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Why to Watch a Film Twice

When I began writing film reviews, the editor of the magazine who had hired me told me this basic principle: if you want to properly evaluate a film, you should always watch it twice. The first time, he said, is for pleasure. The second time is for pleasure too, but a different kind of pleasure. At that time, I did not completely understand the meaning of his words. Now, I think I have finally understood what he meant. Moving from film criticism to the philosophy of film has helped me to clarify this principle.

We should watch a film *twice* since there are *two* important sources of pleasure in a film, and we find it hard to fully enjoy them both if we only watch the film *once*. The first source of pleasure is the *exploration* of a *world*, the second one is the *appreciation* of an *artifact*. These two sources of pleasure are distinct and yet connected. This paper aims at providing an account of the film experience that can explain both their distinctness and their connection.

For this purpose, I will develop Richard Wollheim's (1980) idea that the pictorial experience involves two folds. More specifically, I will argue that in the case of the film experience these folds are to be understood as two distinct temporal series, which can provide us with different kinds of pleasure (§§ 1-2). Conceiving of the cinematic folds as temporal series will lead me to reformulate the traditional distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic features of a film, thereby highlighting two different kinds of non-diegetic features, which play a different role in our appreciation of films (§§ 3-5). Then, I will compare my account of film experience and appreciation, which rests upon the notion of temporal series, with alternative accounts, which rest upon notions such as imagination, intention, and embodiment (§§ 6-7). Finally, I will exemplify my account of film experience and appreciation by analyzing a film segment (§ 8).

1. C-series and R-series

With the aim of articulating the "requirement upon the seeing appropriate to representations", Wollheim (1980, 142–143) introduces "the twofold thesis" stating that,

while looking at a picture, "visual attention must be distributed between two things though of course it need not be equally distributed between them […] what I have expressed as seeing the medium versus seeing the object". In this sense, a pictorial experience involves two experiential folds, one directed to the picture's surface (i.e. the medium) and the other to the scene depicted (i.e. the object). For the film experience is a kind of pictorial experience, one can conceive of it as a *twofold* experience, whose folds represent the screen's surface and the world depicted respectively (see Hopkins 2009, 69).

I argue that, in virtue of the peculiar temporality of films with respect to still pictures, the two folds of the film experience should be characterized as temporal series. More specifically, the film experience is constituted by both a temporal series that concerns an enlightened screen in a theater (or in some other place) and a temporal series that consists of perspectives on the world depicted. Borrowing Wollheim's (1998) adjectives, I will call "Configurational Series" (C-series) the former and "Recognitional Series" (R-series) the latter. While twofoldness is the hallmark of the pictorial experience in general, twoseriesness is the specific hallmark of the cinematic experience.[i] Comparing the C-series and the R-series with the two melodies that constitute a polyphony, one might also treat the film experience as a *polyphonic* experience (for a similar use of the notion of polyphony in the case of speech acts, see Bachtin 1981; Ducrot 1998; Recanati 1981).

The C-series and the R-series are often conflated in the debates about films. A clue of this is the use of expressions such as 'camera movement' or 'editing cut' to designate not only something experienced in the C-series (namely, some features of the film as an artifact) but also something in the R-series (namely, some changes in the perspective on the world depicted). Yet, I argue, a proper account of the film experience requires that one treats the C-series and the R-series as distinct and yet connected. My aim is to investigate their distinctness and their connection in order to explain the distinctness and the connection of two sources of pleasure in the film experience, namely, the exploration of a world and the appreciation of an artifact. Just as the pleasure we take in the

exploration of a world primarily comes from the R-series, the pleasure we take in the appreciation of the film as an artifact primarily comes from the C-series. Thus, we can dub the former *R-pleasure* and the latter *C-pleasure*. By providing an account of the relationship between the C-series and the R-series, I will provide an account of the relationship between the C-pleasure and the R-pleasure.

Both the C-series and the R-series are experiences in the sense figured out by Peter Strawson (1966), who conceives of an experience as a subjective route through an objective world. On the one hand, the R-series is a subjective route through the world depicted. On the other hand, the C-series is a phase of a wider subjective route through the actual world, i.e. the spectator's lifelong experience. More specifically, the C-series is the phase of the spectator's lifelong experience that focuses on a certain artifact in the actual world, namely the film screened.

Both the R-series and the C-series exhibit a subjective temporal order, which is distinct from the objective spatiotemporal order of the world explored. For instance, in the R-series, I can see an eagle flying in the sky and *then* a horse running in a field; yet, in the objective order of the world depicted, the eagle is flying *while* the horse is running. Likewise, in the C-series, I can watch the screen and *then* take a look at my friend munching popcorn in the near place; yet, in the objective order of the actual world, my friend is munching popcorn *while* the film is being screened.

However, there is a key difference between the C-series and the R-series in this respect. In the C-series (and, more generally, in ordinary experience), the subjective temporal order of my experience is determined by the position of my body in the objective spatiotemporal order of the actual world. In other words, the series of *perspectives* that constitutes my experience as a subjective temporal series is determined by the series of standpoints that my body occupies in the objective spatiotemporal order of the actual world. By contrast, in the R-series there is no constraint of this sort. My series of perspectives on the world depicted is independent of the position of my body in the objective spatiotemporal order of the world depicted. That is because *I have no body in the world depicted*. In this sense, we might say that the C-series involves an embodied

experience whereas the R-series involves a disembodied experience.

