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Abstract A number of studies have suggested that depressive mood might lead to the development and/or maintenance of a gambling disorder (GD). The pathways by which such relationships are fostered may involve deficits in emotional regulation capacity and dysfunctional coping styles. This study aims to explore the role played by depressive symptomatology and the regulation of positive emotion in GD. We administered the South Oaks Gambling Inventory (SOGS, Lesieur and Blume in *Am J Psychiatry* 144(9): 1184–1188, 1987), the 21-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21, Lovibond and Lovibond in *Manual for the depression anxiety stress scales*. Psychology Foundation, Sydney, 1995) and the Kill-joy Thinking subscale of the Ways of Savoring Checklist (WOSC, Bryant and Veroff in *Savoring: a new model of positive experience*. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, 2007) to a sample of pathological gamblers (n = 91) and a sample of community participants (n = 105). The pathological gamblers scored higher on the DASS-21 subscales and obtained higher scores on the Kill-joy Thinking subscale of the WOSC compared to the controls. Moreover, the SOGS scores positively correlate with the DASS-21 subscales, and with the Kill-Joy Thinking measure. Finally, it is evident that Kill-joy Thinking fully mediates the relationship between depressive symptomatology and GD severity. Our results further confirm the roles of depression, anxiety and stress in GD. Moreover, this is the first study to explore the mediating role of dampening processes in the relationship between depression and GD. Future lines of research are also discussed.

Keywords (separated by '-') Gambling disorder - Depression - Anxiety - Emotion regulation - Savoring - Dampening

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2 Struggling with Happiness: A Pathway Leading Depression 3 to Gambling Disorder

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7 Abstract

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27 **Keywords** Gambling disorder · Depression · Anxiety · Emotion regulation · Savoring ·
28 Dampening

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29 Introduction

30 Gambling Disorder and Depression

31 Gambling disorder (GD) is characterised by a maladaptive and persistent gambling
32 behaviour, which can lead to clinically significant discomfort or impairment (American
33 Psychiatric Association 2013). Moreover, GD is characterized by various psychiatric
34 comorbidities (el-Guebaly et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2006; Lorains et al. 2011; Rogier and
35 Velotti 2018a; Rogier et al. 2017).

36 In particular, a systematic review of the extant literature (Lorains et al. 2011) indi-
37 cates that 38% of pathological gamblers (PGs) suffer from a comorbid mood disorder.
38 Since comorbid depression in PGs increases the risk of suicide (Blaszczynski and Far-
39 rell 1998; Petry and Kiluk 2002), it is necessary to address this issue in treatment pro-
40 tocols. The causal relationship between depression and GD is still controversial, with
41 some studies indicating that depression symptomatology is a risk factor for GD (Blasz-
42 czynski and Farrell 1998; Chou and Afifi 2011; Parhami et al. 2014), while others con-
43 clude that GD should be considered a facilitator of depression (Afifi et al. 2016), and
44 still others argue that there are mutual direct links between the two disorders (Dussault
45 et al. 2011).

46 Laboratory studies have examined the role of depressive mood in gambling behaviour.
47 For instance, Griffiths (1995) has investigated the moods of 60 individuals (habitual gam-
48 blers and non-habitual gamblers) while playing with a fruit machine. Habitual and patho-
49 logical gamblers reported high levels of depressive mood before the gambling task, while
50 non-habitual gamblers did not. A very recent study used a mood induction paradigm to
51 estimate the causal influence of sadness in a slot machine task, providing a monetary rein-
52 forcement to recreational gamblers (Devos et al. 2018). In the experimental group (sadness
53 induction), the participants exhibited more persistent gambling behaviour compared to par-
54 ticipants assigned to the control condition (no emotional induction).

55 Despite these preliminary evidences, the way in which depressive symptomatology
56 leads to GD remains partially unexplained. The emotional regulation framework pro-
57 vides a useful tool to approach this issue. Several authors have suggested that unsuc-
58 cessful emotional regulation processes may be implicated in both the development and
59 maintenance of gambling activity (Blaszczynski and Nower 2002; Lesieur 2001; Rogier
60 and Velotti 2018b; Sharpe 2002). Indeed, all of these models assert that some PGs gam-
61 ble to “escape” depressive moods. For instance, Lesieur (2001) has labelled this sub-
62 type of PGs as “escape-seekers”, whereas Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) identify them
63 as the “emotionally-vulnerable” subgroup. In accordance with this, the nosographical
64 definition of the disorder itself encompasses a criterion referring to the use of gambling
65 behaviour as a regulator of dysphoric affect (APA 2013). The hypothesis that depression
66 leads to GD due difficulties with emotion regulation, is supported by studies that indi-
67 cate high levels of emotion dysregulation in PGs (e.g. Williams et al. 2012; Navas et al.
68 2018; for a narrative review see Rogier and Velotti 2018b), as well as research that has
69 proven a mediating role of emotion dysregulation in the relationship between psychopa-
70 thology and GD (Jauregui et al. 2016; Rogier and Velotti 2018a).

