

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI GENOVA

**The Mediterranean maritime community
of Camogli:
evolution and transformation in the age of
transition from sail to steam (1850s-1910s)**

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List of abbreviations

ASGe, Archivio di Stato di Genova

AST, Archivio di Stato di Torino

ASN, Archivio di Stato di Napoli

ASSV, Archivio di Stato di Savona

ACS, Archivio Centrale dello Stato

AMAE, Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Esteri

ACC, Archivio del Comune di Camogli

CMMC, Civico Museo Marinaro di Camogli

ACCM, Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille

INTRODUCTION

From the late eighteenth century to the First World War, in slightly more than a century, the Ligurian maritime community of Camogli, located thirty kilometres far from Genoa, underwent enormous transformations. Either provoked by global processes or local events, these transformations were inherently related to the irreplaceable relationship of its inhabitants with the sea.

The sea, the global and the local are the primary elements of this doctoral thesis, which grounds upon the adoption of a maritime perspective to analyse the dialectic between the global and local dimensions – an approach stimulated by recent historiography. In the last years, historians have been increasingly attracted by global questions and, in force of that, many historical disciplines tried to readjust to the contemporary debate. The so-called “global turn” invested and transformed the pre-existent fields and created whole new ones. Even the roots of transnational studies and the success of comparative approaches might be reconducted to the need of historians to investigate global issues to understand the present.

Within this theoretical framework, the opportunity for maritime historians to assume a leading role in the field of historical studies is clear, and the discussion was embraced – now a decade ago – in the pivotal volume *Maritime History as Global History* edited by Maria Fusaro and Amelia Polonia¹. The dialogue between maritime and global history could not be more natural, as the two disciplines converge on the same prerequisites, grounded on geographic mobility and wide-ranged entanglements². In the age of global matters, maritime history can definitively offer its contribution.

¹ M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), *Maritime history as global history*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2010. The same topic is addressed in: P. Manning, “Global History and Maritime History”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 25: 1, 2013, pp. 1-22.

² Frank Broeze, in a pioneering article of 1989, had provided a sort of manifesto for maritime history. See: F. Broeze, “From the periphery to the mainstream: the challenge of Australia's Maritime History”, *The Great Circle*, No. 11:1, 1989, pp. 1-13. See, also: G. Harlaftis and C. Vassallo, “Maritime History since Braudel”, in Idem (eds.), *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime*

The success of “globalism” in historical studies, however, raised several methodological concerns about the actual feasibility to do practical archival research on global themes. As a response to these concerns, arose the discipline of “micro-global history”, which aimed to individuate and implement micro-historical methodologies to investigate global questions³. Accordingly, the studies on phenomena and subjects which can be reconducted to the local scale but show global entanglements occupied a central position within the most recent publications and research directions⁴. Small-scale maritime communities possess all the requirements to be contextualised within the micro-global methodological framework. Firstly, as communities, they are framed within the local scale and, therefore, can be researched with the tools of micro-historical analysis. Secondly, they have the potential for global investigations because of the outward projection deriving from the practice of maritime activities. In other words, maritime communities can be the exemplar subjects for micro-global approaches, since they are spatially limited and, at the same time, framed within broader networks.

The transition from sail to steam in navigation, a real watershed in nineteenth-century maritime history, represents the primary global question to which the present doctoral thesis aims to provide a further understanding. Inscribed within the broader process labelled as “transport revolution”, the application of steam technology to navigation transformed the life and activities of seafarers, disrupted centuries-old maritime traditions and promoted the emergence of new protagonists. Furthermore, the effects of the transition spread outside the maritime sector and raised further transformations in other human activities.

History, St. John’s Newfoundland, IMEHA, 2004, pp. 1-20; G. Harlaftis, “Storia marittima e storia dei porti”, *Memoria e ricerca*, No. 11, 2002.

³ F. Trivellato, “Is there a future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”, *California Italian Studies*, No. 2:1, 2011; C. De Vito, “Verso una microstoria trans-locale (micro-spatial history)”, *Quaderni Storici*, No. 150: 3, 2015, pp. 815-833. See also, the debate published in a recent volume of *Past and Present*: J.P. Ghobrial, “Introduction: Seeing the World like a Micro-Historian”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 1-22; J. De Vries, “Playing with Scales: The Global and the Micro, the Macro and the Nano”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 23-36; G. Levi, “Frail Frontiers”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 37-49.

⁴ Take into account the creation of the “global commodities” and “global lives” research axis, as the most recurrent implementation of micro-global methodologies. See, F. Trivellato, “Is there a future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”.

Technological advance revolutionised the mobility of objects and human beings: steamships became «agents of *globalisation*» – by reformulating the famous definition of Armstrong and Williams⁵.

The adoption of seafaring communities to investigate the effects of the transition from sail to steam, therefore, could not be more natural. British, Northern-American and Scandinavian maritime historians gave their contribution to the development of these studies⁶; instead, the Mediterranean environment and seafaring communities lying at its shores were rarely contemplated within these designs. The ERC project *SeaLiT (Seafaring Lives in Transition. Mediterranean maritime labour and shipping during globalisation, 1850s-1920s)*, coordinated by Apostolos Delis, within which the present doctoral thesis is framed, aims to fill this gap. The project identified the Mediterranean seafaring communities as the core objects of analysis to investigate the transition under a comparative perspective. Thus, the case-study of Camogli will be compared with other Mediterranean communities, including Galaxidi, La Ciotat and Barceloneta. Their consistency and differences with the case of Camogli will be of crucial significance for the advancement of the current knowledge on this field of studies.

The historical evolution of Camogli in the nineteenth century had all the requirements to be selected for this purpose. In the late eighteenth century, it was a fishing village, whose inhabitants engaged to coastal fishing and cabotage. Then, it underwent an unprecedented escalation of shipping which culminated into the 1870s: at that time, its fleet counted more than three hundred vessels engaging to oceanic tramp shipping. Then, it entered into a steady decline: its fleet was

⁵ J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “The Steamship as an agent of modernisation”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19, No. 1, 2007, 145-160.

⁶ A short selection: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, *The impact of technological change. The early steamship in Britain*, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2011; L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds.), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1984; Y. Kaukiainen, *Sailing into twilight. Finnish Shipping in the Age of Transport Revolution, 1860-1914*, Helsinki: SHS, 1994; L.U. Scholl and M.L. Hikkaenen (eds.), *Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjo Kaukiainen*, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2004; D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, St. John’s Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1998. See, also the historiographical account of Gelina Harlaftis about the publications of the *International Journal of Maritime History*: G. Harlaftis, “Merchant shipping in the *International Journal of Maritime History*”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 1, pp. 139-147.

marginalised to low profitable market sectors, and the financial resources of the community were progressively drained. Meanwhile, the shipping world was invested by new technologies, which disrupted the previous dynamics and power relationships. The integration within the international shipping market, which Camogli had acquired throughout its rise, also determined its decline.

Scholarly historians paid scarce attention to the nineteenth-century evolution of Camogli. Conversely, several local historians devoted their energies to the identification of the local sailing fleet and the collection of “great stories of great individuals” to reconstruct a mythological history of the Ligurian community within the “golden age of sail”⁷.

On the national scale, Paolo Frascani was the first to call for the adoption of a maritime perspective to investigate the nineteenth-century Italian history: his collective volume *A vela e a vapore* contains several contributions crossing various themes (fishing, cabotage, high-seas shipping, the Italian maritime institutions, maritime education) and regional areas (more represented the South, less the Ligurian and the Adriatic maritime regions)⁸. However, even the pioneering contribution of Marco Doria about the Ligurian sailing fleet in the nineteenth century was primarily based on secondary sources⁹.

Camogli can claim to be the hometown of Gio. Bono Ferrari, one of the most representative figures of the Italian non-academic maritime literature. Born in 1882, Ferrari dedicated the years of his maturity to the collection of oral testimonies and old newspapers about the history of Camogli and the nearby communities. More than “history”, Ferrari gathered several “stories”: the amount of information is enormous, but the news is presented unsystematically – even randomly – and with no references to historical sources other than non-specified

⁷ The most complete attempt in this sense can be found in: P. Schiaffino (ed.), *I mille bianchi velieri della città di Camogli*, Genova: Nuova Editrice Genovese, 2009.

⁸ P. Frascani (ed.), *A vela e a vapore. Economie, culture e istituzioni del mare nell'Italia dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Donzelli, 2001.

⁹ M. Doria, “La marina mercantile a vela in Liguria dalla metà dell'Ottocento alla prima guerra mondiale”, in P. Frascani (ed.), *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 83-107.

eye-witnesses¹⁰. Nevertheless, Gio. Bono Ferrari is still the primary reference for the Ligurian nineteenth-century maritime history, a fact bearing witness of the unhealthy conditions of its historiography¹¹.

Compared to the status and accomplishments of the international maritime studies, the primary distinction emerges about sources and their utilisation. In this case, maritime-related sources such as crew lists, logbooks and career registers have been long implemented into the methodology and resources of international scholars. Conversely, apart from a pioneering article of Paolo Frascani¹², who underlined the outstanding potential of logbooks to develop maritime research on nineteenth-century Italy, there are no comparable studies.

Instead, the present doctoral thesis will mostly draw on this set of sources, in compliance with their availability. The crew lists, kept – in the State Archives of Genoa – between 1828 and 1866, will be essential to investigate Camogli's maritime labour and routes. The logbooks, kept between 1880 and 1914, are crucial to examine the declining phase of Camogli, across various perspectives. The career rolls, covering the 1843-1914 period, will represent a fundamental tool to analyse the career paths and other critical features of maritime labour.

The structure of the thesis will reflect the adoption of a double perspective. Firstly, the fleet and the shipping business of Camogli will be taken into account to outline the integration of the Ligurian community within the international shipping market, from the late eighteenth century to the First World War. Secondly, it will deal with shipowners, maritime labourers and migrants, thus transferring the focus from the ship to the individuals.

¹⁰ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri: Camogli*, Genova: Tipografia Nazionale, 1935; Idem, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX*, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, 1939.

¹¹ About the conditions of the Italian maritime historiography about the nineteenth century, see, particularly, the contribution of Maria Elisabetta Tonizzi in: M. D'Angelo and M.E. Tonizzi, "Recent maritime historiography in Italy", in G. Harlaftis, C. Vassallo (eds.), *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, pp. 55-82. See also: M.E. Tonizzi, "Lavoro e lavoratori del mare nell'età della globalizzazione", *Contemporanea*, No. 12: 4, pp. 691-701, where she neatly declares: «Nel caso specifico dell'Italia, per la tarda età della navigazione a vela, bisogna ancora, con qualche eccezione, ricorrere alle descrizioni dei "classici" della letteratura marinaresca».

¹² P. Frascani, "Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi a vela dell'800", *Società e storia*, 100, 2003, pp. 487-510.

In the first part, the adoption of a multi-scale analysis led to the identification of three different historical phases which correspond to the first three chapters.

The first chapter (late 18th century – 1830) addresses the conditions of Camogli before the nineteenth century and contextualises its shipping activities within the Ligurian geo-historical framework. The examination of two distinct models of Ligurian seafaring communities will be fundamental to outline the characteristics of the late eighteenth century maritime activities of Camogli, based on fishing and cabotage. Firstly, the main features of Camogli's coastal and high-seas fishing will be taken into account. Secondly, after a general overview of Camogli's cabotage routes, the traffic of charcoal from Tuscany to Genoa will be treated more in details.

The second chapter (1830-1870) deals with the establishment of Camogli's shipping into the Black Sea. From the first contacts to the consolidation, this chapter will outline the pivotal role of the Black Sea grain trade to determine the evolution of the community and its specialisation into shipping. In the first section, the growth of the fleet, by numbers and tonnage, will be addressed. Then, the second and third sections will provide a geo-historical background of the Black Sea trade. The fourth will present its merchant networks, with a focus on Greeks and Italians for their relationships with Camogli. The analysis of Camogli's participation to the Black Sea trade covers the fifth and sixth sections: import and export trade from and to the Black Sea will be taken into account, through the examination of inbound and outbound cargoes and the analysis of loading ports. The seventh section is dedicated to the readjustment of the business to the Crimean War (1853-1856). Finally, the last section analyses the transfer of the discharging ports from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

The third chapter (1870-1914) outlines the global phase of Camogli's shipping, marked by rapid growth, in the beginning, – following the readjustment to the establishment of steam navigation into the Black Sea grain trade – and, then, steady decline, in response to the increase of steam competitiveness on longer routes. The first section provides a general and technical framework about the transition from sail to steam within the broader nineteenth-century transport revolution. The second section analyses the numbers and characteristics of

Camogli's fleet to outline the readjustment to oceanic shipping and its resilience until the First World War. The integration to oceanic routes and the specialisation of Camogli to oceanic tramp shipping are examined in the third and fourth sections: the former outlines the rising phase (1870-1880), the latter its steady decline (1880-1914), which took the form of a gradual marginalisation of sailing shipping to the market periphery.

The second part of the thesis, on the contrary, examines the history of Camogli from a different perspective. Besides ships and shipping, the second part analyses the nineteenth-century transformations from the side of the members of the community. Thus, it takes into account shipownership, maritime labour and migration.

The fourth chapter deals with Camogli's shipowners and aims to delineate the mechanisms of local shipownership and its transformation over time. The first section reconstructs the trajectories of some selected shipping families to highlight the persistence of familiar and communitarian structures to shape shipping business in Camogli. The forms of shared-ownership, the tools implemented to minimise entrepreneurial risks and the development of mutualistic institutions constitute the primary objects of investigation of the second section. The third section deviates from shipping business and addresses the political, social and cultural involvement of shipowners in the development of the community. Finally, the fourth section takes into account the 1880-1914 period aiming to outline the entanglements between the global and local scales to determine the crisis of the community.

The fifth chapter investigates maritime labour. It postulates the existence of an endogenous maritime labour market where demands and supplies of sea labourers remain within the borders of the community. Then, it analyses the transformations observed in the essential elements of maritime labour: the transition from share to salary, the proletarianization of labour, the professionalisation of captains and the consequences of technological transition. Finally, the career paths will be investigated in their last sections, with a specific focus on the rates of abandonment and the professional destinations of seafarers after the exit from Camogli's endogenous maritime labour market.

The sixth and last chapter will deal with the labour migration and diaspora of Camogli. The first section will provide an analysis of desertion and emigration patterns to observe the practical ways of leaving the community and to analyse the geographical and professional destinations. The second section will deal with Camogli's labour migration to the European foreign fleets; the third section will analyse more extensively labour migration and entrepreneurship in Latin America, particularly in Peru and Argentina. The last section will elaborate on the case-study of Tristan da Cunha where a small migrant community of Camogli was created in the aftermath of the shipwreck of the barque *Italia*.

PART I
THE MARITIME COMMUNITY “OUTSIDE”:
SHIPPING AND ROUTES

1. SEAFARING ACTIVITIES BEFORE 1830

Introduction

The integration of Camogli in the international shipping business took place in the 1830s when its ships and seafarers got involved in the Black Sea grain trade. Nonetheless, before directly addressing its evolution in that phase, this chapter aims to contextualise the first steps of Camogli as a maritime community in the geo-historical framework to which it belonged, the multifaceted scenario of the two Ligurian rivieras. The history of Liguria in the late eighteenth century is addressed to illustrate the socio-economic environment in which Camogli asserted itself as a leading shipping centre. In order to do so, the chapter highlights the local maritime activities, from fishing to long-cabotage to identify the distinguishing traits which concurred to the future success of the community.

The first section will analyse the size of the fleet (number of ships and tonnage) and the types of ships. This analysis will illustrate the character of shipping activity of Camogli and the market orientation (trade routes, commodities) along with the perspectives and the structural limits.

The following sections will examine the evolution of the communities and ports in the two sides of the Ligurian coast, namely the western and eastern rivieras. The western area had developed tighter connections with Southern Italy, a decisive factor to secure its participation to the long-range Tyrrhenian cabotage routes. On the other hand, the eastern communities specialised in fishing and short-range cabotage. Then, their parallel experiences are depicted in the light of the Tyrrhenian maritime system concept, in order to present the networks of interregional relationships systematically.

Finally, the maritime activities of Camogli are directly taken into account, under the distinction between fishing and cabotage. Specific attention is paid to the transport of charcoal from Maremma (in Tuscany), which engaged the seafaring population of Camogli in a long-standing trade lasting up to the end of the nineteenth century.

1.1. The Camogli merchant fleet

The data are drawn from the records of the arrivals at the port of Genoa, which the Maritime Health Authority of the Republic collected¹³: these records provide information about ships, captains, routes and cargoes. Nonetheless, the elements to identify the vessels are limited to the name and type, with no reference to the tonnage or serial numbers. Therefore, absolute certainty about the identity of the ship is not obtainable. The data are related to the arrivals in port, or ships' voyages, without enabling to distinguish one ship from another. Name and type are the sole details provided, but they are of little help to the identification because, still in this period, most of the ships carried identical religious names, deeply connected with local devotion¹⁴.

Nevertheless, the scarcity of details and information does not inhibit from illustrating in the most veritable way the main features of the fleet of Camogli, as well as its presumable relevance in the Ligurian maritime framework¹⁵.

¹³ ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

¹⁴ A valuable analysis concerning the evolution of the names of Ligurian ships between the 18th and the 19th centuries can be found in L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza: navi mercantili, costruttori e proprietari in Liguria nella prima metà dell'Ottocento*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2008, pp. 86-92.

¹⁵ A statistical comparison between Camogli and its broader regional area is hindered by some methodological issues detected in the previous literature. Most of the studies about the late 18th century port movement of Genoa had been built on a specific source, the «*Avvisi*», a periodical publication providing general information about maritime business, including the list of the ships entering the port of Genoa. On these premises, Luigi Bulferetti and Claudio Costantini, in their pivotal work about the economic history of Genoa between the 18th and 19th centuries, adopted the «*Avvisi*» as their main statistical source to display the port movement. However, if compared to the sources of the *Ufficio di sanità*, which was the deputed institution to record all the information about in and out port movements, these data seem to be incomplete or, at least, rather deficient. For example, in the year 1785, the health records list 179 *navicello* entering in the port of Genoa (all of them carrying the Genoese flag and manned by Camogli captains). In the data collected in the «*Avvisi*», on the contrary, among the records of all the arrivals in the port of Genoa, only 54 *navicello* are found (with a broader statistical sample). Likewise, the last data recorded in the «*Avvisi*» (1793) display a total of 1229 arrivals of ships carrying the Genoese flag. In a different source, drawn up in 1804, at the end of a protracted period of crisis, distinguished by the consistent loss of ships experienced by the Genoese fleet, the total number of the Genoese ships (not the arrivals in port) amounted to 1443. These and other incongruences imposed the choice not to rely on «*Avvisi*» statistics and on the related literature in order to make comparisons between the situation of Camogli (drawn up by the health records) and the broader region. See: L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 176-177.

Therefore, with the purpose to reconstruct the fleet of Camogli to the most verisimilar figure, we had to develop an estimation approach based on the number of voyages which a single ship carried out in a year. In doing so, we made a distinction according to the vessel type (*navicello*, *pinco*, *tartana*, etc.) and counted the occurrences in which ship name and captains coincided. Lacking further data, we assumed that, if a captain conducted a ship with the same name throughout a year, also the ship was the same. Then, we collected all the voyages referring to the same ship and, in order to obtain the yearly average, we divided the result by the number of captain-ship couples. Finally, we took the number of voyages, and we rounded it for the yearly average in order to have the estimated number of ships¹⁶.

Year	Bombarda ¹⁷		Brick		Feluca		Leudo		Navicello		Pinco		Polacca		Sciabecco		Tartana		Total		
	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*		
1785							16	19%	53	65%	13	16%								82	
1795	1	1%	5	4%			22	19%	47	43%	28	25%	2	2%					7	6%	113
1805					5	17%	4	14%	15	52%	2	7%			1	3%	2	7%		29	

Table 1-1. Estimated number of Camogli-owned ships by type. Source: ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

¹⁶ A sample of the estimate procedure adopted. In the year 1795, among the type of ship *navicello* we found the following results: Giuseppe Ansaldo – *N.S. del Carmine* (7); Giuseppe Avegno – *N.S. della Mercede* (7); Giuseppe Croce – *N.S. del Rosario* (3); Niccolò Denegri – *N.S. del Rosario* (4), etc. All the couple collected, we made the average (4,08 voyages each year) which was finally the divisor of the total voyages recorded for the *navicello* in the 1795 (193), in order to obtain the final result of 47.

¹⁷ The nautical terminology turned out to be one of the most challenging issues in the writing of the present chapter. Indeed, whereas in the following period most of the ship typologies tend to converge towards international standards, in the late eighteenth century the difference between Mediterranean and Atlantic ship-building is still as sharp as for the course of the entire early modern age. Therefore, several terms lack of an appropriate translation in English: in all of the cases where an English correspondence cannot be found, the decision was to keep the original term. This, therefore, is the case of most of the typologies displayed in table, apart from the sole *brigantino* which, for its northern origin (since it is not to be confused with its Mediterranean early-modern counterpart), has been translated in “brick”. Most of the following information provided for Mediterranean traditional ship-typologies are drawn from S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane della costa occidentale dal Medioevo al Novecento*, Milano: Hoepli, 2002. Further information, more from a maritime than a purely nautical perspective, and enriched with reference to archival sources, can be found in L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 38-86.

Notwithstanding all the possible statistical inaccuracies, which might derive from the proposed estimate, from the table emerges a neat predominance of the *navicello*, followed by *pinco* and *leudo*.

The origins of *navicello* are rooted in a different maritime tradition than the Ligurian one: in its first days, this type of vessel was employed in the fluvial navigation along the course of the river Arno, in Tuscany¹⁸. It was destined to the transport of marble from the mining regions towards the sea or Florence (via Arno river). The presence of *navicello* in the Tyrrhenian waters is documented from the first decades of the 17th century¹⁹. Besides marbles, this vessel was rapidly associated with additional local commodities, such as timber and charcoal, which initially complemented marble cargoes but then became bulk cargoes on their own²⁰. The transport of timber and charcoal, indeed, corresponded to the use of *navicello* by the shipowners of Camogli²¹. From a technical point of view, whereas the sophisticated system of sails and rigging is well-known²², there is no explicit reference concerning the dimensions and the tonnage of this type of ship. The average tonnage varied from 30 to 70 tons, but in some cases can be found *navicelli* of more than 100 tons²³. The progressive specialisation of Camogli into the charcoal trade with Maremma led to the widespread diffusion of this ship type.

Instead, the successful establishment of *pinco* in the merchant fleet of Genoa is related to a different history. The Mediterranean *pinco* is a type of vessel with

¹⁸ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 158-163.

¹⁹ Idem, p. 158. The author mentions an episode of 1603, when some *navicelli* were warned by the authorities not to take the sea-route, but to sail instead along the canals linking Pisa with Livorno.

²⁰ L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, p. 67.

²¹ See the paragraph 1.6 "A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal".

²² S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 158-163.

²³ Idem, p. 158; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 123-176. Most of the *navicello* found recorded by the author range from 30 to 70 tons. There are, however, some exceptions, as in the case of the *navicello* "Il Magnanimo", measuring 130,08 tons, which was built in 1827 in Varazze for the Camogli ship-owner Gaetano Schiaffino. Another case is the "N.S. del Carmine" (101,40 tons) built in 1830 for the Camogli ship-owner Michele Bertolotto. These and other cases can be also found in: P. Berti, *Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di Camogli*, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*, pp. 315-328.

Spanish origins²⁴. It is established as one of the most efficient vessels in the Tyrrhenian trade during the second half of the eighteenth century when its diffusion displays an impressive growth. Before the late 1770s its presence is almost negligible; then, between 1778 and 1793, the *pinco* covers up to 18% of the total ships registered at the port of Genoa²⁵. The *pinco* constituted the core of the long-distance Genoese fleet owing to its relatively big tonnage: the dimensions varied from 50 to 200 tons, even though the vast majority of them averaged between 100 and 150 tons²⁶. It was a flat bottomed vessel with a narrow stern; it had three masts, and its main technical distinguishing trait was the double rigging since it usually had both the square and the lateen rigs installed on the main-mast²⁷.

The *leudo* or *liuto* has a longer tradition and historical continuity than *pinco*, since this nomenclature dates back to the Middle Ages, in the Catalan area (1209)²⁸. Over the centuries, it passed through several transformations and found a stable and recognisable structure only in the nineteenth century. Mainly employed in the Tyrrhenian cabotage, especially in the connections between Sardinia and Genoa, the *leudo* was commonly used to transport foodstuffs, such as wine, oil, carobs, tuna and wheat²⁹. Their average tonnage was around 30 tons, and it had one mast with lateen rigs and the bowsprit³⁰.

Finally, of secondary importance to describe the main features of Camogli's merchant fleet, we find: a) the *bombarda*, a two-masted large coaster, ketch-rigged, of 60-80 tons in average, which experienced a discrete fortune in the first half of the nineteenth century³¹; b) the brick, a two-mast ship of more considerable

²⁴ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 172-176.

²⁵ Idem, p. 175. The statistics is found in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 162-163, and it is drawn by the authors from the *Avvisi*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ Idem, pp. 173-174.

²⁸ Idem, p. 136.

²⁹ Among the arrivals of Camogli-owned ships, the *leudo* accounts for 65 cases: although half of them reflects the outstanding importance of charcoal and timber trade, on the other hand the cargo list shows a great diversification, including lobsters, roe, carobs, wheat, oil, tobacco, tuna and wine. ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

³⁰ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, p. 137.

³¹ Idem, pp. 54-55.

dimensions, which later became the central unit of the fleet of Camogli, and especially its evolutions of brick-schooner and barque³²; c) the *feluca*, a two-masted boat with lateen sails, usually employed in cabotage³³; d) the *tartana*, a three-masted vessel whose capacity stretched between 75 and 130 tons, employed in different context according to its dimensions³⁴.

1.2. The Tyrrhenian maritime system

Leaving aside the role of Genoa, whose political and economic power is dominant in the region, in the late eighteenth century the Ligurian area was crawling with several seafaring places which had developed for centuries community-centred maritime traditions, occasionally tied with international shipping and in most of the cases marked by multi-activity. The Ligurian ships were scattered all around the Mediterranean shores, and the captains engaged in all sorts of seaborne business³⁵.

Therefore, it is possible to reconsider the role of the Ligurian merchant fleets within the Mediterranean trade networks. The widespread notion of “northern invasion”³⁶, a legacy of Braudel’s interpretation of the Mediterranean world, might

³² For its fundamental role in the following periods of the history of Camogli, this ship type will be more extensively described in the following chapters.

³³ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 92-97; C. De Negri, *Le feluche dei liguri*, Genova: Tip. A. Porcile, 1966.

³⁴ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 222-229; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 64-65.

³⁵ Among the most recent works about the maritime activities in which the coastal communities engaged see: L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo: la vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi nel XVIII secolo*, Roma: Carocci, 2016; Id., *Capitani, corsari e armatori. I mestieri e le culture del mare dalla tratta degli schiavi a Garibaldi*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2011; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all'estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*, Roma: Carocci, 2008.

³⁶ The first definition of the “Northern Invasion” concept is in F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*, trans. S. Reynolds, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 615-642. See also M. Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century”, *Past and Present*, No. 174, 2002, pp. 42-71. See also the latest: M. Fusaro, C. Heywood and M.S. Omri (eds.), *Trade and cultural exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Braudel’s maritime legacy*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010 and in particular the essays of Maria Fusaro and Colin Heywood: M. Fusaro, “After Braudel: a Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and the Caravane Maritime”, pp. 1-22; C. Heywood, “The

not be questionable. However, as Katerina Galani pointed out in her book about the British shipping at the end of the eighteenth century³⁷, the English vessels engaging to the intra-Mediterranean trade were mostly concerned into linking the Central Mediterranean area (which in her definition overlaps with the Tyrrhenian region of this chapter) with North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean³⁸. The internal connections were left to the local merchant fleets, which participated in the general movement with vessels of minor dimensions. The functional role played by the “Mediterraneans” invites to propose new interpretations aimed to acknowledge the existence of a Tyrrhenian maritime system, self-sufficient but conditioned to interregional networks.

The idea of a Tyrrhenian maritime system – a model to organise trade routes and maritime activities in a given area, which is divided into multiple units to form the entire structure – has found a lavish reception in Italian historiography. More generally, the adoption and definition of systemic approaches to maritime studies have been recently revived by Amèlia Polonia’s reconsideration of port systems in a functionalist model³⁹. Accordingly, Italian historians now conceive the Tyrrhenian region as an organic area, where distinct political entities (from Sicily up to the French region of Marseille) and transnational subjects gave life to

English in the Mediterranean, 1600-1630: a Post-Braudelian Perspective on the «Northern Invasion»”, pp. 23-44.

³⁷ K. Galani, *British Shipping in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars. The Untold Story of a Successful Adaptation*, Leiden: Brill’s Studies in Maritime History, 2017.

³⁸ Idem, p. 108. The author draws on the British trade at the port of Livorno from 1770 to 1815: in reconstructing the routes through the sanitary records of the Tuscan port, Katerina Galani illustrates how 59 percent of the British vessels calling at Livorno engaged in intra-Mediterranean trade. However, only a limited portion of the ships were actually coming from the Central Mediterranean (12%), whereas North Africa (40%) and the Eastern Mediterranean (35%) represented the overwhelming majority areas of the ports of departure.

³⁹ See A. Polonia, “The Northwestern Portuguese Seaport System in the Early Modern Age” in B. Tapio, L. R. Fischer and E. Tonizzi, (eds.), *Making Global and Local Connections: Historical Perspectives on Ports*, Research in Maritime History series (No. 35), Newfoundland: International Journal of Maritime History, 2008, pp.113-136 and Id., “European seaports in the early modern age: concepts, methodology and models of analysis”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, No. 80, 2010, pp. 17-39. Also, see: R. Lee and R. Lawton, *Port development and the demographic dynamics of European urbanization*, in Id. (eds.), *Population and society in Western European Port-Cities, c. 1650-1939*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002, pp. 1-36.

communications and networks through sea activities⁴⁰. Some preliminary approaches can be found in Paolo Calcagno⁴¹, for what concerns the stable linkages between Tuscany, Liguria and Provence. Annastella Carrino and Biagio Salvemini adopted the same approach⁴²: through the observation of the more enduring routes linking together the agricultural regions of the Kingdom of Naples with the seaport of Marseille, they developed a three-level Tyrrhenian system. Its main elements were: a) a *port-to-port* northward trade in foodstuff and agricultural supplies from Naples, Messina and Palermo to Marseille and Genoa⁴³; b) *periphery-to-port* cabotage linking the productive areas of the countryside with the main regional seaports; c) a *port-to-periphery/port* transit and redistribution trade of cereals, colonial genres, spices and every sort of goods arriving in international scale ports– mainly Livorno.

Far from constituting enclosed systems on their own, every level was entangled with the others. For example, the second axis (b) was instrumental in delivering agricultural products to the seaports, from which they were destined to international exports (a). Cabotage played a central role, particularly in the Italian south: it was fundamental to compensate the region infrastructural limits in terms of land communications. Accordingly, the Neapolitan and Sicilian marines developed large fleets of small-tonnage vessels. Local production was steered toward the main regional seaports, primarily Naples, which was the leading collecting centre of the Kingdom, followed by far from Messina⁴⁴. Therefore, the

⁴⁰ The main reference goes to the collective volume edited by B. Salvemini (ed.), *Lo spazio tirrenico nella "grande trasformazione". Merci, uomini e istituzioni nel Settecento e nel primo Ottocento*, Bari: Edipuglia, 2009. The same approach is more directly addressed in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile: il Tirreno nel Settecento", *Studi Storici*, No. 53, 2012, pp. 47-73.

⁴¹ P. Calcagno, "Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell'area marittima ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 33, 2015.

⁴² A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile", p. 49.

⁴³ The crucial distinction between port-cities and the countryside landing-places lacking of harbor infrastructures is directly addressed in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Porti di campagna, porti di città. Traffici e insediamenti del Regno di Napoli visti da Marsiglia (1710-1846)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 1, 2006, pp. 209-254.

⁴⁴ Compare with the data shown in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Porti di campagna, porti di città", pp. 224-226.


northward trade in staples and low-value merchandises encouraged the establishment of a chained structure where coastal trade was necessary. More importantly, while being international, this kind of trade involved endogenous (to the system) actors, as the Kingdom of Naples embodied the supplier, the “Genoese” the carriers and the industrial region of Marseille, the primary consumer. Most of the Italian research about the Tyrrhenian economic world and the maritime exchanges in the late eighteenth century had devoted a great spark of attention to this specific trade axis, emphasising the role of Ligurian maritime actors to the system’s subsistence⁴⁵.