Here is a specificity of the film experience that can be a source of pleasure for the spectator. In the R-series, we can explore the world depicted in a way that is precluded in our ordinary experience of the actual world, namely, by enjoying a series of perspectives on a world that is independent of the position of our body in that world. This is the core of what I have called the R-pleasure.

An important consequence of this difference is the following. On the one hand, the C-series is an experiential route through an objective world to which the experience itself belongs (as far as the experience belongs to the body that determines the experiential route). On the other hand, the R-series is an experiential route through an objective world to which the experience itself does not belong. In short, the C-series is an experience *from the inside* whereas the R-series is an experience *from the outside*.

As a disembodied experience from the outside, the R-series, unlike the C-series, does not make room for action and interaction. In fact, in the C-series, one can interact with the object experienced because one can do so by means of one's body. For instance, in the C-series I can move towards the screen and possibly touch it, whereas, in the R-series I cannot move towards the individuals depicted and touch them. The R-series is an experiential route through an objective world that prevents the subject of experience from acting in that world and interacting with the inhabitants of that world. As a consequence of that, the R-series, unlike the C-series, surely does not make room for sensory modalities such as touch or taste, which involve experiences in which the body shows up (for instance, my experience of touching a table involves experiencing a contact between *my body* and this table).

Among the actions precluded to the subject in the R-series, there is also the possibility to change the viewpoint by changing the position of the body. While the C-series is a series of perspectives that are *chosen*, the R-series is a series of perspectives that are *imposed*. Yet, in the R-series itself, there is no answer to the question: imposed by who? The answer to this question lies in the C-series, in which the film is experienced as an artifact that has been designed in order to determine our exploration of the world

depicted. In the R-series, the perspectives are imposed just in the sense that there is no alternative to them: one cannot chose one's perspectives, but only enjoy them.

This is the price that the R-series must pay in order to provide the subject of experience with a disembodied experience from without the world depicted. Nevertheless, this lack of freedom can be a source of pleasure, as far as in the R-series we are released from the burden of action, interaction and decision. We have no longer to choose our viewpoint by positioning our body in the world, and to face the consequences of this choice. Viewpoints come for free, so to say, and we can simply enjoy them without worrying about our choices and their possible consequences. This is another key feature of what I have called the R-pleasure.

Another important feature of the R-pleasure, which is in turn related to the disembodied character of the R-series, comes from the possibility of discontinuity. In ordinary experience – and thus in the C-series, which is just a phase of it – the perceptual route through the actual world is *continuous* since the series of subjective perspectives is determined by the series of positions of the subject's body, which can move only *continuously*. By contrast, in the R-series the perceptual route through the world depicted does not depend on the position of the subject's body, and thus can involve discontinuities.

More specifically, the R-series can involve both spatial discontinuity and temporal discontinuity. The former allows the subject to change the viewpoint from place A at time T to place B at time T' (which is the immediate successor of T in the objective temporal order) without experiencing a continuous movement from A to B. The latter allows the subject to change the viewpoint from place A at time T to place to place B (or, possibly, A itself) at time T^* (which is *not* the immediate successor of T in the objective temporal order) without experiencing a continuous duration from T to T^*. Editing cuts are the ways in which such experiential discontinuities are implemented in the film as an artifact, and one can actually appreciate such an implementation in the C-series. Yet, in the R-series, what in the C-series we called 'editing cuts' are no longer *editing cuts* (understood as features of the film as an artifact), but rather *spatial or temporal jumps* in the subjective

route through the world depicted. Enjoying such experiential jumps is another important component of what I have called the R-pleasure.

2. C-pleasure and R-pleasure

The R-pleasure, whose basic traits I have sketched just above, is the basic pleasure that one can take in watching a film. This is shared by all moviegoers. Overlooking the R-pleasure means overintellectualizing the film experience. However, cinema provides us with another important source of pleasure that is worth highlighting. This is the C-pleasure, which is not alternative to the R-pleasure but rather complementary to it.

In fact, the R-pleasure, as such, is not simply a pleasure one takes in the scene depicted. Rather, this is the pleasure one takes in the peculiar experience of the scene depicted that films provide us with, namely the R-series (see previous section). On the one hand, the R-series exhibits a specific way of presenting the scene depicted that distinguishes it from ordinary perception. On the other hand, the C-series helps us to make such a specificity explicit by revealing where it comes from.

In this sense, the C-pleasure arises from the etiological question: what caused my R-pleasure? While the R-pleasure consists in the exploration of a world, the C-pleasure consists in the appreciation of the artifact that makes such an exploration possible. This artifact is the film, which we initially encounter in the C-series as a configuration of light on a screen. The C-pleasure involves treating such a configuration as the link between the film as a complex artifact having a distinctive history of production on the one hand, and the exploration of a world that this artifact supplies us on the other.

Films are artifacts whose primary function is the generation of an R-series that provides us with an R-pleasure. Still, in watching a film, we can also focus on the functioning of the artifact itself (instead of limiting ourselves to enjoy its effects), thereby enjoying a C-pleasure. We can do so by means of a cognitive process that consists in tracing valuable experiences back to their causes. Following Wollheim (1980, 1984), I will call this process *retrieval*.