71 However, the concept of emotional dysfunction, in both GD and depression, has not
72 been examined exhaustively. In particular, as already noted in the broadest field of psy-
73 chopathology (Carl et al. 2013), the scientific community has primarily neglected the
74 role of positive emotion regulation in both GD and depressive symptomatology.

75 Hedonic Dysregulation in Depression: the Role of Kill-joy Thinking

76 A core symptom of depression is anhedonia, which is the inability to experience positive
77 emotional states (APA 2013). Studies have found that depressed individuals exhibit
78 low levels of trait positive affect (i.e. how much people experience positive affect) and
79 that blunted neural responses to gambling rewards (i.e. reward insensitivity) is a factor
80 in depression (Watson et al. 1988; Weinberg et al. 2015). Additionally, a recent meta-
81 analysis has further found that depression is associated with diminished reactivity to
82 positive emotional stimuli (Bylsma et al. 2008).

83 The healthy regulation of positive emotions is a wide construct that includes the
84 capacity to *savour* (Bryant and Veroff 2007). This concept refers to a range of cognitive
85 and behavioural strategies used to upregulate the emotional states connected to positive
86 experiences. In accordance with the literature on the role played by the regulation of
87 positive emotions in psychopathology (Carl et al. 2013), studies have shown that *savour-*
88 *ing* is related to low levels of depression (Smith and Hollinger-Smith 2015) and help-
89 seeking behaviours in depressed individuals (Straszewski and Siegel 2018). More spe-
90 cifically, Bryant and Veroff (2007) have identified a dysfunctional strategy of *savouring*
91 known as Kill-joy Thinking, a dampening cognitive process that down-regulates rather
92 than increases positive emotions. The set of dampening processes elicited by a positive
93 emotional trigger includes reactions as such as feeling guilty, thinking of ways in which
94 the positive events could have been better, or reminding oneself about things one should
95 be doing or responsibilities that one must still face. Preliminary results indicate that
96 dampening processes are related to a negative mood after experiencing a success (Wood
97 et al. 2003) and to depressive symptoms (Feldman et al. 2008; Raes et al. 2012). Despite
98 the fact that Kill-joy Thinking and depression appear closely related, evidence supports
99 the idea that these are two separate constructs. Several studies have revealed that, when
100 controlling for depression levels, dampening processes are associated with panic dis-
101 order, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder
102 (Carl et al. 2013; Eisner et al. 2009). In accordance with this, experimental evidence
103 suggests that blunted responses to positive stimuli is not an exclusive characteristic of
104 depressed individuals. For instance, using a cue-exposure paradigm, Larson et al. (2007)
105 have observed that individuals with anxious symptomatology do not exhibit blink atten-
106 uation during and following the presentation of enjoyable stimuli. Thus, as suggested by
107 Eisner et al. (2009), the role of dampening in psychopathology should not be reduced to
108 a hallmark of depression, but may play other functions, such as the reduction of positive
109 arousal experienced as disturbing in individuals with a panic disorder.

110 Hedonic Dysregulation in GD

111 Similarly, in the field of addiction, the role of positive emotions remains on the side-
112 lines of empirical investigations (Carroll and Huxley 1994; Rogier and Velotti 2018b).
113 This is rather surprising considering that several theoretical models have argued that the
114 management of positive emotions is involved in the disorder (e.g. Jacobs 1986; McDou-
115 gall 2004; McConaghy et al. 1988). Promising preliminary data suggests that the dif-
116 ficulty to cope with positive emotional states is central to GD. The most convincing
117 results reveal an association between positive urgency—a personality trait describing
118 the proneness to act rashly under the influence of positive emotional states—and GD

119 (Haw 2017; Steward et al. 2017; Blain et al. 2015; Cyders and Smith 2008; Cyders et al.
120 2007).