The last level (c) concerned to some extent the international trade – of which the Tyrrhenian constitutes a transit unit – accomplished by foreign carriers who held a large proportion of the Levant trade to the Western Mediterranean and the Central and Atlantic Europe. The growth of Livorno’s maritime movement is emblematic to outline its evolution. Since the institution of the freeport status of the Tuscan city (1676), many English and Dutch vessels called to Livorno and filled the harbour warehouses with colonial genres and cereals. Thus, on account on the favourable tax regime granted by the Tuscan authorities, Livorno became an international emporium and the primary destination for the Mediterranean transit trade: hence, the city developed into a fundamental collecting centre for the regional economy and, as a result, attracted several ships aiming to continue the westward trade flow of colonial goods and to redistribute these commodities in the other ports of the system, like Genoa and Marseille⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ Despite the activities of “Genoese” presence and networks in the Mediterranean maritime trade in the nineteenth century have never been systematically collected in a singular monograph, there is abundance of articles and essays which represent indispensable tools to deal with this subject: L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni*; P. Calcagno, “Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo”, *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 33, 2015; A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del secondo settecento”, *Società e storia*, No. 131, 2011.

⁴⁶ The port activities of Livorno are clearly underlined in: J.P. Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998.

1.3. The distinction between Western and Eastern Ligurian maritime communities



Map. 1.1. Genoa and its rivieras (focus on Camogli area).

Within this framework, the people of Liguria specialised in the trade and transport of foreign goods and moved them from port to port within and beyond the Tyrrhenian maritime system. The “Genoese”, as this miscellaneous group was commonly and erroneously labelled⁴⁷, held a relevant proportion of the Tyrrhenian trade, especially in the southern Italian markets where, relying upon centuries of favourable relationships between the Republic of Genoa and the Spanish monarchy, they had developed a long-lasting presence. However, there is a distinction between the two areas of the region: the Western riviera was more integrated within the Mediterranean economy than its counterpart, which instead was specialised on fishing and short-range cabotage.

⁴⁷ A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie”, p. 37.

For instance, to the former group belong the communities of Santo Stefano⁴⁸, Laigueglia⁴⁹ and Sanremo⁵⁰. Here, the local shipowning elites joined the ranks of merchants and commercial entrepreneurs rather than limiting their range of interests to shipping. Their trajectories are in line with the majority of Mediterranean and European businessmen, to which shipownership was an ancillary activity to engage in commerce and trade. In most cases, the unique geographical environment of the western communities of Liguria allowed the inhabitants to cultivate the ground and to produce specific agricultural commodities (olives, fruit and later flowers). On the other side of the region, cultivation was limited to subsistence horticulture, with little or none market integration. For the western elites, the passage from shipowners to traders was facilitated by the presence of marketable commodities in their territory. The studies developed on their commercial correspondence outline that they were able to integrate within international trade networks, which even transcended the Mediterranean borders to reach Central and Northern Europe⁵¹. These “Genoese” expanded their range of interests through the commercialisation of domestic products, as observed in the case of Sanremo, whose citrus and lemons found profitable marketplaces in Northern Europe⁵².

If it were the case for most of the western maritime communities of Liguria – to carry out trade with northern Europe, to actively participate into the northbound commerce from southern Italy to Genoa and Marseille, and to handle the redistribution of colonial merchandises from Livorno to the Mediterranean – the eastern part of the region would display an utterly different scenario. Sparse along the coast, the Eastern riviera hosted a multitude of villages and poorly populated

⁴⁸ L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa. Le attività commerciali di Giovanni Battista Filippi attraverso la documentazione privata (1762-1771)”, *Intermelion*, No. 13, 2007, pp. 83-109.

⁴⁹ A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del secondo settecento”, *Società e storia*, No. 131, 2011.

⁵⁰ A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all’estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*, Roma: Carocci, 2008.

⁵¹ L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”, p. 85. The author has found 38 different places, among which there were Marseille, Livorno, Naples, Bordeaux, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Havre, Nantes and other lesser centres.

⁵² A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni*.

centres whose maritime activities and economic subsistence depended on coastal and deep-sea fishing and short-range cabotage. The social composition of these communities was strikingly dissimilar to that of their western counterparts. There was no space for the merchant elites which elsewhere had a great significance and played a central role in the community economic activities.

In this regard, their economic and social evolution seems to be in line with the historiographical assumption concerning the inverse relation existing between fishing and commerce in terms of diffusion and practice: in the Mediterranean, when a maritime community was able to develop a solid commercial structure, it rarely went back to fishing⁵³. This pattern is recurrent in the Mediterranean – despite the alleged coexistence of sea economies (fishing, cabotage, trade) and land economy (agriculture and manufactures) – and was prompted by the fact that fishing, especially in the Tyrrhenian Sea, was scarcely cost-effective and did not represent a relatively profitable economic option. In comparison with the Northern seas, the Tyrrhenian waters had a scarcity of fishery resources, more various but less abundant. Indeed, this environmental factor led to contrasting results in the two maritime worlds: in the Northern European region (England, the Netherlands and Scandinavia) deep-sea fishing grew as a critical activity in the local economies whereas Mediterranean fishing remained subordinate or, when central, its relevance originated more by the absence of alternatives than due to real profitability. The importance of fishing in the northern countries led, for instance, to gradual modernisation and the introduction of technological (ships) and organisational (labour division and in the forms of food preservation) improvements which, on the contrary, could have hardly occurred in the Mediterranean marines⁵⁴. In the light of the organisational models to structure a

⁵³ See in this case the tables proposed in A. Zanini, “Un difficile equilibrio. Stato, pescatori e comunità in Liguria tra Sei e Settecento”, in S. Cavaciocchi, *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima settimana di studi” 11-15 aprile 2005* (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. Serie 2, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri convegni 37), Firenze: Le Monnier, 2006, pp. 1101-1102. For instance, see the cases of the Levant communities of Quinto, Nervi, Bogliasco and Monterosso, Vernazza and Corniglia, whose figure of fishermen out of the total of the maritime workers range between 51,5 % and 90,2 %.

⁵⁴ The comparative evolution of Mediterranean and Northern European fishing had recently attracted and stimulated international literature. The abovementioned conference papers of the

fishing enterprise, those of «company ownership» and «family ownership⁵⁵» – marked by a fundamental distinction about the existing relationship between capital and labour (divided in the former, combined in the latter) – Mediterranean fishing fell under the second category. The ownership was usually collective, according to family relationships but also, on a broader perspective, with the participation of the entire community. Then, this collective form of ownership – adopted also in long-range cabotage and deep-sea navigation⁵⁶ – overlapped with collective forms of remuneration of the single maritime enterprise. Sailors were recruited for single voyages, and the revenues were divided among the participants, according to the “share” system.

Fishing, short-range cabotage, collective endeavours and “share” system: these are the features which shaped the economic evolution of most of the maritime communities lying eastward Genoa. Still, in the eighteenth century, Camogli reflects and seems to possess all of those characteristics.

1.4. Camogli: a fishing centre

In the analysis of the maritime activities sustaining the economy of Camogli up to the mid-19th century, a clear pattern of continuity is found between this sailor town and other similar realities scattered along the Ligurian riviera. In this phase,

³⁷ conference of Datini Institute of Prato represent a pivotal work to deal with this subject: S. Cavaciocchi, *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima settimana di studi” 11-15 aprile 2005* (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. Serie 2, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri convegni 37), Firenze: Le Monnier, 2006. A authoritative review and critical contextualisation of the conference proceedings and activities can be found in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare in margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi dell’Istituto Datini”, *Storia economica*, No. 8, 2005, pp. 215-235. The Mediterranean fishing practices and communities are also at the center of M.L. De Nicolò, *Microcosmi mediterranei. Le comunità dei pescatori nell’età moderna*, Bologna: CLUEB, 2004.

⁵⁵ This distinction is clearly outlined in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare”, pp. 217-218. Such distinction roots into the North-Atlantic historical debate, where fishing constituted a much more significant activity in terms of finance and business. A comparative analysis can be found in: D. Vickers, “Comparing fisheries”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 1, 1995, pp. 198-224.

⁵⁶ Since the Middle Age, several credit and insuring tools have been created to sustain the collective endeavour to carry out shipping business. Some of them, as the *cambio marittimo* or *colonna* survived up to the end of the 19th century. See: G. Salvioi, *L’assicurazione e il cambio marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano*, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1884.

preliminary to the outstanding achievements of the following period, the history of Camogli does not seem to possess any extraordinary trait. The framework of activities proposed concerning the eastern communities of the region fits perfectly in the specific experience of Camogli, as fishing and Tyrrhenian cabotage played the most remarkable part. First, due to its deep-rooted fishing tradition, both coastal and deep-sea. Secondly, in the wake of its active participation to the Tyrrhenian maritime system: the people of Camogli disregarded long-range cabotage but, at the same time, developed some long-lasting connections with regional areas targeting specific merchandise, charcoal, whose transport constituted an extraordinary long-lasting activity up to the First World War.

The first documented sector of activity pertained coastal fishing, in close contact with the village settlement due to the positioning of a tuna fishery located in the waters of Punta Chiappa, in the nearby area of the Portofino Promontory. The sources attested its effectiveness in 1603⁵⁷: however, its actual instalment might be even dated back to the sixteenth century. Far from being as productive as the most renowned tuna fisheries of Sicilia and Sardinia, the Camogli's one was labelled as *tonnarella*, a trap designed to capture fishes of smaller dimensions (than tuna). The limited range of action of the *tonnarella* found reasons in the lack of fishing resources which is characteristic of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian seas⁵⁸. Despite the long period of activity, from April to September, this kind of fishing was not very demanding in terms of labour, both for the limited size of the whole structure and because it engaged no more than three small boats altogether. Part of the fish was distributed among the population and the rest was commercialised. Then, to underline the collective effort, some of the income was in the end consigned to the municipality to sustain communal expenses. Indeed, since Camogli lacked industrial facilities to process the tuna for external consumption,

⁵⁷ R. Cattaneo Vietti and S. Bava, *La tonnarella e la pesca tradizionale a Camogli*, Recco: Le Mani, 2009; B. Minoletti, *Della pesca a Portofino e della tonnarella di Camogli alla fine del secolo XIX ed oggi*, Genova: La Marina Italiana, 1941; A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli e la pesca nel Golfo Paradiso tra ottocento e novecento", in G. Doneddu and A. Fiori (ed.), *La pesca in Italia tra età moderna e contemporanea. Produzione, mercato, consumo*, Sassari: EDES, 2003, pp. 63-76.

⁵⁸ A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli", pp. 65-71; A. Clemente, "La ricchezza del mare in margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi dell'Istituto Datini", pp. 217-229.

most of the catch was delivered to the Genoa fishing market. Meanwhile, the production and the periodical maintenance and repairing of nets employed part of the residing population, especially the sailors' wives who could participate somehow to the economic activities of the village⁵⁹.

Due to its nature, this kind of fishing was not very demanding as daily commitment and continuous work; as a result, it was usually complemented by a more varied range of deep-sea fishing. For instance, the case of the *Cooperativa degli zeri*, which Gio. Bono Ferrari accounted to be one of the first experiences of a fishing cooperative⁶⁰, seems to have involved a more considerable amount of ships and people of Camogli (the number of nearly one hundred provided by local historiography might be questionable and it is not verified elsewhere) from the 1780s up to 1810. Its foundation and development are tightly connected with the occasional but abundant presence of *zeri*, a species of small anchovies, in the waters surrounding Camogli. The massive output collected in these circumstances pushed the community to commercialise the catch. This feature led to the creation of a cooperative intended to handle the entire productive chain – through salting and frying processes – from the nets to the market. According to Ferrari, most of the output was sold on account of the personal entrepreneurship of the consul (the ruling authority of the cooperative) “Zanebum” Cichero, who was able to place its product on several markets of the Tyrrhenian (Civitavecchia, Gaeta, Messina and Palermo), where he had established substantial networks overtime⁶¹. From 1810 onwards, this species of anchovies almost vanished, putting an end to the profits of the cooperative. Soon, the local fishermen found new employment in the more renowned – and celebrated – fishing for anchovies in the waters of the Gorgona Island.

⁵⁹ A. Mariotti, “La tonnarella di Camogli”, pp. 67-68.

⁶⁰ G. B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 74-76. As usual in the local literature about Camogli, Gio. Bono Ferrari represents the unique authority to account for the history of this *Cooperativa degli zeri*, which is further mentioned by other authors with the mere reference to Ferrari.

⁶¹ Idem, p. 75.

This experience is remarkable for its volume and for the continuity recorded over time⁶². Despite Ferrari positions its beginning in the aftermath of the *Cooperativa degli zeri's* affair, and indeed it is undoubtedly attested through the course of the nineteenth century, other authors, relying on archival sources, can date it back to a preceding period⁶³. The fishing in Gorgona was practised on a seasonal basis, starting in May and lasting up until the first days of September. On a yearly average of 150-200 ships, the community experienced this endeavour collectively, with massive participation of youngsters (aged 9 and 10) who had the opportunity to spend in a relatively safe environment their first period at sea. As the expedition to Gorgona was a collaborative practice, it held a deep significance for the life of the community. For instance, it was thoroughly correlated to mass ceremonies which were celebrated both at the beginning and the end of the fishing period, in religious festivals like the one of San Prospero, in September. The impression of a communal rite is masterfully sketched in Gio. Bono Ferrari's account. He records:

The departure of the ships of Camogli to Gorgona followed a specific event, every year. In May every captain, master and sailor used to go to the Mass, named the "Mass of Gorgona". [...] When all the ships were gathered in the harbour, the bells rang in celebration and the Priest, escorted by the praying crowd, brought the Case of Saint Prospero to the Castle. From the highest point, in order to let the people see, he raised the case and slowly blessed the crowd, spelling three words: oh San Prospero preserve the men, the boats and the nets!⁶⁴

⁶² The fishing for anchovies at Gorgona Island is central in the local historiography of Camogli. Exhaustive accounts can be found in: G.B. Ferrari, *Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 76-80; A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli", pp. 71-73.

⁶³ A. Mariotti, "La tonnarelli di Camogli", p. 72.

⁶⁴ G.B. Ferrari, *Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 77. Personal translation of the Italian original: «La partenza della flottiglia camogliese per la Gorgona seguiva ogni anno un avvenimento. Un buon giorno di maggio tutti i Padroni, i Capi barca ed i marinai si recavano in chiesa alla Messa chiamata della Gorgona. [...] Quando tutta la interminabile flottiglia era ben schierata sul golfo, dalla Bardiciocca alle case di Rissuolo, le campane suonavano a festa e il Prete accompagnato dalla

During the season the ships went to Livorno to sell the fish and, in the end, only a small proportion of the catch was destined to Camogli – for San Prospero’s celebrations – once the fishing was over. The adventure to Gorgona was carried out on small boats, *batelli* and *gondole* in the sources, weighing no more than 4-5 tons⁶⁵. The fleet was relatively recent since the ships recorded aged averagely 6-7 years. These boats were manned by a master (*patrone*) with three, maximum four people, without considering the occasional presence of an equal number of men as “reinforcement personnel” (*uomini di rinforzo*)⁶⁶.

Although the Gorgona has been usually conceived as a training opportunity for the youngest members of the community, the average age shows partially different results. Masters were usually in their late thirties (average 38), while the crew members aged in average 36,8 years, with extremes of 9 and 69. On the one hand, masters’ figure can find an explanation in the requirements of experience and skills to handle ships in the open sea; on the other hand, it is possible to observe a dichotomy in the composition of the crews, crowded of elders and youngsters and with limited participation of men in their most productive working age⁶⁷. This polarisation is not uncommon in late eighteenth century seafaring communities⁶⁸: the coexistence of older and younger elements onboard responded to both social and educational purposes. The presence of seasoned seamen reflects the inner characteristics of short-distance voyages which allowed more mature personnel to continue their maritime careers in a less demanding working environment. On the other hand, the combination of elders and youngster fits totally with the

folia orante portava la teca di San Prospero in Castello. Dal punto più alto, acciocché i partenti ben vedessero, egli alzava solennemente la teca del Santo e con gesto lento benediceva, pronunciando le tre parole sempre tramandate: San Prospero proteggi gli uomini, le barche e le reti».

⁶⁵ The data are extracted from the records of 17 ships involved in this activity in 1831. They are found in ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2436-2463.

⁶⁶ This is, for instance, the case of the *batello* “San Fortunato”, which in a first phase hosts two men of reinforcement, whereas in a second phase it has three. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2442. This occurs in other two instances, in the voyages of two *gondole*: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2447 and 2448.

⁶⁷ In percentage, out of the total members of the crews (51), 45% were in the age interval of 9-29, 43% were 40-69 while only the remaining 12% were in the group of 30-39 years old.

⁶⁸ See the case-study of Scarborough, in C.R. Foy, “Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough’s Maritime Community, 1747-1765”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 24, 2012, pp. 1-28.

conception of seafaring as a traditional activity within which knowledge and expertise were handed down through the generations. Given the scarcity of sources to examine this specific activity, the interesting data representing the age distribution of the crew members might lead to arguing the relatively decreasing importance for Camogli of its fishing sector, at least for the year 1831 when, as we will discuss in the next paragraphs, the attention of Camogli begins to direct towards most profitable activities.

1.5. Camogli in the Tyrrhenian maritime system

Indeed, leaving aside fishing, an activity that, despite its role in the evolution of the community, is out of the intended borders of the research, we might argue a durable coexistence of fishing with coastal shipping and short-range cabotage, as the activities of the merchant fleet, albeit still composed by rather small vessels, seem to demonstrate.

However, before tackling the involvement of Camogli in the Tyrrhenian maritime system, we must briefly deal with the political context, which between the late eighteenth century and the beginning of the next century is too dense of transforming events. Liguria passed through various political transformations, from being an independent oligarchic Republic until 1797 up to be subjected under the Savoy dynasty after the Vienna Congress, without mentioning the countless administrative resettlements occurred under Napoleon's rule. The outbreak of war disrupted the international scenario, involving the whole continent and affecting the shipping activities in the Mediterranean, which were severely damaged by the Anglo-French rivalry at sea. The merchant trajectories of the Camogli-owned ships, therefore, cannot be addressed without taking into account the political dimension and the war events impacting on the Mediterranean maritime framework. On the other hand, whilst admitting the centrality of political mutations in determining trade routes, this paragraph embraces politics only to a marginal extent, to frame Camogli into a broader system where the critical focus is posed on *long durée* elements (economic and social) rather than on conjunctures

(political). Whenever politics is taken into consideration, the reference is made in the light of the explicit key of interpretation to address the community structural limits and potentialities to profit from troubled contexts – a trademark of the Camogli historical evolution also throughout the nineteenth century.

The data are drawn from the archival collection of the maritime health authority of Genoa⁶⁹. To exploit sanitary registrations in dealing with shipping movement in ports is relatively common and widespread in the literature. In the absence of records collecting the arrivals and departures in ports with statistical purposes (more common in the following period), the political authorities main interests to keep an eye on the port movements were sanitary and fiscal concerns. Whereas the taxation controls were aimed at the goods either entering or being temporarily deposited into the port warehouses, on the other hand, the maritime healthcare was concerned with the cargo and vessel material conditions (nautical data), the medical status of the captain and the crew (seagoing personnel data) and the route and the specific ports of call visited by the ship (shipping and trade data). This enormous mass of information is extremely precious to maritime historians, as it allows to collect vast datasets and to carry out quantitative approaches. In the impossibility of delineating in details the overall evolution of Camogli's shipping from the late eighteenth century to the Congress of Vienna, due to the overwhelming amount of vessels recorded, we decided to select three different periods, starting from 1785 with a time interval of ten years. The results obtained seem to fulfil the initial requirements, as, throughout the period under analysis, structural trends emerge along with conjunctural processes, the latter occasionally determining the establishment of new routes or in other cases affecting the final figure in a much more decisive way.

⁶⁹ The "Ufficio di Sanità" of the port of Genoa has produced an extensive documentation from the 16th century up to its dismissal as a result of the Italian unification (1861). For the purposes of our analysis, we mainly used the records of the arriving vessels at Genoa which, with regard the two period under our interest (the latest decade of the Republic of Genoa and the period under the Savoy sovereignty), is divided in three different collections: with regard to the period 1785-1795, the arrival records can be found in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Manuali e Notulari, 208-483; for the 1805, they have been kept in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di capitani e padroni, 1682-1694; for the latest phase, under Savoy administration, they are found in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 553-615.

For methodological purposes, the ports were grouped on a geographical basis and concerning port systems and traffic flows, notwithstanding the political borders. The port of Livorno deserves a different treatment: despite its location within the Tuscan area, it was considered as a distinct unit to underline its different role within Camogli's shipping system. Indeed, the traffics linking Livorno, and the Tuscan area with Liguria differed under several regards, particularly when concerning merchandises.




Figure 1-1 Camogli-owned ships arriving at Genoa distinguished by regional area. 1785; 1795; 1805. Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

The figure reflects rather clearly the trend of cabotage routes and traffics handled by the fleet of Camogli. The records show the existence of a stable connection with the nearby Tuscan area and particularly with the region of Maremma, whose relative geographical proximity with the Ligurian eastern communities contributed to the establishment of long-lasting relationships. From the eighteenth century onwards, Maremma continuously supplied with charcoal and timber the Republic of Genoa and, in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress, to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The relevance of the statistical measure of charcoal trade within the whole shipping of Camogli – and within the strategies of its

captains and shipowners – leads to devoting more space to this subject in order to carry out proper analyses. Meanwhile, the other routes might be taken into account, especially as these activities are keen to provide an insight about the ability of Camogli maritime actors to enter into, and to benefit from, different typologies of trade. In this regard, the distribution of the ports of departure, among which it is worth outlining the recurrent presence of Livorno and Marseille, the sporadic records concerning the Iberic coast and the intermittent participation in the traffics with the southern Italian area might outline a more composite scenario, where short and long-distance hauls overlapped and coexisted according to convenience and trade opportunities⁷⁰.

The first remark involves the rate of arrivals to the port of Genoa from Livorno in 1795 (13%), which strikes against the figures of 1785 and 1805, when Livorno is negligible in terms of relative frequency (respectively 1,3% and 5,5%). The reasons for such contrast lie into exogenous factors. The conflicts waged by Napoleon against the British fleet in the Mediterranean granted a comparative advantage to Livorno, which established itself as one of the main *entrepôts* for grain trade. Livorno absorbed a high percentage of the seaborne trade of Marseille, becoming the principal port of transit (and deposit) of the Mediterranean, especially for what concerned wheat and cereals⁷¹. From the data drawn from the number of Camogli-owned ships to Livorno in this specific year, the favourable conjuncture of the Tuscan city constituted an extremely profitable opportunity for the Genoese fleet. Among the cargo typologies registered emerges a neat preference for cereals and leguminous plants, which constituted the 95,3% of the total. Wheat was loaded as

⁷⁰ The ports of departures were grouped as such: Western Mediterranean (Agde, Barcelona, Ceuta, Ibiza, Marseille, Nice, Toulon, Villefranche-sur-Mer); Southern Italy (Castellammare, Girgenti, Licata, Majori, Mazzara, Mazzarelli, Modica, Napoli, Palermo, Pozzallo, Termini and Terracina).

⁷¹ The most authoritative reference concerning the evolution of the port of Livorno in the early modern period until the Restoration is: J.P. Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998. For the importance acquired by the Tuscan port in the Napoleonic period, see also: S. Marzagalli, “*Le boulevards de la fraude*”. *Le négoce maritime et le Blocus continental, 1806-1813. Bordeaux, Hambourg, Livourne, Villeneuve d’Ascq*: Presses Universitaire du Septentrion, 1999; Id., *I negozianti delle città portuali in età napoleonica: Amburgo, Bordeaux e Livorno di fronte al blocco continentale, 1806-1813*, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 1993. Also, see the chapter about the British presence in Livorno during the Napoleonic wars in K. Galani, *British shipping in the Mediterranean*, pp. 89-116.

the main cargo in 48,8% of the instances⁷². Colonial genres, usually transported over British vessels from the Atlantic and the Levant, are absent, despite they have been a crucial export from the port of Livorno throughout the eighteenth century,. There are a few exceptions when high-value commodities are combined as a complement of the leading merchandise (usually wheat). In this regard, we can find cotton in eight instances and spices like pepper and saffron in four cases⁷³.

The absence of records concerning the arrival of colonial genres – which instead were common in the overall trade linking Livorno with Genoa – in the other years surveyed, together with the restrict number of ships departing from the Tuscan city in 1785 and 1805, poses the question about the exceptionality of the results found in correspondence to the year 1795. Arguably, Camogli-owned ships simply met Livorno’s conjunctural high demands for maritime transport. In 1797, the first French occupation of the city disrupted the trade, which revived at the edge of the century to last only a few years before the imposition of the continental blockade. The absence of vessels recorded in 1805 holds a more profound significance to the general trend of the Tuscan port, especially concerning the British arrivals, whose presence was instrumental to the redistribution trade in which the Camogli-owned ships engaged⁷⁴. Nevertheless, the picture plotted for 1795 is still valuable about the conditions and the potentialities of Camogli’s fleet, which might have accounted for more or less 31-33 ships – at least a pair of identifications are uncertain⁷⁵ – to this route. It implied, also, the presence of a mature merchant

⁷² This is the table listing the cargoes loaded at Livorno in 1795 by Camogli-owned ships:

fodder	canvas	chick peas	fava beans	wheat	corn	olive oil	barley
3	1	2	6	21	3	1	6

⁷³ See, for instance, the case of the *pinco* “Nostra Signora del Carmine” (*patrone* Prospero Schiaffino), which arrives at Genoa on 6th March 1795 with a cargo of wheat, soap, cotton and saffron: ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, 468.

⁷⁴ The decline of British shipping in the port of Livorno is clearly observable in the analysis of Katerina Galani: K. Galani, *British shippin in the Mediterranean*, p. 103 (figure 4.2b).

⁷⁵ In two cases, the Marine Health Authority official does not provide any name for the ship, one of the two main distinguishing information to identify a ship together with the family name of its master.

awareness of trade conjunctures and international flows of goods, a fundamental skill for the future sake of the community. Finally, this fortuitous occurrence might represent the first involvement of Camogli in the international wheat trade, an activity which later – under similar circumstances – played a critical role in the maritime community success within the international shipping business.

Apart from the particular case of Livorno in 1795, and the already mentioned trade of Tuscan charcoal which will be the subject of the next paragraph, the general trend of Camogli-owned ships in the late eighteenth century displays some occasional relationships with western Mediterranean ports, like Barcelona, Ceuta, Agde, Toulon and especially Marseille, together with sporadic arrivals from southern Italy, in particular Sicily.

As far as the western Mediterranean is concerned, almost one-third of the ships (18 of 55) arrived at Genoa on ballast, presumably in their return haul. Although the archival sources lack of further insights about the traffics to this vast area, presumably the transport of Tuscan charcoal touched Marseille as well. This hypothesis leads to the idea that some ships from Marseille were just returning to resume the trade from Genoa. Besides, the existing literature suggests the involvement of a few families from Camogli in alum trade between Naples and Palermo and the Iberian and French coasts⁷⁶. Within this area, the data bear witness of a large predominance of Marseille, detaining the 76,3% of the total arrivals from the Western Mediterranean: from the French port, the vessels of Camogli imported to Genoa a various spectrum of commodities, ranging from colonial genres such as coffee, tobacco, sugar, cotton and indigo to local production like hats, draperies, soap and wine.

In analogy with the abovementioned trade axis linking the Republic of Genoa with the Kingdom of Naples, the ships which were directed to Southern Italy usually returned with general cargoes in foodstuff. The relatively modest number of vessels pursuing this route (15 percent of the total movement, leaving out the southernmost charcoal loading ports) sets the role of Camogli in the commercial

⁷⁶ G.B. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonucelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983, p. 5.

relationships with Southern Italy in a liminal position if compared to that of other communities. Nevertheless, it might be worth noting the existence in this period of a quite recurrent route to trade carobs – almost one-third of the general merchandises arriving from this region. Indeed, the trade in carobs is, to a lesser extent than Tuscan charcoal, a durable activity in which Camogli-owned ships engaged. Interestingly, the comparison with the sources collected concerning the late 1850s period illustrates a shift in the geographical distribution of this kind of traffic: the role of Sicily gradually decreased, and the routes extended to the Eastern Mediterranean, where captains were able to contract more profitable freights in Crete and Cyprus. Indeed, out of 45 ships with a carobs cargo between 1858-1862, 19 were loaded in Crete and other 4 in Cyprus⁷⁷. The continuity of the traffic is remarkable and, perhaps, deserving of further analysis. The fact that a limited group of ships travelled more than once along the same route might suggest the existence of a certain degree of specialisation and leads to posing questions about whether existed or not further interests throughout the supply chain of this particular commodity. The late eighteenth century sources do not provide this kind of information: on the other hand, the mid-nineteenth century ones might give us more insights. The same merchant, Giuseppe Denegri, purchased most of the carob cargoes⁷⁸. Although this family name is attested amongst the historical households of Camogli, he was born elsewhere, in Sampierdarena: nevertheless, Denegri maintained firm and continuous contacts with the leading figures of Camogli's shipping. For instance, in 1854, he purchased in society with Angelo Olivari 18 shares (in a 24 share system) of the brick "Annibale" (149 tons.) from different owners⁷⁹. Two years later, he was found as

⁷⁷ ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613. Among the Cretan ports is observed a quite consistent preference for Rethymno (12) and Heraklion (7). In Cyprus, carobs were loaded in Larnaca. Then, among the remaining arrivals it is worth noting the persistence of the market of Pozzallo (Sicily), which appears in other 11 instances.

⁷⁸ ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613. Giuseppe Denegri is the main buyer in 27 instances out of 45.

⁷⁹ ASGe, *Notai II Sezione*, Notaio Gio. Batta Degregori, 172, n. 41. In this purchasing contract he is recognized by the notary as «Denegri Giuseppe fu Bartolomeo, mediatore in noleggi e sicurtà, native del Comune di San Pier d'Arena mandamento di Rivarolo, Provincia di Genova, ed in Genova domiciliato e dimorante».

commercial correspondent of the Rocca family, merchants of Ligurian origin dealing with long-ranged international trade with North Africa and the Levant, and that in the late 18th century had established the leading unit of their company in Marseille⁸⁰. His commercial activities and his wide-ranging networks might have probably facilitated and stimulated Camogli's persistence in this traffic, even when, from the 1850s onwards, the Camogli maritime elites had already abandoned most of their traditional habits, and redirected their investments to the construction of bigger ships with to insert into more lucrative traffics.

1.6. A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal

Since the late eighteenth century, the most relevant trade practised by the ships of Camogli seems to be the transport of charcoal and timber from the Maremma Tuscan region to Genoa (and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, e.g. Marseille). The first mention of this kind of traffic ascends to Gio. Bono Ferrari's works, who pointed out the remarkable rate of arrivals to Genoa from Maremma and provided some necessary information about the maritime actors and the ships involved, as well as a few details about the typology of merchandises which were traded along this route⁸¹. Lacking more exhaustive news, Ferrari erroneously dated the first occurrences of this activity to the mid-nineteenth century when, in effect, the people of Camogli still sailed along the route as much as they began to frequent the Black Sea to transport the Russian wheat to the Mediterranean and England. However, as the thoroughly conducted archival research of Pietro Berti has pointed out, the presence of ships from Camogli in this trade is more long-dated and

⁸⁰ About the Rocca family there is the recent work of Annastella Carrino: A. Carrino, *Passioni e interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel Mediterraneo dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Viella, 2018. The commercial correspondence of the Rocca family is kept in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille. The letter of Giuseppe De Negri can be found in: ACCIMP, *Fonds Rocca*, Maison Rocca-Correspondance passive, L 19/14/101, Giuseppe De Negri 1856-1856.

⁸¹ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX*, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, 1939, pp. 471-473.

effectively might be ascended at least to the preceding century, at some stage between the 1730s and the 1770s⁸².

Nevertheless, the purpose of Berti's work was to outline a trend in order to stimulate further research on this subject: indeed, rather than attempting to reconstruct the entire statistical figure of Camogli's involvement in the Tuscan charcoal trade, the author chose to focus on a few familiar nucleuses to show the effective continuity observed in this trade overtime. Despite the significant number of ships recorded in the article, the data bear witness of a much more consistent presence – from a quantitative perspective – than what is shown in Berti's study. For instance, whereas he reports respectively 3, 2 and 7 ships dealing with charcoal in the years 1785, 1795 and 1805, the registrations of the Marine Health Authority of Genoa provide us with a much more remarkable picture, with 134, 161 and 46 Camogli-owned ships recorded for having transported charcoal from Maremma to Genoa. Furthermore, charcoal was not the unique kind of good with which the people of Camogli dealt in the same area, due to the conspicuous numbers of timber cargoes, which made the total figure increase to 174, 188 and 47 respectively.

During the late-eighteenth century period, in the measured intervals, the share of this traffic on the whole amount of Camogli-owned ships sailing along other routes is impressive:

Year	Total arrivals registered	Charcoal and timber trade	%
1785	219	174	79,5%
1795	330	188	56,9%
1805	55	47	85,5%

⁸² P. Berti, *Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di Camogli*, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*, pp. 315-328.

Table 1.2 - Relative number of ships coming from Camogli out of the total arrivals. Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

First, it is possible to point out the similar figure observed in 1785 and 1795 concerning the number of ships doing the route of Maremma. This trend might suggest the substantial inelasticity of Ligurian demands for charcoal and timber within a decade, despite the relative percentages. Likewise, in 1795 the trade with Livorno absorbed another 13% of the traffics, thus resulting in a total picture of almost 70%.