Although there are films that patently reveal themselves as artifacts, for example the so-called Brechtian films like *Une femme est une femme* (J.-L Godard, 1961) or *Othon* (J-M. Straub and D. Huillet, 1969), traditional narrative cinema normally favors the exploration of the world depicted in the R-series. However, the spectator can always appreciate any film also as an artifact by means of cinematic retrieval. This can be characterized as the process of tracing the R-series back to its causes through three kinds of awareness. First, the awareness that the R-series is caused, in the C-series, by patterns of light upon the screen and sounds coming from the speakers. Second, the awareness that there is a template (e.g. a film strip, a disk, a file) enabling the showing of such lights and sounds. Third, the awareness that this template is linked to a historical chain that originates in the creative action of a maker who intended to elicit certain responses from the audience. In sum, tracing the R-series back to a configured surface in the C-series leads us to wonder where this configuration comes from, thereby tracing it back to its history of production. This is the cinematic retrieval from which the C-pleasure originates.

The cornerstone of the C-pleasure is the acknowledgment that our perspective on the world depicted is in fact a shot that is currently projected on the screen and that was produced through a camera (or some alternative technical device such as computer graphics). In this sense, the *range* of our perspective (in the R-series) on the world depicted corresponds to the *frame* of the shot that is screened (in the C-series).

The frame, understood as the shape of the screened shot, is the most basic configurational feature of cinema since it appears in any moving picture. Even if one endorses the thesis that moving pictures constituting documentaries, audiovisual recordings or live television are "transparent" (see Walton 1984), that is, they put us in perceptual contact with real events, one should still acknowledge that the experience elicited by such transparent pictures, unlike ordinary perception, essentially involves a frame. In fact, the experience of documentaries, audiovisual recordings or live television sharply differs from ordinary perception first of all because the content of the former, unlike the content of the latter, is framed.

To sum up, the exploration of the world depicted that one enjoys in the R-series rests upon the frame, which one can experience in the C-series. Even in a moving image that leads us to focus on the R-series thereby minimizing the role of the C-series, the frame keeps playing a fundamental role. For instance, the frame plays a crucial role in early films such as Lumière Brothers' *vues*, just as in the digital videos one can nowadays make using one's smartphones. Ultimately, the frame is the basic formal constituent of any film, and we can appreciate it in the C-series as providing us with the perspective on the world depicted that we enjoy in the R-series.

3. Perceptual non-diegetic features

The frame is not part of the world depicted. 'Being framed' is not a property of the scene we see, but only of our experience of it. At most, if we are watching a documentary, we can infer from the frame that a camera was there in face of the scene depicted, but the frame itself is not something that inheres in the scene depicted. Film scholars (see Souriau 1951; Metz 1977), as well as philosophers of film (see Wilson 2011; Livingston 2013), usually call "diegetic features" those features that inhere in the world depicted and "non-diegetic features" those that do not. Framing, in this sense, is a non-diegetic feature; indeed, it is the most basic non-diegetic feature, which enables us to visually experience diegetic features.

I will call framing a *perceptual* non-diegetic feature (or perceptual feature for short) since it does not inhere in the world depicted but nevertheless affects our perceptual experience of that world. As an essential feature of any film, framing is the most basic perceptual non-diegetic feature. Yet, it is not the only one. Editing also is a *perceptual* feature, just as framing is. The difference is that, in principle, a film can do without editing but it cannot do without framing. Indeed, editing itself requires framing whereas framing does not require editing.

While *framing* provides us with a perspective on the world depicted, and possibly allows us to *continuously* change this perspective by means of camera movements,

editing enables us to *discontinuously* change this perspective. Thus, an editing cut in the C-series corresponds to a jump of perspective in the R-series. By undergoing this jump we can enjoy an R-pleasure, which concerns our exploration of the world depicted. Moreover, by tracing this jump back to its cause (i.e. a skillful activity of cutting and linking motion pictures), we can enjoy a C-pleasure, which concerns our appreciation of the film as an artifact.

Here is the reason why the technical terms used in our reports of cinematic experiences – and especially those used by film critics in their reviews – are somehow misleading. By speaking of an ʿamazing camera movementʾ or of an ʿimpressive editing cutʾ, one wrongly suggests that what we primarily experience is a configuration in the C-series. In spite of their wordiness, ʿcontinuous change of viewpoint caused by a camera movementʾ and ʿdiscontinuous change of viewpoint caused by an editing cutʾ would be better reports of our experience. The reason is that the latter expressions rightly suggest that what we primarily experience are perceptual effects in the R-series, which we can then trace back to the configuration in the C-series that caused them.

In addition to framing and editing, there are two others kinds of perceptual features that can significantly contribute to both our R-pleasure and our C-pleasure in watching a film. These are visual texture and film music. By ʿvisual textureʾ I mean a special use of cinematography in virtue of which our visual experience of the scene depicted significantly differs from a putative ordinary perception of the same scene from the same perspective. The black and white cinematography is a paradigmatic case of this.