121 An interesting line of research examined the specific nature of pleasurable experiences
122 in individuals suffering from addiction. These contributions theorized the existence of
123 a hedonic dysfunction in addicted individuals that would explain an excessive approach
124 to hedonic stimuli. One of these theories, known as the incentive-sensitization theory of
125 Berridge and Robinson (2008), asserts that addicted individuals, due to the excessive and
126 repeated consumption of highly rewarding stimuli (such as gambling), have developed an
127 unbalanced hedonic state. This would be expressed throughout an asymmetric hedonic sen-
128 sitivity with elevated responses to addictive rewards and complementary blunted hedonic
129 responses to other sources of pleasure, such as natural rewards. In accordance with this,
130 a recent mindfulness-inspired treatment for addiction has the central objective of restor-
131 ing hedonic function through training the savouring capacities (Garland 2016). Similarly,
132 the reward deficiency syndrome theory (Volkow et al. 2002; Comings and Blum 2000)
133 postulates the existence of a chronically impaired reward system, likely due to a hypo-
134 dopaminergic state of subcortical areas. From this perspective, PGs would be driven to
135 compensate for this impairment through involvement in activities providing high hedonic
136 rewards. Unfortunately, the evidence presented by the neuroimaging field are inconclusive,
137 with several studies reporting increased (Joutsa et al. 2012) reactivity of the reward sys-
138 tem among PGs, while other report a decreased reactivity (Balodis et al. 2012; Chase and
139 Clark 2010; de Ruiter et al. 2009; Reuter et al. 2005). An interesting and related study was
140 conducted by Sescousse et al. (2013), who observed that PGs exhibit a decreased reactivity
141 (measured throughout the activity of the ventral striatum) to erotic stimuli (i.e. a natural
142 reward). Importantly, it has been recently argued that these two main theories should not
143 necessarily be considered self-exclusive, but that they may be conceptualized as two com-
144plementary explanations of the development of GD. As a whole, both converge towards the
145 idea that levels of hedonic dysfunctions (e.g. dampening processes, Kill-joy Thinking)
146 should be associated with levels of GD severity.

147 The Present Study

148 Despite these interesting premises, to date there remains a lack of research examining the
149 complex interplay between depression, Kill-joy Thinking and GD. As such, we aim to
150 bridge this gap by investigating the topic among a clinical sample of PGs and comparing
151 the results to a group of community participants. Specifically, we formulated the following
152 hypotheses:

153 **H1** We expect to find high levels of both internalizing symptomatology (i.e. depression,
154 anxiety and stress) and down-regulation strategy of positive emotions (i.e. Kill-joy Think-
155 ing) among PGs, compared to community participants. This hypothesis was formulated on
156 the basis of previous literature that has suggested high levels of depressive symptomatology
157 among PGs, as well as based on neurobiological and theoretical literature that has dis-
158 covered abnormalities in the hedonic response of addicted individuals.

159 **H2** In accordance with the findings of previous studies, we expect to observe a significant
160 and positive predictive effect of depressive symptomatology on severity of GD. Moreo-
161 ver, we predict the same pattern of results for Kill-joy Thinking, because the primary

162 theoretical models assert that the severity of hedonic dysregulation accounts for the pro-
163 pensity to become addicted to gambling rewards.

164 **H3** In accordance with previous empirical evidence and, in line with the cognitive concep-
165 tualization of depression (Beck 1976), we argue that depressive symptomatology orientates
166 cognitive processes. We, thus, expect depressive symptomatology to predict the levels of
167 Kill-joy Thinking.

168 **H4** Finally, as Kill-joy Thinking is strongly associated with depression, and is a hypothe-
169 sized variable of GD, it is reasonable to predict that the pathway by which depression leads
170 to GD would be partially mediated by an individual's level of Kill-joy Thinking.

171 **Methods**

172 **Participants and Procedure**

173 This study was conducted on 196 Italian adults. The clinical group (n=91) comprised
174 participants (77 males) with a clinician-based current diagnosis of GD, with a mean age
175 of 47.4 years (SD=13.11), who were recruited from three clinical centres specialized in
176 the treatment of GD. The comparison group (n=105), with a mean age of 46.88 years
177 (SD=10.01), included community participants (79 males) who were drawn from the gen-
178 eral population using a purposive sampling technique.

179 Information about the research's objectives and procedure were provided, and the par-
180 ticipants' privacy and anonymity were ensured through the signing of a written consent
181 form. The participants filled out self-reported questionnaires in an individual context (pri-
182 vate rooms inside clinical centres or at the University of Rome), under the supervision of
183 a clinical psychologist. All procedures complied with the guidelines of the American Psy-
184 chological Association, and were approved by the Research Ethic Board of the University
185 of Rome.