The relevance of coastal coal transport in the history of Camogli might resemble those of the multitude of British maritime communities which specialised in collier trade before committing to deep-sea shipping⁸³. The opportunity to rely on a stable and unrelenting trade might have played a role in the evolution from occasional to professional sailors, engaged steadily throughout the year in the shipping business. Meanwhile, steadiness could have nurtured the expansion of the merchant fleet, as the statistical relevance of *navicelli* among the ships of Camogli seems to indicate.

Following the inner features of the Mediterranean cabotage, the short-distance route covered by the vessels linking Genoa with the Maremma allowed captains and masters to sail throughout the whole year, even in winter, despite the seasonal interruptions which were needed in long-distance hauls which would necessarily involve deep-sea navigation stretches. This advantage, however, was not statistically relevant, since of 188 ships engaging in the trade during the whole 1795, as few as 22 challenged the odds of adverse weather over the winter months⁸⁴.

The figure for 1805, instead, demonstrates a rather remarkable resilience of the route within the economic depression, when all the trade were limited by the

⁸³ See R. Davis, *The rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, Research in Maritime History series (No. 48), Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2012. An interesting comparison can be sketched with the maritime community of Scarborough: C.R. Foy, "Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough's Maritime Community", pp. 1-11.

⁸⁴ ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Manuali e notulari, 468-469. In particular the arrivals of Camogli-owned vessel from Maremma to Genoa in the months of January and February and from October to December are as follows: January (1), February (3), October (7), November (3), December (7).

international crisis owing mainly to the continental blockade and, therefore, marked by the absence of the British commerce which was vital to the Mediterranean maritime activities. The conditions of the Ligurian trade were even worse: in 1804, the inclusion into the Imperial administration had deteriorated the already precarious position of Genoa within the international stage. Bulferetti and Costantini, in their pivotal work, have already underlined how the concomitant actions of the continental blockade and the inclusion in the Empire had inflicted a decisive blow to the Ligurian city⁸⁵. After the steady growth observed until 1797, the volume of traffics had remained stable up to 1803; then, beginning with the following year, Genoa was rapidly cut off from the international trade, as the minimal participation of big ships in the total movement seems to confirm⁸⁶. Genoa became a destination of short-distance voyages, and its fleet strictly restrained to cabotage. In the same regard, it is worth noting the fact that the Genoese fleet had been unceasingly diminished since Napoleon's Egypt expedition in 1798, in the context which the newly acquired territories of Liguria offered a consistent participation⁸⁷. The campaign of Egypt directly concerned the fleet of Camogli, since several ships (26) joined Napoleon's expedition, and only a few of them (3 out of 26) returned safely⁸⁸.

The interests of Ligurian ship-owners had been damaged by British privateering in the Mediterranean waters, which disrupted the maritime activities of the region.

⁸⁵ L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria nell'età del Risorgimento: 1700-1861*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1967.

⁸⁶ See the two tables in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 268-269. These tables clearly express the decrease of the percentage of big ships (over 150 t.) arriving at Genoa between 1797 (27,9%) and 1804 (3,3%).

⁸⁷ The exploitation of the Ligurian marine for the Egypt expedition is mentioned in most of the general literature about the late 18th century history of Genoa: L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 272-273. A more detailed focus on the naval involvement is found in: V. Ilari and P. Crociani, *Le marine italiane di Napoleone: le marine ligure, toscana e romana, 1797-1814*, Milano: Società Italiana di Storia Militare, 2014.

⁸⁸ The number of ships of Camogli within the total amount is questionable. In Ferrari's books the ships are 26, but, as usual for the local historian, there is no mention of his sources: G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare*, p. 333. In the papers of the French administration of Genoa there are mentions of bureaucratic procedures to refund the shipowners who had lost their ships in the campaign, but through these sources is impossible to reconstruct the whole figure: see, A. Pellegrini, "Napoleone e il porto di Camogli", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, p. 136 and ASGe, *Prefettura francese*, b. 573.

As a result of all these factors, the total number of Camogli-owned ships engaging in business in 1805 might not be a surprise. Nonetheless, the increased importance of charcoal trade in the broader perspective find reasons in the relative proximity of Maremma, and therefore in the limited length of the route. The short distance coastal navigation and the deployment of small ships allowed the Camogli-owned vessels to continue in their trade to a certain extent, despite the presence of British privateers in the Tyrrhenian waters. Through the year, out of 47 voyages, only three captains reported some dealings with privateers, and all of them were involved in a single attack⁸⁹. In order to prevent privateers' aggressions and to conduct safer navigation, most of the vessels probably sailed in convoys. In several cases, the sources display concomitant arrivals from the same place of departure. On the 9th March 1805, three Camogli-owned ships arrived at Genoa and two of them – captained respectively by Biagio and Gio. Batta Mortola – came from Castagneto (the latter one coming from the nearby area of Portiglione)⁹⁰. The same individuals arrived together on 22nd September, from Follonica⁹¹. Family ties might have also connected Lorenzo and Andrea Senno who, on the 19th July, arrived at Genoa from Portiglione⁹². Nevertheless, convoys were not restricted to the members of the same family: for instance, on the abovementioned 22nd September, six ships are recorded, coming respectively from Castiglione della Pescaia (Geronimo Mortola and Biagio Schiaffino), Follonica (Biagio e Gio. Batta Mortola), Portiglione (Antonio Boggiano) and Torre Civette (Bartolomeo Mortola)⁹³.

⁸⁹ This is the case of the *navicello* “Gesù, Giuseppe e Maria” (*patrone* Bartolomeo Mortola) and of the *filuca* “La Misericordia”, (*patrone* Filippo Bertolotto), who reported to having been attacked in the waters of Castagneto (one of the main places of charging of charcoal) by English corsairs on the 17th September 1805. In the first case, the sight of the privateers approaching led the sailors to abandon the ship, leaving only the captain to deal with the corsairs. Both of the ships were not attacked for the cargoes which they were transporting, but only to take foodstuff and water («diverse bagatelle e alcune provviste»). Then, the second vessel attacked had to share its own sailor with Bartolomeo Mortola who was evidently in need of people to man the ship to Genoa. ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità, Arrivi di capitani e padroni*, 1688.

⁹⁰ ASGe, *Idem*, 1687.

⁹¹ ASGe, *Idem*, 1689.

⁹² ASGe, *Idem*, 1688.

⁹³ ASGe, *Idem*, 1689.



Map 1.2 – The ports of Tuscan charcoal.

The presentation of a singular example of ship engaging in this trade might lead to valuable results, especially with the purpose to reconstruct the rate of productivity to engage in the charcoal route, under the lens of both owners and sailors. For instance, taking into account the navigation of the *navicello* “N.S. del Rosario” led by the *patrone* Andrea Simonetti through the course of the year 1795, it is possible to observe that seven out of eight arrivals of this vessel at Genoa are related to the trade of Tuscan charcoal, evidence suggesting the rate of specialisation of the ships involved in this traffic. Furthermore, the occurrence of seven hauls in a single year might lead to arguing a similar rate of sailings between Maremma and Genoa, thus allowing to propose some hypothesis about the real dimensions of the fleet of Camogli (at least of the part which engaged in charcoal trade)⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ See paragraph 1.3 “The Camogli merchant fleet”.

Day of arrival	11/02	16/03	01/05	22/05	27/06	12/08	05/09	28/12
Provenience	Nice	Torre delle Civette	Torre delle Civette	Torre delle Civette	Porto Ercole	San Vincenzo	San Vincenzo	Follonica
Cargo	ballast	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal

Table 1.3 – The voyages of the *navicello* “N.S. del Rosario”, *patrone* Andrea Simonetti, during the year 1795 – January to December. Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Manuali e notulari, 468-469.

The analysis of the trade geography might lead to interesting results, at least concerning the practical procedures to load the cargo, and to obtain few indications about the ships types and the numbers of the tonnage deployed. The location and identification of the 24 places of charging recorded in the sources led to the detection of three sites which were, already in the late eighteenth century, somehow inhabited and only two of them (Castiglione della Pescaia and Civitavecchia) had actual ports (being the third the village of San Vincenzo)⁹⁵. On the contrary, the majority of these sites was placed in depopulated areas: the loading occurred next to military outposts located before the beach – with long stretches of marshlands at the back. Charcoal, which was locally produced through the burning of timber according to traditional procedures, was then transported to the sea by the members of the agricultural communities populating the hinterland. In the absence of ports, and due to the peculiar hydrographical characteristics of the area, dominated by shallow waters, charcoal and timber had to be loaded on small lighters and then, finally, on the ship which was anchored offshore.

In the late 1850s, the geographical distribution of the place of loading frames a somewhat different picture, with only 6 locations registered and the overwhelming

⁹⁵ See D. Barsanti, *Castiglione della Pescaia. Storia di una comunità dal XVI al XIX secolo*, Firenze: Sansoni, 1984.

role of Talamone, covering the 64% of the departures⁹⁶. Also, the number of ships changed significantly, from the averagely 170 figure for the late eighteenth century to the 42,6 yearly average in the last decade before the Italian unification (and the subsequent loss of information about this trade). However, as a result of the improvements in Camogli's shipping business, leading to new and more significant constructions, the tonnage devoted to this traffic every year might not have decreased too much, despite the relevant fall in the number of vessels. The sources fail in providing reliable information about the average tonnages of the vessels employed by Camogli in this trade.

Finally, a further interesting feature to observe in the charcoal trade in opposition to the other routes sailed by Camogli-owned ships comes out from the analysis of the average age of the captains involved. These data are available only to what concerns the 1850s phase, but this kind of analysis provides nonetheless fruitful results. In the case of charcoal, the age of captains is much higher than the average for the same period: indeed, whereas the average age of the Camogli captains was 36,5, those going back and forth to Maremma were 47,2 years old. This remarkable difference might imply the relatively traditional nature of the traffic, as well as its declining position within the broader commercial framework, much more focused on longer and more challenging routes, those of the Black Sea grain trade.

Conclusions

In the course of the late eighteenth century, the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities seems to be in line with the paradigm of the Ligurian communities, especially of those lying east of Genoa. From the coasts to the deep-sea, fishing remained a key source of economic subsistence to the community. In parallel, the community developed its merchant fleet to profit from both some long-lasting

⁹⁶ The locations reported in the documents are Castiglione della Pescaia, Follonica, Longone, Pozzallo, San Vincenzo e Talamone. ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613.

routes as well as conjunctural shipping opportunities. The coexistence of the two aspects represented respectively by the massive involvement in the Tuscan charcoal and the critical readjustment of the routes to exploit the advantageous status of Livorno in the Revolutionary period, reveals a discrete capability to shift from one type of navigation to another. The range of activities remained restricted to the local level, as the outliers from the Northern Tyrrhenian area seems to be somewhat sporadic and exceptional, and seldom substantial to the general framework of Camogli's shipping.

The coexistence of fishing, coal trade and the capability to exploit the opportunities deriving from trade conjunctures (a sort of tramp shipping), constitute the distinguishing traits of the first phase of activities of Camogli. Despite the later outstanding success of the community to insert into the international shipping business might not be directly connected to these premises, since the late 18th century Camogli demonstrates to possess a solid maritime tradition, based on vast supplies of skilled sea labourers and a discrete availability of tonnage. Indeed, only a minimum portion of the pre-existing fleet survived to the following phase, due to the different purposes it served. Nonetheless, the strength of the maritime tradition and the expertise of local sea workers might have played a role in future accomplishments.

2. SEAFARING ACTIVITIES IN THE EXTENDED MEDITERRANEAN (1830-1870)

Introduction

The decades between 1830 and 1870 represent a phase of profound changes in the economic and social conditions of the maritime community of Camogli, which dramatically transformed it due to the outstanding growth of its shipping industry. Such evolution, in less than forty years, led a traditional seafaring community to achieve a dominant position within the Italian and world shipping. In the heart of this momentous evolution lies the direct participation in the leading maritime business of the period, the Black Sea grain trade, which produced hundreds of thousands tons of cereals transported yearly from the Southern Russian and Danube port-cities to the Mediterranean and Western Europe. The geographical range of Camogli's shipping extended to new horizons, passing from the local to the international dimension, thus preparing the ground for further oceanic expansion characterising the last stage of its maritime activities. In the history of Camogli, the Black Sea phase is the cornerstone of all the further developments, as the consistent revenues collected with this traffic were continuously reinvested in the shipping sector, especially in the direction of the enlargement of the fleet.

In this chapter, the Black Sea trade and the rise of Camogli's shipping will be taken into account altogether, since the features and peculiarities of the former played a crucial role in shaping the evolution of the latter. The first section examines, from a quantitative and qualitative point of view, the transformations that occurred in the fleet of Camogli, the main economic asset – together with human capital, which will be directly addressed in the second part of the thesis – of the maritime community.

The second and third sections will provide, instead, an historical and geographical contextualization of the main characteristics of the Black Sea trade, its formation, the earlier development, and the geographical framework, which has

been divided into three areas: the region of Odessa, the ports of the Azov Sea and the ports of Danube.

In the fourth section, the most important commercial networks established in the Black Sea are taken into account, focusing on the Greek and Italian trade houses, due to the relative importance of their business to the maritime activities of Camogli. The analysis also aims to investigate and to determine the role of each of the two groups in shaping the characteristics of the business model of the maritime community.

Then, the fifth and the sixth sections target the transport trade of Camogli in relation to both imports and exports to and from the Black Sea directly. Apart from the quantitative assessment of Camogli's presence and participation in the economic activities of the area, one of the purposes is to contextualize Camogli within the broader framework of the Italian shipping business in the region.

The seventh section, instead, opens a parenthesis about the reconversion of Camogli's shipping during the period of the Crimean War (1854-1856). This interlude is fundamental to depict, on one side, the dependency of Camogli from the Black Sea framework and the difficulties to readjust into other markets. On the other side, the adjustment to warfare economy is an indication of the capability of Camogli's ship-owners to develop rapid and reliable responses to conjunctural crisis, a crucial quality to endure in the shipping business.

Finally, the eighth and last section addresses the last component of the Black Sea trade, namely the presence of Camogli ships in the ports of discharge. In this case, the gradual geographical transfer from the Mediterranean to the British Isles acquired greater significance in light of the development of a complementary trade, that of British coal to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This trade transformed the nature of the maritime activities of Camogli by reducing the dependency of its economy from the grain trade and by introducing its captains to new markets, which opened the way to Camogli's following establishment along the Atlantic and oceanic routes.

2.1. The Camogli merchant fleet

Compared with the previous period, during the second historical phase, more data are available about Camogli's fleet. Voyage and arrival records can be combined with crew lists, data about the shipbuilding industry in Liguria and, from 1853 onwards, with the lists of the ships enrolled in the local mutual insurance company (*Mutua Assicurazione Marittima La Camogliese*)⁹⁷. Altogether, the sources provide us information about tonnage, type of ship, place and date of construction (Gatti's database also adds details about ship-builders) without mentioning all the data about ownership, the object of more extensive analysis in the fifth chapter.

To propose an evaluation of the fleet of Camogli, two different perspectives are adopted: the first is related to the fleet's average tonnage over time; the second to new constructions. The observation of the evolution of the fleet allows us to contextualise Camogli's operational capacity within the international framework of the Black Sea trade. The information about new constructions, instead, is intended to highlight the historical peaks of investments in shipbuilding, aimed to enlarge the fleet and to conform its technology to the demands of the international market.

The main corpus of data is available from crew lists from the Genoa State Archives, which allowed us to draw an almost complete survey of Camogli's operating fleet in the Black Sea in the 1853-1865 period. Nonetheless, as far as possible, they have been integrated and compared with other sources.

The first level of analysis concerns the growth of the average tonnage overtime. Paired with the progressive specialisation into brigantine, brigs and barks, these

⁹⁷ The following sources constitute the archival corpus in the analysis of the evolution of the fleet of Camogli: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865; ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613; Civico Museo Marinaro "Gio. Bono Ferrari" (CMMC from now on), *Assicurazioni varie*; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice I – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176. For a comparative perspective, see: A. Delis, "Mediterranean Wooden Shipbuilding in the nineteenth century: Production, Productivity and Ship Types in Comparative Perspective", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, No. 84, 2012, pp. 349-366.

data offer a clear picture of the Camogli's fleet upgrade from coastal trade vessels to long-distance navigation ones.




Figure 2.1 – Average tonnage of Camogli merchant fleet (1828-1865). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1828 to 1865; ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero*, 590-613⁹⁸.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the constant growth in the average tonnage between 1828 (121 tons) and 1865 (297 tons.). The increase is even remarkable as far as the 1853-1865 period is concerned (from 158 to almost 300): this evolution is indicative of the profound correlation between Camogli's participation in the Black Sea trade and the expansion of its merchant fleet. From a methodological point of view, the decision to show average tonnage rather than total tonnage is ascribed to the lack of homogeneity between the two chronologic sub-series under consideration, the periods 1828-1840 and 1853-1865. This specific information, instead, is found in the 1853 list of the ships enrolled into the local Mutua (Mutual Insurance Association)– the first of the kind –, which constitutes a fundamental source to reconstruct the whole fleet of Camogli⁹⁹. In 1853, it was composed of 143 vessels,

⁹⁸ The health records of Genoa's port authorities have been paired to the crew lists information only for the years between 1858 and 1862.

⁹⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

for a total of 25.038 tons (average 175,09). Most of the ships fall under the 150-200 tonnage class (Figure 2.2).




Figure 2.2 – The fleet of Camogli by tonnage range in 1853. Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

Unfortunately, in its first edition, the Mutua list does not provide further information concerning the fleet age and qualitative features: place and date of construction and ship type are not mentioned¹⁰⁰. However, since an evaluation of the categorization by types might offer a more precise depiction of the nature of the fleet, we resorted to crew lists.

	Bark	Brigantine	Brig	Other
1828-1835	0%	2%	55%	44%
1836-1846	0%	9%	70%	20%
1853-1857	4%	5%	88%	4%

¹⁰⁰ The same data will be available, instead, with the new lists of the 1870s onwards (see Chapter 3).

1858-1862	8%	3%	88%	1%
1863-1866	27%	0%	72%	1%

Table 2.1 – Percentage of ship types of Camogli’s fleet active in commerce (1828-1865)¹⁰¹. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*,

According to Table 2.1, the traditionally high rate of diversification in ship types (see chapter 1.2) was replaced by the specialization into three different types, brigantines, brigs and barks, suitable to long-distance navigation. Between 1828 and 1835, *sciabecco* (3,23%), *navicello* (8,06%) and *pinco* (11,29%) are still found¹⁰²; the frequent recurrence of ketches (20,97%), then, might be interpreted as the first transition from coastal to the Mediterranean and Black Sea trade. Indeed, some of them sailed along these routes in the early stages of Camogli’s presence. The disappearance of traditional types of vessels coincided with the boom of brigantines, brigs and barks¹⁰³. These three types shared some technical features, in particular concerning the hull. However, they were distinguished by rigging and masts: brigantines (*brick goletta* or *brick schooners* in the sources), had two masts. The foremast square-rigged, while the second mast was equipped with fore-and-aft sails¹⁰⁴. Brigs (*brigantino* in Italian) had two masts, both of them square-rigged, although usually, the mainmast carried a small fore-and-aft sail in order to improve manoeuvrability¹⁰⁵. Barques (*brigantino a palo*) were bigger and had three masts: the first two were armed with square sails and the aftermost with fore-and-aft sails.

Furthermore, these three ship types, all employed in the Black Sea trade, had considerable differences in tonnage. Brigantines were the smallest, measuring

¹⁰¹ To translate the nautical terminology, in particular for what concerned the ship types, we chose the official translation proposed by the *Registro Navale Italiano*. Brigantines and brigs are found also in all the numbers of the *Lloyd’s register* to identify the respective kind of ships. Barks, instead, are also commonly found as barques.

¹⁰² All of these ship types are grouped in the class “Other” in the Graphic 3. For a description of these ship types see, Chapter 1.2.

¹⁰³ A comparable transition is shown by A. Delis in the Greek-owned merchant fleet: A. Delis, “From Lateen to Square Rig: The Evolution of the Greek-Owned merchant fleet and its ships in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, No. 100: 1, 2014, pp. 44-58.

¹⁰⁴ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 72-77.

¹⁰⁵ Idem, pp. 64-71.

around 111,2 tons (Gatti¹⁰⁶) or 127,6 (crew lists of Camogli¹⁰⁷). Brigs spanned between 178,2 (Gatti) and 204,7 tons (crew lists). Finally, barks (or *barques*) averaged to 365,1 tons (crew list)¹⁰⁸.

	Brig	Bark	Brigantine	Other
1826-1835	61%	0%	4%	34%
1836-1846	83%	2%	6%	9%
1847-1852	80%	3%	6%	10%
1853-1857	91%	6%	1%	1%
1858-1862	61%	37%	0%	2%
1863-1865	47%	53%	0%	0%

Table 2.2 – Ship types of Camogli built between 1826-1865. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

Differently from the previous one, Table 2.2 focuses on ship-building statistics in order to emphasize the transition from coastal to long-distance navigation ships. The data available in Gatti also fills some of the gaps of the crew lists. Still, in the 1830s, some ship-owners opted for the construction of small-sized vessels, suitable for cabotage. The incidence of these ship types within the operating fleet of Camogli (Table 2.1), therefore, was not outdated; instead, small cabotage still represented a reliable and profitable market niche to the point of encouraging new constructions. Notwithstanding the impressive reduction of ship-buildings within this category, still, some ship-owners invested in coastal vessels until the early 1850s. Then, as Camogli's vessels had strengthened their position in the Black Sea trade, the maritime activities of the community specialized, even more, leaving few, if any space at all, to investments in other sectors.

¹⁰⁶ L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

¹⁰⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1828 to 1865.

¹⁰⁸ The statistics are drawn from the crew lists of Camogli ships (ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1828 to 1865) and from L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176. Barks lack in Gatti's statistics is due to the absence of barks among the ship-buildings reported. Indeed, also the crew lists show that no barks of Camogli was built in Liguria before 1856, thus confirming the data of Gatti.




Figure 2.3 – Comparison between yearly ship constructions and average tonnage of Camogli ship-buildings. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

In Figure 2.3, a further level of analysis emerges from the combination of the yearly number of constructions and the average tonnage of the newly-built ships. In so doing, the results lead us to an estimation of the total tonnage constructed within the period.




Figure 2.4 – Estimation of total tonnage built by Camogli ship-owners. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice I – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

After the opening of the Black Sea waters to the Sardinian flag (1825), Camogli's ship-owners made efforts to renew their fleet to respond to the increasing demands of sea transport connected with the booming Russian grain trade. Gradually, the constructions specialized in medium-sized brigs (between 150 and 200 tons.) which represented the most typical and recurrent ship type up until the late 1850s. Hence, after the Crimean War, the shipping capital in the hands of local ship-owners rose to new levels: more ships were ordered in the shipyards, and the tonnage growth represented one of the main accomplishments of the period. The average tonnage of the new vessels increased from 189 tons to around 270 tons; most of them were barks, suited for both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in line with the geographical expansion of Camogli's shipping activities.

In conclusion, Table 2.3 invites us to propose some considerations about the shipyards and the place of constructions of the fleet of Camogli.

GENOESE WESTERN RIVIERA	
PRÀ	40
SESTRI PONENTE	31
VOLTRI	10
CORNIGLIANO	1
GENOESE EASTERN RIVIERA	
RECCO	23
CHIAVARI	7
LIGURIAN WESTERN RIVIERA (SAVONA)	
VARAZZE	239
SAVONA	31
LOANO	6
ALASSIO	2

LIGURIAN EASTERN RIVIERA (LA SPEZIA)	
LERICI	3

Table 2.3. Place of construction of the ships of Camogli divided by area. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865.

All of the ships belonging to Camogli's fleet during this period were built in Ligurian shipyards. The geographical subdivision in Table 2.3 is only partially in accordance with the 19th-century maritime districts, attributed to the four main cities of the region, Genoa, Savona, La Spezia and Imperia. Instead, due to the absence of shipyards from the district of Imperia, we chose to divide the region of Genoa into two sub-divisions, referring to each side of the city. As shown in Table 2.3, the absolute majority of the ships were constructed in Varazze (58,4%), the Ligurian leading centre for ship-building, whose primacy rooted in the early modern period¹⁰⁹. Then, at a very long distance, followed Prà, Sestri Ponente, Savona and Recco; the formers are located in the western part of Genoa and possessed a long tradition of seasonal and improvised shipyards on the beach. Nevertheless, during the last quarter of the century, Sestri Ponente was modernized, provided with infrastructures apt to industrial ship-building. Hence, it became a leading shipbuilding centre; a role still played so far. Savona had more or less the same fate, as in the late 19th century it was industrialized and readjusted for iron shipbuilding¹¹⁰. Recco, finally, had the closest shipyards to Camogli; based on seasonal activities along the beach, it never became a permanent site for ship-building as Sestri Ponente or Savona.

2.2. Historical background

The process of integration of the Black Sea into the international scene represents a long-told narrative in which foreign politics, military struggles and

¹⁰⁹ L. Gatti, *Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova, sec. 16-18*, Genova: Brigati, 1999; Idem, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 93-109 and Appendice 3 – Repertorio di costruttori.

¹¹⁰ G. Doria, *Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale*, pp. 273-303.

the increase of the provisioning demands of Western Europe form a composite scenario.

During the early modern period, the access to the Black Sea was firmly detained by the Ottoman Empire, and its navigation was subordinated to the obtainment of special privileges granted by the Porte. The commercial policies of the Ottomans responded to provisioning criteria, and the Black Sea represented the foremost region of production for strategic goods, such as grain, cattle and slaves. The merchants allowed to carry out trade in the area were provided with specific permission to be admitted in the Straits' customhouses: after the loading of the cargo in the Black Sea, the ships were mandatorily destined to Constantinople, as the needs of the Porte hold the priority over international trade. Such trade connected the Ottoman capital with the commercial emporia scattered either along the northern coasts of Anatolia or the Bulgarian shores. Merchants and seafarers were usually settled in either of the three extremes of the traffic (Constantinople, northern Anatolia or Bulgaria). Therefore, the picture of a closed sea sailed by Greek and Turkish subjects under the Ottoman flag was the most veritable to describe the 18th-century trade conditions of the Black Seaⁱⁱⁱ. These conditions, however, lasted until 1774, when the Treaty of Kuçuk Kainargé forced the Ottoman authorities to accept Russian flagged ships to navigate through the Straits and to participate in the Black Sea trade. The end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 and the accomplishment of the free entrance of Russian vessels into the Black Sea represented an astounding breakthrough in the history of the region because it led the way to further transformations, being acknowledged as the first step of integration of the area into the world economy. From this moment onward, to pursue the long-desired economic exploitation of the northern shores of the Black Sea, the Russian Empire launched a massive campaign of colonization through the foundation of commercial emporia in the most strategic places of the region. After Taganrog (1769), positioned at the mouth of the river Don, in the

ⁱⁱⁱ C. Ardeleanu, "The discovery of the Black Sea by the Western World: The Opening of the Euxine to International Trade and Shipping (1774-1792)", *New Europe College, Stefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2012-2013*, 2014, pp. 21-46; Idem, "The opening and development of the Black sea for international trade and shipping (1774-1853)", *Euxeinos*, No. 14, 2014, pp. 30-52.

Azov sea, soon followed Kerch (1774) and Mariupol' (1778) in the same area. Then, in the aftermath of the 1783 Russian annexation of Crimea, Theodosia was built in the historical site of medieval Caffa, followed by the port of Sevastopol, designed to become the basis of the naval fleet. The foundation of Odessa in 1794, however, represents the most remarkable action pursued by the Russian authorities to enhance the commercial activities of the region. Odessa was provided with countless privileges and fiscal concession, which stimulated its rapid demographic and economic growth¹¹². In particular, most of the efforts aimed to facilitate the settlement of commercial and maritime operators, mostly of Greek origin, to compensate for the absence of merchants and seafarers of Russian descents¹¹³. The establishment of Greek merchant houses along the northern shores of the Black Sea proved to be crucial to the commercial growth of the area; along with seafaring expertise and ships' ownership, the Greeks contributed to increase and expand the trade through their long-standing merchant networks in the most important European port-cities¹¹⁴.

Meanwhile, the opening of the Black Sea to international commerce attracted the interest of the Mediterranean and Western countries, which rapidly sought to sign agreements with the Russian Empire in order to participate in the trade.

¹¹² The most recent historiography about Odessa is embodied by the following works: E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: people, spaces and identities*, Leiden: Brill, 2018; P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected: the Port and the People*, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018.

¹¹³ R.P. Bartlett, *Human Capital. The settlement of foreigners in Russia 1762-1804*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

¹¹⁴ The historiographical production about the role of the Greeks in the Black sea area is vast and dense. See: G. Harlaftis, *The role of the Greeks in the Black sea trade, 1830-1900*, in L.R. Fischer and H.W. Nordvik (eds.), *Shipping and trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History*, Pontefract: Lofthouse, 1990, pp. 63-96; Id, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to present day*, London: Routledge, 1996; E. Sifneos and G. Harlaftis, *Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade. The Greek merchant community of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, 1780s-1830s*, in V.N. Zakharov, G. Harlaftis and O. Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), *Merchant colonies in the early modern period*, London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, pp. 157-179; V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea. The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775-1861*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001; G. Harlaftis, "From diaspora traders to shipping tycoons: the Vagliano Bros", *The Business History Review*, No. 81, 2007, pp. 237-268; P. Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, No. 3, 1979, pp. 399-420; E. Sifneos, "Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, 1850-1917", *The Business History Review*, No. 87, 2013, pp. 279-308; J. A. Mazis, *The Greeks of Odessa: diaspora leadership in late Imperial Russia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004; O. Shliakhov, "Greeks in the Russian Empire and their role in the development of trade and shipping in the Black and Azov Seas", *The Historical Review/La revue historique*, No. 10, 2013, pp. 255-264.

Austria, having a direct interest toward the Black Sea, stipulated a commercial agreement in 1784; in 1787, both France and the Kingdom of the Naples signed commercial treaties to gain all the advantages and customs exceptions granted by Russia to friendly nations¹⁵. As a result, a Neapolitan consul was appointed in Kherson, the same city where some French merchants had established their commercial houses since the 1780s¹⁶. During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the conflict between the Ottomans and the French led to new concession to their allies, Russia and the United Kingdom, which in 1803 achieved for the first time the right to cross the Straits for its merchant marine¹⁷. In the same year, 815 ships loaded with Russian wheat delivered their cargoes to European ports: in historiographical accounts, 1803 represents the first occurrence of massive arrivals of grain from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean¹⁸.

After the Congress of Vienna, the situation slowly changed and witnessed a gradual increase of the European trade in the Black Sea. In 1819, Odessa was granted with the free port status, a factor that enhanced its already advantageous position into grain exports. Then, the outbreak of the Greek Independence War and the reopening of the hostilities between Russia and the Ottomans in 1828-1829 led to a new phase of closure of the Black Sea navigation, lasting until the sign of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. After that, the exponential increase of foreign

¹⁵ The first diplomatic and commercial encounters between Neapolitan subjects and Russia have stimulated various studies: M. Mafrici, *Le relazioni diplomatiche e commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e l'Impero Russo*, in R. Sabbatini and P. Volpini, *Annali di storia militare. Sulla diplomazia in età moderna. Politica, economia, religione*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011, pp. 219-239; M. D'Angelo, *Tra Messina e "li mari neri"*, in L.M. Migliorini and M. Mafrici, *Mediterraneo e/è Mar Nero. Due mari tra età moderna e contemporanea*, Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012, pp. 91-138; O. Fedenko, "The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century", *Danubius*, No. 34, 2016, pp. 31-42; H.R. Gomez, "Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti", *Eurasiatica*, No. 8, 2017, pp. 117-144.

¹⁶ C. Ardeleanu, "The opening and development of the Black sea for international trade and shipping (1774-1853)", p. 35.

¹⁷ Idem, p. 37.

¹⁸ A. de Saint-Joseph, *Essai historique sur le commerce et la navigation de la Mer-Noire*, Paris: H. Agasse, 1805, pp. 204-207; T. Dandolo, *Sulle cause dell'avvilimento delle nostre granaglie e sulle industrie agrarie riparatrici dei danni che ne derivano*, Milano: Giambattista Sonzogno, 1820, pp. 5-7. Most of the ships (552) departed from Odessa, followed by Taganrog (210); among the ships, the Austrian (421) and Russian (329) flags outnumbered all the others. With regard to the port of destination, the scheme is more various, with the pre-eminence of Trieste (186), Messina (144), Cephalonia (103), Genoa (72) and Livorno (57).

ships arriving at the Black Sea ports to load cereals finally enacted the inclusion of the Black Sea into the global economy¹¹⁹.

Concerning the specific case of the participation of Sardinian, and later Italian, subjects in the Black Sea trade, within which Camogli's maritime activities are included, we observe a relatively late establishment in the area. The Republic of Genoa, in its latest years, never sought to stipulate agreements with the Russian Empire in order to engage in the Black Sea trade; Ligurian main interests aimed at the Tyrrhenian and the Western Mediterranean. Nonetheless, some private entrepreneurs and merchants settled either in the newly founded Odessa or in the first commercial emporia of Crimea and Azov. Scattered information, for instance, can be found about the activities of individuals such as Raffaele Scassi¹²⁰, or about merchant families such as the Garibaldi, Lagorio or Durante¹²¹, the first settlers of Ligurian origins in the region. In the same period, between 1800 and 1813, the number of Italians enrolled in the first guild of Odessa ascended from 1 to 8 members¹²². However, before the Congress of Vienna and the annexation of Liguria to the Kingdom of Sardinia, the number of ships of 'Genoese' origin is hardly relevant. Conversely, from 1816 onwards, the port of Genoa witnessed a constant increase of Ligurian ships arriving with cargoes of cereals from Odessa and the other ports of the region.

