Within cognitive science, the “concept of concept” results to be highly disputed and problematic. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that the notion itself of concept is in some sense heterogeneous, and encompasses different cognitive phenomena. This results in a strain between conflicting requirements, such as, for example, compositionality on the one side and the need of representing prototypical information on the other. This has several consequences also for the practice of knowledge engineering and for the technology of formal ontologies. In this paper we propose an analysis of this state of affairs. As a possible way out, in the conclusions we suggest a framework for the representation of concepts, which is inspired by the so called dual process theories of reasoning and rationality.
The Computational Representation of Concepts in Formal Ontologies: Some General Considerations
FRIXIONE, MARCELLO;
2010-01-01
Abstract
Within cognitive science, the “concept of concept” results to be highly disputed and problematic. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that the notion itself of concept is in some sense heterogeneous, and encompasses different cognitive phenomena. This results in a strain between conflicting requirements, such as, for example, compositionality on the one side and the need of representing prototypical information on the other. This has several consequences also for the practice of knowledge engineering and for the technology of formal ontologies. In this paper we propose an analysis of this state of affairs. As a possible way out, in the conclusions we suggest a framework for the representation of concepts, which is inspired by the so called dual process theories of reasoning and rationality.
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