186 **Measures**

187 A self-report questionnaire was administered to all participants to gather information on
188 the following areas:

189 *Demographic information* such as age, gender and nationality.

190 *The severity of the participant's gambling disorder (or lack thereof)* was evaluated using
191 the 20-item South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS, Lesieur and Blume 1987; Guerreschi
192 and Gander 2002). This instrument also provided cut-off scores to differentiate between
193 participants who were not at risk, those who were and those with pathological gamblers.
194 The reliability of this study was confirmed through the use of a Cronbach's Alpha test
195 (score of 0.94).

196 *Kill-joy Thinking* was measured through the use of the Ways of Savouring Checklist
197 (WOSC, Bryant and Veroff 2007; Balzarotti et al. 2018), a self-report questionnaire that
198 assesses capacities to savour positive emotions. This questionnaire asks the participants
199 to describe how they typically react to positive events, using a Likert-type scale ranging
200 from 1 (*Definitely doesn't apply*) to 7 (*Definitely applies*). The participants completed

all of the items of the WOSC, but only the Kill-Joy Thinking subscale was analysed. Scores for this subscale were obtained by adding the responses given by the participant to 7 of the total 60 items. Examples items include: "I thought about ways in which it could have been better", "I thought about things that made me feel guilty" or "I thought about other things that were hanging over me, problems and worries that I still had to face." This tenth subscale of the WOSC exhibits good internal consistency, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.84.

Depression, Anxiety and Stress were measured through the use of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 items (DASS-21, Lovibond and Lovibond 1995; Bottesini et al. 2015), a self-report questionnaire that asks participants to indicate how often the described experience applies to them using a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (*Never*) to 3 (*Almost ever*). The instrument's excellent psychometric proprieties were confirmed with Cronbach's alphas of 0.88, 0.84 and 0.90 for *Depression, Anxiety* and *Stress*, respectively.

215 Statistical Analyses

Cronbach's alphas were calculated for each instrument to examine the reliability of the measures. A *t* test was performed for each to ensure that the control and clinical groups did not differ in age ($p=0.14$) or on the basis of gender ($p=.07$). Means and standard deviations were calculated for each variable in the study. The relationships between all of the variables considered in the study were examined by calculating r-Pearson correlations. Subsequently, a *t* test was performed to explore the differences between groups on the DASS-21 and Kill-joy Thinking measures. Finally, the mediating effect of Kill-joy Thinking on the relationship between depression and the severity of GD was examined through a series of regression analyses, in accordance with Baron and Kenny (1986). In particular, we examined whether (1) depression effectively predicts the severity of GD; (2) depression significantly predicted Kill-joy Thinking; (3) Kill-joy Thinking predicts GD severity; (4) depression indirectly predicts the severity of GD through Kill-joy Thinking. Statistical significances were tested using the bootstrap method. All statistical analyses were implemented using SPSS 23.0 software for Windows.

AQ1

Table 1 *T* test comparing groups on Kill-joy thinking, depression, anxiety and stress

	Addicted Gamblers (n=91)		Control group (n=105)		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Kill-joy thinking	23.08	8.81	15.80	6.31	6.15	< .001
DASS-21 depression	5.35	3.84	3.25	2.97	3.99	< .001
DASS-21 anxiety	4.01	3.28	2.74	2.80	2.77	.006
DASS-21 stress	7.12	4.49	5.71	3.46	2.33	.021

SD standard deviation, *DASS* depression anxiety stress scales-21

230 Results

231 Differences Between the Groups

232 The scores of the two groups were compared with regard to the Kill-joy Thinking and
233 DASS-21 measures through the use of a *t* test. As displayed in Table 1, the results indi-
234 cate that the means of the two groups differed significantly. In particular, the clinical group
235 scored higher than the control group on the Kill-joy Thinking, depression, anxiety and
236 stress measures.

237 Relationships Between GD Severity, Kill-joy Thinking, Depression, Anxiety and Stress

238 The *r*-Pearson correlations between all the study variables are illustrated in Table 2. Thus,
239 it can be seen that GD severity is positively and significantly correlated with Kill-joy
240 Thinking. All subscales of the DASS-21 were positively and significantly correlated with
241 GD severity. Moreover, Kill-joy Thinking was positively and significantly associated with
242 the subscales of the DASS-21.