On the other hand, despite few preliminary contacts – of diplomatic purpose – had taken place in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of

¹¹⁹ A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business and the integration of the Black and Azov Seas of the Russian Empire into the First global economy", *Business history*, 2019, pp. 1-27.

¹²⁰ H.R. Gomez, "Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti", pp. 134-136. Raffaele Scassi settled in Theodosia some time before the 1813, when he already hold some influence in the city. Then, in the early 1820s, he moved to Kerch, where he was appointed Port Governor and had strong connections with other Sardinian merchant families. Some of his correspondence (13 letters) with his brother living in Genoa has been published in V. Vitale, *Onofrio Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo (1768-18369). Con appendice su Raffaele Scassi*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1932, pp. 335-365.

¹²¹ H.R. Gomez, "Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti", pp. 134-138. Members of both the Garibaldi and Lagorio families covered the role of consular representatives of pre-unitarian Italian states (the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies) in Kerch and Theodosia.

¹²² O. Fedenko, "The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century", p. 11. Among the names reported by the author, only Giacomo Tassara can be surely recognized for his Ligurian origins.

Sardinia, lacking a maritime policy up until 1815, never developed commercial relationships with Russia before that date¹²³. The annexation of Liguria, however, altered the economic policies of the Savoy State: despite the initial imposition of a customs barrier between Liguria and Piedmont (lasting until 1818) which was detrimental to the business of Genoese ship-owners, the subsequent introduction of flag privileges (1824) and the sign of the Treaty with the Porte (1825) paved the way for national shipping to participating to the Black Sea trade¹²⁴. Flag privileges damaged the long-standing tradition of Genoa within transit trade, whose bulk volume moved to Livorno. Instead, shipowners highly appreciated these measures: indeed, the share of Sardinian ships handling the wheat trade boosted, passing from 30% in 1824 to 92,5% in 1830¹²⁵. The second institutional factor to play a significant role in the facilitation for Ligurian ships to access the Black Sea was the stipulation of a treaty –with the Ottoman authorities. Negotiations began in 1823 and lasted until 1825, through which the Sardinian vessels obtained free entrance to the Black Sea together with some fiscal advantages to trade in Ottoman Black Sea ports¹²⁶. This treaty led to immediate results: the presence of the Sardinian flag

¹²³ See, F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, Roma: Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, 1952, pp. 9-20.

¹²⁴ The entry customs of cereals were 1/3 less if the cargo was carried on board of national ships. Es. in 1825, the custom was L. 9/quintal under foreign flag and L. 6/quintal under national flag. Source: E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, Genova: Quaderni dell'Associazione Ligure di Archeologia e Storia Navale, 1957, p. 12; M. Cevasco, *Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II*, Genova: Ferrando, 1840, pp. 374-375.

¹²⁵ E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, p. 13. Flag privileges and differential duties were harshly opposed by the Genoese merchant elites, together with the progressive dependence from wheat imports over the total movement of the port of Genoa. To frame the protectionist economic policies of the Kingdom of Sardinia within the general context of the pre-unitarian Italian states, see: V.D. Flore, *L'industria dei trasporti marittimi in Italia. Dagli inizi del XVI secolo al 1860*, Roma: Bollettino Informazioni Marittime, 1966, pp. 155-305; A. La Macchia, "Aspetti dell'economia marittima genovese nei primi decenni della Restaurazione", in R. Battaglia, S. Bottari and A. La Macchia, *Porti e traffici nel Mediterraneo. Tre saggi di storia economica marittima (1695-1861)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2018, pp. 9-48.

¹²⁶ Idem, pp. 20-21; E. Guglielmino, *Genova dal 1814 al 1849. Gli sviluppi economici e l'opinione pubblica*, Genova: Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, 1938, p. 45. The integral version of the Treaty can be found in *Raccolta dei regi editti, manifesti ed altre provvidenze de' magistrati ed uffizi*, No. 23, Torino: Davico e Picco, 1825, pp. 31-38. The sign of the Treaty constituted an international concern, as we might infer by the decisive role played by the British plenipotentiary Lord Strangford, who had the duty to enforce the principle of free passage through the Straits in order to appease the relationships between the Porte and the Russian Empire.

in Odessa increased from 57 (1825) to 116 (1826) and 237 (1827)¹²⁷. Then, apart from a two year stop of the traffics owing to the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, the figure recovered to the pre-war levels again in 1830 (225)¹²⁸.

Finally, since the early 1830s Sardinian maritime actors were well-established in the Black Sea trade. Within this framework, the action of Camogli seafarers, captains and ship-owners found profitable terrain to flourish and to rise through the ranks of international shipping.

2.3. Geography and navigation in the Black sea

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the participation of Camogli ships in the Black Sea trade in total and within the Sardinian fleet is among the main objectives of the present chapter. In the following pages, the main characteristics of the Black Sea grain trade and the participation of Camogli in this crucial phenomenon will be outlined, from geographical, commercial and maritime perspectives.

Since its opening, the Black Sea grain trade concentrated in three different geographical areas: the ports of the northern shore, dominated by the presence of Odessa; the Azov Sea ports, mainly Taganrog, Mariupol and Berdyansk and the ports of the Danube, where Galatz and Braila had a prominent role in grain exports.

From the period of its foundation – at least up until the end of the Crimean War –, Odessa represented the main port for both export and import trade in Southern Russia. The city of Odessa benefitted from the Imperial government unique benefits to facilitate and support its commercial activities through fiscal facilitations (the free port status in the period between 1819 and 1857) and infrastructural investments. Built in the original site of the Turkish fortress of Hadji-Bey, Odessa was ideally positioned nearby the mouths of the rivers Dnepr, Dniester and Bug. Soon after its foundation, the city was rapidly provided with a spacious harbour (with quays), a customs house and a large quarantine station.

¹²⁷ E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, p. 24.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*.

The inland waterways system was fundamental to the growth of Odessa: the three rivers granted direct connections with the grain-producing regions of Podolia and Volynia, from which the cereals were delivered through the utilisation of barges floating downstream to the coast.

Moreover, fluvial navigation was paralleled by land transports operating through wheeled wagons. Water and land communications coexisted and, more accurately, were complementary according to the unique geographical features of the area¹²⁹. Therefore, Odessa was the leading destination of cereals from the most productive areas of Ukraine and Southern Russia (with the sole exception of the Don region, whose products were delivered to the Azov Sea ports); then, favourable fiscal conditions, modern and spacious ports infrastructures and the growth of foreign merchant communities led it to prosper and dominate the Black Sea trade for a long time.

The Azov Sea ports, instead, were very different, especially on what concerns their geographical environment. The navigation in the Azov Sea was dominated by unpredictable currents, fog, harsh weather conditions and shallow waters¹³⁰. The access to the main ports, positioned on the northern shores of the sea, constituted a great challenge for captains and vessels. The opening of the port of Kerch, located at the entrance of the Azov, in 1821¹³¹, was fundamental to guarantee a safe harbour

¹²⁹ P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 232-233; V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, pp. 63-78. Both the authors underline the existence of an integrated system of transport for grain from the interior to the coast. Up until the construction of railroads (from late 1860s), riverine barges coexisted with the *chumaky*, carts or wagons pulled by oxen. The usage of one or the other was dictated by geographical reasons: in the northernmost regions, where rivers presented the most impeding obstacles to navigation (Podolia), land transport was usually preferred over barges which, instead, were more profitable along the southernmost course of the rivers (Bessarabia). Also, E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendixes, Table 10 *Number of carts carrying grain to Odessa, 1830*, p. 247.

¹³⁰ See, in particular, the recent publication of Apostolos Delis: A. Delis, “Navigating perilous waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the 19th century”, in M.C. Chatziioannou and A. Delis (eds), *Linkages of the Black Sea with the West. Navigation, Trade and Immigration*, Rethymnon: Black Sea History Working Papers, 2020, pp. 1-33. See, also: V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, pp. 4-7.

¹³¹ Interestingly, in his correspondence, the Genoese merchant Domenico Scassi entitles to his personal entrepreneurship the opening of the port of Kerch (of which the Scassi was appointed as first port-governor). He was also responsible for the earlier investments to provide the port with the needed infrastructures. See: V. Vitale, *Onofrio Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo (1768-18369)*, pp. 360-361, Letter XII, 5th May 1822.

and to provide some essential services. The port was furnished with a quarantine station, where all the vessels aiming to enter into the Azov must stop, denounce their cargo and deliver all the needed information to Russian officials. Furthermore, due to the shallowness of the straits, several ships resorted to the enlightening practise: in order to sail through safely, the captains had to discharge part of the cargo at the entrance and then to receive it back at the opposite end of the passage. These expensive and time-wasting manoeuvres, however, represented one of the main economic activities of the local population¹³².

Although, the obstacles to sail in the Azov Sea were not limited to the Straits passage: for an average of 126 days in a year (more than four months), icing impeded navigation¹³³. Free navigation was usually inaugurated in late March-beginning of April and lasted until late November: nevertheless, sudden icing was a possible risk, and consular or private correspondence is filled with cases of ships being entrapped within the Azov or, otherwise, stuck in the harbours for the whole winter¹³⁴.

Finally, shallow waters impeded the vessels' entrance to the ports: the short water depth in the proximity of the coast prevented most ships from getting ashore. To this regard, apart from the environmental constraints, the captains bore their guilt: in order to clear as fast as possible the operations, they used to throw their ballast out of the ship, directly into the sea. Thus, they worsened the already troublesome conditions of the seabed¹³⁵. However, not all the ports were affected by shallowness to the same extent: in more than one circumstance, Berdyansk was

¹³² *Sulla città di Kertch. Cenni di G.B. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849) in Orano*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp. 457-459.

¹³³ These data have been calculated on the basis of the information about the yearly opening and the closure of navigation in the Azov sea in the 1860-69 decade. See, V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, p. 7.

¹³⁴ See, for instance the data about the vessels which were forced to spend the winter in Mariupol and Taganrog: *Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio console cav. Avv. G. Rossi*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp. 464-468.

¹³⁵ In order to prevent this behavior and to punish the perpetrators, the Empire issued some laws requiring double inspections to the ballast quantities both in Kerch and in the ports of arrival. The lawbreakers might incur in fees from 100 to 300 roubles or even the confiscation of the ship and up to 6 months of detention. See, AMAE, *Affari esteri*, 895, Odessa, Giuseppe Rossi – Regio Delegato Consolare d'Italia a Taganrog, Gennaio 1862.

praised for presenting fewer hindrances (the ships were able to moor at 3 miles maximum from the quay), whereas in Taganrog and Mariupol vessels might have to stop up to 15-20 miles¹³⁶.

The grain deposits of the three cities were supplied from the fertile hinterlands. In this regard, Taganrog held a comparative advantage due to its relative proximity to the mouth of the river Don which provided a fundamental waterway connection with the internal regions where a network of canals put into communication the Don and Volga regions with Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog. Berdyansk and Mariupol, on the other hand, relied mostly on their respective countryside, despite some railway projects to improve the connections with the Dnepr river are repeatedly mentioned in the sources¹³⁷.

Furthermore, the Danube port system presents some similar characteristics to the Azov Sea. Located along the western shores of the Black Sea, the Danube embodied the third main area of grain deposit and exports to Western Europe. In this regard, the Wallachian and Moldavian cities of Braila and Galatz represented the most important ports for trade volume. Both of them, however, were in the interior, along the course of the Danube River: instead, the access to the river itself, through the three mouths of Kilia, Sulina and St. George was controlled by the Russian Empire from the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) onwards. According to the existing literature, in order to limit the economic growth of the principalities which was challenging the prosperity of Odessa, the Russian authorities decided to build a quarantine station at the mouth of Sulina, in 1835, where all the ships entering and clearing the Danube were obliged to stop and denounce cargoes and navigation details to local officials¹³⁸. The environmental conditions of the Danube, however, were slightly different from those of the Azov Sea; therefore, soon in

¹³⁶ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, 26 Novembre 1852.

¹³⁷ In this regard, the Italian consul in Berdyansk emphasizes the potential commercial growth of the city if put in direct connection with Alexandrovsk (nowadays Zaporizhzhia) on the eastern shore of the river Dnestr. AMAE, *Affari esteri*, 895, Odessa, Cenni Statistici sul commercio di Berdianska ordinati a questa Regia Delegazione Consolare, Novembre 1861.

¹³⁸ See, A. Emilciuc, "The Trade of Galati and Braila in the Reports of Russian Officials from Sulina Quarantine Station (1836-1853)", in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 63-94.

Sulina lighters and tugboats companies were developed to assist or even substitute the ships arriving at the mouths heading to either Galatz or Braila. River cabotage became highly profitable, and even some Sardinians and Italians tried to invest in this activity¹³⁹.

Beside the Danube system, however, throughout the mid-19th century, Galatz and Braila entered in competition with Constanta and the Bulgarian ports of Burgas and Varna, southward to the entrance of the Danube. Whereas Constanta developed later (from the early 1880s)¹⁴⁰, the ports of Burgas¹⁴¹ and Varna¹⁴² competed with the Principalities in the period of our analysis, and experienced exceptional growth in concomitance with the outbreak of the Crimean War, and to the related warfare economy.

2.4. Merchant communities and commercial networks

The absence of a structured Russian mercantile tradition in the area, and the early settlement of foreign merchant communities, attracted by the late 18th century imperial policies, were crucial to shaping the Black Sea trade. These ethnical and national groups carried out the overwhelming majority of imports and exports and, through their networks, contributed to include the Black Sea into a broader interregional economy, including the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, up to the global scale. The influence of each group and the business models implemented changed over time, depending on conjunctural and

¹³⁹ The Italian consul in Galatz reports about the existence of the lightens company Fratelli Corsanego, in 1868. See: *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1868, pp. 127-128.

¹⁴⁰ D. Kontogeorgis, “«International» and «National» Ports. The Competition between the Ports of Braila / Galati and Constanta during the Period 1878-1914”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 95-129.

¹⁴¹ D. Christov, “The Rise of a Port. Socio-economic development of Burgas in the 19th c.”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 177-213.

¹⁴² I. Roussev, “The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization. The First Modern Attempts in Varna during the 1840s-1870s”, in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 214-223.

structural transformations which altered both the regional and the world economies. In different periods, and different ways, Greeks, Jews, Italians, British, Germans and French played their role in the history of the Black Sea trade. On the long-term perspective, the Greeks and the Jews might have probably exercised the most substantial influence¹⁴³. Historically, both groups were already circulating in the area during the Ottoman period, before the Russian conquest: upon these premises, they demonstrated similar capacities to capitalize their long-lasting presence with respect to the latecomers. Such a feature, for instance, was evident concerning the commercial relationships and networks with the hinterland and the production sites¹⁴⁴. Then, another common feature might be found in the geographical width of their commercial operations: both Greeks and Jews disposed of long-standing networks in the critical places of the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, which were vital to trade along far-reaching routes and to optimise the information flows. On the other side, the western communities – a cluster comprehending the English, French, Austrians, Sardinians and Neapolitans – established their presence differently. First, the relationship with their native countries might be considered as a crucial distinguishing trait. Unlike the Greeks or the Jews, who settled in the region through private entrepreneurship, the westerners sought assistance in or even followed, their home political institutions before starting any sort of business. Therefore, most of the westerners retained stable and pervasive affiliations to their home countries, both from political and commercial perspectives, a development which was precluded to Greeks and Jews. These features led to some implications in terms of the pattern of business adopted: such sort of dependency from national business implied some restrictions, such as in the development of less widespread commercial networks, which seldom went beyond their respective home markets.

¹⁴³ A. Papadopoulou, “Foreign merchant business”, pp. 1-27. With regard to the Jewish community of Odessa: P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 196-208; E. Sifneos, “The Dark Side of the Moon: rivalry and riots for shelter and occupation between the Greek and the Jewish populations in multi-ethnic nineteenth-century Odessa”, *Historical Review/La revue historique*, No. 3, 2006, pp. 189-204.

¹⁴⁴ Some historians also address the mistrust of Western merchants towards the producers in order to add further explanations of Greek and Jewish superiority against Europeans in the hinterland. See. V. Kardassis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, p. 82.

The analysis which follows, however, will address two specific groups, the Sardinians and the Greeks. The selection will be motivated by their more direct relevance to the maritime activities of Camogli.

2.4.1. THE GREEK NETWORKS

In the mid-19th century, the Greeks handled the majority of the Black Sea trade. This feature is even more evident when exports and imports are merged (the European countries were less competitive in the latter). To analyse the Greek influence in Southern Russia throughout the nineteenth century, the current historiography proposes a distinction between Chiot and Ionian phases, according to the existence of different ethnic commercial networks, also distinguished by the adoption of different business models and with regard to different geographical areas in the Black Sea region¹⁴⁵.

The Chiot phase (1830s-1860s) corresponds to the predominance of merchant families from the island of Chios, or somehow related to them. The Ralli represented the most influential family, followed by Rodocanachis, Schilizzi, Scaramanga, Negroponte and Sevastopulo¹⁴⁶. The base of their operations was usually Odessa, where the head branch of their firms was founded. Their networks were based on ethnicity and kinship and were ruled by severe reputation mechanisms; the structure of their companies outreached the Black Sea, though it regarded the English financial and maritime centres, and some intermediate ports in between, such as Marseille, Livorno and Trieste likewise¹⁴⁷. Rather than strictly specialize in the grain trade, the Chiot network opted for high degrees of diversification, engaging in different trade commodities, though still maintaining consistent investments towards shipping. Their commercial strategy was based on the control over both the production and consumption markets, being the Russian

¹⁴⁵ G. Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping*, pp. 38-106.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*; about Ralli and Radocanachi see also, P. Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 407-416.

¹⁴⁷ G. Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping*, pp. 39-40.

countryside and England the extremes of the system¹⁴⁸. Then, some families belonging to the network engaged directly in shipping, under Greek or foreign flag, depending on the opportunities: indeed, whereas most of the trade between the Black Sea and Marseille was carried out on Greek vessels, the grain destined to the English ports was usually loaded on Greek-owned ships flying the British flag.

In the 1860s, the Chiot predominance over the Black sea trade gave way to the rise of another Greek network, based on Ionian families. The reasons behind this transition lied in multiple factors, most of them concerning the end of the Crimean War and the following modernization of Russian economy and society (for instance, the abolition of serfdom in 1861). The wave of renovation sought by the political authorities of the country affected the economic and social structure of Southern Russia dramatically: large estates based on serf labour were replaced by small land-ownership, and the Jews proved to be more able than the Greeks to adapt to the new conditions¹⁴⁹. Modern transport communications, as railways, were built, in concomitance with the modernization of Azov and Caucasus ports infrastructures; moreover, Odessa lost its free port status in 1857¹⁵⁰. All of these transformations contributed to the redirection of most of the grain trade to the Azov Sea. There, in Taganrog, was based perhaps the most influential Ionian trade and shipping company, the one of Vagliano¹⁵¹.

The Ionian phase (1870s-1900s) is such due to the role of numerous Greek families, most of them coming from Cephalonia or Ithaca, which were based mostly in the Danube and Azov areas. The reorientation of trade must have undoubtedly contributed to their rise: Braila, Galatz on one side and Taganrog,

¹⁴⁸ Idem, pp. 57-70.

¹⁴⁹ P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 149-150; E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 120-121; A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business", pp. 18-20. Among the main features of the Jewish business organization, most of the authors mention their capability to operate on a smaller scale than Greeks. Indeed, several Jews were members of the second guild (see *infra*).

¹⁵⁰ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, p. 26 and Appendixes, Figure 2-5. Relying on the analysis of imports and exports of the port of Odessa overtime, the author shows how the end of the freeport status in 1857 had minimal impact over the trade movement of the Russian port-city. On the contrary, the effects of the Crimean War (1854) and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 are emphasized, due to the fact that in those periods more drastic variations of trade are observed.

¹⁵¹ G. Harlaftis, "From Diaspora Traders to Shipping Tycoons: The Vagliano Bros", *The Business History Review*, No. 81, 2007, pp. 237-268.

Berdyansk and Mariupol on the other substituted Odessa rapidly in its leading role to grain exports. In its organisational structure, most of the features of the Ionian network were inherited by the Chiot predecessor, such as kinship and community-based relationships; however, the most distinguishing trait concerned the existing balance between shipping and trade. If in the Chiot network shipping was instrumental in trading, in the Ionian phase seems rather the opposite. Several protagonists of the Ionian networks were of maritime origins: the case of Vagliano is emblematic, as the first successful member of the family left Cephalonia as a seaman and then, once settled in Taganrog, started a career as sailing fleet ship-owner. Later, while involved in grain trade shortly after the Crimean War, the Vagliano bros firm raised the largest Greek-owned fleet, developing interests into maritime credit, banking and insurances as well.

2.4.2. THE SARDINIAN NETWORKS

Differently from the Greeks, the Sardinian commercial networks of the Black Sea have seldom been at the centre of specific studies¹⁵². The existing literature, indeed, has rarely been able to outline the patterns of business or to single out the distinguishing features of the Sardinian presence in Southern Russia. Moreover, it failed even to reconstruct individual or “firm” histories. Therefore, even though an extensive presentation might exceed the specific objectives of this chapter, the present paragraph will attempt to illustrate some of the main features as well as to outline few specific trajectories in order to draw a veritable picture of Sardinian business in the Black Sea.

Lacking any bibliographical reference to deal with the massive amount of existing archival sources, we attempt here to put into effect the models developed for other communities, especially to the Greeks, and to verify their validity to the Sardinian case. For instance, in the process of formation of the merchant class in

¹⁵² In order to reconstruct the Italian presence in the Black sea area, some work has already been done on Russian sources: O. Fedenko, “The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century”, pp. 31-42; H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, pp. 117-144.

Odessa and the Azov port cities, historians have underlined the role of the interconnections between trade and consular delegation¹⁵³. About the Greeks, the case of John Ralli is emblematic to this purpose¹⁵⁴; however, the evolution of the Sardinian case reflects even more pervasive and systematic overlaps between the two figures, especially in the Azov port-cities.

NAME	CITY	CONSULAR FUNCTION	MERCHANT ACTIVITY
Rezoagli Federico	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Merchant
Tubino Giuseppe	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Tubino firm
Tubino Lorenzo	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Tubino firm
Chichizola Pietro	Kertch	Vice-consul Sardinia and Papal State	Merchant
Chiozza Gio. Batta	Mariupol	Aspiring vice-consul Sardinia	Merchant
Lanfranco Sebastiano Filippo	Mariupol	Vice-consul Sardinia	Merchant
Pignone Giuseppe	Mariupol	Regent vice-consul Two Sicilies	Rocca firm (Odessa) correspondent
Schiaffino Pietro	Mariupol	Vice-consul Sardinia and Two Sicilies	Rossi firm (Taganrog) correspondent

¹⁵³ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 72-75. In particular, Sifneos includes diplomacy among the three patterns of successful business employed by merchants to establish in the Black sea, following the example of Henry Yeames.

¹⁵⁴ P. Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 407-410.

Gerbolini	Odessa	Aspiring	consul	Gerbolini & Simoni
Gustavo		Sardinia		firm
Rocca Fratelli	Odessa	Merchant		Rocca firm
Rossi L.	Odessa	Merchant		Rossi firm
Tubino	Odessa	Merchant		Tubino firm
Domenico				
Rocca	Taganrog	Aspiring	vice-consul	Rocca firm
Pellegro		Sardinia		(Odessa)
Rossi	Taganrog	Vice-consul	Sardinia	Rossi firm
Antonio				
Rossi	Taganrog	Vice-consul	Sardinia	Rossi firm
Domenico				
Rossi	Taganrog	Vice-consul	Sardinia	Rossi firm
Giuseppe				

Table 2.4 – List of consular representatives of Genoese origins in the Black Sea. Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6; AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato degli affari esteri*, 2916-2918 and Id., 7138-7142; ACCM, *Rocca frères*.

With the unique exception of the seat of Odessa to which, for its relevance¹⁵⁵, only professional diplomats were appointed, the Sardinian consular representatives were always personally involved in the trade. For being a consul, merchants could benefit from various economic privileges, such as tax exemptions and the collection of the consular fees. They could increase their prestige by having access to confidential information relating to commercial agreements and representing their merchant community before the local authorities. In the Azov Sea, the model of merchant-consul resisted to the bureaucratic modernization process to appoint professional diplomats, state-salaried and trained to occupy an

¹⁵⁵ In Odessa, the Sardinian government put a 1st rank consul, under whose control were positioned all the vice-consulate seats of the Black sea and Azov. The consul of Odessa was always a professional diplomat and he did not have a direct connection with the local society. He was not permanently resident in Odessa: instead, he usually stayed for a period between 5 to 10 years. See: F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, Roma: Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, 1952.

official position¹⁵⁶. Indeed, with the partial exception of the Crimean War period (1853-56)¹⁵⁷, the consular profession was highly appreciated, and most sought by resident merchants. This is evident in the occasion of consular resignations when local merchants petitioned to the central consul in Odessa to advance their candidacies¹⁵⁸. In doing so, each aspiring vice-consul needed to demonstrate his trade expertise and to attest the support of the local community. In the case of Pietro Schiaffino (whose case is even more relevant for his origin from Camogli), vice-consul in Mariupol, the availability of the corpus of bureaucratic papers for his appointment at the service of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies led us to understand the procedure. In 1843, Luigi Accame, a Sardinian merchant, decided to move to Taganrog, leaving his seat vacant. Soon, Pietro Schiaffino, not a Neapolitan subject too, advanced his candidacy relying on the support of the local merchant elites. Although in the supporting letter Schiaffino's «perfect integrity», «fair-minded qualities» and «Christian conduct» were praised¹⁵⁹, the consul of Odessa did not omit his trade expertise: Pietro Schiaffino was «the local director of the famous trade house Enrico Rossi & Co.»¹⁶⁰. Furthermore, the subscriptions reveal the existence of a composite scenario in which all the Italian native speakers, notwithstanding their origins, were deeply interrelated¹⁶¹.

The personal trajectory of Pietro Schiaffino is worth more attention due to its uniqueness within the paradigm of Camogli's pattern of business. Pietro Schiaffino

¹⁵⁶ F. De Goey, *Consuls and the institution of Global Capitalism, 1783-1814*, New York: Routledge, 2016.

¹⁵⁷ The effects of the Crimean War, such as the cease of the grain exports and the stagnation of trade led the local vice-consuls to abandon their posts to develop further trade in other regions. See, for instance, the case of both Pietro Schiaffino or Domenico Rossi who, in 1855, asked for a leave of absence due to the «actual cessation of navigation in those ports, and the disappearance of any kind of business there». AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6.

¹⁵⁸ See the contrast between Sebastiano Lanfranco and Gio. Batta Chiozza for the seat of Mariupol, or between Pellegro Rocca and Giuseppe Rossi in Taganrog. AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa.

¹⁵⁹ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916, 31st December 1843.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, 14th May 1844.

¹⁶¹ Among the subscribers we find Gustavo Gerbolini, of Ligurian descent; Giovanni and Luca Mimbelli, perhaps merchants of Venetian origins, whose relative Stefano, in 1860, figures as Tuscan consul in Mariupol; finally, G. Drascovich, Austrian consul in Mariupol, and repeatedly appointed as regent of the Neapolitan seat in the frequent leaves of Schiaffino. AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916. For Gustavo Gerbolini, see *infra*.

was born in Gibraltar in 1811¹⁶²: his father, born in Camogli, had moved to the British protectorate in 1802, in the attempt to install a commercial presence along the route towards the Atlantic. Pietro had a brother, Giuseppe, a captain, and two sisters. Since the early 1840s, Pietro Schiaffino settled in Mariupol as director of the local branch of the Rossi firm. As said, in 1844 he was appointed vice-consul of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; in 1850, he reached the same position for the Kingdom of Sardinia. His unique origins and his father commercial background might have determined his professional career: Pietro was one of the few subjects from Camogli who engaged in trade rather than shipping. However, the absence of private correspondence prevents us from proving any direct relationship between Schiaffino and Camogli's captains, his strategic presence in the port city of Mariupol might have constituted a fundamental contact for the subjects of Camogli, especially if considering the importance of reputation, trust and kinship in the formation of long-standing businesses.

To single out some of the most influential and wealthiest Sardinian firms, we resorted to consular information and to Russian sources, crucial to frame the activities of Genoese companies within a broader context. According to the Imperial regulations, each merchant had to subscribe to a guild in order to engage in trade. The Russian guild system was structured in three categories, scaled according to the amount of declared capital. The first guild was for merchants dealing with wholesale and international trade without limits on annual transactions; the members of the second guild, instead, had limits for both domestic and international trade; in the third category, there were merchants engaged in retail and the range of their activities was restricted to the Empire¹⁶³. The requirement of enlistment to guilds was also related to citizenship: apart from

¹⁶² The data about his origins and his family are available in the 1834 *Gibraltar census of inhabitants*, online and free searchable at: <http://www.nationalarchives.gi/gna/1834.aspx>.

¹⁶³ E. Sifneos and G. Harlaftis, "Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade", p. 168.

the first rank, which remained accessible to foreigners, the membership of the lower guilds was gradually restricted to Russian citizens¹⁶⁴.

The following list is drawn from Sifneos' reconstruction of the first-guild merchants published in the 1859 *Odessa Vestnik* newspaper¹⁶⁵. The top positions were occupied by Greek and Jews merchants, as Efrussi, Ralli, Raffalovich, Radocanachi or Scaramanga. Then, five Sardinian firms are listed, three in the first fifteen.

<i>Position</i>	<i>Merchant</i>	<i>Imports</i> (roubles)	<i>Exports</i> (roubles)	<i>Total</i> (roubles)
12	Rocca Carlo*	55.811	1.279.594	1.335.405
13	Dall'Orso Cesare Augusto	48.684	1.134.027	1.182.711
14	Rossi Luigi	3.245	1.147.010	1.150.255
22	Tubino Domenico	93.339	688.899	782.238
28	Porro Giacomo	41.285	471.215	512.500

Table 2.5 – List of the top Genoese merchants in the first guild of Odessa in 1859. Source: E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendix. Table 12. *Of Genoese origin, based in Marseille

The presentation of all the inner characteristics of the Sardinian presence in the Black Sea area might be well beyond the objectives of the present research. Therefore, unable to unravel this history in all its facets, we chose to focus on a critical feature, the relationship existing between shipping and commerce. This

¹⁶⁴ The correspondence of the Sardinian consul reports that the closing of the third guild (retailers and artisans) to foreigners was announced by the end of the 1854, or more probably in the 1855. The law may have not been effective in the following years, since Herlihy date this decree to 1858: P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 140-141. In both of these circumstances, however, the closure of the third guild to foreigners arouse complaints and demonstrations among the local European communities. Herlihy reports the case of French merchants; the Sardinian consul mentioned all the Sardinian subject who protested: 5 jewelries, 1 hotel, a pasta factory and 2 retailers. AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, 10th December 1854.

¹⁶⁵ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendixes. Table 12.

choice, indeed, might allow us to outline the evolution of some specific firms in relationship with Camogli's unique evolution as a purely seafaring community.

The organizational structure of the Sardinian firms entangled a few similarities with their Greek analogues. As merchants and businessmen forged throughout the early modern period, the Genoese group acknowledged the importance to operate through commercial networks based on kinship¹⁶⁶: therefore, they bring to life various family firms¹⁶⁷. The first group of merchants to settle in the region founded their main branches in Odessa, as in Rocca and Gerbolini. Later, as the Azov Sea ports entered into competition with Odessa, those companies expanded to this region; meanwhile, other merchants proceeded directly to the Azov, in order to maintain close control over local operations (Tubino in Berdyansk and Rossi in Taganrog).

The most striking difference between Greeks and Sardinians lied in the variety of trade typologies practised. As mentioned before, the Greeks retained their outstanding shares of exports and imports altogether; instead, the Genoese firms engaged little or none at all into import trade. The underlying reasons for such discrepancy were linked with the structure of the Sardinian trade as a whole. The port of Genoa had little to offer to Russia in terms of export: the interior was poorly industrialized, and few were the products which could be exported, with the partial exception of silk, highly demanded in the United Kingdom¹⁶⁸. Moreover, the Genoese merchant lacked connections in the production sites of the most appreciated goods in Russia, apart from Sicily, where the few imported

¹⁶⁶ In this regard, we must mention the pioneering work of Giorgio Doria: G. Doria, *Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti-finanzieri genovesi nel secolo 16. e 17.*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986. More recently: C. Marsilio, C.A. Nogal and L. Lo Basso, "La rete finanziaria della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere di cambio (1610-1656)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 124, 2007, pp. 97-110; L. Lo Basso, "Diaspora e armamento nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella seconda metà del XVII secolo: una storia globale", *Studi storici*, No. 1, 2015, pp. 137-156.

¹⁶⁷ E. Sifneos, "Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, 1850-1917", *Business history review*, No. 87, 2013, pp. 279-308.

