Antropomorfismo e alterità animale: Heidegger e il dibattito contemporaneo

Theorists of animal ethics have often argued that anthropomorphism is a flawed way of thinking about animals. Recently, however, philosophers and ethologists have pointed out that, far from being a mistake in itself, anthropomorphism can be a positive heuristic tool for accessing the realm of animals. The fact that this notion has been subjected both to criticism and positive re-evaluation can be interpreted as proof of the ambivalence of anthropomorphism: this appears to be a resilient way of thinking that can be misleading, but also strategic to develop new questions and knowledge. A similar ambivalence can be found in Heidegger’s account of anthropomorphism. Bringing Heidegger’s view into a dialogue with contemporary discussion proves to be crucial for many reasons. Firstly, it enables us to reflect on the theoretical premises that contemporary debate assumes without questioning. Secondly, it helps us to distinguish between a negative metaphysical form of anthropomorphism (based on onto-historical grounds) and a neutral form (“ontological anthropomorphism” understood as intrinsic to human thinking). Thirdly, the return to Heidegger allows us to define the possibility of a positive, ex-centric anthropomorphism, starting from a rethinking of man’s original morphe, which is no longer placed in animality or rationality, but in the ‘pathic’ receptivity to the ontological alterity of animals.