In watching a black and white film, we do not experience the things depicted as being black and white. In this sense, the black and white is not a diegetic feature. Yet, it would be hasty to claim that black and white is nothing but a feature of the film as an artifact that we experience in the C-series. This would amount to overintellectualizing the film experience. In fact, the black and white also plays a role in the R-series, inasmuch as it affects our visual experience of the world depicted. Although we do not represent the things depicted as being black and white, we do represent-as-black-and-white the things depicted. That is to say that black and white is not a feature we ascribe to what we see,

but rather a modifier of our visual experience of such things. In an ideal report of our *seeing* the *things* depicted in the film, 'black and white' would not function as an adjective that applies to 'things' but rather as an adverb that applies to 'seeing'. Borrowing a distinction from the philosophy of mind, we might say that the black and white is not part of the *content* of our experience, i.e. *what* we experience, but rather of its *mode* or *attitude*, i.e. *how* we experience (see Brentano 1973; Crane 2003; Kriegel 2015).[ii]

Film music functions in a similar way. On the one hand, we do not experience film music (viz. the musical score of a film) as belonging to the world depicted. This is the basic difference between film music and diegetic sounds such as noises, dialogues or the music played within a certain scene. On the other hand, film music does not come down to a feature of the film as an artifact that we enjoy in the C-series. Film music also play a role in the R-series, inasmuch as it affects our perceptual experience of the world depicted. We do not represent the things depicted as producing film music, and yet we represent-as-imbued-with-music the things depicted. Film music metaphorically "colors" our experience of the world depicted just as the black and white literally colors (or discolors, if you prefer) this very experience. In sum, the fact that film music is not to be experienced as a feature of the scene that we enjoy in the R-series does not mean that it should be exclusively experienced as a feature of the film that we appreciate as an artifact in the C-series. There is room for an experience of film music in the R-series, not as a feature of the content of our experience, but as a feature of our very experience.

In his essay "Film Music and Narrative Agency" (1996), Jerrold Levinson argues that the spectator experiences film music either as the communicative act of the narrator within the fictional world or as the communicative act of an implicit filmmaker in the real world. In both cases, film music is experienced as the outcome of an agency. The distinction is only between a fictional agency (the narrator) and a purportedly real agency (the implicit filmmaker).

I argue that the notion of an R-series reveals a basic level of the experience of film music that Levinson overlooks. At this level, we can experience film music as a modifier

of our experience in the R-series, independently of the mediation of any agency. In fact, Levinson (1996, 266) mentions the possibility that film music could be experienced as "an atmosphere", as "a mood" of the presentation of a scene, but he treats this as a secondary case of little interest. By contrast, I argue that such an auditory atmosphere enveloping the scene depicted is the primary way in which one usually experiences film music. The communicative functions that Levinson attributes to film music are only secondarily derived from this basic cinematic experience, by tracing it back to its alleged causes.

Treating film music as a perceptual modifier of the R-series allows us to make sense of an apparently unsound commonplace in film studies, which Levinson (1996, 250) stigmatizes: "that nondiegetic film music is standardly 'inaudible', i.e. is not, and is not meant to be, consciously heard, attended to, or noticed. This seems to be clearly false". On the one hand, I am inclined to agree with Levinson's criticism of the claim that film music is inaudible. On the other hand, I think that there is a more charitable reading of the commonplace of the inaudibility of film music that can help us to make sense of this.

The idea is to interpret the attitude of the audience not as a total lack of auditory attention, but rather as a way of experiencing film music as a modifier of the R-series through which the audience perceives the world depicted. What in the commonplace is roughly called "inaudible film music" can be better understood in terms of a musical sound that is primarily experienced neither as belonging to the scene depicted nor to the film as an artifact. The "inaudible music" is inaudible in the sense that is not primarily heard as a content of the spectator's experience, i.e. as something produced in the world depicted or as the skillful work of a composer or as the skillful selection of a filmmaker or, in Levinson favorite conception, as the communicative move of a fictional narrator. Yet, even though film music is not part of content of the spectator's experience (either in the R-series or in the C-series), it is not completely unperceived. Indeed, it can be felt as a modifier of the way in which the spectator experiences the content provided by the R-series. In this sense film music is an attitudinal feature of the R-series; it contributes to

the attitude of this series towards its content.

Just as treating film music as an attitudinal feature of the R-series helps us to make sense of the commonplace according to which film music would be "inaudible", so treating camera movements and editing cuts as attitudinal features of the R-series helps us to make sense of another film studies' commonplace, according to which in many films camera movements and editing cuts are "invisible" or "transparent" (especially in the so-called classical Hollywood movies, see Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson 1985). Camera movements and editing cut may be "invisible" or "transparent" to the extent that we can experience them not as the outcome of an agency but rather as attitudinal features of the R-series, which gives us perceptual access to the world depicted. That is to say that "invisible" camera movements and "transparent" editing cuts allow us to keep enjoying our experience in the R-series without being forced to tracing it back to its causes in the C-series.

In sum, perceptual non-diegetic features operate at two different levels. First, we can enjoy these features in the R-series as special features of our experience of the world depicted, and this can elicit a special R-pleasure since such features allow us to perceive the world depicted in a special way, which is different from ordinary perception. Second, we can trace the experience we undergo in the R-series back to what caused it in the C-series. This leads us to acknowledge that the screened film that we experience in the C-series is the exhibition of an artifact, which has been provided with the visual and auditory features that are responsible for our peculiar experience (in the R-series) of the world depicted. In this way, we can enjoy a different kind of pleasure, namely the C-pleasure, which comes from the appreciation of the skillful achievement that has caused our R-pleasure. In savoring the C-pleasure provided by perceptual non-diegetic features, we, so to say, turn the "adverbs" of the film experience that we enjoyed in the R-series into the "adjectives" of the film as an artifact that we appreciate in the C-series.

4. Discursive non-diegetic features

Perceptual non-diegetic features such as framing, editing, visual texture or film music essentially differ from other non-diegetic features such as intertitles, superimposed inscriptions, or voices over (e.g. the voices of narrators). The latter do not shape our perceptual experience of the world depicted, but rather provides us with discursive contents that supplement this experience. However, such features also are non-diegetic since they do not belong to the world depicted. Therefore, I will call them *discursive* non-diegetic features (or discursive features for short).

