The paper examines the logical notion of compossibility in Bertrand Russell's metaethics. It does so by exploring the foundations of a logic for value judgments based on the logical tools of compossibility and incompatibility of desires, and by analyzing the possible role played by compossibility as a criterion of choice between different sets of value judgments.
Some Remarks on Russell’s Theory of Compossibility in Ethics
Giovanni Battista Ratti
2021-01-01
Abstract
The paper examines the logical notion of compossibility in Bertrand Russell's metaethics. It does so by exploring the foundations of a logic for value judgments based on the logical tools of compossibility and incompatibility of desires, and by analyzing the possible role played by compossibility as a criterion of choice between different sets of value judgments.File in questo prodotto:
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