In the first part, the essay surveys some of the logical problems which affect counterfactual conditionals, in particular those stemming from their lack of inferential power. In the second part, it deals with the use of such sentences in causal judgments framed by jurists. Within this compass, the two main criteria for verifying the causal nexus in the legal domain (i.e. the “but-for” test and the NESS test) are examined. The implication between causal conditional and material conditional, which is presupposed by such criteria, is also analyzed. Finally, the essay points up some problems related to such tests, and shows the logical indeterminacy of the implication between the two kinds of conditionals.
Contrafácticos y juicios causales
RATTI, GIOVANNI BATTISTA
2012-01-01
Abstract
In the first part, the essay surveys some of the logical problems which affect counterfactual conditionals, in particular those stemming from their lack of inferential power. In the second part, it deals with the use of such sentences in causal judgments framed by jurists. Within this compass, the two main criteria for verifying the causal nexus in the legal domain (i.e. the “but-for” test and the NESS test) are examined. The implication between causal conditional and material conditional, which is presupposed by such criteria, is also analyzed. Finally, the essay points up some problems related to such tests, and shows the logical indeterminacy of the implication between the two kinds of conditionals.
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