The originality of the 1924 lecture course not only consists of the inclusion of new fundamental topics in Heidegger’s hermeneutics of human Dasein (the dimension of affectivity, the public sphere and the ethical side of existence), but also of his first-time exploration of the specific mode of Being of animal Dasein. The aim of the present paper is to show that the lecture course sets the grounds for a philosophy of animality that is still valuable today due to the acknowledgment that animals are teleological beings that perceive and evaluate the world through their affective nature, actively search for pleasure and ultimately tend to their own welfare. Unlike his later Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik lecture course of 1929-30, in which animals are considered «poor in world», in 1924 Heidegger argues that both humans and animals are «Beings-in-the-world». This means that humans and animals, despite their specific ontological differences, share a fundamental mode of Being, that of life. This paper illustrates the core features of Heidegger’s early reflections on animal life, by showing, at the same time, how these anticipate many of the ideas that have been recently developed in animal ethics (particularly in the Neo-Aristotelian approaches) and animal welfare science.
L’avere-mondo dell’animale: l’originalità della riflessione heideggeriana nel corso del 1924
pasqualin
2024-01-01
Abstract
The originality of the 1924 lecture course not only consists of the inclusion of new fundamental topics in Heidegger’s hermeneutics of human Dasein (the dimension of affectivity, the public sphere and the ethical side of existence), but also of his first-time exploration of the specific mode of Being of animal Dasein. The aim of the present paper is to show that the lecture course sets the grounds for a philosophy of animality that is still valuable today due to the acknowledgment that animals are teleological beings that perceive and evaluate the world through their affective nature, actively search for pleasure and ultimately tend to their own welfare. Unlike his later Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik lecture course of 1929-30, in which animals are considered «poor in world», in 1924 Heidegger argues that both humans and animals are «Beings-in-the-world». This means that humans and animals, despite their specific ontological differences, share a fundamental mode of Being, that of life. This paper illustrates the core features of Heidegger’s early reflections on animal life, by showing, at the same time, how these anticipate many of the ideas that have been recently developed in animal ethics (particularly in the Neo-Aristotelian approaches) and animal welfare science.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.