¹⁶⁸ E. Guglielmino, *Genova dal 1814 al 1849. Gli sviluppi economici e l'opinione pubblica*, pp. 122-123; M. Cevasco, *Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II*, pp. 12-13; V.D. Flore, *L'industria dei trasporti marittimi in Italia. Dagli inizi del XVI secolo al 1860*, pp. 217-221.

merchandises came from¹⁶⁹. The absence of reciprocity in the Sardinian sea-borne trade with the Black Sea influenced the organization of shipping business. The unidirectionality of trade, complicated a profitable integration between commerce and shipping. On the one hand, the Sardinian merchants were able to charter most of the national fleet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, relying on their high share of exports. On the other hand, they could hardly provide return (from Genoa to the Black Sea) cargoes to the captains, forcing them to sail on ballast for one-half of the route.

For merchant companies, chartering national vessel on the market was more convenient than owning a fleet. There was a sort of externalisation of the transport phase to leave the management of entrepreneurial risks (covering the on ballast route from Genoa to the Black Sea) to shipowners. However, merchants and firms operating in the Black Sea port-cities adopted a wide array of solutions. The analysis will lead us to outline two different models to balance shipping and trade in the Sardinian Black Sea trade.

The first might be labelled as a 'high investment' model, in which trade and shipping coexisted and complemented each other. In the early period, it represented the prevalent organizational structure of the Sardinian business in the area. The reasons lied in concomitance of factors: high diversification of the investments and low specialization had been characterizing the Genoese business at least since the 16th century. In 1852, in his description of the national commercial activities in Odessa, the local Sardinian consul wrote:

The Sardinian merchants in Odessa have twelve firms. They work both on commission and their own. Since most of them own ships (or possess interests in ships), they trade on heavy loads and send them to Genoa, unless Livorno and Marseille offer better opportunities. It is rare for the ships owned or co-owned by the

¹⁶⁹ Nonetheless, even long after the Italian unification (and the inclusion of Southern Italy) the trade balance between Italy and Russia did not change its trend. In 1877, for instance, the Italian consul in Odessa denounces losses for more than 1 million roubles annually deriving from the unfair distribution between imports and exports. See, S. Castiglia, *Rapporto quadrimestrale. 1° Quadrimestre 1877*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1877, p. 623.

merchants to be chartered by others, due to the fact that, on favourable circumstances, with high freight rates, they prefer to load them for their own profit; with low freight rates, apart from the difficulties to find freights to foreign ports, they prefer to load them anyway, hoping to meet favourable selling conditions in Genoa or in the abovementioned ports.¹⁷⁰

The Dall’Orso firm might offer an exact sample of this business model. The establishment of their business in the region had some traits in common with the members of the Ionian network, such as Vagliano. For instance, the Dall’Orso family had a maritime background: Chiavari, their hometown, was a small-sized port in the eastern riviera of Liguria, with similar characteristics to Camogli. The long-standing tradition of the place within the Mediterranean cabotage played a central part in the formation of the firm. Nevertheless, concerning Dall’Orso first steps into the Black Sea trade little or none is known so far, apart from few sparse notions collected about the protagonists and their activities.

The company name was Dall’Orso Fratelli (Bros.), but more individuals can be associated with the firm. Francesco appeared in Genoa in 1855: surprisingly, he chartered ship of Camogli directed to either Mariupol or Berdyansk to load wheat¹⁷¹. A few decades later, in 1880, Giacomo and Gio. Batta subscribed into the Italian Society for Mutual Aid in Odessa, information demonstrating the longevity of their business¹⁷². However, the most influential members were Giacomo, Cesare and Giuseppe, merchants and ship-owners. Giacomo was the first enrolling in a Russian guild (first guild – Odessa): in 1852, he handled import and export trade

¹⁷⁰ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «I negozianti sardi stabiliti in Odessa vi hanno dodici case di commercio. Essi lavorano in commissione e fanno anche molto per conto proprio. Essendo i sardi per la maggior parte possessori di bastimenti o esclusivamente o per interesse parziale, speculano per proprio conto sui carichi gravi e ciò che inviano per lo più a Genova, salvo che gli scali di Livorno e Marsiglia presentino maggiore vantaggio. Raramente avviene che i bastimenti di proprietà d’armatori o cointeressati negozianti siano ceduti a nolo, giacché in favorevoli circostanze granarie, e per conseguenza con noli alti, preferiscono di speculare caricandoli; ed in epoca di calma degli affari, e perciò di bassi noli, oltreché allora rari sono gli impieghi per i porti esteri, preferiscono anche fare il carico sulla speranza di favorevole sfogo sia a Genova che negli scali sovracitati».

¹⁷¹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Costantinopoli, 32.

¹⁷² AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa.

for over 70.000 roubles¹⁷³. After that, he strengthened his business up to ascend to achieve an important position among the export merchants of Odessa¹⁷⁴. Presumably, Cesare was his successor: he is found in Odessa, Berdyansk and Galatz as a resident first-guild merchant and local representative of Ligurian maritime insurance companies (including Camogli's *Mutua*)¹⁷⁵. On the other hand, Giuseppe Dall'Orso had engaged in shipping: in the 1860s, around 6-7 vessels were registered under his name, and he possessed co-interests in another dozen ships, all of them sailing the Black Sea¹⁷⁶. The deep interdependence between shipping and trade, in the absence of specific studies, finds a partial confirmation from the data corpus of the *Semaphore de Marseille*. The economic fortunes of the firm peaked in the period between the late 1860s and the 1870s: in 1870, the Dall'Orso chartered 47 vessels from various ports in the Black Sea to Marseille¹⁷⁷. The 36% of these ships were owned by Giuseppe Dall'Orso or his relatives¹⁷⁸.

Direct investments in shipping, as occurred in the case of Dall'Orso, are found in other instances. The Rocca house, for example, possessed a small fleet¹⁷⁹; nevertheless, their approach is relatively diversified¹⁸⁰. From the company

¹⁷³ See the data processed from *Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii*, 1852. In 1852, Cesare Dall'Orso ranked 100th out of the first guild merchants of the Southern ports of Russia; his business amounted to 14.785 roubles in imports and 59.886 in exports.

¹⁷⁴ *Idem*, 1853-1856. In 1853-54, Cesare increased rapidly his affairs volume, reaching the impressive amount of 361.775 roubles (matching imports and exports). Then, in 1856, despite an evident setback because of the Crimean conflict, he still moved more than 200.000 roubles.

¹⁷⁵ CMCC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

¹⁷⁶ P. Schiaffino, *Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi*, Genova: Nuova editrice genovese, 1996, pp. 90-93.

¹⁷⁷ Data processed from *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

¹⁷⁸ Lacking of any information concerning ship-ownership in the *Semaphore* data, we confronted name and tonnage with the list of ships owned by the Dall'Orso firm in the same period, found in P. Schiaffino, *Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi*, pp. 90-91.

¹⁷⁹ Most of the archival material concerning the correspondence between the Rocca firm and their captains can be found in ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes, L-19/14/066-069. Furthermore, it is possible to consult the commercial correspondence between the different branches of the firm, where the different systems are vividly outlined. In their correspondence the difference between owned-ships and the others is made clear through the usage of the possessive adjective «nostra» (ours).

¹⁸⁰ About the renowned Rocca merchant firm, their business and their family history, there is a recently published monograph, based on archival material kept in Marseille. See: A. Carrino, *Passioni e interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel mediterraneo dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Viella, 2018.

correspondence, their ownership over a few vessels, as the ships *Francesco*¹⁸¹, cap. Graffione, and *Moderazione*¹⁸², captain Giuseppe Craviotto seems to be clear. The second ship, for instance, is mentioned to be anchored in Odessa for weeks in the expectation of cargo; this incident triggers an evaluation about the efficiency of the system and recalls the concerns – raised by the consul – about the disproportionate relationship between shipping and trade in the Sardinian business. However, Rocca's ships rarely engaged in the Black sea trade: instead, they were more likely employed in regular connections with Algeria, to honour the firm's commercial agreements and relationships with the French merchant elites in Marseille¹⁸³. Therefore, a high percentage of their trade must have been carried out by ships owned by others.

Furthermore, from Rocca's correspondence, we can assume the existence of an intermediate model, based on privileged relationships between captains and merchants, in accordance to the merchant-captain partnerships theorized by Sifneos to illustrate Greek and Western European entrepreneurship in the Black Sea¹⁸⁴. These connections were established on trust and on the same reputation mechanisms which had been ruling trade since the Middle Age. For language familiarity and geographical proximity, the Rocca choices usually fell on Sardinian captains¹⁸⁵. At the end of every voyage, comments addressing the captain's behaviour and trustworthiness were shared between the company branches. When incidents occurred, ending up in the loss or deterioration of part of the cargo, the relationships were unilaterally closed¹⁸⁶. On the other hand, once gained the

¹⁸¹ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

¹⁸² Idem, L-19/14/023.

¹⁸³ Idem, L-19/14/022 and Algiers, L-19/14/113. Most of the traffics with North Africa were still concerning the grain trade, especially from Algiers and Oran.

¹⁸⁴ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁸⁵ Part of the correspondence kept in the ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères*, Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes, is related to this category as well.

¹⁸⁶ A few of these incidents involved some captains from Camogli. The first is the case of captain Diego Schiaffino, ship *Chiara*, which was chartered in Messina, in 1848, with a cargo of citruses to Odessa. In the Russian city, however, the cargo arrived completely deteriorated; an incident for which, after long inquiries, the responsible was not clearly individuated and, therefore, the economic loss went all on the Rocca's side. Another experience is that of captain Ferrari, of the ship

company trust, captains could put to profit their privileged relationships, by the inclusion of their kinship under these favourable conditions: this is the case, for instance, of the captain of *Stella del Mare*, Giacomo Razeto from Camogli, who recommended to Rocca firm his brother, captain on *Annetta*, unable to find cargo in the Black Sea due to weather hazards¹⁸⁷. The actual economic advantages of these partnerships were not clear: most likely, merchant and carriers split the profits of both the cargo selling and the freights. However, the unavailability of commercial and personal correspondence concerning other Sardinian firms operating in the Black Sea trade prevented us from going any further in the analysis of this issue. Arguably, there were several other cases, as witnessed with the establishment of ethnic networks as the Greeks.

Finally, the main alternative to ship-ownership was a “low investment” model in which merchants disregarded or were limitedly involved in shipping. The cargo was loaded in the holds of “tramp ships” available in the loading ports. The profits concerning the cargo, the earnings deriving from price differentials in the purchasing and selling markets all fell into the hands of the traders, whereas the income of the ship was based on freights. The significant volume of affairs and the relative profitability for both parties involved led to the high supply of sea transport in the Black Sea port-cities, matched by high demand: the fluctuations of the two, animated the freight rates market. Despite the consul observations, or probably due to later developments following the Crimean War, some leading Sardinian firms (Rossi and Tubino) preferred to charter ships rather than to own them directly. Undoubtedly, both companies owned some shares on a few vessels; however, there is no clear evidence of high investments in shipping to the same extent of those of Dall’Orso, in which the link between trade and shipping was inherently structural. On the contrary, Rossi and Tubino, for instance, are repeatedly found as the most recurrent charterers of Camogli ships, a perfect example of a “tramp fleet” among the Sardinians.

Margherita, who, on the contrary was held responsible for the rotting of a cargo of hides loaded in Taganrog and carried to Marseille in 1852. ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Odessa, L-19/14/022 and L-19/14/023.

¹⁸⁷ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes, L-19/14/069.

Besides, both in surplus period or in extreme needs, the Dall'Orso or the Rocca exploited the opportunity to charter captains outside their networks. The correspondence of the latter can provide us fascinating insights on their practices: in their opinion, priority was given to the Sardinian and the other "Italian" flags; then followed the northerners and, as the last resource, the Greeks. This judgement raises some cultural issues: Greek captains could accept lower freights. However, a constant prejudice towards the Greeks played a role in influencing the merchants' perspectives. In the Rocca's words, the Greeks were unaccountable and «less known in the Mediterranean ports»¹⁸⁸.

2.4.3. CAMOGLI AND THE BLACK SEA COMMERCIAL NETWORKS

The introduction about the commercial networks in the Black Sea area provides a framework for the following analysis. The present section aims to reconstruct the various relationships established between the people of Camogli and the local merchant networks. The analysis is drawn upon the data collected from the maritime health records of Genoa (1858-1862) and the *Semaphore de Marseille* (1850-1870).

	Italian	Greek	Other
Odessa	61,50%	12,35%	26,15%
Berdyansk	56,70%	32,04%	11,25%
Mariupol	60,30%	28,20%	11,50%
Taganrog	57,70%	30,77%	11,54%
Galatz	55,17%	31,03%	13,80%
Braila	58,82%	35,30%	5,88%

¹⁸⁸ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Odessa, L-19/14/022. «Preferiamo la bandiera bremese o svedese o altra neutrale alla greca, essendo quest'ultima nazione di poca fede e capace di rubare l'intero carico nelle attuali circostanze e poi tutti i capitani greci in nessun porto non sono affatto conosciuti, per cui non vogliamo aver da fare con simile gente»

Table 2.6 - Merchants chartering Camogli ships to Genoa and Marseille divided by nationality in Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube. Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero*, registers from 590 to 613; *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

The traffics of Odessa, in comparison with Azov and Danube ports, present unique features: there, a more significant part of Camogli ships was chartered by Sardinian (to Genoa) or French (to Marseille) subjects. More specifically, the houses Casareto, Rocca and Dall'Orso handled most of the Sardinian trade to those destinations, whereas Savine et fils managed most of the expeditions to Marseille. On the other hand, and differently from the trend of the Azov and Danube regions, the share of the Greeks of Camogli's trade from Odessa is of secondary importance, with minor involvement of Rodocanachi and Spartalis. The peculiarity of this trend is to be in opposition with the Greek predominance within Odessa's export trade: indeed, Greek historians have extensively studied the contribution of the major Greek houses over Odessa's trade. Their role was determinant and, in the period 1833-1860, it counted for almost half of the exports value¹⁸⁹. Moreover, the diminished importance of Greek partners from the port of Odessa implied further consequences about the destinations and to the structuring of the trade. Indeed, in the framework of Camogli's activities, Odessa represented a fundamental market to the Mediterranean, whereas, Camogli's vessels seldom left Odessa toward English destinations – where Greek houses handled most of the trade and the Sardinians run little or none business¹⁹⁰.

In Berdyansk, Mariupol and Taganrog, instead, the trend was different. First of all, the percentage of the third category – neither Italians nor Greek – falls to 11% average. Then, looking inside the two groups, we observe some difference in the partner merchants. In Berdyansk, the importance of the firms Tubino and Porro & Pertica is praised both in consular reports, where their commercial leading position is underlined and in additional sources (such as the Rocca's private

¹⁸⁹ V. Kardassis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, pp. 147-155. Tables from 7.1 to 7.4.1. According to these tables, 43% of the export trade value was handled by Greeks. Moreover, from his evidences the author illustrates how 51% of the total (export and import) business of Odessa (1833-1860) was detained by the three greater houses Rodocanachi, Ralli and Pappoudov (62% if adding Zarifi and Mavros).

¹⁹⁰ See, paragraph 1.8 'Destination ports'.

correspondence)¹⁹¹. Concerning the Greeks, instead, most of the charterers of Camogli's vessels were Ambanopoulo, Cuppa and Vagliano¹⁹². In Mariupol, instead, the trade was in the hands of the Sardinian houses Rossi (whose local agent was Pietro Schiaffino, until 1858) Gerbolini and Rocca (through their agent Giuseppe Pignone¹⁹³), whereas, for the Greeks, Scaramanga and Spartalis seemed to be the most influential¹⁹⁴.

About the commercial firm of Gustavo Gerbolini, later Gerbolini & Simoni, there are a few more details about their trade activities and their contacts with the people of Camogli. Established in Mariupol in 1836, the founder started by operating on commission¹⁹⁵. In the following years, however, Gerbolini became one of the most influential merchants of the Sardinian community; he was also a personal acquaintance of Pietro Schiaffino, the resident Sardinian vice-consul¹⁹⁶. In 1850, by handling commercial operations for more than 600.000 roubles, Gerbolini & Simoni grew into the wealthiest Sardinian firm in the Black sea¹⁹⁷. To increment his income, Gerbolini obtained a long-term provisioning contract with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, a safe and continuous source of revenues which was decisive to the firm economic growth¹⁹⁸.

Finally, Taganrog emerged as the port where the relationships between Camogli's captains and Greek merchants were more solid – although Table 2.6 shows results in line with other ports. The combination of the arrival information

¹⁹¹ See: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6; ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

¹⁹² *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

¹⁹³ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/022.

¹⁹⁴ *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

¹⁹⁵ See, ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Gustave Gerbolini (Marianopoli), L-19/14/102. At the moment of my archival research, the passive correspondence from Mariupol was erroneously kept within the correspondence from the Italian states (perhaps due to the existence of a Marianopoli in Sicily).

¹⁹⁶ See the support provided by Gustavo Gerbolini to Pietro Schiaffino in the moment of his election to vice-consul for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies: ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916.

¹⁹⁷ *Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii*, 1850.

¹⁹⁸ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 7140.

in Genoa and Marseille and the sparse notions emerging from consular and private correspondence suggests a different picture indeed, with particular regard to the role of English ports, for which we lack the merchant information. For instance, Rocca's report of all the ships leaving Taganrog to either the Mediterranean or England in June 1859, illustrates some fundamental features of the trade. From it, we could individuate 18 ships hoisting the Sardinian flag and, half of them might be identified as Camogli's vessels (100% reliable identification is impossible due to the absence of other means of identification apart from the name of the ship).

Name	Destination	Cvt	Goods	Place of loading	Merchant
Adelfide*	British ports	2379	rye	Taganrog	Scaramanga
Cara	British ports	1781	rye	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
Francesco*	British ports	2907	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
Leone	British ports	3154	oat	Taganrog	Several
Luigi*	British ports	3859	oat	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
Maria	British ports	3345	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
Moderazione*	British ports	2457	linseed	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
Oriente*	British ports	3389	oat	Taganrog	Several
Regina	British ports	2500	wheat	Taganrog	Micrulacchi
Rimbalto	British ports	3405	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
Siccino	British ports	2823	rye	Taganrog	Scaramanga
Solone*	British ports	1372	oat	Taganrog	Ralli
Teresa	British ports	2398	linseed	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
Thalia	British ports	3755	barley	Taganrog	Ralli
Tigre*	British ports	1600	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
Arbace*	Mediterranean	2615	oat	Taganrog	Micrulacchi
Aurora	Mediterranean	2540	wheat	Taganrog	Lauder

Idea*	Mediterranean 199	3412	oat	Taganrog	Lauder
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Table 2.7 - List of the Sardinian ships leaving Taganrog in June 1859. *presumable Camogli-owned ships. Source: ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

According to Table 2.7, the overwhelming majority of traders were of Greek origin. The Ralli chartered 6 Sardinian ships (3 of Camogli); then, followed Rodocanachi with 4 (2); finally Scaramanga and Micrulacchi, with 2 (1) vessels each. Most of the ships were sent to the British ports, 15 (7) out of 18.

Finally, the scarcity of similar sources about the Danube area limits our capacity to deal with the context of Galatz and Braila as much as their counterparts. From Genoa and Marseille arrivals, the Greek houses Argenti & Sechiari, Melas, Spartalis and Zariffi seem to participate extensively to Camogli's presence in the mentioned ports. Besides, for what concern the Sardinian traders, most of the cargoes were purchased on the mediation of Andrea Danovaro, of Genoese origins²⁰⁰. However, the main Sardinian commercial house settled in the Danube region had been that of Pedemonte Brothers²⁰¹. Founded in 1831 by Filippo, Antonio and Francesco, the company was very active in the 1840s. From 1847 onwards, it entered in crisis, from which it never recovered. His troubled business passed through bankruptcies, unpaid debts, company renaming throughout the 1850s; Francesco Pedemonte had indebted with both Sardinians and local subjects (an Italian banker, Marco Thal or even the Moldavian prince Gregori Stourdza²⁰²). In the late 1850s and 1860s, however, when Camogli's presence in the Danube ports grew consistent,

¹⁹⁹ Although the brig *Idea* was chartered to the Mediterranean, from its crew list it emerged that this vessel delivered its cargo in Newcastle. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 2107.

²⁰⁰ The identity of Andrea Danovaro is rather neglected by the sources: in Russia and in the Danube area, he is never mentioned neither in consular correspondence nor in the guild lists. Nevertheless, Danovaro emerges as one of the greatest commissioners of grain cargoes from the Black sea. His absence from local sources lead us to assume that he played an intermediate role between the Black sea and Genoa. Perhaps, he corresponds to the cav. ("knight", an honorific title) Andrea Danovaro who, in 1867, is granted by the Savoy Kingdom of the noble title of Count in 1867.

²⁰¹ R. Tomi, "L'histoire de la Maison de commerce Pedemonte et Fils", *Historical Yearbook*, No. 3, 2006, pp. III-122; C. Ardeleanu, "La comunità italiana nella città portuale di Galati nel periodo del Risorgimento (1830-1856)", in G. Nemeth and A. Papo (eds.), *Unità italiana e mondo adriatico-balcanico*, Trieste: Luglio, 2012, pp. 65-78.

²⁰² AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Galatz,

their company seems to be wholly disappeared, apart from the latest court proceedings between Francesco and his creditors.

An interesting case concerning the evolution of the Genoese presence in Galatz and Braila is embodied by the decision of some merchants to move there in correspondence to the Crimean War period. For instance, this was the case of Gustavo Gerbolini, previously settled in Mariupol: in his dense correspondence with the Rocca family, in April 1854 he declared his establishment in Galatz. According to his words, the merchant had moved to the Danube in response to the outbreak of the Crimean War, which had stopped a significant part of the ongoing trade in the Azov ports²⁰³. Indeed, to transfer the business to the Danube area was in line with the commercial strategies of other Black Sea trade houses (see the analogy with George Rodocanachi²⁰⁴) which, as a result of Crimean War and the subsequent shutdown of exports from the Russian territories, had sought in Galatz and Braila alternative markets.

2.5. Camogli and Black Sea Import trade

The Sardinian and Italian participation in the Black Sea import trade was less relevant than into exports. The low demand for merchandises in the Russian ports limited Sardinian arrivals with cargo. The Genoese firms settled in the Black Sea were highly competitive on exports and handled a significant part of the trade to the Mediterranean markets, almost monopolising Genoa and with interests towards Livorno and Marseille as well. The competition with the Greek firms was critical:

The import trade to this port [Odessa] on board of Sardinian vessels is narrow due to the fact the most easily sold goods are not profitable [...] and because the several bankruptcies occurring

²⁰³ See, for instance, the several complaints about the stop of commercial transactions delivered by the Sardinian consuls in Mariupol, Berdyansk and Taganrog. AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6.

²⁰⁴ P. Herlihy, "Greek merchants in Odessa in the nineteenth century", p. 416.

every year among the retailing shopkeepers, from which the Sardinian firms had been repeatedly damaged, has disgusted them with regard to importing trade at the point that, apart from the goods sold easily in exchange of cash, they are increasingly disregarding this branch of trade. On the contrary, the Greek firms, enjoying broader relationships, have attracted to them the monopoly over imports, and they fill the market to such an extent to keep away any competitor. Nevertheless, thanks to the sole exports, some Sardinian firms play a remarkable role in the local business. In 1852, the Porro firm moved 3 million francs. The Rossi firm [moved] 2 million and 700 thousand francs and the Rocca firm two million.²⁰⁵

In Table 2.8, imports and exports values in the Sardinian and Greek firms are compared to shed light over the differences in their business:

Firm	Import	Total	%
<i>Rocca</i>	55.811	1.335.405	4,2%
<i>Dall'orso</i>	48.684	1.182.711	4,1%
<i>Rossi</i>	3.245	1.150.255	0,3%
<i>Ralli</i>	517.849	2.200.645	23,5%
<i>Rodocanachi</i>	496.394	1.685.796	29,4%

²⁰⁵ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «L'importazione in questo porto sui legni sardi è assai ristretta, perché quei generi che qui sarebbero di facile sfogo non presentano conveniente utile [...] ed oltre della molteplicità dei fallimenti, che ogni anno più accadono fra i bottegai di piazza, nei quali più e più volte le case sarde restarono compromesse, le ha talmente disgustati dell'importazione che, eccettuati gli articoli di facile vendita a contanti, vanno poco alla volta trascurando questo ramo di commercio. Le case greche, invece, che hanno relazioni più estese, hanno attirato a sé il monopolio dell'importazione ed inondano talmente la piazza di ogni genere di qualità di merci di consumo, ed in sì gran quantità da svogliare qualunque altro speculatore. Malgrado ciò, quasi colla sola esportazione alcune dette case sarde ricoprono un posto non indifferente nel giro commerciale di questa piazza. La casa Porro figura nel 1852 per un giro di 3 milioni di franchi. La casa L. Rossi per 2 milioni e 700 mila franchi e la casa Rocca per 2 milioni».

Table 2.8 – The value of import over the total commercial movement of Sardinian and Greek firms settled in Odessa, 1859. Source: E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendix. Table 12.

The three leading Sardinian firms collected no more than 4% of their revenues from import trade; the most evident discrepancy between imports and exports occurred in the case of Rossi, where imports reached the 0,3% only. Ralli and Rodocanachi, on the other hand, earned from import trade, respectively the 23,5% and 29,4%. The nature of the trade influenced shipping and maritime activities. Indeed, lacking the support of their traditional commercial partners – the Genoese merchant houses – the merchant marine contributed only to a lesser extent to the imports flow to the Black Sea. Nevertheless, a brief introduction dealing with the general trend characterising Black Sea import trade will follow to contextualize the operations of Camogli's people within this scenario.

From a geographical perspective, imports were mainly concentrated in Odessa and Taganrog. Odessa was a natural outlet for colonials and industrial products, due to the continuous population growth and its connections with the hinterland; concerning the latter factor, Taganrog enjoyed identical conditions. Indeed, the city was able to exploit its position and the communications with Rostov-on-Don and, therefore, to outnumber the imports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, its natural competitors.

Table 2.9 compares the progression of British and Italian import trade to Russia in the period between 1850 and 1880. The data corpus was made available by the researchers of the Black Sea Project²⁰⁶. The results underline a relatively reduced relevance of Italian merchandises in the Black Sea markets, especially in comparison with the UK.

²⁰⁶ Data processed from: Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., *Black Sea historical statistics, 1812–1914*, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774–1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, 2012–2015, www.blacksea.gr.

	UK		Italy		Russian Imports	Total
	Value	%	Value	%		
1850	100.109	27%	32.979	9%		367.667
1851	104.005	26%	33.197	8%		402.520
1852	97.384	25%	34.141	9%		394.283
1853	110.995	28%	31.005	8%		402.893
1854	33.011	13%	15.200	6%		263.861
1855	3.483	1%	3.675	1%		269.435
1857	149.781	26%	35.069	6%		582.125
1858	153.763	27%	41.400	7%		563.051
1859	151.816	29%	34.800	7%		526.355
1860	164.707	28%	40.712	7%		592.888
1861	170.419	29%	43.040	7%		585.029
1862	124.557	24%	36.707	7%		513.371
1863	168.040	28%	38.173	6%		595.013
1864	163.861	31%	31.573	6%		531.187
1865	159.587	28%	32.571	6%		570.888
1866	161.565	28%	28.003	5%		582.221
1867	273.219	28%	53.005	5%		987.331
1868	270.048	29%	43.453	5%		929.141
1869	298.005	29%	65.533	6%		1.020.376
1870	332.184	32%	59.437	6%		1.053.677

Table 2.9 - Italian and English imports to the Russian Empire (1840-1870). Source: S. Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., *Black Sea historical statistics, 1812-1914*, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774-1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, 2012-2015, www.blacksea.gr.

Indeed, according to Table 2.9, apart from the favourable period at the beginning of 1850s, when Italian products reached almost 10% of the total value, from 1863 onwards Italian exports averaged for the 5% of the total. However, these data merge the various pre-unitarian Italian states altogether and does not provide any distinction by ports. Indeed, this figure is even more manifest according to

more accurate analysis, taking into account the distinction between different ports of origin. We utilised the Italian official statistical publications about shipping and trade, available for 1865²⁰⁷, and compared the three main Italian main ports in terms of shipping movement, Genoa, Livorno and Messina. Out of the total amount of ships – destined either to Russia or to the Danube Principalities – calling for commercial operations in these ports, the percentage of those cleared with cargo has been estimated. The results illustrate different trends according to each port:

Destination	Genoa			Livorno			Messina		
	Total	Cargo		Total	Cargo		Total	Cargo	
		No.	%		No.	%		No.	%
Southern Russia	162	6	4%	20	12	60%	28	26	93%
Danube Principalities	11	5	45%	5	3	60%	1	0	0%

Table 2.10 - Vessels cleared with cargo the ports of Genoa, Livorno and Messina to Russian and to the Danube in 1865. Source: *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno*, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1867, pp. 74-79.

The contribution of Genoa's exports toward Russia, for instance, is negligible (6 ships, 4% of the movement); in Livorno and Messina, instead, the percentages increase to 60% and 93%, and also the total numbers grow consistently, to 12 and 26 ships cleared with cargo. Therefore, despite its leading role in terms of both ship-ownership and maritime movement, Genoa has little or none direct commercial relationships with Russia about local exports. The figure slightly changes when taking the Danube Principalities into account, though the relatively low numbers may suggest caution. This is an additional indication of the limited competitiveness, in Russia, of the products from the pre-unitarian Savoy state, of which Genoa was the natural port of export.

²⁰⁷ *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno*, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1867.

However, in the attempt to estimate the contribution of the Italian and Sardinian merchant marine to the trade relationships between Italy and Russia we disaggregated the data concerning the whole outbound trade to circumscribe our sample to the Italian flag. In Table 2.11, Italian and foreign ships cleared to Southern Russia and the Danube are compared. The percentage of those vessels cleared with cargo out of the total ships operating on the same route has also been taken into consideration, in order to evaluate the average efficiency of Italian shipping engaging the Black Sea trade in comparison with the foreign flag.

Destination	Italian			Foreign			% Italian flag cargoes
	Total	Cargo		Total	Cargo		
		No.	%		No.	%	
Southern Russia	251	28	11%	99	82	83%	25%
Danube Principalities	21	12	57%	122	118	97%	9%

Table 2.11 - Italian and foreign vessels cleared with cargo from Italian ports to Southern Russia and the Danube principalities. Source.

The results of Table 2.11 are indicative of the low proportion of Italian vessels sailing to the Black Sea with cargo. Conversely, as far as all the foreign flags are concerned, both absolute and relative numbers are much more positive, with an average rate of employment over 80%. These indicators, and the general evaluation about the Sardinian contribution to Southern Russian import trade, are confirmed by the coeval consular accounts from the Black Sea ports. The Italian consuls in Berdyansk and Taganrog, in particular, transmitted a large amount of documentation, suitable for the purpose to investigate national trade and shipping in the abovementioned ports. The general framework witnesses numerous arrivals of Italian ships, a figure which was not balanced by an equivalent share of import trade. For instance, in 1861, the Italian flag counted for more than half of the ships

calling to Berdyansk (51,20%)²⁰⁸. Meanwhile, as reported in Table 2.12, these vessels transported in their holds less than 17% of the total imports value mainly Mediterranean foodstuff and some colonials.

FLAG	ITALY	OTHER	% ITA
N° SHIPS	150	143	51,20%
OLIVE OIL	1100	17100	6%
COFFEE	7200	22980	31%
RICE	1050		100%
PEPPER		1453	0%
SUGAR		733	0%
CITRUSES	2800	3713	75%
WINES		2368	0%
WALNUTS		24318	0%
ALMONDS		569	0%
FIGUES		2513	0%
CAROBS		22267	0%
MARBLES	1600		100%
FURNITURES	2100		100%
HATS	600		100%
TABLES		504	0%
TOT VALUE	16450	98518	17%

Table 2.12 - Imports to Berdyansk according to value (roubles) (August 1860-August 1861). Source: AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, Odessa, 895.

A few years later, inside the report of the Taganrog vice-consul, published in the *Bollettino Consolare Italiano*, a statistical account about the ports of Mariupol and Taganrog provides analogous information concerning Italian trade and shipping. The results drawn in Table 6.6 illustrate an even wider discrepancy between the total tonnage calling in the Azov ports and the value of their contribution to local imports.

²⁰⁸ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, Odessa, 895.

	SHIPS		IMPORT	
	TONS	%	VALUE	%
1867	115.402	29,57%	757.900	3,80%
1868	153.696	27,75%	1.040.947	5,09%

Table 2.13 - Italian imports to Mariupol and Taganrog (together) in 1867-1868 compared to tonnage. Source: Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel 1868 rapporto del Cav. Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, p. 201.

According to Table 2.13, the imports on the Italian flag counted for the 4-5%, in the face of an outstanding amount of tonnage available in port, between one fourth and one third.

In quantitative terms, the weight of Italian import trade with the Black Sea was low; however, from a qualitative perspective, there were some evident limits, connected with a restricted list of articles and genres, mainly dealing with Mediterranean foodstuff. These limitations played a crucial role in the failed evolution of this commercial sector. As mentioned above, most of these merchandises were not produced in Liguria or the northernmost regions of Italy; citruses, for instance, one of the main exported articles, were usually loaded at the port of Messina, in Sicily, despite the long-standing tradition of the western Ligurian Riviera to produce citruses for the international market²⁰⁹.