Unlike perceptual features, discursive features play no role in our perceptual experience of the world depicted that we enjoy in the R-series. That is to say that discursive features have their place only in the C-series and therefore we only experience them as features of the film as an artifact. More specifically, such features are the way in which the film as an artifact (or, if you prefer, the agency who is responsible for this artifact) provides us with some pieces of information (or comments) about what is going on in the world depicted.

Filmmakers can use discursive features to force spectators to shift their attention from the experience of the world depicted to the film as an artifact that has led to this experience. The "Brechtian" intertitles in *2 ou 3 choses que je sais d'elle* (J.-L. Godard, 1967) are of this kind. However, discursive features are usually avoided as much as possible in traditional narrative cinema, whose implicit challenge consists in telling a story by *showing* as much as possible what is going on, that is, by relying as much as possible on the R-series (see McKee 1997). In this sense, film critics often deplore the use of the voice over, especially when this seems to be a clue of the incapacity of the filmmaker to provide us with a perceptual experience of some crucial passages of the story – see for instance some reviews of films such as *The Gangs of New York* (M. Scorsese, 2002) or *Vicky Cristina Barcelona* (W. Allen, 2008), e.g. Romney (2003) and Rowson (2009) respectively.[iii]

Ultimately, discursive non-diegetic features can only contribute to the C-pleasure, not to the R-pleasure. When a filmmaker exploit such features, she communicates with us directly in the C-series by overtaking our perceptual experience of the world depicted that

occurs in the R-series. Thus, our appreciation of such features does not come from wondering what in the C-series caused our experience in the R-series. We appreciate such features by directly grasping them in the C-series, that is, by directly treating them as features of the film as an artifact.

While perceptual features emphasize the perceptual dimension of the film experience, discursive features emphasize its cognitive dimension. Indeed, discursive features lead us to shift our attention from the world depicted in R-series to the film as an artifact in the C-series. Conversely, perceptual features like the black and white or film music, let alone editing and camera movements, do not primarily bring us back to the film as an artifact, but rather make us perceive the world depicted in a certain way.

However, perceptual features can also be experienced by tracing them back to their real causes, that is, to the achievement of a filmmaker. Yet, I argue, such an achievement can be fully appreciated only secondarily, as the agency that contrived the R-series experience as an apparently-not-contrived effect. In this sense, we can conceive of film-making as the design of a special experience, namely the R-series experience, which is primarily experienced as not designed. Consider for example the black and white in *Manhattan* (W. Allen, 1979), the editing in *The Godfather* (F. Coppola, 1972), or the camera movements in *Satantango* (B. Tarr, 1994).[iv] The spectator enjoys such non-diegetic features primarily as a perceptual effects, as a special way of perceiving the world depicted. It is only at a secondary stage that these perceptual non-diegetic features are also appreciated as the skillful (and possibly expressive or symbolic) achievement of an agent who purposely produced such perceptual effects. Discursive non-diegetic features, instead, directly put us in contact with some agency.

5. Diegetic features

Both perceptual and discursive features are non-diegetic, that is, they do not inhere in the world depicted. There is no framing, no editing, no black and white, no film music, no intertitles or superimposed inscriptions in the world depicted. Instead, the world depicted is inhabited by a variety of individuals having their distinctive properties and relations.

Such individuals, properties and relations constitute the diegetic features of a film.

For the R-series is a series of perspectives *on the world depicted*, the diegetic features, as features *of the world depicted*, play a crucial role in this series. Yet, the role of the diegetic features in the R-series is essentially different from that of the perceptual non-diegetic features in this very series. The diegetic features concern *what* a certain perspective in the R-series represents, namely its content, whereas the perceptual features concern *how* this perspective represents its content. As seen above, framing, editing, visual texture and film music, understood as constituents of the R-series, are all non-diegetic perceptual features, inasmuch as they concern *how* we perceptually represent the world depicted. Still, in order to provide an exhaustive account of the R-series, we should consider also the diegetic features. The point is that a perspective makes sense only if it is understood as a perspective *on something*. The diegetic features allows us to figure out this *something*.

It is at the level of the diegetic features that we can distinguish between fiction films and non-fiction films. In the latter, the diegetic features simply are the features of our actual world, whereas in the former the diegetic features concern a fictional world, which may exhibit some relevant affinities with our world (as in the case of biographical or historical movies) but remains substantially different from it in virtue of providing us with different perceptual contents. In this sense, there is a substantial difference between a documentary, which provides us with perceptual perspectives on the actual world, and a docudrama, which provides us with perceptual perspectives on a fictional world that resembles to (or stands for) the actual one.[v]

For diegetic features play a key role in constituting the R-series, they play a key role also in eliciting the R-pleasure that we can take in this series. That is to say that the R-pleasure comes not only from the special way (disembodied, from the outside) in which we perceive the things depicted, but also from the very nature of such things. The R-pleasure depends not only on *how* the film allows us to represents a certain content in the R-series, but also on *what* it allows us to represent, i.e. this very content.

