The essay is devoted to the analysis of some features of the influential theory of legal sentences elaborated by Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz Manero. In particular, such an analysis deals with three main problems which are present in Atienza’s and Ruiz Manero’s rational reconstruction of regulative norms: i) the strongly Platonist conception of the logic of norms which they seemingly presuppose; ii) the controversial notions of “openness” and “closure” of normative conditionals; iii) and the contradictoriness of some of their background assumptions regarding the rules/principles dichotomy.
A Note on the Logical Form of Legal Principles
RATTI, GIOVANNI BATTISTA
2009-01-01
Abstract
The essay is devoted to the analysis of some features of the influential theory of legal sentences elaborated by Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz Manero. In particular, such an analysis deals with three main problems which are present in Atienza’s and Ruiz Manero’s rational reconstruction of regulative norms: i) the strongly Platonist conception of the logic of norms which they seemingly presuppose; ii) the controversial notions of “openness” and “closure” of normative conditionals; iii) and the contradictoriness of some of their background assumptions regarding the rules/principles dichotomy.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
