Gli attori nel mercato italiano del private equity. Primi cenni sulla regolazione dei modelli organizzativi

Abstract: Investors and private equity fund managers in the Italian market: some consideration on the regulation of the governance of private equity funds. A field of research – somehow neglected – of the legal end economic literature on private equity funds’ governance deals with agency costs affecting the relationship between managers of private equity funds and investors and the contractual or institutional structures employed to organize such relationship. This paper – after having briefly identified such agency costs and other organizational problems – attempts to evaluate if the institutional models of funds’ governance provided by Italian regulatory framework are well suited to minimize such agency costs and other problems tipically affecting the relationship between managers and investors. After a brief review of contractual schemes generally adopted to organize private equity funds’ governance in the Italian market, the essay focuses on the Italian regulatory framework of asset management, trying to verify the regulatory constraints deriving from such framework in comparison with organizational and contractual structures adopted in other countries.