243 The Mediating Role of Kill-joy Thinking

244 The mediating role of Kill-joy Thinking has been explored through the relationship
245 between depression and GD severity. As Table 3 illustrates, depression positively pre-
246 dict the severity of GD (Step 1), as well as Kill-joy Thinking (Step 2). Moreover, Kill-
247 joy Thinking positively predicts GD severity beyond the role of depression (Step 3), and
248 depression indirectly predicts SOGS scores through Kill-joy Thinking (Step 4). The results
249 indicate that the predictive role of depression in GD severity is entirely mediated by Kill-
250 joy Thinking.

251 Discussion

252 This study aimed to explore the role of depressive symptomatology and the regulation of
253 positive emotions in the lives of PGs. Furthermore, we wanted to test the mediating role of
254 Kill-joy Thinking on relationship between depression and GD severity. The results widely
255 support our hypotheses.

Table 2 Correlations between severity of GD, kill-joy thinking, depression, anxiety and stress

	SOGS	Kill-joy Thinking	DASS depression	DASS anxiety	DASS stress
SOGS	–				
Kill-joy Thinking	.41**	–			
DASS-21 depression	.25**	.51**	–		
DASS-21 anxiety	.19*	.51**	.72**	–	
DASS-21 stress	.18*	.37**	.75**	.69**	–

SOGS south oaks gambling screen, DASS depression anxiety stress scales-21; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$

Table 3 Direct and indirect effects of Depression on GD severity through Kill-joy Thinking

	B	SE	Bootstrap confidence interval [95%]
<i>Step 1</i>			
DASS-21 depression → SOGS			
$R^2 = .062; p = .001$			
Constant	3.29	.65	2.1091 to 4.5361
DASS-21 depression	.41	.121	.2051 to .6190
<i>Step 2</i>			
DASS-21 Depression → Kill-joy thinking			
$R^2 = .260; p < .001$			
Constant	13.95	.84	12.3614 to 15.7373
DASS-21 Depression	1.22	.16	.8654 to 1.5029
<i>Step 3</i>			
Kill-joy Thinking → SOGS			
$R^2 = .172; p < .001$			
Constant	-.52	1.02	- 2.2110 to 1.4224
WOSC10	.30	.05	.2043 to .3754
<i>Step 4</i>			
DASS-21 Depression + Kill-joy Thinking → SOGS			
$R^2 = .174; p < .001$			
Constant	-.54	1.03	- 2.5816 to 1.4947
Depression → SOGS	.12	.14	-.1581 to .3872
Depression → Kill-joy Thinking → SOGS	.32	.09	.1650 to .5172

256 First, PGs exhibited higher levels of depression, anxiety and stress than the non-clinical
 257 group. These levels are also positively correlated to GD severity, in accordance with previ-
 258 ous literature which has found that GD is associated with depression (Chou and Afifi 2011;
 259 Lorains et al. 2011; Parhami et al. 2014), anxiety disorders (Giddens et al. 2012; Kessler
 260 et al. 2008) and life stressors (Roberts et al. 2017).

261 Moreover, our data illuminates the association between Kill-joy Thinking and depres-
 262 sive symptomatology. This extends the current literature (Wood et al. 2003; Feldman et al.
 263 2008; Raes et al. 2012) on the role of dysfunctional responses to positive events in depres-
 264 sion, suggesting that people with depressive symptoms may tend to minimize or eliminate
 265 (Feldman et al. 2008) self-relevant positive emotions (i.e. through dampening). Specifi-
 266 cally, Gruber et al. (2011) have asserted that depressed individuals struggle to regulate pos-
 267 itive emotions related to self-relevant cues.

268 Subsequently, in our study, the PGs exhibited higher levels of Kill-joy Thinking than the
 269 community group, and these levels were found to be positively correlated with the severity
 270 of GD. These results extend the literature on the difficulties of managing positive emotions
 271 for PGs, and further indicate a new path of research towards the role of savouring in addic-
 272 tions. Indeed, theories that argue in support of a deficit of hedonic regulation in traditional
 273 addictions seem to be successfully extended to the topic of GD. Our psychological evi-
 274 dence converges on the neurobiological data of Sescousse et al. (2015), indicating a deficit
 275 in hedonic responses to erotic stimuli among PGs. The reward deficiency syndrome the-
 276 ory asserts that individuals with impaired hedonic capacities are more prone to becoming

277 addicted to highly rewarding activities. Thus, and in accordance with our results, the levels
278 of hedonic impairments appear to be a relevant predictor of GD severity.

