Banche centrali e democrazia. Istituzioni, moneta e competizione politica

This book examines the role that central banks performs within political systems and, in particular, in the democratic one. The origin of these institutions is traced, on the one hand, to the evolution of payment systems and, on the other, to the process of separation of powers characterizing the origin of Modern States. This approach helps us to understand the different features of central banks within various models of democracy. In particular, central banks are "agents" of central governments within populist democracies, while these institutions are structured as independent benches – like Constitutional Courts or independent agencies – in democracies based on checks and balances system. These assumptions allow to reconsider from a different point of view some crucial aspects related to the central banks, such as their governance, their degree of accountability and transparency, the possibility that they may perform monetary as well as supervisory functions, the coordination models between monetary and fiscal policies.