In this paper I disuss logic in the pragmatic apporach of (Brandom, 2008). I consider differnt logical consequence relations (classical, intuitionistic and linear) and I will argue that the formal treatment proposed by Brandom, even if I believe it provides powerful intuions and an interesting framework on logic in general, doesn't allow to state properly the relationship between differnt logics. I propose an alternative account of the elaboration of logical vocabuilaries not based on incompatibility semantics, rather on a particular notion of interaction, which I claim is implicit in the practice of giving and asking for reasons, which allows to state the relationship between differnt logics in terms of differnt aspects of the inferential practice.
Logic and Pragmatics
PORELLO D
2009-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I disuss logic in the pragmatic apporach of (Brandom, 2008). I consider differnt logical consequence relations (classical, intuitionistic and linear) and I will argue that the formal treatment proposed by Brandom, even if I believe it provides powerful intuions and an interesting framework on logic in general, doesn't allow to state properly the relationship between differnt logics. I propose an alternative account of the elaboration of logical vocabuilaries not based on incompatibility semantics, rather on a particular notion of interaction, which I claim is implicit in the practice of giving and asking for reasons, which allows to state the relationship between differnt logics in terms of differnt aspects of the inferential practice.
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