La workable democracy nel pensiero del giudice Breyer.

The paper draws the traits of the philosophy outlined by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer in his works and decisions. In Breyer's view, the American Constitution embodies the quest of a workable government, that is, an institutional system ensuring the protection of individual rights, democratic decision-making, and sound public policies. The paper reconstructs and discusses this claim, emphasizing both its ambitions and contradictions. Particularly, Breyer's insistence on good government is at risks of destabilizing its theorical proposal and open the doors to elitism. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section justifies the interest in Breyer's writings, legacy, and sensibility to the dangers of political partisanship. The second section describes the pillars of Breyer's constitutional thought by characterizing his analysis of citizens' active liberty in a democratic framework. The third section considers the function of good government in the reading of the Justice, showing how some elements of Breyer's philosophy collide. Finally, the fourth section discusses Breyer's disappointing insights on the foundations of Court's public authority. Contrary to Breyer's claims, the only way to preserve the Court from the "peril of politics" is imagining new shared rules to regulate its work and composition.