Fitting Pragmatics into the Human Mind: A philosophical investigation of the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis

This thesis focuses on the hypothesis that pragmatic understanding is underpinned by a mental module closely related to the ability to interpret others’ behaviors by inferring underlying mental states, also called ‘mindreading’. First, it aims at evaluating the plausibility of this hypothesis in light of the available data in the empirical literature by drawing on the argumentative toolbox of the philosophy of mind and language. Second, it aims at developing this hypothesis by addressing its main theoretical and empirical challenges. In Chapter One, I outline a historical overview of the different declinations of the modularity hypothesis in cognitive science, with a focus on early works in cognitive pragmatics and Theory of Mind research. In Chapter Two, I provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis by focusing on the central tenets of Relevance Theory. In Chapter Three, I explore the idea of pragmatics as a ‘sub-module’ of Theory of Mind from an empirical perspective by surveying the current state of the art in experimental and clinical pragmatics, thus ‘clearing up’ the recent controversy on the modularity of pragmatics from some misconceptions and empirical predictions which do not follow from the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis. In Chapter Four, I provide a novel cognitive framework for the modular view of pragmatics by evaluating the significance of research on ostensive communication in infancy with respect to the hypothesis of an early-developing modular heuristic for interpreting communicative behaviors. Chapters Five and Six both focus on the several ‘developmental dilemmas’ that must be confronted by intentional-inferential accounts of infant communication like the one endorsed in the present thesis, which will be disentangled, analyzed, and addressed by evaluating several possible solutions. In these two chapters, I show how the cognitive framework offered in Chapter Four can be employed and further extended to deal with such developmental dilemmas from a renewed modular perspective.