Universalidad y sistemas normativos

This paper discusses some ideas that Jorge Rodríguez puts forward in his book Analytical Theory of Law when analyzing legal norms as reasons for actions. First, I critique Rodríguez's theses about what it means to hold a universalist view of legal reasons. Specifically, the idea that a system of universal legal norms must necessarily establish perfect balances that determine what should be done in each case, taking into account all relevant factors. Second, I criticize the author's proposed distinction between problems of defeasibility in the context of the identification and application of legal norms as inconsistent with the universalist position he purports to advocate. Finally, I try to show, by means of some examples, how a universalist conception of legal systems can account for the existence of conflicts between their norms without implying that they are defeasible on the basis of extra-systematic considerations at the time of their application, i.e., without abandoning the thesis that legal norms provide universal reasons.