This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its effects upon efficiency are also discussed.
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Titolo: | Voting the public expenditure: an experiment |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2008 |
Abstract: | This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its effects upon efficiency are also discussed. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11567/243624 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 07.12 - Altro |
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