Just as we can trace the perceptual non-diegetic features in the R-series back to the

corresponding features of the film as an artifact in the C-series, we can do the same for the diegetic features. The things that we enjoy in the R-series as features of the world depicted can also be appreciated in the C-series as components of the film as an artifact. For instance, the events that we enjoy in the R-series correspond to a certain screenplay that we can appreciate in the C-series, the places that we enjoy in the R-series correspond to a certain production design that we can appreciate in the C-series, the individuals that we enjoy in the R-series correspond to a certain acting (or computer graphics) that we can appreciate in the C-series, and so on and so forth. The C-pleasure that we can take in diegetic features precisely consists in appreciating what in the C-series caused the contents of our experience in the R-series.

6. Alternative models of film experience and appreciation

The distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic features allows us to compare the twoserieness model of film experience and appreciation proposed so far with two alternative models. These have been proposed by George Wilson (2011) and Paisley Livingston (2013) in the framework of the debate on the role of the imagination in the experience of fiction films.

According to Wilson's "Mediated Version of the Imagined Seeing Thesis", the spectator of a fiction film imagines to see a sort of imaginary recording that shows her the fictional events that this film depicts. Thus, the spectator imagines perceiving the fictional events in virtue of the *mediation* of such an imaginary recording. Yet the spectator is not forced to imagine anything about the way in which such a recording is produced. In Wilson's (2011, 47) terms, it is "fictionally indeterminate" how these recordings are produced.

By claiming that the viewer imagines to see a sort of imaginary recording, Wilson's account can easily deal with non-diegetic features without the need to refer to the history of making of the actual film. It suffices that the viewer imagines such features as non-diegetic features of the imaginary recording. If a film is in black and white, for example,

the spectator imagines that the imaginary recording has a black and white texture. Thus, Wilson provides us with a unitary account according to which the spectator can experience and appreciate both diegetic and non-diegetic features within the framework of the fictional world.

By contrast, Livingston proposes an "Appreciator Version of the Imagined Seeing Thesis", according to which diegetic and non-diegetic features are separately experienced. While the spectator imagines perceiving the diegetic features of the depicted scene, she appreciates the non-diegetic features by scrutinizing the real vehicle (i.e. the film as an artifact) that produces such an impression. As Livingston (2013, 144) puts it, "The absence of colors is for the competent and informed spectator a familiar feature of black and white photography in the actual world, and not necessarily to be reasoned about as the vestige of some obscure story-internal mediation. Good appreciators of movies pay attention to attributes of the audio-visual presentation such as color, grain, focus, aspect ratio, depth of field, and editing, and they are warranted to think of these features in terms of the filmmaking strategies of the actual filmmakers who have been operating within the constraints of available cinematic technology".

I argue that both Wilson's Mediated Version and Livingston's Appreciator Version cannot adequately deal with non-diegetic features. On the one hand, Wilson's Mediated Version treats all the non-diegetic features of the real film as non-diegetic features of the imaginary film thereby forcing the spectator of, say, a black and white film to imagine a fictional documentary made in black and white, instead of simply acknowledging that the real movie has been made in black and white. On the other hand, Livingston's Appreciator Version forces the spectator to treat all the non-diegetic features as exclusively belonging to the film as an artifact, thereby splitting the spectator's attention between the latter and the world depicted. For example, the spectators of a black and white film should experience the scene depicted as being colored, and the cinematic artifact as being black and white. While Wilson's Mediated Version requires an excessive effort of imagination from spectators, Livingston's Appreciator Version seems to require an excessive effort of selective attention.

The point is that both the Wilson's Mediated Version and Livingston's Appreciator Version, in spite of their contrasting views, put all non-diegetic features on the same level. According to Wilson's Mediated Version all non-diegetic features are experienced as belonging to the imaginary recording, whereas according to Livingston's Appreciator Version all such features are experienced as features of the film as an artifact. Yet, as I have showed above, there is a relevant distinction between two kinds of non-diegetic features, namely, perceptual features, which shape our experience of the world depicted, and discursive features, which provides us with further pieces of information or comments on the world depicted. Both Wilson's Mediated Version and Livingston's Appreciator Version overlook this distinction thereby conflating perceptual non-diegetic features with discursive ones. Instead, in the model of film experience and appreciation that I have proposed, these two kinds of non-diegetic features can be effectively keep distinct. That is because my model locates different kinds of features in different places; the diegetic features in the *content* of the *R-series* (as features of the world depicted); the perceptual non-diegetic features in the *attitude* of the *R-series* (as features of the perceptual experience of the world depicted); the discursive non-diegetic features in the *content* of the *C-series* (as features of the film as an artifact). That being the case, perceptual features such as the black and white are primarily enjoyed in the R-series; they can be appreciated also in the C-series, as Livingston rightly points out, but only secondarily, as the result of a retrieval. We primarily experience-as-black-and-white the world depicted, even though we can trace this experience back to its cause thereby also appreciating the film as a black and white artifact.

7. Intentions and embodiment

The models of film experience and appreciation that I have discussed so far mainly focus on the perceptual and imaginative states of the spectator. Still, there are scholars who, by relying on linguistic pragmatics, cognitive science and neuroscience, have argued that the spectator's uptake of the filmmaker's intentions, just as the spectator's bodily reactions, also play a crucial role in film experience and appreciation (for the emphasis on the

uptake of intentions, see Donati 2006; Kobow 2007; Pignocchi 2015; for the emphasis on embodiment, see Sobchack 1992; Anderson 1996; Gallese and Guerra 2012; Zacks 2015). I contend that the distinction between C-series and R-series paves the way for a unified account of film experience and appreciation in which all these different components can find their proper place.

