The aim of this research is to introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness that is metaphysically compatible with most contemporary theories of consciousness, insofar as it is intended to fix the conceptual level to which the study of consciousness belongs. In the first chapter, I analyze different uses of the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ and three approaches to the concept of consciousness that can be drawn from three popular kinds of theories of consciousness. My goal is to show that those approaches are based on the identification of three discernible features of conscious states, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. In the second chapter, I introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness where the above features are characterized as components of the concept, unifying them into a single conceptual space. Such interpretation allows me to explore how the conceptual space can be adjusted to build models of consciousness. In the third chapter, I argue that conscious states are internal states that are described in terms of the components of the concept of consciousness and their relations. In the fourth chapter, I show how my view can be implemented to theorize about non-human consciousness by analyzing two kinds of non-human systems, namely, dolphins and bees.

An Analysis of the Concept of Consciousness

CASTRO MARTIN, LUIS GUILLERMO
2021-10-29

Abstract

The aim of this research is to introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness that is metaphysically compatible with most contemporary theories of consciousness, insofar as it is intended to fix the conceptual level to which the study of consciousness belongs. In the first chapter, I analyze different uses of the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ and three approaches to the concept of consciousness that can be drawn from three popular kinds of theories of consciousness. My goal is to show that those approaches are based on the identification of three discernible features of conscious states, namely, intentionality, reflexivity and phenomenality. In the second chapter, I introduce an interpretation of the concept of consciousness where the above features are characterized as components of the concept, unifying them into a single conceptual space. Such interpretation allows me to explore how the conceptual space can be adjusted to build models of consciousness. In the third chapter, I argue that conscious states are internal states that are described in terms of the components of the concept of consciousness and their relations. In the fourth chapter, I show how my view can be implemented to theorize about non-human consciousness by analyzing two kinds of non-human systems, namely, dolphins and bees.
29-ott-2021
conceptual space; practice of conceptualization; discernible feature; intentionality; reflexivity; phenomenality
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1060240
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