A Weberian Analysis of Business Groups and Financial Markets. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008.

This work has pursued three goals. Firstly, to expound on the thesis, which Weber and Simmel have originally formulated, that economic and social exchanges are best promoted by a particular combination of restricted and generalized reciprocity. Secondly, to formulate ideal types of organizations of production, and therefore of relations among firms, which are conducive to this combination of different kinds of trust. Finally, to illustrate the consequences for an organization of production to survive and succeed in the global market, which derive from the prevailing of a specific kind of trust. As Weber and Simmel have argued, a country's competitiveness in the global market depends on whether market exchanges benefit a restricted number of local participants, or is rather open to all actual and potential participants. Only in the latter case the norms and principles of a moral economy apply. The first chapter considers the question of whether ethical behavior, in the sense of a commitment to the observance of norms of reciprocity and fairness, is necessary to the proper functioning of the market, and dwells on Toennies', Simmel's and Weber's positions in this regard. The two latter authors have contended, in contrast to Toennies, that the market is an institution, failure to comply with these norms would be in the long run detrimental to a country's productive organization, and market exchanges are more viable in an economy open to international exchanges. The second chapter contrasts two ideal types of organizations of production, designated as the "German" and the "English" model, and describing two different market communities dominated by large-scale and small or medium-sized enterprises. Korea and Taiwan are here considered as approximation to, respectively, the former and the latter ideal type. This chapter also shows how empirical approximation to the former or the latter ideal type involves different consequences, in line with Simmel's and Weber's theoretical formulations. The third chapter deals with financial markets as particular market communities, as instantiated by the London Stock Exchange, and expatiates on Weber's thesis that for their optimal functioning financial markets need the preservation of moral principles in financial exchanges, and the involvement of specific economic actors as guardians of such principles. A recapitulation is here provided of the aims and contents of this work. Moreover, the theoretical reasons for the superior performance of the "English" model are stated.