The perceptual and imaginative states of the spectator are the keys to understand what goes on in the R-series. Indeed, as a *perceptual* route through the world depicted, the R-series essentially involves *perceptual* states. In the case of fiction films, the R-series also involves imagination, which enables the spectator to locate the things she perceives in a unitary spatiotemporal system that is not her own. Furthermore, the R-series can involve emotions that allows the spectator to *evaluate* what she perceives in the world depicted (see Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone 2001). Such emotions do so by affectively coloring, so to say, the perceptually based fold that is mobilized in the R-series. For instance an emotion of fear allows the spectator to *evaluate* something as dangerous, just as an emotion of joy allows her to *evaluate* something as good. In this sense, borrowing Ed Tan's (1996, 65–66) terminology, we might call "fiction emotions" those that, in virtue of being enjoyed in the R-series, are directed towards (and enables evaluation of) the fictional world, thereby distinguishing them from "artifact emotions", which, in virtue of being enjoyed in the C-series, are directed towards (and enables evaluation of) the film as an artifact in the actual world.

However, the filmmaker's intentions and the spectator's embodiment play no role in the R-series. That is because the R-series essentially is the exploration of an imaginary world in which neither the filmmaker nor the spectator have a place. Representing the filmmaker's intentions and the spectator's body in the R-series would amount to prejudice the R-pleasure, which precisely consists in the impression of exploring a self-standing world in a disembodied way, from the outside. However, intentions and embodiment start playing a crucial role when our appreciation of a film traces the R-series back to what caused it in the C-series.

When we start focusing on the C-series, the filmmaker's intentions can reveal to be

the source of the perspectives on the world depicted that we have enjoyed in the R-series. In fact, in the R-series, we limit ourselves to exploit a sort of epistemic luck, which allows us to perceive the world depicted from informatively favorable points of view. It is only by moving from the R-series to the C-series that we can treat such an epistemic luck as the outcome of the filmmaker's intentions to make us effectively understand what is going on in the world depicted.

Something similar happens in the case of embodiment. As argued above, our R-series experience of the world depicted is disembodied in the sense that this world does not include the spectator's body in it. However, when we wonder where the disembodied experience enjoyed in the R-series comes from, we acknowledge that it is produced by the interaction, in the C-series, between the film as an artifact and our own body. The perceptual and emotional states that in the R-series we enjoyed as purely mental attitudes towards a world in which our body has no place, in the C-series reveal to be states of our embodied mind that have been generated by the film as an artifact.

An interesting example of the difficulty for an embodiment-based conception of the film experience to take the R-series into account can be found in Vivian Sobchack's influential book *The Address of the Eye* (1992). Sobchack rightly acknowledges that the perspective of the spectator as an embodied subject is different from the perspective on the world depicted that the film provides us with. Yet, I argue, she overlooks the specificity of the latter perspective, namely its being an R-series. In fact, she states that this perspective also is essentially embodied, in the sense that it depends on the "body" of the film: "We recognize the moving picture as the work of an anonymous and sign-producing body subject intentionally marking visible choices with the very behavior of its bodily being. However, these choices are not initiated by the movement of *our* bodies or *our* intending consciousness. They are seen and visible as the visual and physical choices of some body *other* than ourselves […] That some body is the film's body" (Sobchack, 1992, 278) – "The camera its perceptive organ, the projector its expressive organ, the screen its discrete and material occupation of worldly space" (299).

As a consequence of her conception of the film experience as embodied all the way

through, Sobchack conflates the R-series, in which we enjoy a perceptual perspective on the world depicted, with the C-series, in which we recognize that such a perspective is the outcome of a technological process involving the "body" of the film. Thus, Sobchack ends up in treating a secondary level of the film experience, namely the acknowledgment of the film as a technological artifact, as if it was the primary one. Yet, this conception prevents the most basic cinematic pleasure, namely the R-pleasure, which consists in enjoying a perceptual perspective on a world in which neither our body nor the film itself have a place.

8. Why to watch *Au hasard Balthazar* twice

At the beginning of *Au hasard Balthazar* (R. Bresson, 1966) we see a newborn donkey, then a girl who caresses him, and then a boy and a man which, we guess, are the brother and the father of the girl. Then our viewpoint changes by means of a temporal jump that allows us to see the father and his children bringing that donkey to their house. Then, we temporally jump to the moment in which the two children baptize their donkey naming him Balthazar. Some spatial jumps allow us to recognize two other participants to this ceremony; one is a friend of the two children who is called Marie; the other is their elder sister, a girl who lies in a bed and seems to be seriously sick. After that, a temporal jump makes us see a farmer who accompanies Balthazar in his stable. Then, another jump leads us to see the two children who play with their friend Marie and their donkey Balthazar, first in the barn (fig. 1), and then in the garden (fig. 2), where their sick sister observes them. Finally, we temporally jump to the moment when the owners of Balthazar are going to leave the countryside.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

All of this occurs in the R-series. In fact, as showed in the previous lines, we can describe our experience of *Au hasard Balthazar*'s beginning only in terms of perceptual perspectives on the world depicted, without the need of making reference to the film as an artifact. We can speak in terms of viewpoints and their continuous or discontinuous changes, without the need of making reference to camera movements or editing. Likewise, the fact that we see things in black and white can be treated as a modifier of our experience of the world depicted without the need of making reference to the film as an artifact. Even when we hear non-diegetic music, that is, from the happy moment in which the children play with the donkey until the sad moment when they leave the countryside, we are not forced to treat this music as a feature of the film as an artifact.

