Le forme dell'osservatore. La cibernetica di secondo ordine e il circolo onto-epistemico.

Second-order cybernetics (CSO) investigates how the observer (an operationally closed system) generates its order partitions (distinctions) and how these partitions, in coordination with those of other observers, produce a stable world of references, an “objective reality”. The thesis will examine the role of the observer in second-order cybernetics by means of the concept of form developed by George Spencer-Brown in Laws of Form. “Form” refers to the distinction between distinction and indication; it is a two-sided structure, in which one side is indicated (marked) at the exact moment when it is distinguished from the other side (unmarked). The marked side is defined as the difference between the marked side and the unmarked side – i.e., indication is the difference between indication and distinction. This definition is clearly autological: the distinction is distinguished by re-entering in the marked side, i.e., the distinction is self-distinguished by re-entering in itself. To account for the observer, we will focus on two forms: 1) the system/environment form; and 2) the operation/observation form. In autopoietic systems theory, the system/environment form is related to the way in which the system identifies itself as an operationally closed unit: the distinction between system and environment is the product of the system’s self-distinction. The operation/observation form allows us to articulate the relationship between autopoiesis and observation and to distinguish between the level of self-distinction of the autopoietic system and the level of self-distinction of the observer. In the first chapter, we will start with an analysis of the notions of system, observer, and ontology. Then, we will examine the underlying implications of the idea of system as form, focusing in particular on the process of inclusive exclusion (the distinction re-enters within the side that has been distinguished). Finally, drawing on the concepts of system as form and of re-entry, we will define an ontology of observers, showing how in CSO the constitution of identities (both objective and subjective) has been problematized; we will also address the issue of the operation/observation form, which is pivotal for an adequate understanding of the onto-epistemic circle. In the second chapter, we will start with an overview of von Foerster’s “cybernetics of cognition”, showing the peculiarity of CSO with respect to cognitivist and connectionist models. We will then trace a path from von Foerster’s bio-computationalism to Varela’s neurophenomenology. Finally, problematizing the idea of the substantial self, we will propose a characterization of the self as Eigenform. In the third chapter, we will focus on the ethical-political implications of the onto-epistemic assumptions of CSO. Starting from von Foerster’s definition of the ethics of responsibility and autonomy (to decide on an undecidable issue), we will discuss the conditions of existence of an autonomous and self-instituting collective, and we will trace the outlines of an autonomous community made up of agents who assume their groundlessness. The elucidation of the basic notions of CSO is aimed at outlining an anti-substantialist, anti-identitarian, anti-foundationalist, and constructivist theoretical proposal. Such a proposal allows for the resemantization of epistemologically crucial concepts such as those of observation, cognition, and reflection, as well as ontologically fundamental concepts such as those of identity, difference, and invariance.