n the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative gametheoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.

On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

Gnecco G.;Sanguineti M.
2021-01-01

Abstract

n the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative gametheoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1100013
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