The commercialization of citruses had a similar fate to olive oil within a different geographical framework. Liguria produced and sold abroad both of these articles: however, only southern Italian citruses found profitable markets in Russia, whereas the trade of olive oil was mainly managed by Greek merchants and carried out on board of Greek ships. Olive oil was indeed highly demanded in Russia, mainly for religious purposes, because it was needed to light the lamps illuminating the sacred icons²¹⁰. Nevertheless, neither Ligurian nor southern Italian olive oil was able to compete with the Greek counterpart in terms of transport costs and market price, despite numerous attempts to introduce such

²⁰⁹ See, A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all'estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*.

²¹⁰ AMAE, *Affari esteri*, Odessa, 895.

product in Russia²¹¹. On the other hand, other merchandise, rice, succeeded to penetrate the Black Sea market as a high-quality alternative to local products. Indeed, according to the Italian consular reports, in 1859 the rice of Piedmont was first introduced in Russia, in concomitance with a bad harvest occurred in the province of Astrakhan. After that, the Italian rice maintained its position, appreciated for its flavour and superior cooking qualities²¹².

In line with the general framework of Sardinian import trade to the Black Sea, the absolute majority of Camogli ships arrived there on ballast, along a straight route from Genoa to Constantinople, without intermediate stops. However, to not sail on ballast for the whole first leg, some vessels called at Messina – with no orders – seeking for some cargo to sell in the Southern Russian ports. The traces of this trade have been preserved inside the correspondence of the Neapolitan consuls in the Black Sea, as they were requested to compile tables and statistics of the commercial relationships between Russia and their home countries, including number and details of foreign ships arriving in Odessa from national ports. In the first half of 1851, for instance, of 17 foreign ships from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Odessa, the Sardinian flag was represented by eight vessels (the remaining being Russian and Austrians)²¹³. All of these ships were loaded in the port of Messina, seven with citruses and one with pumice stones. Among them, there were three ships of Camogli, all brigs: *Il Pegaso*, captain Giuseppe Schiaffino, *La Tigre*, captain Paolo Borzone and the *Guardia*, captain Gio. Batta Razeto²¹⁴. In January 1853, a similar table enumerates three more ships of Camogli arrived at Odessa from Messina, again with citruses and wine²¹⁵. Here, the vessels were the

²¹¹ *Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk, di Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849) in Orano*, pp. 65-66.

²¹² *Idem*, p. 65.

²¹³ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 5256.

²¹⁴ The brig *Il Pegaso* (197 t.), constructed in Varazze in 1843, was owned by Bernardo Schiaffino; the brig *La Tigre* (176 t.), built in the same place and date, and the brig *Guardia* (372 t.), built in Varazze in 1848, were owned by Prospero Lavarello. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4018 (*Il Pegaso*); *Idem*, serie 14, No. 8659 (*La Tigre*); *Idem*, serie 14, No. 6754.

²¹⁵ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 5256.

Grimaldo, *Arpia* and *San Carlo*, captained respectively by Gio. Batta Repetto, Giuseppe Bertolotto and Gio. Bono Ferrari²¹⁶.

Concerning the Azov seaports, the larger corpus of information produced by the Neapolitan consul in Kerch provides more details, reported in Table 2.14.

Year	Port of loading	Ship	Captain	Cargo	Tonnage
1846	Genova	Concezione	G. Razeto	coffee	146
1846	Genova	La Purità	P. Senno	olive oil / furnitures	133
1846	Malta	Chiara	D. Schiaffino	citruses	168
1846	Messina	La Sacra Famiglia	L. Brigneti	citruses	162
1846	Messina	Unione	B. D'Aste	fresh fruits	187
1846	Nizza	Concezione	F. Stagno	citruses and oil	101
1846	Other 21			Ballast	3724
1847	Messina	Costante	P. Mortola	citruses	190
1847	Genova	Amore	F. Lavarello	furnitures	145
1847	Other 37			Ballast	6083
1851*	Messina	Elia	G.B. Mortola	citruses	210
1851	Messina	Costante	P. Mortola	citruses	190
1851	Messina	San Carlo	G.B. Ferrari	citruses	188
1851	Messina	Rosario	G. Mortola	citruses	158
1851	Messina	Almeria	Lavarello	citruses	254

²¹⁶ The brig *Grimaldo* is enrolled in the list of the *Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese* in 1853, owner Antonio Schiaffino: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*. The brig *Arpia* was captained by the owner, Giuseppe Bertolotto; ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4245. The brig *San Carlo* (188 tons), built in Varazze in 1835, instead, was owned by Erasmo Schiaffino, one of the leading ship-owner of the first generation of Camogli's ship-owners. He was one of the founders of the local mutual insurance company. The captain, Gio. Bono Ferrari, was his son-in-law. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4251.

Table 2.14 - Camogli ships arrived with cargo in Kerch (1846; 1847; 1851*). *from Neapolitan ports only. Source: ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 5256.

Whereas Neapolitan consular reports are rich of details for the period 1846-1851, concerning the following years, up to 1865, the crew lists help us reconstruct the relevance of this trade within the whole figure of Camogli. According to our calculations, an average of 10-11 vessels from Camogli (nearly 8% of the total) annually called at Messina to load cargo to the Russian ports²¹⁷. However, even in the Sicilian port, the relevance of English and Greek competition prevented this route from assuming crucial importance in the perspectives of the community ship-owners. In particular, in the latest years under consideration, indeed, while the ships of Camogli established durable connections with the British ports, regular cargoes of coal replaced occasional loads of citruses in the framework of their trade to the Black Sea²¹⁸.

2.6. Camogli and Black Sea Export trade

Despite the existence of import trade from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, the presence of Camogli in the area was mainly motivated by the development of the grain export trade. An extensive description of the Black Sea grain trade, its development throughout several decades and its features and characteristics are well beyond the intentions of the chapter. Each geographical area taken into account, Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube region showed a remarkable increase of exports and experienced an exponential economic growth directly ascribable to the grain trade.

²¹⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

²¹⁸ See the “Destination ports” paragraph.




Figure 2.4 - Export trade from Odessa, the Danube region and the Azov ports (1831-1883). Source: S. Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., *Black Sea historical statistics, 1812–1914*, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774–1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, 2012–2015, www.blacksea.gr.

The competition between each other varied throughout the nineteenth century: in general, the loss of the leading position of Odessa observed after the Crimean War (1853-1856) was due to significant structural changes in which Russian infrastructural investments on railways in the Azov region, the abolition of serfdom (1861) and the loss of Odessa’s free port status (1857) merged. The data of Odessa’s exports within the total figure of the southern Russian ports reflects the declining importance of the city: its share over exports falls from 40% average in the 1840s to 25% average in the 1870s.

The main categories of products exported were cereals of different kinds, mainly wheat and, then, corn, rye and linseed. In Odessa and the Azov ports, there was also some trade in woollen clothes (especially of “merinos” quality) and salt.

In Table 2.15, in the attempt to frame Camogli’s maritime activities in a broader context, the Sardinian and Italian percentage ratios within the sea-borne export trade in Odessa, the Azov and the Danube ports are put into comparison.

	Odessa	Azov	Danube
1850	16%	15%	
1857	18%	16%	
1858	17%	18%	
1859	23%	15%	
1860	19%	33%	
1861		32%	10%
1862		22%	13%
1866		26%	3%
1867		27%	
1858		30%	
1869	31%	30%	
1870	14%	21%	
1871	16%	19%	
1872	17%	19%	9%
1873	15%	24%	5%
1874		21%	3%
1875		47%	5%
1877		24%	1%
1878		12%	2%

Table 2.15 - Tonnage percentage out of the total movement of Sardinian and Italian flags in Odessa, the Azov ports and the Danube. Source: *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls (CRFO)*, from 1862 to 1879; *Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel 1868 rapporto del Cav. Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp.199-206; *Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio console cav. Avv. G. Rossi*, in *Idem*, pp. 464-468; *Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk*, di *Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849)* in Orano, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1868, pp. 45-104; *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz*, in *Idem*, pp. 107-128.

According to this table, the traffics of the Italian merchant marine were more regular and had a more consistent weight in Odessa and the Azov, whereas in Galatz and Braila they seldom reached 10%. In the Azov Sea ports, the Italian participation averaged to 22,60%; in Odessa to 17,60%. Indeed, Italian shipping system turned out to be one of the most successful in the Azov ports in comparison

with the other regions; in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Sardinian vessels directed much more decisively to these ports, establishing durable supremacy in the Azov export trade. In Taganrog, the tonnage of the Italian ships increased from 21.728 tons (9% of the total) in 1857 to 134.036 (29% of the total) in 1871²¹⁹. Even more impressive is the figure of Berdyansk, where Italian shipping outnumbered all the other flags: in the same period, the proportion of the Italian tonnage out of the total available in the Russian port passed from 40% to 57%.

In Figure 7.2, the number of Italian ships in Berdyansk is compared with the total amount of all flag.




Figure 2.5 - Italian and all flag ships cleared from the port of Berdyansk (1857-1879). Source: *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls, Berdyansk, from 1862 to 1879*; *Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk in Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1868; AMAE, *Affari politici*, Odessa, 895; I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire (nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, Vol. 1: British Consuls in the port*

²¹⁹ *Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the Trade of Taganrog for the year 1861*, in CRFO, London: Harrison and Sons, 1862, pp. 248-254; *Report by Consul Carruthers*, in *Idem*, 1872, pp. 431-442. The peak of the Italian share over Taganrog shipping movement was in 1863 when it reached the 31%. In parallel with the tonnage, the ships' number grew almost accordingly: in 1857 there were 104 Sardinian ships, whereas in 1871 there were 348. Since Italian ship-owners had invested in newer and bigger ships, also the average tonnage witnessed an impressive growth, from 208 tons in 1857 to 385 tons in 1871.

of Berdyansk, Kiev: Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Primary Sources Studying of M.S. Hrushevskyi, 2018.

According to the British consuls, the reasons for the Italian success in these ports is to be found in various factors. First, the high appreciation toward Italian captains, whose «intelligence, activity and exemplary conduct» were praised and valued over «the shipmasters of any other nation»²²⁰. The second factor, instead, was in terms of market competitiveness: due to their lower operational costs, Italian captains were able to accept lower freights. More specifically, British consuls underlined all the factors determining the Italian comparative advantage in terms of costs. Maritime labour in Italy was cheaper than in other merchant marines, especially compared to the British one; then, due to the Italian relative delay in terms of unionism and class movements, several aspects of sailors' working activities were not strictly regulated as in the case of the British. For instance, the food supplies distributed on board could have been of lower quality, and there was no evident limit to their working hours (whereas British sailors did not work on Sunday, and their working hours were from six to six)²²¹. The discrepancies in terms of the rights of seafaring labourers, therefore, had a direct impact on operational costs, both in terms of money and time. However, apart from this brief reference to maritime labour, all of these aspects will be more extensively outlined in the fifth chapter. Then, Italians were also advantaged for the lower costs of wooden ship-building; despite the alleged more safety and endurance of British vessels, merchants were not willing to charge the freight differentials on their accounts, reversing the risk, instead, on insurance companies²²².

²²⁰ *Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the trade of Taganrog for the year 1861*, in *CRFO*, 1862, pp. 248-249. Also in Berdyansk, in 1864, Italian captains were «preferred by the majority of the exporters to any other except British. This might be attributed to the energetic character of their commanders, and the great care taken by them in the preservation of cargoes». *Report by Mr. Acting Consul Wagstaff on the trade of Berdyansk for the year 1864*, in *CRFO*, 1865, p. 13.

²²¹ *Report by Consul Zohrab on the Commerce and Navigation of Berdyansk for the Year 1870*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire (nineteenth-early twentieth centuries)*, Vol. 1: British Consuls in the port of Berdyansk, Kiev: Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Primary Sources Studying of M.S. Hrushevskyi, 2018, p. 415.

²²² In this regard the British consul is clear: «the advantages of British vessels, being safer and more ably navigated, are lost in the difference of cost, for merchants do not, after all, place so much importance on superiorities which benefit insurance companies rather than themselves». *Report by*

These more significant numbers about the Azov ports might be partially explained through a combination of technological advances in navigation and the peculiar environment of the area. Indeed, whereas in Odessa and the ports of the Danube steamers established their rule in the grain trade between the 1860s and early 1870s, in the Azov Sea the transition from sail to steam in navigation was not even close to its conclusion a decade later. For instance, already in 1867, 37% of the value of the goods exchanged in Galatz had been transported on steamships²²³. In 1872, 421 steamships (of which 310 hoisting the British flag) cleared the port of Odessa (only partially balanced by 621 sailing vessels)²²⁴. In the same year, only 69 steamers called at Taganrog, out of 874 ships, counting for no more than 18% of the tonnage. In Berdyansk, competition among steamers was even less effective: in 1874, the tonnage of steamships cleared from the port counted for the 8% of the total, since there were only 11 steamers out of 323 ships²²⁵.

Moreover, Berdyansk was the most resilient to the success of steamships: only in 1883 and 1884 steam navigation established on proportions similar to those of Odessa and the ports of Danube during the previous decade²²⁶. The evolution of technological transition in the Black Sea trade had inherent connections with the success of one or another merchant marine in different ports. For a wide array of reasons, among which ship-building costs, coal availability and prices were mentioned, it is to be taken into account also the organizational structure of shipping business²²⁷; indeed, British controlled a great part of the world steamship

Mr. Consul Zohrab on the Trade and Navigation of the Port of Berdiansk for the Year 1866, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, p. 397.

²²³ *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia*, pp. 121-125. The overall data, in Italian lira, show that the total movement on steamships counted for 18,4 millions, whereas sailing ships transported goods for 31,9 millions. The Italian participation to this movement was of the 12% of the total (only on sailing ships).

²²⁴ *Report by Consul-General Abbott on the trade of Odessa in 1872*, in *CRFO*, 1873, pp. 1020-1021.

²²⁵ *Report by Vice-Consul Wagstaff on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the year 1874*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, p. 471.

²²⁶ *Report by Vice-Consul Lowe on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the Year 1883*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, pp. 520-525.

²²⁷ All of these factors will be the object of a more extensive presentation in the third chapter.

fleet, whereas Italy continued to a large extent to employ sailing vessels on these routes²²⁸.

To reconstruct the nature of Italian business in the Black Sea, we must consider the following features. First, the bulk of the fixed capital to engage in the sea-borne trade was constituted by the sailing fleet of Genoa, in which ship-owner invested shipping incomes to modernize and enlarge the fleet. Second, Italian shipping seized a significant part of the export trade to the Mediterranean, relying on their partnership with the national commercial firms established in the Southern Russian ports. Finally, the expansion phase lasted from the 1850s to the beginning of the 1870s. In this regard, the role of Italian ships increased in the Azov ports rather than in Odessa or the Danube, due to the comparative advantage provided by lower operational costs, and due to the delayed establishment of steam shipping there.

Therefore, the national framework will provide a fundamental tool to analyse the participation of Camogli to this movement, its success, its weight on the total figure and its peculiarities.

The presence of Camogli ships in the Black Sea ports has been evaluated through the vast corpus of crew lists available concerning the period from 1853 and 1865²²⁹. Indeed, these documents, apart from the information about ship and crews, which will be the object of further discourses, provide an unparalleled source of information about all of their routes. These routes have been reconstructed through the consular stamps or subscriptions which every Sardinian captain needed to obtain before leaving a foreign port.

²²⁸ According to the statistics tables elaborated by the Norwegian Office for Statistics, in 1879, the British steamship fleet represented the 66% of the world steamship tonnage; Italy counted for 1,7% of the total. See: A.N. Kjaer (ed.), *Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands*, Christiania: Ahschehoug, 1881, Table No. 3, *Nombre et tonnage des navires marchands des different pays dans chaucune des annes 1871-1880*, pp. 18-25.

²²⁹ The end date is due to the lack of further crew lists in the Genoese archives, because of the relocation of most of the material as a result of the Italian unification, which caused huge damages to archival conservation.




Figure 2.6 - Camogli ships loading in the Black sea ports by region. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*.

According to Figure 2.6, the numeric consistency of Camogli's shipping in the Black Sea increased in parallel with the structural growth of the fleet – analysed in paragraph 1.2 of the present chapter. The rise of Camogli's vessels from 63 units before the Crimean War up to the almost 180 in 1865 is even more evident if associated with the boost of the average tonnages, passed from 163 to 297 tons (Figure 2.1).

The absolute majority of the fleet of Camogli was employed in the Black Sea trade; apart from the persistence of coastal cabotage (dealing with Tuscan charcoal, see chapter 1), all the ships able to long-distance navigation engaged in this business. However, the presence of Camogli vessels within the broader framework of the national participation in the Black Sea trade was not an easy task due to the dispersion of most of the consular correspondence (particularly concerning statistics and tables) between the archives of Turin and Rome²³⁰. This

²³⁰ The correspondence of the Sardinian consuls of the 1850s and 1860s have a peculiar archival history: first collected in Turin, the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, after the Italian unification some of it was transferred to Rome (1871) among the documents of the "Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Italia". Then, some parts returned to Turin after the Second World War, whereas

fact was explicitly actual for what concerns Odessa and the Danube ports, whereas more information is available for the Azov Sea ports.

	Odessa			Berdyansk			Mariupol			Taganrog			Danube		
	Cam.	Sard.	%	Cam.	Sard.	%	Cam.	Sard.	%	Cam.	Sard.	%	Cam.	Sard.	%
1857	29	189	15%	20	90	22%				28	104	27%			
1858	12	175	7%	41	147	28%									
1859	28	269	10%	22	110	20%				54	135	40%			
1860															
1861	23	217	11%	15	166	9%	18	122	15%	32	188	17%	51	274	18%
1862				14	143	10%	14	97	14%	38	232	16%			
1863				13	102	13%	9	49	18%	30	246	12%	59	368	16%
1864				16	91	17%	10	94	11%	34	166	20%			
1865										37	183	20%			

Table 2.16 - Camogli's share over the Sardinian presence in Odessa, the Black Sea ports and the Danube²³¹. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; AMAE, *Affari Politici*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato degli affari esteri*, 5256; *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls*, from 1862 to 1879.

The little amount of data concerning Odessa restricted the analysis to a few specific years. In average, the results show the participation of 10,75% of the ships in the leading Russian Black Sea port. Hence, further comparisons can be advanced for Odessa and the Azov ports. Notwithstanding the total amount of ships going toward either the two destinations, the participation of Camogli increases to a 14,50% yearly average in Mariupol, 17% in Berdyansk and, finally, to 21,70% in Taganrog.

Through crew lists information, we were also able to reconstruct the general route patterns followed by ships of Camogli to and from the Black Sea. In this regard, we might propose three different samples, corresponding to each area of destination among Odessa, the Azov and the Danube. The first example might be found in the route of the brig *Principe di Moldavia* (169 t.), built in Varazze in 1851,

other remained in Rome. See, F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, pp. 9-20.

²³¹ In order to elaborate this table we chose to show only the years in which we possessed data for both of the categories (Camogli ships and Sardinian flag) and, therefore, able to the percentage calculations and to draw comparisons.

owned by Gio. Batta Grimaldo Ansaldo and captained by Gerolamo Lavarello²³². The ships sailed on the 24th May 1861 from Genoa with the direction of Constantinople, an obligated stop to enter and leave the Black Sea, due to the presence of passage duties which were demanded by the Ottoman authorities. However, far from representing merely a customs house, Constantinople was a leading financial and commercial centre, where several trade houses, banking and any kind of shipping operators possessed some branches or even the headquarters²³³. In 1872, for instance, the captain Nicola Schiaffino from Camogli, contracted a 7.389 francs bottomry loan from the Greek businessman Antonio Inglesis to repair his ship *Dittatore Garibaldi* which had suffered some damages along his route from Taganrog²³⁴.

In the Ottoman capital, the captain either received (from a local commissioner) or established his following destination, Odessa, the port from which he would have taken a grain cargo to go back into the Mediterranean. The ship left

²³² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 8054. This is not the first time we found this ship. Other voyages (always along Black sea routes) are found in Idem, serie 13, n. 4250 and Idem, serie 14, n. 1221.

²³³ The intermediate role for shipping and banking of the city of Istanbul has been underlined by recent works, especially for what concerned the presence of Greeks operators. See, E. Eldem, S. Laiou and V. Kechriotis (eds.), *The economic and social development of the port-cities of the southern Black sea coast and hinterland. Late 18th-beginning of the 19th century*, Black Sea Project Working Papers vol. V, Corfu: 2017. In particular, see K. Galani, "The Galata bankers and the international banking of the Greek business group in the 19th century", pp. 45-79. See also, G. Harlaftis and V. Kardassis, *International shipping in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea: Istanbul as a maritime centre, 1870-1910*, in S. Pamuk and J.G. Williamson (eds.), *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 233-265.

²³⁴ MCMC, *Noli*, Contratto di cambio marittimo tra Nicola Schiaffino e Antonio Inglesis – 5 marzo 1872. The bottomry loan (*cambio marittimo* in Italian) has been a fundamental financial and risk-sharing tool since the Middle Age and throughout the whole early modern period. It was based on a loan connected to the ship, where all the risks were pending on the borrower in exchange of high interests. In period when loans with high interests were forbidden or opposed for religious reasons, the bottomry loan was allowed due to the as much high risks on the borrower connected with the unpredictability of navigation. Several merchants and businessmen, still in the 18th century, practiced the bottomry loan as a proper financial investment, due to the high returns of sea-borne trade. In the case under analysis, Antonio Inglesis contracted an interest rate of 12% (total 8.275 francs) to be returned within three days from the arrival of the ship to its final destination. For a broader introduction to marine insurances and the institution of bottomry loans, see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 1300-1850*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016; G. Salvioli, *L'assicurazione e il cambio marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano*, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1884. See also: A. Delis, "Shipping Finance and Risks in Sea Trade during the French Wars: Maritime Loan Operations in the Republic of Ragusa", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 24: 1, 2012, pp. 229-242.

Constantinople on the 8th July 1861. From the Russian port, since the stowage of the cargo into the hold could take up to 10-14 days, the *Principe di Moldavia* departed at the end of July. Finally, after a due stop in Constantinople again, it sailed to Marseille, where it arrived at the beginning of September (10th). Following a two-week stop in the French port, owing to the discharge of the cargo and the recruitment of a new crew, the ship left Marseille towards Constantinople on the 28th September. Then, it sailed along the Odessa-Marseille route another time, and in the following year, it went to a Danube port (Galatz) to carry its cargo to England. After a two year service and three voyages to the Black sea, in the end, it went back to Genoa, for some reparations, a few months stops during winter, in order to resume navigation in the following spring.

The average routes for those ships heading to the Azov and the Danube, however, did not differ so relevantly from those going to Odessa (at least in their haul to the Black sea). The brig *Mentore* (274 t.), for instance, departed from Genoa to Constantinople on 11th March 1862²³⁵. There, almost a month later it left the Ottoman capital destined to the Azov (no more details were provided); after the obligatory stop at Kerch quarantine station, however, it headed directly to Taganrog, from where the departure towards English ports took place only in late May. In this case, as we will analyse more closely in the next paragraph, the *Mentore* was chartered directly to Falmouth, one of the most trafficked ports for orders of the British Isles, to receive the communication about its final direction (Amsterdam), on 6th August. To illustrate a sample route to the Danube, instead, we might choose the voyage of *Sincero* (172 t.). The vessel left Genoa in late November 1861; by the time that the ship would have been in the Black sea, (1 and ½- 2 months maximum) the entrance to the Azov would have been closed due to the icing (in 1862, its navigation opened on 7th April²³⁶). Therefore, it stopped first

²³⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 15, n. 2504. The brig was constructed in 1852 in Varazze and was owned by the Mortola Bros of Gio. Batta. Active in the Black sea trade at least since the 1856, it was led for six years by the experienced captain Prospero Castagnola of Camogli (ASGe, *Matricole*, register 2, n. 2127). In 1862, however, the ship changed its captain in favour of Gio. Batta Olivari.

²³⁶ V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, p.7, Table 1.1, *Duration of Freezing up of the Sea of Azov*. For the average routes length and directions, see: A. Delis, "Navigating perilous waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the 19th century", pp. 1-33.

in Messina to load some cargo to sell in the Danube and set sails to Constantinople at the beginning of January. Afterwards, the ship was checked in the quarantine station of Sulina (where the captain denounced to have the hold full of citruses) and went to Galatz to discharge. In a few days, perhaps unable to find freight in the port, the ship left for Braila, where it finally loaded its wheat cargo and left in late March to Falmouth²³⁷.

2.7. Trading at war: shipping activities during the Crimean War

Between 1854 and 1856, the outbreak of the Crimean War disrupted the Black Sea trade system, reducing the traffic to its lowest numbers since the Russo-Turkish war of 1827-28. This historical phase, however, is a unique observation point to examine the behaviour of the members of the Camogli merchant marine in front of the subversion of most of their commercial activities. Indeed, the rate of specialization of Camogli's shipping from Black Sea trade, and somehow its dependency, was relevant, since the fleet consisted in 143 ships in 1853²³⁸, a great deal of them employed along the grain routes. Furthermore, apart from the loss of profits for ship-owners, shipping revenues fed the community as a whole, through the salaries – or even shares – of maritime labourers.

Therefore, Camogli shipowners (some of them owning 2-3 different ships²³⁹), unable as they were to readjust to other trades, put the vessels at the service of the belligerent powers (the United Kingdom and France at the beginning), for the transport of troops and supplies to the Crimean front.

²³⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 15, n. 6251. The ship was built in Varazze's shipyards in 1855 for the ship-owner Rocco Schiaffino. In the first years of navigation the ship captain was Ferdinando Peragallo. Then in 1862 he was substituted by Filippo Boggiano, who lasted a couple of years and then was destined to command Rocco Schiaffino's newly built ship (*Giano*, 430 t., built in 1862) whereas Emanuele Mortola was employed on *Sincero*.

²³⁸ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

²³⁹ *Ibidem*. Among the most important ship-owners there were Bernardo Degregori (3 ships), Biagio Olivari (3), Erasmo Schiaffino (3) and Gerolamo Schiaffino (3). In this period, however, concentrated ship-ownership was not a distinguishing trait of the community as it will be in the late 19th century. See the fourth chapter.

The only available reference for the chartering of the ships of Camogli for the war comes by the reports of the Sardinian consul in Malta. A key station both for the English and the French fleet before moving troops and provisions directly to the war front. The British army relied mainly both on its naval and merchant fleet; instead, the French government disposed of more of the Sardinian commercial fleet.

According to such reports, from April 1854 to March 1855, 141 ships hoisting the Sardinian flag were chartered by the French militaries to transport troops and supplies to the Black Sea.

Place charging	of N* Sardinian ships
Algiers	10
Arzew	3
Bona	13
Gibraltar	1
Marseille	93
Sète	1
Skikda	1
Toulon	19

Table 2.17 - Number of Sardinian ships chartered by the French government divided by place of charging. Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Malta.

Officer s	Soldier s	Horse s	Oxe n	Donkey s	Flour sacks	Supplie s	Fodde r
13	1963	2016	415	58	1500	6	2

Table 2.18 - Passengers and cargoes carried on board of Sardinian ships. Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Malta.

The most significant part of the Sardinian ships carried soldiers and horses from Marseille or from Algeria to the Black Sea. Apart from the discrete amount of cattle, all the other categories did not represent a considerable amount (1500 sacks of

flour were carried on four ships only). On average, each ship transported up to 20 soldiers and an equivalent number of horses.

However, in order to go a little deeper in the analysis of this trade and to investigate destinations as well as the ports of loading, the Maltese data need to be paired with the crew list of each ship sailing along this route. The results are quite evident: the main ports of discharging were Varna and Kamiesch, both of them of serious strategic concern within the French military organization. The port of Varna, in Bulgaria, of relative importance in the grain trade routes, from June 1854 onwards became a crucial point to retake (by the French and British sides) the control over the Danube region²⁴⁰. The small harbour of Kamiesch, instead, a natural bay in the surroundings of Sevastopol, constituted the logistic base of the French activities in the Crimean Peninsula.

2.8. Destination ports

After having presented the main features of the Russian grain trade and of the Camogli's presence in the Black Sea, the present paragraph, on the contrary, deals with the opposite end of the trade, the destination ports. In the Black Sea, the vessels of Camogli were chartered to either the Mediterranean or the British Isles. The exact destination was communicated to the captains in the ports of charging mainly when it concerned a Mediterranean port, either Genoa or Marseille, mostly upon Italian commissions; instead, when destined to a port for order, Malta in the Mediterranean and Falmouth and Cork in the Atlantic, the cargoes were destined to British and Northern European ports. Therefore, we divided all the destinations into two geographical categories: the Mediterranean ports, with a focus on Genoa, Marseille and Livorno due to their relevance in the trade in general and relation to Camogli; the British ports, which composed a maritime system, in which ports for

²⁴⁰ I. Roussev, *The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization*, pp. 214-223. For a general framework of the Crimean War events, see: A. Ramm, "The Crimean War", in J. Bury (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 468-492.

orders, grain import ports and coal export ports coexisted and integrated each other in a functional perspective.

Concerning destinations, the route reconstruction operated on crew lists produced the following results:

	Marseille	Genoa	Livorno	British ports
1853	40%	47%	9%	4%
1854	30%	45%	6%	18%
1857	52%	37%	0%	10%
1858	52%	25%	4%	19%
1859	30%	48%	0%	23%
1860	43%	28%	0%	30%
1861	35%	19%	7%	39%
1862	15%	22%	3%	60%
1863	24%	33%	6%	37%
1864	16%	33%	6%	45%
1865	28%	19%	0%	53%

Table 2.19 - Cargo destinations from the Black Sea by year (1853-1865). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

Table 2.19 constitutes a fundamental tool to observe the evolution of Camogli's participation in the Black Sea trade throughout the 1850s and 1860s. Mediterranean destinations, especially for what concerned Genoa and Marseille appear to be central in their maritime activities, at least until 1860-61. After that, an impressive increase of cargoes directed to the Atlantic radically transformed the trade and had consequences on Camogli's subsequent development. In the 1850s, the Crimean War years apart, Marseille and Genoa received the 41% each (on average) of the grain carried on Camogli's ships. Moreover, with the inclusion of Livorno, the average in the 1853-1859 period ascended to 86% of the cargoes to Mediterranean ports. Despite this predominance of the Mediterranean destinations, the transport of cereals to the United Kingdom began in 1847 as soon as the abolition of the protectionist Corn Laws allowed Russian grains to penetrate

the British markets²⁴¹. Such development was so evident that was reported by contemporary observers (the Sardinian consul in Odessa, in 1853):

The extraordinary increase of grain imports to the United Kingdom dates back to the abolition of the Corn Laws. Indeed, until 1845, Great Britain figured for the 8% of Odessa's grain exports, whereas now it counts for the 43%, without even considering 1849-50 when the United Kingdom purchased the 50% and 62% of the exports from this port respectively. The exports to the Mediterranean, conversely, was affected by this transformation and, whereas in 1845 it counted for 83%, now it is reduced to 41%. Such diminution is caused by the fact that before Livorno, Genoa and Trieste covered the role of intermediate grain deposits, keen to supply the British demands; instead, for a few years onwards, these demands are directly satisfied in Odessa.²⁴²

However, the participation of the Sardinian ships in the Black Sea-Britain routes was affected by their smaller average tonnage vis a vis the northern European ships.²⁴³ A glance to the average tonnage of Sardinian ships and all of the other flags seems to confirm his assertions at least until the 1860s. To illustrate this

²⁴¹ On the Corn Laws, their abolition and their impact on the growth of the Black Sea trade, see: C. Schonhardt-Bailey, *From the corn laws to free trade: interests, ideas, and institutions in historical perspective*, Cambridge: MIT press, 2006; S. Fairlie, *The Anglo-Russian grain trade 1815-1861*, Thesis: University of London, 1959; Idem, "The Nineteenth-Century Corn Law Reconsidered", *The Economic History Review*, No. 18: 3, 1965, pp. 562-575; Idem, "The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production. 1829-1876", *The Economic History Review*, No. 22: 1, 1969, pp. 88-116.

²⁴² AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «Lo straordinario aumento nell'importazione dei cereali nel Regno Unito, data dalla abolizione della legge eccezionale sui grani. Difatti si vede che sino all'anno 1845 la Gran Bretagna non figurava nell'esportazione dei cereali da Odessa che per l'8%, mentreche attualmente figura già per il 43%, non contando gli anni 1849 e 50, nel primo dei qual il Regno Unito ritirò il 50% e sul secondo il 62% delle esportazioni di questo porto. L'esportazione invece per il mediterraneo risentiva di questa modificazione, e mentre che si vede questo figurare nel 1845 per l'83%, riducesi presentemente al solo 41%. Tale riduzione nasce da che in prima gli scali di Livorno, Genova e Trieste figuravano come depositi granarii intermedi, pronti sempre a soddisfare ad ogni minima domanda del Regno Unito, mentre che da qualche anno questa domanda viene direttamente soddisfatta da questa piazza».

