Robert Alexy developed a legal philosophy which, aligning with the neo-constitutionalist paradigm, claimed to overcome the classic alternative between positivism and natural law. This claim led him to posit a theory of law, rights, and practical argumentation that culminated in the formulation of an “inclusive non-positivist” concept of law. The present investigation purports to reconstruct critically and systematically two central aspects of Alexy’s theory in the light of the central idea that structures his thought: “the institutionalization of reason” understood as the effort to reconcile the real and the ideal dimensions of law. The first chapter aims at contextualizing his work in view of its philosophical and legal sources of inspiration and at analyzing his metaphilosophy. It will be shown that besides the clear analytical and Kantian inheritance at work in his thought, the metaphysical theses he puts forth render its internal coherence difficult to maintain. The second chapter, dedicated to the study of his ideas regarding the nature and the concept of law, results in a critique of the “pretention to correctness” as well as of the establishment of the existence of human rights. It concludes that the foundation of the “inclusive non-positivism” he advocates is doubtful. Finally, the third chapter, which analyzes his theory of general practical discourse and legal argumentation, criticizes the logico-transcendental foundation of the discourse rules as well as of his metaethics. This critique unveils the prescriptive and ideological dimensions at work in his legal philosophy. Given the theoretical shortcomings of his work, his legal philosophy does not constitute a satisfactory “third way” between positivism and natural law. Nevertheless, it is an interesting attempt that illustrates, through its wide international reception, the contemporary aspiration to protect the fundamental liberties and rights of citizens in modern constitutional states.

L’institutionnalisation de la raison : le système de philosophie du droit de Robert Alexy et ses limites

GENIEZ, ROMAIN SYLVAIN JEAN
2023-03-09

Abstract

Robert Alexy developed a legal philosophy which, aligning with the neo-constitutionalist paradigm, claimed to overcome the classic alternative between positivism and natural law. This claim led him to posit a theory of law, rights, and practical argumentation that culminated in the formulation of an “inclusive non-positivist” concept of law. The present investigation purports to reconstruct critically and systematically two central aspects of Alexy’s theory in the light of the central idea that structures his thought: “the institutionalization of reason” understood as the effort to reconcile the real and the ideal dimensions of law. The first chapter aims at contextualizing his work in view of its philosophical and legal sources of inspiration and at analyzing his metaphilosophy. It will be shown that besides the clear analytical and Kantian inheritance at work in his thought, the metaphysical theses he puts forth render its internal coherence difficult to maintain. The second chapter, dedicated to the study of his ideas regarding the nature and the concept of law, results in a critique of the “pretention to correctness” as well as of the establishment of the existence of human rights. It concludes that the foundation of the “inclusive non-positivism” he advocates is doubtful. Finally, the third chapter, which analyzes his theory of general practical discourse and legal argumentation, criticizes the logico-transcendental foundation of the discourse rules as well as of his metaethics. This critique unveils the prescriptive and ideological dimensions at work in his legal philosophy. Given the theoretical shortcomings of his work, his legal philosophy does not constitute a satisfactory “third way” between positivism and natural law. Nevertheless, it is an interesting attempt that illustrates, through its wide international reception, the contemporary aspiration to protect the fundamental liberties and rights of citizens in modern constitutional states.
9-mar-2023
Robert Alexy a développé une philosophie du droit qui, dans la droite lignée du néo-constitutionnalisme, porte l’ambition de dépasser l’alternative classique qui oppose positivisme et jusnaturalisme. Cela le conduit à formuler une théorie du droit, des droits et de l’argumentation pratique qui culmine dans la formulation d’un concept « non-positiviste inclusif » de droit. Cette investigation propose une reconstruction critique et systématique de deux aspects centraux de la philosophie du droit de Robert Alexy à l’aune de l’idée centrale qui structure tout le programme théorique du juriste allemand : « l’institutionnalisation de la raison » conçue comme l’ambition de réconcilier la dimension réelle et idéale du droit. Le premier chapitre s’attache, d’une part, à contextualiser son œuvre à l’aune de ses sources d’inspirations philosophiques et juridiques ainsi que, d’autre part, à analyser sa métaphilosophie. Il révèle en outre que malgré l’héritage analytique et kantien qui structure son œuvre, les thèses proprement métaphysiques qu’il développe rendent la cohérence de sa pensée difficile à maintenir. Le deuxième chapitre, dédié à l’étude de ses développements relatifs au concept et à la nature du droit, se solde par une critique de la thèse de la « prétention de correction » et de l’établissement de l’existence des droits de l’homme qui permet de douter du bien-fondé du « non-positivisme inclusif » qu’il défend. Enfin, le dernier chapitre, dédié à l’analyse de sa théorie du discours pratique général ainsi qu’à sa théorie de l’argumentation juridique, propose une critique de la fondation logico-transcendantale des règles du discours et de sa métaéthique qui révèle le caractère essentiellement idéologique et prescriptif de son travail. Bien que les difficultés qui grèvent sa théorie sont insusceptibles de lui permettre de constituer une « troisième voie » entre positivisme et jusnaturalisme, son œuvre présente un intérêt historique indéniable et illustre, par l’ampleur de sa réception internationale, l’aspiration contemporaine à la protection des droits fondamentaux et à la réalisation de l’État de droit.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1109133
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