A way of saving normative epistemology? Scientific knowledge without standpoint theories

Feminist standpoint epistemologies of the sciences must be acknowledged to have significant merits. However, as we have already argued, the very notion of standpoint – being intrinsically linked to the notions of better epistemic reliability, privilege, or advantage – brings with it an unavoidable dilemma: it forces its defenders to choose between essentialism (or at least its negative and dangerous consequences) and regarding all standpoints as equal. Moreover, we have also noted that there is no reason to appeal to any feminist standpoint epistemology of the sciences to retain all of its more significant merits. Given the importance of the debate, this paper aims to rebut possible objections that standpoint theorists may advance against the general argument from essentialism that we defend and to show that there is no effective way of supporting a genuine (i.e., normative) standpoint epistemology.