²⁴³ *Ibidem*.

feature, we opted for the port of Taganrog rather than Odessa, in order to rule out steamers from the computation:

Year	Sardinian	All the flags
1847	179	244
1857	208	271
1867	322	290

Table 2.20 - Average tonnage in the port of Taganrog in 1847, 1857 and 1867. Source: *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls, Taganrog, 1847-1857-1867.*

Moreover, in the first paragraph of the present chapter, we have underlined the rapid growth of the fleet of Camogli in terms of total and average tonnage, following a great campaign of new constructions occurred in the period 1855-59 (Figure 2.3). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the availability of newly built and bigger ships played a decisive role in allowing Camogli's ship-owners to establish in this profitable branch of trade.

One more obstacle might have been constituted by the utilization of Sardinian and Italian ships by Sardinian merchants and trade houses, which sometimes possessed a direct interest over the ship, or, relying on long-term partnerships, had some sort of priority in their chartering²⁴⁴. In this regard, since the early 1850s, Camogli's captains had been widely employed at the service of foreign merchants, especially Greeks, which chartered them to Marseille.

In the 1860-65 period, instead, the relevance of British ports as a destination acquired much more importance within the whole figure, passing from a yearly average of 14% to 44% with a 60% peak in correspondence to 1862²⁴⁵. Furthermore, an analysis of the ports of destinations matched with their respective ports of loading might help achieve a clearer understanding of the factors concurring to such evolution.

	Marseille	Genoa	Livorno	British ports
Odessa	38%	32%	6%	25%

²⁴⁴ See paragraph 2.5.

²⁴⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

Azov Sea	33%	30%	3%	34%
Danube	24%	29%	3%	45%

Table 2.21 - Cargo destinations from Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube region (1853-1865). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

According to this table, indeed, the difference between Odessa, the Azov Sea ports and the Danube area concerning their most frequent destinations is remarkable. Whereas from Odessa (throughout the same chronological period) the Mediterranean ports constituted the overwhelming majority of destinations, up to the 75%, the same percentage fell in the Azov regards to 66% and even to 56% from Galatz and Braila. Among the numerous factors contributing to this trend, the absence, or the more limited extent, of Sardinian business in the Danube area is worth mentioning. On the contrary, the Crimean War boosted the concentration of Greek businessmen, involved in coastal shipping and international trade, in both Galatz and Braila.

Furthermore, the redirection of the trade from the Mediterranean to the British Isles and the Atlantic had an enormous impact on the maritime history of Camogli, which cannot be reduced to a mere geographical transfer. Instead, the opening of the British shipping market, and the acquaintance with British and Greek subjects operating on a more extensive scale of business, were crucial factors for the rise of Camogli's maritime activities.

2.8.1. BRITISH PORTS: THE FORMATION OF A WHEAT-COAL INTEGRATED ROUTE

The main consequence of the redirection of trade to Britain resulted in a profound transformation of the Camogli's shipping for the whole 1840s-1850s period.

However, in order to illustrate these crucial transformations, some information related to the nature of the British maritime system and Camogli's establishment in this area might be needed. To do so, first, we propose a sample of an average route from the Black Sea to the British Isles in order to illustrate the main features of the grain-coal composite trade deriving from it.

The bark *Verità* (362 t.), built in 1858 in Sestri Ponente, was one of the finest and biggest ships built in the booming period of 1855-59. Her owner was Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, who, at the end of his maritime career became an important ship-owner within the community (he also had the ship *Giovanni*, 377 t.). In February 1862²⁴⁶, sailed in her third voyage to the Black Sea to get a grain cargo in Galatz or Braila to the United Kingdom (the local Italian consul recorded her first voyage to Newcastle in 1860²⁴⁷). Having loaded in Braila, on May 20, 1862, *Verità* sailed straight to Cork-Queenstown (after Sulina and Constantinople); there, the captain (Fortunato Cuneo, employed for a long time on the ship) received his final orders to go to Waterford for the discharge (July-August 1862). From there, the ship was directed to Newport, Wales, in order to load coal to Genoa on its haul back to the Mediterranean, where arrived on the 24th of September. Some months after, instead, *Verità* was among the first ships of Camogli going to New York and to remain actively employed for a couple of years on oceanic routes on British commissions²⁴⁸.

Therefore, Camogli's presence in the British ports distinguished itself from the earlier period mainly for the introduction of a new commodity – coal – which led to a radical transformation of the routes of the Black Sea trade, in particular for what concerned its cost-effectiveness. The Black Sea – Mediterranean route forced the Italian merchant marine to travel on ballast for the first leg (with the unique exception of Sicilian exports); then, once the grain cargo was delivered to the port of destination, the navigation resumed likewise. The high profitability of Black Sea freights covered the inefficiencies of this kind of transport. On the contrary, the access to the British markets led to the formation of a composite route; grain trade was tied with coal transport to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, resulting into more efficient management and leading to higher profitability. According to the

²⁴⁶ ASGE, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 9560.

²⁴⁷ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 895, Newcastle.

²⁴⁸ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 19, n. 15028, Bertolotto Michele Mentore. Throughout the career of one of the ship-owner sons, embarked as ship-boy on board of the *Verità* from its first voyage in 1858 to 1865, we were able to reconstruct part of the vessel's activities after the crew list registration of 1862.

Italian consular representative in Berdyansk, in 1868, «the value of a ship, employed between the Levant and the ports of the United Kingdom, with the auxilium of the coal as return cargo, could be repaid in 5 to 6 years»²⁴⁹.

Before leaving the British Isles with a coal cargo, however, a ship could reach up to three different ports, each of them covering a specific role: a port for orders, a port to discharge the wheat cargo, a port to load coal. The main ports for orders were Falmouth and Queenstown: in these ports, the captain called in order to receive the final instructions for the final leg of the voyage. Falmouth and Queenstown received more than 80% of the vessels incoming to the region²⁵⁰. Then, the cargo was delivered to its port of discharge; several ports covered this role, and they were not only British.

	Port for orders	Discharging ports	Coal ports
Ireland	Queenstown	Limerick	
		Waterford	
Western England	Falmouth	Gloucester	
		Bristol	
		Plymouth	
Wales			Cardiff
			Swansea
			Newport
Eastern England		Hull	Newcastle-upon-Tyne
		London	Hartlepool
			Liverpool
Scotland		Edinburgh	Glasgow

²⁴⁹ Bollettino consolare italiano, pp. 81-82. Translation from the Italian original: «Si stima che il valore di un bastimento, tenendo la carriera tra il Levante e i porti del Regno Unito britannico, e col rinalzo del carico di ritorno di carbon fossile, venga riscattato dopo 5 o 6 anni».

²⁵⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

			Troon
Continental Europe		Antwerp	
		Amsterdam	
		Rotterdam	
		Hamburg	

Table 2.22 - List of the most frequent British ports for Camogli ships divided by region and primary function. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

Indeed, Falmouth collected also all the destinations to continental Europe, with the Dutch and Belgian ports of Amsterdam and Antwerp in the first line (approximately 8% of the cargoes). Then, being in front of the eastern side of England, most of the ships coming from the continent sailed to the Tyneside region, more specifically to Newcastle and Hartlepool to load cargoes either to the Mediterranean or straight to the Black Sea. In the 1860 consular records from Newcastle, we find 12 ships of Camogli in Hartlepool (out of 29 Italian ships, 41,3%) and 11 in Newcastle (out of 41 Italians, 26,83%).

Port	Provenience		Destination	
Hartlepool	London	8	Genoa	13
	Wisbech	2	Odessa	1
	Dunkerque	1		
Newcastle	Antwerp	4	Genoa	7
	Hull	3	Constantinople	2
	Leith	2	Odessa	2
	London	2		

Table 2.23 - List of provenience and destination of Camogli ships in the ports of Hartlepool and Newcastle in 1860. Source: AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, 895, Newcastle.

The participation in British coal trade to the Mediterranean, then, will characterize Camogli's shipping activities for an extended period. Although in the following decades, up to the 1900s, the presence of ships of Camogli along the Black Sea routes and in the Mediterranean cabotage gradually diminished down to their nearly complete disappearance, the coal trade remained a profitable opportunity to conclude the oceanic voyages in order to go back to Genoa, for

disembarking the crew or due to some ship repairs. To this trade, furthermore, the Italian state contributed with direct subsidies over coal cargoes, thus making the transport even more profitable²⁵¹.

Conclusions

In a couple of decades, the nature of Camogli's shipping, and therefore the economic structure of the community itself, was transformed dramatically. If before the 1830s Camogli epitomised the average Ligurian seafaring community, divided between cabotage, fishing and, occasionally long haul trade, in the late 1860s, it operated on an entirely new level. It engaged in oceanic routes with destination the British ports rather than the Mediterranean and increased the dimensions of its fleet up to compete on a global scale. The participation in the Black Sea trade represented the key to success, and Camogli's maritime actors demonstrated the capability to achieve the highest results from already favourable conditions. The early access to the trade allowed them to occupy a market niche, but the size of the fleet (175 ships in the Black sea ports in 1865, 297 tons of average tonnage) and its share in the Black Sea trade is impressive for a seafaring community of ca. 7.000 inhabitants.

In a decade (1850-1865), the most successful ship-owners, as we will see in chapter 3, reinvested all the shipping incomes in new constructions, leading the way to the formation of a considerable fleet, which at its peak, in 1879, reached 368 ships of an average tonnage of 497 tons, a result ranking Camogli at the 7th place in the world concerning sailing vessels (25th counting also steamships)²⁵². The premises of such development lied in the Black sea phase, and can be ascribed to some crucial factors: first, the strict specialization of all the people of Camogli into

²⁵¹ The introduction of direct subsidies over a limited list of 'strategic cargoes' represented one of the most durable accomplishments of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the Italian Merchant Marine of 1882, aimed to provide long-term solutions to this industry which was entered in a downward phase. Some captains of Camogli benefitted from this subsidies for what concerned coal cargoes from British ports to Genoa. This is the case, for instance, of the brig bark *Giuseppe Aste*, in 1888: ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, 689, n. 104.

²⁵² A.N. Kjaer (ed.), *Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands*, p. 12, Table n. 2.

shipping; second, the opening to various commercial partners beyond the more local Sardinian networks, with a special mention toward Greek merchants. The instruments to penetrate the market diverged from most of the Ligurian competitors; rather than establishing a direct association with export trade houses, the captains of Camogli operated to a great extent on the freight market and focused on the upgrade of the fleet (both under qualitative and quantitative respects) and the reduction of the operative costs. Finally, as mentioned, the consolidation in the British markets (enhanced by the envoy of members of the community, who settled in the most strategic ports, as we will see in the next chapter) facilitated Camogli's readjustment to the transformation of the Mediterranean and Black Sea shipping market, from which they were gradually pushed away by the increased competitiveness of steamers.

3. SEAFARING ACTIVITIES ON A GLOBAL SCALE (1870s-1900s)

Introduction

This chapter is the first to directly address the transition from sail to steam. In particular, the first section aims to introduce this theme under a global perspective and, therefore, not declined into the specific case-study of Camogli. Thus, it firstly deals with purely technological factors, in order to outline all the transformations which revolutionised nautical technology throughout the nineteenth century. Secondly, it addresses the improvements unfolding in the field of communications, logistics and company organisation, which contributed to the birth of contemporary shipping as much as the formers.

Then, the second section will outline the evolution of the fleet of Camogli from the end of the Black Sea phase to the immediate pre-war years (1870s-1914). Notwithstanding the late manifestation of actual technological transition – culminated into the formation of a fleet of tramp steamers – the section will illustrate the trajectory of local shipping, from the peak moment to its gradual decline.

The third section, finally, will underline how the ongoing transition affected Camogli indirectly, by means of market pressure. The shipowners of Camogli reacted by transferring their maritime activities from the Mediterranean Sea to the global scenario: this geographical transfer is the most evident result of Camogli's readjustment to the successful establishment of steam shipping in the Mediterranean waters. Accordingly, the last part will tackle the subtle line lying between geographic expansion and marginalisation, by outlining the evolution into a proper tramp fleet: such dialectic, declinable also as the contrast between evolution and resilience, will be delineated through the passage from the first phase (1870s-1880s) to a second one (1890s-1914).

3.1. The introduction of new technologies in shipping

In international literature, the Industrial Revolution is such a relevant field of studies that giving a detailed presentation of its historical evolution as regard to the existing literature is far beyond the purpose of the present dissertation. Even to outline the several connections with the transport industry might result in a too extensive introduction for this section²⁵³. Technological innovation stimulated dramatic changes into the transport system, as the utilisation and optimisation of both land and water means of communications escalated to unprecedented degrees, paving the way to increases in speed and reliability, to several changes in the methods of distribution, to the rise in market size and by providing more accessible raw materials²⁵⁴. The transition from sail to steam is just a portion of the broader scale of transformations that occurred in the framework of the transport revolution²⁵⁵. Furthermore, international shipping is only one of the fields of application of the new technologies, and among the latest, being the introduction of steam engines on board of high-seas ships preceded by railways, inland navigation and coastal shipping. The combination of multiple varieties of

²⁵³ A significant work on the topic is R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution. A comparison of England and France*, Montreal: MacGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. The author emphasises the role of technological innovation in transport as an agent of change in the productive organisation rather than as a result of it. The same approach with a more explicit reference to navigation is found in: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, *The impact of technological change. The early steamship in Britain*, St. John's Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2011. Other studies, to mention only the most relevant, are: D.R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress. Technology transfer in the age of Imperialism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990; D.S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969; S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990; A. Jarvis, "The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some Technological Considerations", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1998, pp. 217-238 (with noteworthy considerations about "technological determinism"). A good attempt to summarise the role of technological advance within the whole context of the global transformations of the 19th century is J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the nineteenth century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 637-672. See, also: M. Merger, "Una nuova rete di comunicazioni", in V. Castronovo (ed.), *Storia dell'economia mondiale. L'età della rivoluzione industriale*, pp. 472-491.

²⁵⁴ R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 3-33.

²⁵⁵ P.H. Bagwell, *The transport revolution, 1770-1985*, London: Routledge, 1988.

innovative components – as iron hulls, engines and propellers – required more time for their optimisation rather than on land communications, where the absence of reliable competitors led to the rapid establishment of railways. Then, as a result of canals, railways and steamships merging in a deeply renovated system, the transport revolution did occur.

In examining the features embroiled with transport revolution in shipping, a distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors might be outlined. Under the first category lie those improvements which are strictly entangled with nautical technology: compound steam engines, which emancipated navigation from winds regimes and dramatically diminished coal consumption on longer routes; screw propellers, which substituted side-paddle-wheels, thus improving navigation efficiency; iron hulls which increased longevity and weather resistance²⁵⁶. Besides, to the growth of the nineteenth-century maritime industry contributed other transformations, not directly involved with nautical technology, which nevertheless played a key-role to rationalise the flow of merchandises and global transports. Regular communications tied to the development of liner shipping, the deep-sea cable network and the constructions of the canals – Suez, 1869 and Panama, 1902 – dramatically changed traditional routes and trade patterns. Nautical evolutions represent the core topic in the next section; the creation of liner shipping and the improvements in the fields of logistics and communication will be outlined in the following one.

3.1.1. THE EVOLUTIONS IN NAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY

3.1.1.1. *Steam engine*

As steamship technology matured over time, the improvements mostly concerned the following factors: speed, reliability, longevity and fuel efficiency. The latter represented the most challenging feature to be improved in order to meet the economic demands of deep-sea navigation. Before the invention of

²⁵⁶ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics. Third edition*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 23.

compound engines, steamers were not able to compete with the sail on longer routes. Previously, coal consumption was so demanding that steamships must either dispose of constant supplies or devote a consistent percentage of their cargo capacity to fuel storage. Therefore, deep-sea navigation was barred to steamers, which instead grew competitive on coastal navigation. From the 1850s, with the first application of a compound engine²⁵⁷ into a steamer, this trend gradually changed. At the beginning of the 1870s, steamships ruled the Mediterranean waters. Their success within the Mediterranean lied into the specific characteristics of an enclosed sea, which could be filled with easily accessible coal stations.




Figure 3.1. Coal consumption (kg) in IPH (Indicated Horsepower) per hour. Source: E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, Tav. XIV, p. 187²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁷ R. Knauerhase, "The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in the German Merchant Marine", *The Journal of Economic History*, 28, No. 3 (1968), pp. 390-403.

²⁵⁸ E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, Città di Castello: Società Tipografica Leonardo da Vinci, 1926. Similar data are reported with different unit of measurements (lbs.) in several further studies: D.R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of progress*, p. 25; M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 26-27; G.P. Allington, "Sailing rigs and their use on ocean-going merchant ships, 1820-1910", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 16, No. 1 (2004), pp. 135-136; S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy*, p. 51; C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the Economic of Shipping", in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds.), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1984 p. 176; Y. Kaukiainen, "Coal and Canvas: Aspects of the Competition between Sail and Steam, c. 1870-1914", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 4: 2, 1992, pp. 175-191.

As shown in Figure 3.1, the average coal consumption fell dramatically in the first decade of steam shipping. Then, as the evolution decelerated at mid-century, it almost halved in the 1870s. The last sharp decrease is universally associated with the invention of triple expansion engines, the definitive instrument for steam shipping to compete on oceanic routes. In the meantime, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had shortened the way to India, thus granting steamships more advantages in the carriage of high-value cargoes. Still in the 1850s, in connecting Europe and North America, steamers could not rival with the new generation *clippers*, both on passenger and cargo transports²⁵⁹. Also, in the pre-Suez era, steamships were excluded from the Indo-European routes, where *tea clippers* dominated the seaborne trade by providing regular connections between the Far East and Europe. Afterwards, although steamships could challenge sail on longer routes, sailing ships did not disappear but readjusted to new contexts²⁶⁰.




Figure 3.2. Distribution of world tonnage between sail and steam (1850-1885). Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes*, 1887²⁶¹.

From the appraisal of the existing literature tackling the competition between sail and steam and the role of technological improvements in its determination,

²⁵⁹ G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the sailing ship, 1850-1885", *The Economic History Review*, IX, No. 1 (1956), pp. 74-88; R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

²⁶⁰ See *infra*.

²⁶¹ A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1887.

the ascendance of steamers might be portrayed as a sequence of forwarding leaps and could be metaphorically represented as a succession of concentric circles stemming from the United Kingdom²⁶². From British coal *colliers* to the Pacific Ocean tramp steamers, passing through the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, the success of steam shipping exacerbated marginalisation of sails and pushed them towards increasingly peripheral markets. According to Knick Harley's calculations²⁶³, sail competitiveness with steam lasted for the whole second half of the nineteenth century. On short routes, steamers rapidly overcame sail; on the longer ones, steam did not establish its rule up until the First World War.

3.1.1.2. Iron hulls

Differently from engines, hull evolution was not limited to steam navigation. In the nineteenth century, hull materials changed significantly, from wood to iron and then from iron to steel. This development affected both sail and steamships, turning out to be a decisive factor for sail resilience in shipbuilding, albeit the dramatic differences observed from country to country. In the first place, iron hulls (and later steel) allowed the construction of bigger ships. Also, weather resistance and longevity notably increased, providing a set of transformations paving the way for a revolution of shipbuilding and shipping altogether (consider, for instance, the advantage of longevity for the creation of a structural sale-purchase market, almost non-existent until then²⁶⁴).

²⁶² See C. Knick Harley, "Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed", *The Journal of Economic History*, XLVIII, No. 4, 1988, pp. 851-876; Idem, "Aspects of the Economic of Shipping", in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panton (eds), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, pp. 167-186; Idem, "The shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850-1890: a study in technological change and its diffusion", in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), *Essays on a mature economy: Britain after 1840*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 215-234; D.M. Williams and J. Armstrong, "An Appraisal of the Progress of the Steamship in the Nineteenth Century", in G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold and J.M. Valdaliso (eds.), *The World's Key Industry. History and economics of International Shipping*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 43-63.

²⁶³ C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the Economy of Shipping", pp. 177-178; G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the sailing ship, 1850-1885", pp. 74-88.

²⁶⁴ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 198-207.




Figure 3.3. Number of constructions and mean tonnages of iron and wooden sailing ships (the UK, 1877-1879). Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, 1881²⁶⁵.

Figure 3.3 examines a sample of mean tonnages of iron and wooden ships compared with the yearly number of constructions between 1877 and 1879. Despite the relatively high constructions of wooden vessels, it is clear how it maintained a role in low tonnages, devoted to coastal shipping. Meanwhile, iron hulls were favoured in more significant constructions, measuring about 800-900 tons, the minimum requirement for engaging to oceanic bulk trade.

In relation to this nautical discourse, the uneven availability of raw materials and the diffusion of highly-specialised know-how to handle iron shipbuilding exacerbated the already existing divergence between the United Kingdom and the other European countries. In this sense, it is between the 1860s and the 1870s that matured the future configuration of the world shipbuilding industry: some embraced new developments, substituting sail with steam and wood with iron. Elsewhere, for instance Italy, notwithstanding the positive performances of the national merchant marine, the shipyards stuck to traditional wooden shipbuilding and, in the long run, lost its productive shares.

²⁶⁵A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, pp. 64-65 (Table n. 8°: Tableau supplémentaire concernant les constructions navales).

	ITALY	UNITED KINGDOM	ITA / UK (UK=100)
1865-69	74574	376821	19,8
1885-89	8826	456082	1,9
1905-09	28083	895166	3,1

Table 3.1. Yearly mean tonnage built in Italy and the United Kingdom (1865-1909). Source: Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914. Relazione del Direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari, Roma: Officina Poligrafica Italiana, 1916, pp. 80-95.

Table 3.1 neatly describes the impaired competition between the Italian and British shipbuilding industries in the wake of the establishment of new technologies. Still in the late 1860s, the Italian shipyards were able to fabricate the equivalent of one-fifth of the tonnage released by the world leading country. After a couple of decades, the same mathematical relationship fell tenfold, to one-fiftieth.

Without inclining in energy determinism, part of the reasons underlying such diverging developments lied in Great Britain's natural resources²⁶⁶. The whole set of raw materials required for the construction of steamships and iron-hulled sailing ships and for their activity – iron and coal – were in short supply in the Italian territory. Conversely, the country abounded of timber and could rely upon a solid tradition for wooden shipbuilding.

Within this framework, to technological determinism were added other factors playing against the transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant marine. Among them, for instance, there was the fact that the earliest attempts to transition resulted into dramatic failures, as in the case of the *Transatlantica*²⁶⁷. In general, in the long run, it is possible to observe the increasing regional specialisation in the shipbuilding sector resulting into the gradual exclusion of traditional centres to the advantage of the most advanced ones, or of those who adapted better to the innovative techniques and the market demands.

²⁶⁶ See J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, p. 643-645 and 651. The author enumerates what he considers factors of comparative advantages for England against the rest of the world: the creation of a consumption marked of the so-called upmarket products; the disposal of colonial outlets to absorb the growth of production; the normalisation of technological advance.

²⁶⁷ On Rubattino's activities and particularly on the unsuccessful experience of *Transatlantica* see G. Doria, *Debiti e navi. La compagnia di Rubattino (1839-1881)*, Genova: Marietti, 1991.

Furthermore, technological advance triggered remarkable changes in the international distribution of tonnage. As seen, the Italian shipbuilding sector had experienced its golden period in the 1860s up until the biennium 1872-73²⁶⁸. Then, it entered in a deep crisis of which dependency from foreign-built and second-hand ships represented the most evident results. In the context of high-seas navigation, such development interested both steamships and sailing ships. The crisis was not limited to shipbuilding but it was widely associated with the ongoing global transformations within shipping as a whole. In this period, competition between sail and steam revealed its downsides, such as the freight rates declining trend²⁶⁹ and the increasing globalisation which harmed the least developed economies. From the very beginning of the introduction of steamers in Italian shipping, the dependency from foreign production is neatly observable. In 1867, amid a positive cycle for the Italian merchant marine, out of 98 steamships only five were built entirely in Italian shipyards (eight disposed of Italian hulls, but foreign engines), and all of them were wooden-hulled²⁷⁰. One decade later, in the period 1873-1879, the purchases on the foreign market outnumbered domestic constructions (61 to 26). Again, an observation to average tonnages underlines an even higher gap, presenting respectively 581,82 tons per unit (foreign) and 185,58 (Italian)²⁷¹.

3.1.2. LINERS, COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURES

Although the most tangible factors to determine the transition from sail to steam were inherently connected with the development of nautical technology, it cannot

²⁶⁸ See *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, 1868 and other data from: G. Giacchero, *Genova e la Liguria nell'età contemporanea: un secolo e mezzo di vita economica 1815-1969*, Genova: Cassa di risparmio, 1970.

²⁶⁹ In the third section of this chapter I will present most of the studies on the correlation between transition and the evolution of freight rates.

²⁷⁰ Data extracted from *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867. Marina mercantile e costruzioni navali*, pp. 109-110 (Table n. 4: Quadro descrittivo dei piroscafi per compartimenti marittimi d'iscrizione).

²⁷¹ Data extracted from A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, pp. 62-63 (Table n. 8: Détails sur les accroissements et extinctions relatifs à l'effectif des marines marchandes pendant les années 1873-1879).

be restrained within such borders. Indeed, the transport revolution taking place in shipping needs to be contextualised and entangled with the transformations occurring in the field of communications and logistics²⁷². As we will see, during the nineteenth century the organisational sector of shipping changed as much as shipbuilding²⁷³.

The circulation of valuable information has always been an essential factor to the development of seaborne trade. Since nautical developments reduced shipping costs, thus making sea transports more profitable on longer routes, the transfer of commercial knowledge assumed more importance. As a result, the traditional ways to gain and transmit information needed improvements to adapt to the needs of the globalised market. Both traders and shipowners required a smoother and quicker information flow, based on regular and up-to-date communications.

Maritime historians put the introduction of steam engines at the beginning of this process. Notwithstanding most of the technical aspects, the leading innovation of the application of steam power to navigation consisted of the emancipation from wind regimes, whose rule had lasted since pre-history. Thus, steamers surmounted weather unpredictability and provided scheduled services between different ports. Soon the routes were organised according to fixed schedules, paving the way for the birth of liner shipping²⁷⁴. However, the revolutionizing character of this transformation impacted well beyond shipping. Regularity and predictability became crucial to private merchants and public

²⁷² J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “«A new and very modern Business». The traffic and operations of the early steamships”, in Id., *The Impact of Technological change*, pp. 183-203.

²⁷³ These developments are outlined in a vast bibliography: M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 23-35; G.H. Boyce, *Co-Operative Structures in Global Business: communicating, transferring knowledge and learning across the Corporate frontier*, New York: Routledge, 2002; P.N. Davies, “The impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: nineteenth-century case studies from British West-Africa and Japan”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 14, No. 1 (2002), pp. 225-238. In a broader interpretation connected with Imperialism, see J. Black, *The power of knowledge. How information and technology made the modern world*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014, pp. 276-279.

²⁷⁴ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 25-28; P.N. Davies, “The development of liner trades”, in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1978, pp. 173-206;

governors. Then, the movement volume of news, people and merchandises considerably increased²⁷⁵.

In the formation of liner shipping, state intervention represented a key-factor: since the earlier stages of development, steamship companies obtained privileged contracts to transport mail in exchange for postal subventions²⁷⁶. Within historiography, subsidised companies had attracted a great deal of attention²⁷⁷: public aids have been awarded in almost every country with a maritime projection, including the most committed supporter of free market, the United Kingdom. Indeed, in the history of the development of subsidised lines engaging to postal services, Great Britain is at the forefront²⁷⁸.

At the onset of steam navigation, when coal consumption was still inefficient to transport bulky cargoes, the allowance of subventions for mail cargoes granted to steamers a crucial advantage. Postal communications were obviously critical in the rulers' objectives, particularly for a colonial country as the United Kingdom²⁷⁹. The establishment of regular and steady connections with India engaged the English society for a protracted period. Mail transport represented a mean to run political and economic integration, especially in terms of power projection and colonial administration. From direct public management, postal services rapidly passed under private handling, thus leading the way to the state subsidies policy which from Britain spread in all the European societies²⁸⁰. The presence of privileged companies in a free market was sharply criticised and opposed by the competitors:

²⁷⁵ See L.U. Scholl, "The global communications industry and its impact on international shipping before 1914", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, pp. 195-215.

²⁷⁶ See coeval studies such as: R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 6, No. 3, 1905, pp. 1-229.

²⁷⁷ The debate between free navigation (and free trade) and protectionism is continuously present in economic discourses through the second half of the century. Flag privileges and public subsidies represented the main tools to protect the national merchant marine: for the Italian case, see: *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana e sui mezzi più acconci ed efficaci per assicurarne l'avvenire e promuoverne lo svolgimento*, Roma: Tip. Eredi Botta, 1882, voll. 6.

²⁷⁸ R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", pp. 5-42.

²⁷⁹ D.R. Headrick, *The tentacles of progress*, pp. 97-144.

²⁸⁰ A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni nell'Ottocento*, Prato: Istituto di studi storici postali, 2011, pp. 35-98.

hence, shipping became a central field in the broader discourses between the sponsors of protectionism and those of free-trade²⁸¹.

Furthermore, subsidies facilitated the development of liner shipping and, thus, the rapid seizure from steam companies of crucial markets, such as passengers transport²⁸². From the late 1850s, fuel efficiency improved with the introduction of compound engines: thus, steamships, relying upon the advantages of being able to offer scheduled services, won the competition against sail in migrant transoceanic transports²⁸³. Previously, steam liners had filled shipping sector for general cargo: by this locution we mean «many small consignments, each too small to fill a ship, that had to be packed with other cargo for transports»²⁸⁴ as opposed to bulk cargoes, which consisted of «large homogenous parcels big enough to fill a whole ship»²⁸⁵. The neatly diverging evolution of the two typologies based on commodities exacerbated the distinction based on shipping types between liners and tramps, as the latter specialised in bulk cargoes²⁸⁶.

Leaving to further discourses the sketching of these two kinds of shipping, an introduction about the rise of liners is suitable to deal with the mentioned

²⁸¹ See the theoretical framework of shipping subsidies developed by Meeker: R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", pp. 172-218.

²⁸² Passengers transport rapidly became one of the main market for international shipping. There is a huge bibliography on the topic, due to its involvement in wider themes of historiography, such as migration and globalisation. From a maritime perspective, the main references on the topic are: T. Fey, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste and S. Vanfraechem, *Maritime transport and migration. The Connections between Maritime and Migration networks*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2007; T. Fey, *The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European Exodus*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2017. Despite the clear advantages of steam shipping over time, at the beginning (early 1850s) also sailing ships competed on this transport. For the Italian case, see, for instance, the experience of Gio. Batta Lavarello, a ship-owner from Varazze (Genoa): G. Giacchero, *Genova e Liguria nell'età contemporanea. Un secolo e mezzo di vita economica, 1815-1969*, p. 269; G. Doria, *Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1973. This context offered also some interesting features, like the recurrent presence of mixed-propelled ships. See, G. Gropallo, *Navi a vapore ed armamenti italiani dal 1818 ai giorni nostri*, Genoa: Bertello, 1958, pp. 77-78.

²⁸³ R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

²⁸⁴ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, p. 60.

²⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁸⁶ On the subject of the distinction between liner and tramp shipping, a general reference is: M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 25-28. The detailed descriptions of the two are in M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 417-427 (tramp) and 505-512 (liner).

evolution in communications. The formula of the «steamship as an agent of modernisation²⁸⁷», coined by Armstrong and Williams might be suitable to this context: liners offered scheduled services, thus providing regular exchanges of mail, goods and people from one point to another. As a result, they surely contributed to the escalation of the international flows of information and transfer of knowledge. Indeed, as argued by Peter Davies²⁸⁸, the transition from sail to steam impacted directly on the history of information and communications. In his studies about the commercial activities which British merchants maintained with West Africa and Japan, the contribution which the creation of liner shipping made to commercial expansion emerges vigorously²⁸⁹.

One further example can be offered by the activism of the Italian shipowner Raffaele Rubattino in designing a liner connection between the Italian ports and the Far East immediately before the opening of the Suez Canal²⁹⁰. According to his project, the route was intended to increase Italian exports to the Far East, through the establishment of monthly connections between Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Messina with Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama. At the beginning, Rubattino's steamers transported samples of Italian merchandises and manufactures to promote national production abroad. Then, by the accomplishment of encouraging commercial results, the liner connection was subsidised by the Italian state²⁹¹.

²⁸⁷ J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, "The Steamship as an agent of modernisation", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19, No. 1 (June 2007), 145-160.

²⁸⁸ P.N. Davies, "The impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: nineteenth-century case studies from British West-Africa and Japan", pp. 225-238.

²⁸⁹ *Idem*, pp. 227-228. Particularly meaningful is the case of West Africa, where, with the foundation of the *African Steam Ship Company* in 1852, was instituted a weekly connection with London and, later on, Liverpool. This development attracted investors, leading to a commercial escalation of the trade between the area and England.

²⁹⁰ ASGe, *Camera di commercio*, box 39. The first formulation is attributable to a member of the Genoese Chamber of Commerce, Errera.

²⁹¹ NGI (Navigazione Generale Italiana): it represents the result of the fusion between Rubattino's company and the one of Florio, based in Palermo. See ACS, *Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisioni premi compensi e tasse*, box 61, *Movimento generale della navigazione*, Bombay: in 1891, are found five steamships regularly connecting Genoa and Bombay (Po, Domenico Balduino, Singapore, Raffaele Rubattino and Manilla) and two that covered the section from Bombay to Hong Kong (Bisagno and Bormida).

