Military Policing in Advanced Democracies: The Case of Italy (1992-2024)

This dissertation investigates the conditions under which governments in advanced democracies decide to deploy the armed forces for domestic policing purposes. While traditionally associated with authoritarian or fragile states, military involvement in internal security has become increasingly common even in advanced democratic systems. This shift raises important theoretical and normative questions, particularly in the context of Western Europe. The study contributes to theory development by proposing a rationalist model that explains military deployment as a strategic decision by governing parties, shaped by variables such as threat type and salience, police capacity, economic constraints, and party ideology. The model is tested through a within-case analysis of Italy between 1992 and 2024—one of the most enduring examples of military policing in a democratic context. Using process tracing and a range of qualitative sources, the dissertation uncovers the causes behind this phenomenon. The analysis reveals that the core causal mechanisms behind military deployment are surprisingly consistent across different democratic contexts. In both Latin America and Italy, the key driver is the presence of an internal threat that the police cannot adequately manage. What differs is the nature of the threat and the type of deficit affecting police forces. In Latin America, the threat tends to be highly violent and the police suffer from a legitimacy deficit. In contrast, Italy faces less visibly violent threats—often linked to perceived insecurity, immigration, or terrorism—and the police deficit is one of resources, due to long-term financial constraints. In this context, the armed forces are not perceived as more capable, but rather as a cost-effective substitute. The findings offer new insights into how the internal use of the armed forces for policing purposes evolve in democracies.