Lacune assiologiche e rilevanza normativa

Logical and axiological problems are usually confused in the analysis of legal systems and the traditional discussion about their completeness or incompleteness is one of the main topics where this confusion is revealed. The logical question of incompleteness should be clearly distinguished from axiological inadequacies in the promulgation of norms. This view was stressed by 1971 Alchourrón and Bulygin's definitions of normative and axiological gaps. The main purpose of this paper is to refine the notion of axiological gap by taking into account some ambiguities generated by the different senses in which normative relevance can be understood. Two descriptive notions of normative irrelevance will be presented in analogy with the positive and negative descriptive concepts of permission. Both distinctions rely on a similar basis and have the same consequences in relation with the ideals of consistency and completeness, Furthermore, the different notions of normative irrelevance here suggested will be used to reject an objection against a logical and non-axiological conception of normative gaps, and to link axiological gaps with the problem of defeasibility of norms.