In this paper, I propose to draw attention to a specific version of non-voluntaristic imperativism, its corresponding conception of legal norm, and the framework in which it is inserted: that advocated by Scandinavian realist Karl Olivecrona. In order to carry out this analysis, I will first contextualise Olivecrona’s position and his rejection of voluntarism; briefly reconstruct his position in relation to law and legal authority; and introduce the way in which authority and legal norms are articulated as cogs in the machine of law (section 2). I will then analyse in depth Olivecrona’s conception of the legal norm as an independent imperative with a suggestive character, focusing on his rejection of the norm as a mandate and the elements of this type of legal imperative (section 3). Finally, I will focus on this particular conception of norms as independent imperatives and address some problems it raises, including the problem of their identification, the obscurity of the claim that these imperatives “guide behavior”, and the appropriateness of the category of ‘suggestive character’ (section 4). I conclude the analysis with some brief reflections on the possible usefulness of the category of independent imperatives for at least two relevant and current topics in the philosophy of law (section 5).

La máquina del derecho y sus engranajes. Karl Olivecrona sobre derecho, autoridad, y normas jurídicas como imperativos independientes

Julieta Agustina Rabanos
2021

Abstract

In this paper, I propose to draw attention to a specific version of non-voluntaristic imperativism, its corresponding conception of legal norm, and the framework in which it is inserted: that advocated by Scandinavian realist Karl Olivecrona. In order to carry out this analysis, I will first contextualise Olivecrona’s position and his rejection of voluntarism; briefly reconstruct his position in relation to law and legal authority; and introduce the way in which authority and legal norms are articulated as cogs in the machine of law (section 2). I will then analyse in depth Olivecrona’s conception of the legal norm as an independent imperative with a suggestive character, focusing on his rejection of the norm as a mandate and the elements of this type of legal imperative (section 3). Finally, I will focus on this particular conception of norms as independent imperatives and address some problems it raises, including the problem of their identification, the obscurity of the claim that these imperatives “guide behavior”, and the appropriateness of the category of ‘suggestive character’ (section 4). I conclude the analysis with some brief reflections on the possible usefulness of the category of independent imperatives for at least two relevant and current topics in the philosophy of law (section 5).
En este trabajo, propongo concentrar la atención en una versión específica del imperativismo no voluntarista, su correspondiente concepción de la norma jurídica y el entramado en el cual ésta se inserta: aquella sostenida por el realista escandinavo Karl Olivecrona. Para llevar adelante este análisis, primero contextualizaré la posición de Olivecrona y su rechazo al voluntarismo, reconstruyendo brevemente su posición con respecto al derecho y a la autoridad jurídica, e introduciendo el modo en el cual autoridad y normas jurídicas se articulan como engranajes de la máquina del derecho (sección 2). Luego, analizaré en profundidad la concepción de Olivecrona de la norma jurídica como imperativo independiente con carácter sugestivo, centrando la atención en el rechazo a la norma como mandato y en los elementos de este tipo de imperativos jurídicos (sección 3). Por último, me centraré en esta particular concepción de las normas como imperativos independientes y plantearé algunos problemas que presenta, entre ellos el problema de su identificación, la oscuridad de la afirmación de que estos imperativos “guían el comportamiento”, y la adecuación o no de la categoría de “carácter sugestivo” (sección 4). Concluiré el análisis con algunas breves reflexiones sobre la posible utilidad de la categoría de los imperativos independientes para al menos dos temas relevantes y actuales de filosofía del derecho (sección 5).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1096799
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