibrium as the point where every player either guarantees at least ''k'' or he (she) does not lose more than ''e'', we introduce an original definition of well-posedness. We study characterizations of this well-posedness and its relations with the more known Tikhonov well-posedness. We prove that this well-posedness is an ordinal property if the payoff functions are bounded from below.
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