279 Beyond this interpretation of our results, it can be speculated that Kill-joy Thinking
280 fosters GD severity due to an increased persistence in gambling behaviour. For instance,
281 Kill-joy Thinking refers to a propensity to think of ways in which positive events could
282 have been better. In this regard, a dampening response to a reward may enhance persist-
283 ent gambling behaviours, even after a win, which sustains the craving for the next suc-
284 cess. Moreover, Kill-joy Thinking refers to the tendency to remind oneself about the things
285 one should be doing, such as one's responsibilities. In a gambling context, this may result
286 in increased levels of charges-related concerns, which can interfere with the capacity to
287 savour the current experience, favouring instead a focus on the next gamble to escape from
288 uncomfortable emotional states. It is worth noting that these are only speculations, and
289 should be considered as hypotheses to test in future research that investigates the relation-
290 ship between Kill-joy Thinking and gambling involvement.

291 Finally, our results support the hypothesis that depression leads to GD through the medi-
292 ating role of Kill-joy Thinking. The relationship between comorbid depression and GD has
293 been traditionally understood from the perspective of the "gambling-as-an-escape" hypoth-
294 esis. In other words, current literature mainly recommends that clinicians treat depressed
295 PGs' inability to manage negative emotions to reduce the risk of gambling behaviour elic-
296 ited by negative emotional triggers. Our study sheds light on another, likely complemen-
297 tary, mechanism that links depressive symptomatology and GD: difficulty enjoying posi-
298 tive experiences. The restoration of the hedonic capacity is a central aspect in traditional
299 treatments for mood disorders (Beck 1976), and may be proficiently addressed in the treat-
300 ment of comorbid GD and depression.

301 Importantly, it can be argued that Kill-joy Thinking is a stable trait that acts as a risk
302 factor for depression which, in turn, predicts GD severity. While the predictive role of
303 dampening processes on depression makes sense—and has been tested in other studies—
304 the mediational model seems less convincing. Indeed, conceptually, dampening processes
305 are considered a hallmark of cognitive depression (Beck 1976): maladaptive schemas are
306 thought to orientate cognitive processes in a maladaptive way, which consequently per-
307 petuates depressive symptomatology. However, our results indicated that depressive symp-
308 tomatology, after controlling for Kill-joy Thinking levels, is not a significant predictor of
309 GD severity.

310 The present study is insightful on both empirical and clinical levels. Indeed, this
311 research provides preliminary results on the role of regulation of positive emotions in GD.
312 Moreover, it stimulates future studies aiming to deepen the role of Kill-joy Thinking as a
313 risk factor for the development of GD, as well as a maintenance mechanism of pathological
314 gambling behaviour. Innovative treatments for GD, especially those that focus on comor-
315 bidity with depression, will benefit from our findings. For instance, techniques inspired by
316 the treatment options proposed by Garland (2016), which aim to train addicted individuals
317 to enjoy natural positive experiences, may be usefully translated within the context GD
318 treatment.

319 Limitations

320 Although our study provides innovative insight, several limitations should be considered.
321 The cross-sectional nature of our study does not allow us to draw irreversible conclusion
322 on the causal relationship between depression, Kill-joy Thinking and GD. Therefore, a

323 future longitudinal examination of this topic is needed to support our results. Subsequently,
324 our sample was unbalanced in regard to gender, as there was a much higher proportion of
325 male participants. As women have been shown to be especially prone to suffering from
326 depressive symptoms (Salk et al. 2017), the role of gender should be considered. Finally,
327 the cross-cultural research suggests that the use of dampening processes may vary across
328 cultures (Miyamoto and Ma 2011). Thus, cultural factors may have affected our study, lim-
329 iting its generalizability.

330 Future Directions

331 This study introduces a promising line of research, profiling future directions for empirical
332 investigations into the role of positive emotions in addiction. First, future research should
333 explore whether the observed relationships between GD severity, depression and Kill-joy
334 Thinking vary across subtypes of gamblers. Moreover, future research should be exam-
335 ined the nature of positive emotions by distinguishing their processes of regulation and the
336 complex interplay between the regulation processes of negative and positive emotions. For
337 instance, the role of guilt—elicited by Kill-joy Thinking—can foster in reaction to specific
338 self-relevant positive cues (e.g. positive triggers eliciting pride). Finally, the role of Kill-joy
339 Thinking in GD should be investigated by exploring the relationships between the dysregu-
340 lation of positive and negative emotional states.

AQ2

342 Compliance with Ethical Standards

343 **Conflict of interest** The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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