Rather, we can enjoy this music as a modifier of our experience of what is going on in the world depicted. In this sense, film music, just as the black and white texture, is a *perceptual* non-diegetic feature. By contrast, the superimposed inscription "Les années passent" ("Years go by"), which we read when – a little later in the film – we see a grown Balthazar cruelly exploited by his new owners, is a *discursive* non-diegetic feature, which forces us to treat the film as an artifact.

The R-pleasure that the beginning of *Au hasard Balthazar* provides us with consists in the peculiar exploration of the world of Balthazar and his young owners. This is what I have tried to verbally described just above. This pleasure is crucial to the appreciation of the film, but there is another pleasure that is equally important, namely, the C-pleasure. This consists in wondering what caused the R-pleasure, thereby paying the attention to the C-series, in which we appreciate the film as an artifact that allows us to explore (in the R-series) the world depicted. For instance, we can appreciate the way in which the film begins with a close-up of the donkey and then gradually reveals the girl, his father and his brother by means of a diagonal camera movement that ends up in a sort of triangular configuration having the three characters as its vertexes. Likewise, we can appreciate the way in which the temporal jumps in the R-series are realized through editing cuts that involve lap dissolves. In particular, focusing on the lap dissolve that links the two scenes in which the children play with the donkey, we can appreciate the

symmetry produced by the skillful inversion of the figure/background relation; in the first shot the girl and Balthazar are in the foreground while the boy and Marie are in the background (fig. 1); in the second shot it is the other way round (fig. 2). Furthermore, in the whole segment of the R-series that begins with this lap dissolve and finishes with Balthazar's owners leaving the countryside, we can appreciate Bresson's expressive use of Franz Schubert's *Piano Sonata No. 20* as a way of emphasizing the intensity, the fragility and the evanescence of childhood's happiness.

This analysis of *Au hasard Balthazar* ultimately shows that both the R-pleasure, which comes from the exploration of a world in the R-series, and the C-pleasure, which comes from the appreciation of an artifact in the C-series, are highly valuable. In principle, we might enjoy them both while watching a film since we are able to switch from the R-series to the C-series in our film experience. However, the first time that we see a certain film, the R-series tends to capture our attention thereby preventing us from fully enjoying plenty of features of the film as an artifact that lie in the C-series. That is why we need to watch a film twice, or even more than twice, in order to fully appreciate it. Even if the experience of the world depicted remains the same, scrutinizing the film as an artifact can provide us with further layers of pleasure at each new watching.

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i   In principle, twoseriesness also applies to naturally moving things in which one can see something else moving. For instance, one can see a moving dog in a moving cloud. In this case, the C-series would represent the moving cloud, the R-series would represent the moving dog, and the sky would play the role played by the screen in the film experience (on the analogy between the sky and the screen, see McGinn 2005, 26). One might call this 'a naturally produced cinematic experience'. Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for drawing my attention to this possibility.

ii The content/attitude distinction can allow me to address two problems that are traditionally raised against Wollheimian accounts of seeing-in. First, how the content of the R-series is related to that of the C-series. Second, how the R-series can have a perceptual nature. I contend that the R-series involves perceptual states having a distinctive *attitude* that can include features such as 'being black and white' or 'being framed', which are instead represented in the *content* of the C-series. I defend this view in my (still unpublished) paper *How We See Things in Pictures. An Attitudinal Approach to Seeing-in*, which I presented at the PaCS Seminar, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, December 11th 2017. This application of the content/attitude distinction to the pictorial experience also allows me to avoid the commitment to the claim that seeing-in for films is just *inflected* seeing-in. The latter is a case of seeing-in such that "what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface's design" (Hopkins 2010, 158). In the case of the film experience, inflected seeing-in would recruit the features of the C-series content to the features of the R-series *content*. Yet, my account of the film experience is not committed to inflected seeing-in because it claims that the features of the C-series content are recruited to the R-series *attitude*, not to its *content*. My account is just committed to what one might call 'attitudinally inflected seeing-in', but I am happy with this. For a thorough account of inflection in the film experience, see Robert Hopkins' paper in this collection.

iii In films such as *The Gangs of New York* or *Vicky Cristina Barcelona* the neutrality of the voice over with respect to the fictional world leads spectators to treat this voice as a discursive feature. However, when the voice over belongs to a character things are more complicate. In principle, spectators might treat such voice as a diegetic feature thereby enjoying it directly in the R-series. In this case, the voice over becomes a component of a complex perceptual experience that allows us to see events that occur at a certain time while listening to a character that speaks, through the voice over, at a different time. We can enjoy such experience, for instance, in *Millennium Mambo* (Hou H.-h., 2001), in which we see events that occur in a fictional 2001 while listening to the voice of the protagonist who comments on them after the fact, in a fictional 2011. Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for leading me to consider this sort of cases.

iv In his paper for this collection, Gregory Currie treats camera movements in *La regle du jeu* (J. Renoir, 1939) as "a surrogate for, if not a trace of, the corresponding movements of an agent". However, according to the account I propose, such an agency is something that one can only secondarily appreciate by tracing the change of perspective experienced in the R-series back to its causes in the C-series.

v   Following Currie (1999), I conceive of documentaries as motion pictures that depict their subjects in virtue of being traces of them. That is to say that I treat documentaries as essentially *factive* pictures, which entails that the facts depicted have actually occurred.