Then, after the establishment of liner steam shipping within mail transport, the invention, in rapid succession, of the deep-sea cable network revolutionised the world information system²⁹². To the year 1850 corresponds the first laying of cables between Dover and Calais commencing a process concluded in a couple of decades (1872), when Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama were finally included in the world network. Hence, most of the maritime world was connected.

Steamships, by providing regular and faster connections, had qualitatively improved commercial communications; then, submarine telegraphy radically enhanced the globalisation and the commercial integration between remote areas. Before cable telegraphy, a London merchant carrying business in India needed several months to perform a single commercial operation; afterwards, the same person could exchange 25-30 words in a minute²⁹³. Naturally, these improvements echoed into the organisation of shipping: among the various transformations, we might mention the formation of an autonomous managerial structure, distinct from the personnel operating on seas²⁹⁴. In this regard, the evolution of the relationship between shipowners and captains is one of the most discernible effects²⁹⁵. In the pre-cable era, shipowners could not handle first-hand all the commercial operations. Instead, they ought to delegate decision-making in the hands of reliable and trustworthy people or, otherwise, to command the ship by filling the captain's position²⁹⁶. Indeed, the mastering of both navigational and

²⁹² Submarine telegraphy is a well-studied topic in the British and American historiography, due to the preponderant involvement of these two countries in its development. A valuable summary is D.R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. The same author has repeatedly emphasised how telegraphy might be studied from both a political and economic perspective: D.R. Headrick and P. Griset, "Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business and Politics, 1838-1939", *The Business History Review*, LXXV, No. 3, 2001, pp. 543-578. In Italian, a good reference is: A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni nell'Ottocento*.

²⁹³ A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo*, p. 152.

²⁹⁴ P.N. Davies, "The development of liner trades", in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, p. 97.

²⁹⁵ See also Chapter 5.

²⁹⁶ On the various aspects about the relationships between ship-owners and captains and the role of the captains on board, see: Y. Kaukiainen, "Owners and Masters: management and managerial skills in the Finnish Ocean-Going Merchant Fleet, c. 1840-1880", in L.U. Scholl and M.L. Hikkanen (eds.), *Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjo Kaukiainen*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2004, pp. 53-68. Another important contribution about the evolution of

commercial skills figured among the professional prerequisites to be possessed by captains. Afterwards, submarine telegraphy suppressed most of the pre-existing intermediate passages and allowed shipowners to manage all the required operations personally.

Conversely, on the captains' side cable telegraphy was perceived as «a controlling device that curtailed their freedom as masters of the ship²⁹⁷». Their capabilities as businessmen were no longer required. The increase of informational speed and business competitiveness created the need to dispose of personnel on the ground, permanently connected with the global network of information through the cable telegraphy. In a broader perspective, it is not dissimilar from the process of substitution of owner-capitalists with hired managers observable in the industrial sector, as a result of capital concentration and cartelisation²⁹⁸. Within Italian shipping, apart from big companies such as NGI, this development occurred on a smaller scale, since owners turned themselves into managers and left navigational operations to trustworthy members of their broader kinship.

Then, to the improvement of shipping logistics, the amelioration of port facilities aimed at shortening the time spent in ports represents another key-factor. As steamships, by increasing speed, reduced the loaded days at sea, the idle time ashore became more significant in terms of income foregone. Thus, the optimisation of cargo-handling diminished the no-income and costly intervals between subsequent voyages. Where possible, the governments invested in the construction of docks to adapt to the increase of trade volumes, as congested port traffic impacted severely on shipping enterprises. Besides, technological advance made its crucial contribution even in this field: since the early nineteenth century, pump-machines and mechanical elevators were installed in the most advanced ports to exploit the fundamental principle whereby «all the lifting is done in a

the figure of merchant captains: J.M. Witt, «During the Voyage every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth century», *International Journal of Maritime History*, 13, No. 2, 2001, pp. 165-194.

²⁹⁷ L.U. Scholl, «The global communications industry and its impact on international shipping before 1914», in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets*, p. 212.

²⁹⁸ J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, p. 649.

single initial stage, after which successive movements are carried out chiefly or wholly by gravity²⁹⁹».

The introduction of mechanical devices to optimise cargo handling in ports constituted a crucial achievement for the escalation of seaborne economy. Then, in the same conceptual direction were channelled the efforts to curtail the number of total handlings within single transports. Notwithstanding the single improvements developed in each field, the need of numerous transshipments, from ship to ship, from ship to warehouses and from there to railways impacted severely on the cost-effectiveness of sea-transports. Within this framework, the greatest achievements to the benefits of shipping logistics involved the radical transformation of geography. Indeed, the realization of monumental infrastructures, such as canals and railway tunnels, aimed at overcoming geographical constraints and, thus, to fulfil human ambitions to control nature. The most practical accomplishments of such ambitious designs were converted into a huge boost for the international trade and into the optimisation of the global transport system. Among the various case-studies, such as the Alpine railway tunnels – which redirected a substantial part of the European seaborne trade to the Mediterranean basin – the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 is the most emblematic.

The construction of the Suez Canal can be placed at the culmination of long-standing designs pointed at the development of inland waterways. In competition with railways, the rise of canal systems in certain countries has always been associated with steamships as a result of the technological implementations in transport logistics³⁰⁰. Indeed, since the earlier phases of development of the technology of steam shipping, inland waterways offered a crucial source of

²⁹⁹ A. Jarvis, “The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some Technological Considerations”, in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets*, p. 223.

³⁰⁰ See the attention given to canal systems in various works on the subject: S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, pp. 30-48; A. Grubler, *The rise and fall of infrastructures. Dynamics of Evolution and Technological change in Transport*, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 73-81. A comparison between British and French canal networks is in R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 54-60 and 81-84.

employment: on short distances and under specific conditions, steamers even withstood the competition with railways³⁰¹.

Then, Suez represented a great leap forward within the deeply rooted tradition for canals, by transferring on international shipping what had been widely deployed in inland navigation. Leaving to a further section the representation of a few details about the alterations that the opening of the Suez Canal aroused in the Italian shipping sector, in this context we will develop some discourses about the role of the Suez Canal in determining broader transformations³⁰².

First of all, from a technical point of view, navigating into the Canal represented a troublesome challenge for sailing vessels. Since the limited depth and the variable winds and currents hindered the passage of big sailing ships even in the waters of the Red Sea, captains were obliged to hire steam tugboats for the entire course. Indeed, despite advertised as much as one hundred meters large, in width the Canal measured more realistically around sixty meters and the central section – where the ships were supposed to navigate – stretched for no more than twenty-two meters³⁰³. Likewise, also common knowledge about depth presented similar discrepancies between the official data and the reports of first-hand witnesses: in several cases, ships with a draught measuring about five meters incurred in collisions and groundings, despite the alleged eight meters depth³⁰⁴. These troubling conditions affected voyage safety and, as a result, could be translated into higher insurance premia (the same went for the Cape circumnavigation, which was listed among the dangerous routes and, therefore, required additional costs).

However, it was the usage of tugboats (mandatory for sailing ships over 50 tons) to epitomise one of the most evident comparative disadvantage for sails against steamships which could instead navigate without additional costs. The impact of tugboats rentals and passage fares on voyage costs was indeed substantial. In

³⁰¹ S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, pp. 30-48.

³⁰² For a general account: M.E. Fletcher., “The Suez Canal and World Shipping (1869-1914)”, *Journal of Economic History*, No. 4, 1958, pp. 556-573.

³⁰³ G. Boccardo, *Il Bosforo di Suez in relazione con il commercio del mondo e segnatamente con il commercio dell'Italia. Cenni ed osservazioni*, Forlì: Febo Gherardi Editore, 1869, pp. 6-7.

³⁰⁴ *Ibidem*.

return, Suez offered just a slight time reduction which, however, in the economy of a sailing ship, determined nothing more than a proportional diminution of labour cost, insufficient to cover the higher expenditure. The equivalent factor (time saved), instead, retained a much more significant value for the benefit of steam voyages where, together with labour costs, fewer navigation days meant a relevant cut in coal consumptions, a critical item in steamers operational budgets³⁰⁵. Summing it up, the Suez Canal provided impair advantages to steam as opposed to sailing vessels for which, instead, the passage was economically unsustainable.

Thus, the Indo-European traffics, utterly strategic to the English interests, were rapidly monopolised by steam navigation. Although, at first, the United Kingdom expressed its opposition to the construction of the Canal, tolls registrations illustrate how British steamers soon seized the route. Already in the first year (1870), British ships dominated the traffic: on 489 ships passing (441.890 tons), 314 belonged to British shipowners (291.680 tons). In other words, 64% of the vessels and 66% of the tonnage passed through the Canal could be reconducted to British shipping³⁰⁶. Afterwards, in 1896, such supremacy was even neater, as 70% of the cargo and postal ships hoisted the Union Jack flag³⁰⁷.

As we will see, however, not every kind of shipping was immediately redirected through the Canal. In virtue of their enormous advantage, steam liners monopolized the transport of general cargoes, which granted high freights to cover toll expenses and related fees. Meanwhile, because the freights for bulky commodities were hardly satisfactory to grant profits to the tramp shipping industry, sail withstood the competition with steam for a longer period. In

³⁰⁵ For instance, within the proceedings of the ministerial inquiry about the conditions of the merchant marine, we found various calculations and comparisons of sailing vessels and steamers operational costs. According to the Cadenaccio Bros., ship-builders, for instance, coal consumption (together with oil, fat and routine maintenance of the engines) accounted for about 10-15% of the monthly expenditure. See, *Inchiesta parlamentare*, vol. I, pp. 86-87.

³⁰⁶ Data from: G. Giacchero, *Genova e Liguria nell'Età contemporanea*, p. 357.

³⁰⁷ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1896. Relazione del direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 1897, p. 562.

particular, in the connections with the Far East, sailing vessels lasted until the end of the century.

This introductory section was aimed to illustrate the transformations in the global shipping occurring in concomitance with the third phase of evolution of Camogli's maritime activities. All the mentioned factors – nautical technology (hulls and propulsion), communications (liner shipping and cable telegraphy) and logistics (cargo handling in ports and infrastructures) – contributed to determine the unique trajectory which Camogli underwent throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century and until the First World War. More than ever, the macro-historical processes, operating at the global and structural levels, influenced the micro-historical and local dimension.

3.2. The Camogli merchant fleet on the global scale (1870s-1914)

In tight continuity with the comparable section of the previous chapter, this section will address the development of the fleet of Camogli throughout the period under analysis (1870s-1914). The first source to be used is the 1883 list of the ships enrolled to the local mutual insurance association³⁰⁸. Then, to examine the evolution of the fleet in the last decades of the nineteenth century, we resorted to the 1902 book of the *Registro Navale Italiano*, which recorded all the Italian merchant marine at the end of December 1901³⁰⁹. Finally, we will take into account its 1916 publication which, for recording all the Italian ships in 1915, provides the last depiction of Camogli's fleet dimensions before the First World War³¹⁰.

In the wake of the economic rise of the community after the Black Sea period, the fleet of Camogli entered into an expanding phase lasting until the early 1880s. Throughout the last third of the century, the bulk of Camogli's merchant marine

³⁰⁸ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

³⁰⁹ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*, Genova: Pietro Pellas, 1902.

³¹⁰ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*, Genova: Pietro Pellas, 1916.

stemmed from an impressive campaign of constructions which took place at the turn of the 1860s and the 1870s.




Figure 3.4. Number of constructions within the fleet of Camogli (1850s-1883). Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

Indeed, as graphically represented in Figure 3.4, 78% of the constructions occurred between 1866 and 1876. Throughout this period, more than two hundred-forty ships were built: the resulting figure, measured in 1883, consisted of 307 ships enrolled to the *Mutua*. Already in the 1850s, as we saw in the previous chapter, many shipowners built numerous ships in order to renew the fleet and adapt it to the needs of the Black Sea trade. From the late 1860s, however, they started a new massive campaign of constructions which transformed the nature of the fleet completely. After this period, Camogli's merchant marine achieved its most significant and most competitive (in terms of international shipping) configuration: in particular, the mean tonnage rose outstandingly. In 1883, it measured about 595 tons: at the lower extreme, there were the brigs *Annetta* (185 t.) and *Etra* (197 t.), built in the 1850s. On the other side lied the newly built (right in 1883) full-rigged ships, *Fede e Amore* (1331 t.), *Gio. Batta Repetto* (1244 t.) and *Indus* (1111)³¹.

³¹ The respective owners were Giacomo Olivari (*Annetta*), Andrea Cichero (*Etra*), Gio. Batta Bertolotto (*Fede e Amore*), Gio. Batta Repetto, who named his ship under himself, and Gio. Batta




Figure 3.5. Ships enlisted in the 1883 *Mutua* divided per tonnage categories. Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

Figure 3.5. illustrates the growth of the fleet by tackling the ships according to their tonnage (1883). Whereas in the early 1860s, the presence of vessels bigger than three hundred tons was extraordinary, the first shipbuilding campaign of 1866-1876 totally transformed the fleet of Camogli. These remarkable accomplishments were made possible by various factors: firstly, through the revenues of the Black Sea phase and the results of the first approaches to oceanic navigation; secondly, due to the massive inflow of maritime credit which Camogli underwent in the early 1870s, which will be the object of more reasoned analyses in the next chapter³¹².

Lavarello (*Indus*). See: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese.

³¹² See chapter 4.

From a nautical point of view, apart from few exceptional cases (4,56% of brigs, 1,95 % three-masted schooners and 0,97% full-rigged ships), the fleet was composed for an overwhelming majority of barques (93,16%).

In a broader perspective, these exceptional performances in the shipbuilding sector granted to Camogli the inclusion among the most critical shipping centres of the world. More in details, in 1881, a study published by the Norwegian Statistical Bureau ranked the small seafaring community as the fifteenth shipping port of the world for locally-owned tonnage³³.

	Ports	Steamships	Sailing ships	Total
1	Liverpool	523182	1077827	1601009
2	London	570308	619764	1190072
3	New-York	206788	533312	740100
4	Glasgow	379783	353015	732798
5	St. John	5375	266992	272367
6	Boston	16341	239612	255953
7	Sunderland	106586	110934	217520
8	Hamburg	74518	142452	216970
9	Bremen	59655	157284	216939
10	Marseille	156039	57258	213297
11	Greenock	35179	170065	205244
12	Newcastle	137672	59847	197519
13	Syros	6968	187652	194620
14	Hull	152369	39367	191736
15	Camogli	0	183026	183026
16	Philadelphia	52473	114892	167365
17	Yarmouth	437	161505	161942
18	San Francisco	52341	105295	157636

³³ A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, Christiania: 1881.

19	Arendal	688	154166	154854
20	North-Shields	80158	72385	152543
21	Genoa	34221	115905	150126
22	Barcelona	41706	99567	141273
23	Bath	2123	130658	132781
24	Le Havre	54778	74262	129040
25	Aberdeen	22188	97619	119807

Table 3.2. Ranking of world shipping centres (1881). Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, Christiania: 1881.

According to this study, Camogli ranked above remarkable competitors, such as San Francisco, Philadelphia, Genoa, Barcelona and Le Havre. Among the ports of the Mediterranean, it even ranked third, under Marseille and Syros only. Finally, when taking into account sailing tonnage only – since Camogli was among the few ones to completely lack steam tonnage – the position of Camogli upgraded to eight and second – depending on the geographic sample – within the whole world and the Mediterranean. By comparing these data with further statistical sources, it is also possible to observe how 18,48% of the Italian tonnage (sail and steam together) belonged to the shipowners of Camogli³⁴. In other words, at the beginning of 1880s, the results of the massive shipbuilding of the previous years granted to Camogli a leading role within the Italian and European shipping.

However, the late 1870s represented the peak of the maritime development of the Ligurian community. As seen in Figure 3.4, the rate of yearly constructions fell dramatically from 1875 (26) to 1877 (3). Even in the following years, it never recovered: amid a global freight crisis, which accelerated the decline of sail

³⁴ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914. Relazione del Direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari*, Roma: Officina Poligrafica Italiana, 1916, p. 105. In 1882, the total tonnage of the Italian merchant marine was calculated to measure 990.004 tons (sail and steam altogether), of which 885.285 (89,39%) consisted of sailing vessels.

shipping, Camogli shipowners stopped to invest in new ships and entered in a downward trend.




Figure 3.6. Evolution of the merchant fleet of Camogli by tonnage (1879-1920). Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1896*; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1914*; *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*; *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*; *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921*.

Figure 3.6 outlines the overall evolution of the total tonnage of Camogli's merchant marine, from 1879 to 1920. As we can see, from the early 1880s onwards, its dimensions followed a downward curve until 1896, before improving once again at the turn of the century until the First World War. Nevertheless, the inversion of the trend of the end of the century requires more in-depth analysis. Although mean tonnage began to increase after a protracted declining phase, the list of the ships belonging to Camogli shipowners in 1902 highlights some noteworthy features concerning the practical conditions of Camogli's merchant marine. Indeed, although the mere quantitative aspects might indicate a trend inversion, a more accurate qualitative analysis revealed some troublesome aspects.

In 1902, the fleet of Camogli consisted of 97 ships, measuring 988 tons on average³⁵. In comparison with those of the preceding periods, a crucial characteristic of the 1902 fleet lied into the average age. For example, in 1883, since

³⁵ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

most of the vessels had been built between 1866 and 1876, they were 13 years old on average. In 1902, the same measure rose to almost 27 years old: out of 97 vessels, only thirteen had been built after 1883. Just one ship was less than ten years old, while almost one-third of them were older than thirty years³¹⁶.

In broader terms, throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, Camogli's investments toward shipbuilding stopped almost completely. The ships built during the «golden era» still composed the bulk of the fleet in 1902. Furthermore, instead of constructing new ships, most of the shipowners purchased second-hand ships on the foreign market: indeed, in 1902, the 56,70% of the fleet was constructed abroad, mostly in British shipyards³¹⁷. The reliance of Camogli's shipowners onto the second-hand foreign market responded to their need to renovate the fleet to compete in terms of tonnage and technology on bulky cargoes routes and, at the same time, it compensated for their lack of resources³¹⁸.

Starting from the late 1870s, the conditions of the national shipbuilding industry were not as prosperous as before: notwithstanding the transition from sail to steam, technological competition pushed for the replacement of wood with iron (and later steel) for hulls. These transformations found unprepared the Italian shipbuilders: a significant share of them still worked on improvised and seasonal shipyards along the beach. The Italian shipbuilding industry, in sums, lacked both the natural resources and the professional skills to adapt in a brief time to the market requirements.

The declining trend of the Italian shipbuilding showed a similar pattern to that of Camogli: throughout the 1860s and up to 1875, the rate of yearly constructions

³¹⁶ The newest was the wooden-hulled barque *Precursore* (1508 t.), built in Liguria for Prospero Schiaffino; the oldest, apart from the steamer *Filippo Chicca*, built in 1853, were the iron hulled barque *Oriana* (1050 t.), built in the UK in 1864 and purchased second-hand by Stefano Razeto, and the wooden hulled barque *Marion* (542 t.), built in the same year in the UK and purchased second-hand by Giuseppe Schiaffino. See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

³¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

³¹⁸ Identical strategies were adopted by Norwegian shipowners: see, B.E. Johnsen, "Cooperation Across the North-Sea: The Strategy behind the Purchase of Second-hand British Iron and Steel Sailing Ships by Norwegian Shipowners, 1875-1925", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 17: 1, 2005, pp. 151-169.

amounted to the ca. 70.000 tons³¹⁹. Afterwards, it entered in a neat crisis, culminating with an average built tonnage of 5.000 tons per year in 1887-1888³²⁰. Although in the pre-war period the performances of national shipbuilding slightly ameliorated (around 24.000 tons per year), they never returned to the peak level. From 1885, the state had embraced protectionist policies aimed at safeguarding the national shipyards from foreign competition³²¹. However, at that time, second-hand prices were too attractive for Camogli shipowners, who implemented the renewal of their fleets, at least under a technological perspective.

In 1902, for example, 29,89% of the fleet was iron-hulled. Sometimes overaged second-hand ships were modified – with iron structure and wooden planking – in a second moment, to increase their durability³²². The gradual toughening of the fleet with the substitution of wood with iron offered advantages in many regards, as for insurances. For instance, in 1907, as a sign of the time, the local mutual insurance company "Cristoforo Colombo" accepted iron-hulled ships only³²³.

Finally, the last noteworthy feature which we can retrieve from the 1902 composition of the fleet is Camogli's attempt to transition. Throughout the list, indeed, it is possible to find four steamers: the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.; 400 ihp) and the *NS del Boschetto* (1401 t.; 1100 ihp), belonging to Stefano Razeto, the *Maria Teresa* (348 t.; 345 ihp), owned by R. Repetto, and the *Luigino* (1321 t.; 700 ihp), ownership of Emanuele Bozzo³²⁴. Whereas the *Filippo Chicca* and *Maria Teresa* are small-sized steamers, mostly employable on cabotage routes, the *NS del Boschetto* and *Luigino* were medium-sized. All of them had been purchased second-hand

³¹⁹ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914*, pp. 81-82.

³²⁰ *Ibidem*.

³²¹ See *infra* and Chapter 4.

³²² See, for instance, the case of the barque *Dilbhur* (1281 t.), belonging to Giuseppe Mortola. The hull was originally constructed in wood in 1865, but it was renewed in 1897, with the consolidation of the structure with iron. See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*, p. 246.

³²³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie, Statuto dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Cristoforo Colombo*, 1907, art. 1.

³²⁴ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

abroad: the oldest was the *Filippo Chicca*, whose hull and engines had been built in 1853; the relatively newest was the *Luigino*, built in 1879.

This embryonal group of steamships, witnessing Camogli's attempt to transition, was then enlarged and developed until the First World War. Indeed, in 1915, the steam fleet of Camogli was composed of thirteen elements:

NAME	YEAR OF CONSTRUCTION	PLACE OF CONSTRUCTION	TONS	HORSEPOWER (indicated)
ASCARO	1891	Sunderland	3244	1250
AVALA	1890	Stockton	3384	1850
DEIPARA	1886	Hull	2219	1234
ELIOFILO	1897	Glasgow	3523	1500
ELIOPOLI	1897	Glasgow	3344	1500
ESPERO	1882	Blyth	999	812
LUIGINO B.	1885	Newcastle	1971	628
MADDALENA	1891	Willington	2600	1150
MESSICANO	1891	Barrow	4202	1825
ORIANA	1886	Belfast	3132	1350
PATRAS	1895	Newcastle	1602	1150
POLYNESIA	1881	Newcastle	1294	950
TRENTINO	1876	Hartlepool	1283	720

Table 3.3. List of steamers owned by Camogli shipowners in 1915. Source: RINA, 1916.

Right before the outbreak of the war, Camogli's steam tonnage accounted for almost 40% of the total. Finally, Camogli had engaged the path to transition, at least nominally: indeed, throughout a slightly positive shipping cycle, the community had retained almost the same tonnage between 1902 and 1915³²⁵. Nonetheless, from the peak moment (1879-1883), its dimensions halved in absolute terms and performed even worse in comparison with national and international competitors. The mean tonnage (2522 t.) and age (more than 26 years old) of Camogli's steamship fleet were no longer competitive within the oceanic tramp shipping market which, until the 1910s, many shipowners embraced as the primary road to resilience. As we will see in the following pages, Camogli's steamers

³²⁵ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, p. 110, Figure 3.8.

engaged mainly to Mediterranean cabotage and specialised as tramp carriers of bulk commodities within the European maritime borders.

Then, the First World War stroke the final blow to Camogli's permanence within the international shipping market. According to local historians, German torpedoes sank many ships³²⁶. In 1920, at the end of the conflict, barely twelve ships had survived: among steamers, the *Patras* was the only one to get past the war unscathed³²⁷. The total tonnage owned by the members of the community (10.309 tons) decreased well beneath the 1853 levels (25.045)³²⁸. The «golden age of sail» was finally over and, along with it, the trajectory of what had been once the third shipping centre of the Mediterranean.

3.3. Fleeing the Mediterranean: the effects of transition on Camogli's sail shipping

In the following section, in continuity with the representation of Camogli's maritime activities of the previous chapter, we will tackle the evolution of local shipping in the aftermath of the Black Sea phase. Indeed, as seen, from the early 1870s onwards, the ships of Camogli were gradually ousted from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes as a result of the victorious advent of steam navigation. According to a definition of the transition from sail to steam as a «succession of forwarding leaps», as opposed to the interpretations stressing its graduality, it might be possible to argue that, by late 1870s, steamships had seized Mediterranean long cabotage. However, the establishment within the British ports and the creation of the integrated wheat-coal trade granted to Camogli's shipping system to access alternative markets, an essential step to readjust to the late nineteenth-century new configuration of global seaborne trade.

³²⁶ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 294-296.

³²⁷ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921.*

³²⁸ *Ibidem.*

In order to achieve a better understanding of the original features and distinguishing traits of Camogli's maritime activities throughout this period, these accomplishments will be outlined and examined in the next sections with a critical distinction. The first section will aim at proposing a general framework of the conversion from the European to the global dimension, bearing in mind the total absence of systematic sources as far as the 1870s-1880s decades are concerned. The second section, instead, drawing on vast and plentiful archival material, will tackle the resilience phase: from the 1880s onwards, the vital spark which had animated Camogli's shipping until that moment left the room to instinct for survival. Instead of conquering new markets, the ships of Camogli retreated to firmer positions, until finally returning to Mediterranean cabotage at the turn of the century.

3.3.1. THE EXPANSION TOWARDS THE OCEANS (1870S-1880S)

As anticipated, between 1865 and the late 1880s, the most classic maritime sources, such as crew lists or logbooks, are utterly silent. Beginning with 1865, crew lists, to which we widely resorted for the completion of the previous chapter, completely disappeared from the Italian archival map³²⁹. Conversely, logbooks, which provide an even broader set of data, appear from the year 1881, though a more robust collection begins from the 1890s and become then systematic in the new century³³⁰. Thus, owing to the silence of the mentioned maritime sources, the only feasible choice was to gather parcels of information and discontinuous notions from the miscellaneous archival funds of the administration of the Italian merchant marine which, still, cover the 1861-1869 period and then, from the late 1880s onwards³³¹.

³²⁹ After a brief phase of continuity with the Piedmont administration, the state reunification was supposed to reorganise the administration of maritime affairs. De facto, neither the State Archives of Genoa ever received more recent crew lists, nor these documents were transferred to the centre (National Central Archives of Rome).

³³⁰ See *infra*.

³³¹ See, ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diveri, 1861-1869. This archival collection gathers sources of all sorts about the administration of the merchant marine within this period; it consists of hundreds of boxes containing, with no chronological, typological or thematic order, a wide variety of documents, ranging from desertion

Moreover, further details might be found in the proceedings of the already mentioned Inquiry into the conditions of the merchant marine, which took place in 1881 and 1882. Basically, in Camogli, the local shipowners questioned themselves and discussed about the extant potential and the foreseeable future of sailing shipping; in doing so, they examined the actual conditions of their traffics, thus bringing on the floor clear samples of their activities³³².

On this precarious archival basis this section is geographically divided into two parts: first, it deals with the Latin American subcontinent where, owing to the creation of various interests intermingling with the formation of migrant communities, the ships of Camogli are found with unbroken continuity. Secondly, it analyses the access to the Southeast Asian markets in the wake of the construction of the Suez Canal and the subsequent inclusion of the Italian merchant marine in the transport of bulk commodities from and to this region through the Cape route.

3.3.1.1. Migrants, guano, coolies and other traffics: scattered information about the presence of Camogli ships in the Latin American area (late 1860s-early 1880s)

Postponing to a later stage the critical discourse about Ligurian migration flows to the Latin American countries, the presence of the ships and seafarers of Camogli in this area deserves a general overview nonetheless. From the late 1860s, it is possible to record increasing numbers of Camogli-owned ships in the ports of Latin America. Although – owing to the lack of sources – to contextualise the traces of their presence to a systematic framework might present some difficulties, some main features can be exposed. First, these ships converged in two neatly distinct areas: the Plata basin and the Pacific coast. Secondly, relying on cross-references and secondary literature, these movements can be reconducted to the handling of

processes, the papers required for captains' licenses, news about the selling of national ships abroad, ministerial inquiries about various subjects etc. Furthermore, the subsequent archival fund, covering the 1870-1880 period, is not inventoried and, therefore, not available to researchers.

³³² *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

the early waves of migrant transports, to the commercialisation of the Peruvian guano and even to the carriage of *coolies* across the Pacific, from China to Peru.

As early as in the 1830s, it is possible to date the first attempts of Camogli shipowners to establish within the transport of passengers to America. The crew list of the brigantine *L'Indio* (150 t.), belonging to Pellegrino Marciani, might represent an antecedent of this traffic. Departed on 27th September 1836, it arrived at Montevideo in late December. Somewhat surprisingly, it consisted more of a collective migration than a real business, as all the members of the crew transferred there with their families. Hence, the brigantine was sold in Buenos Ayres in February 1837³³³. Apart from this unusual and unique event, from the early 1860s onwards, it is possible to find somewhat regular passenger transports taking place on board of the ships of Camogli. For example, in autumn 1864, the barque *Nina Figari* crossed the Atlantic to Montevideo with 149 passengers on board³³⁴. Built in 1863 for Prospero Figari – who also commanded the ship – and measuring 439 t., the *Nina Figari* ranked among the most weighty ships of Camogli in that period. Other similar voyages are recorded for the barques *Nuova Ottavia* (468 t.), *Ascensione* (395 t.) and *Fison* (325 t.) which, between 1861 and 1865 engaged to the transport of migrants to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres³³⁵. Before steam technology annihilated the competitiveness of sail within this specific business sector, migrant transport was highly profitable: in a single voyage, shipowners could cover a significant part of the initial costs³³⁶.

Although a vast literature targeted the establishment of steamers within transoceanic passenger transports and their decisive impulse to mass migration, few studies have highlighted the role of sailing vessels in sustaining the earliest manifestations of such movement³³⁷. As a partial exception, the works of Raymond

³³³ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, n. 4719, 1836.

³³⁴ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 9030.

³³⁵ Idem, serie 14, n. 8444; Idem, serie 16, n. 1681 and n. 4426.

³³⁶ See, ASGe, *Fondo miscellaneo*, 61, Ricevute del passaggio su brigantine sardo *Il Guerriero* per Montevideo, 1842.

³³⁷ T. Fey, *The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of steam shipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European Exodus*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2017.

L. Cohn targeted mass migration under sail as a research objective, even in connection with the theme of the transition from sail to steam within this specific shipping market³³⁸.

Mass migration in the age of sail was characterised for its minimal organisation: multiactivity and irregularity represented unique features of the sail handling of migration transports. From a nautical point of view, there were no substantial differences between cargo and passenger sailing vessels: in the latter case, the hold was provided with temporary intermediate decks where to allocate migrants³³⁹. Thus, shipowners could engage to both cargo and passenger transports without remarkable differentiation. This feature granted extreme elasticity in terms of market opportunities and represented a fundamental prerequisite to dedicate to this business. Obviously, for the inherent characteristics of migration flows, it was no possible for ships to find passengers in both directions. Therefore, most of the vessels involved in the migrant traffic transported people from Europe to America and, then, sought for return cargoes to Europe.

Although Cohn, in analysing the migration from Atlantic (Ireland and Great Britain) and Central (France and Germany) Europe to the United States, demonstrated that the transition manifested from the early 1860s onwards, in the Latin American case, source evidence might suggest postponing this line. Still in 1868, for instance, the Italian consul residing in Montevideo reported the news of the shipwreck of the Camogli-owned brig schooner *Due Sorelle*, commanded by Bartolomeo Ferro, before the Brazilian coasts. Although a few details are provided, the consul is explicit about relating about the conditions of the «passengers», who ended up safely to their intended destination, Buenos Ayres³⁴⁰.

³³⁸ R.L. Cohn, *Mass Migration Under Sail. European Immigration to the Antebellum United States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Idem, “The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States”, *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

³³⁹ See, *Regio Decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166 che approva il regolamento per l'esecuzione del testo unico del Codice per la Marina Mercantile*. Art. 546. For a broader analysis see, A. Molinari, *Le navi di Lazzaro. Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione transoceanica italiana: il viaggio per mare*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1988; Idem, “Emigration Traffic in the Port of Genoa between the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries: Shipping and Problems of Social Hygiene”, *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 13, No. 1, 1993, pp. 102-118.

³⁴⁰ ACS, *Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 342, Corrispondenza Montevideo, 10 Maggio 1869.

Most frequently, it is shipwrecks and the related events to provide news about the presence of Camogli ships in the area. Many cases were usually reported from the consuls of Valparaíso and Lima and targeted Cape Horn, well-known for being among the most troublesome passages for oceanic navigation. In February 1869, for example, the actions of Emanuele Ferro, captain of the barque *Itala*, were praised for having salvaged the crew members of the ship *Matteo* «from certain death»³⁴¹.

News concerning the presence along the Latin American Pacific coast of people and vessels from Camogli regarded mainly Peru and, to a lesser extent, Chile. Basically, as we will see in the last chapter, some members of the community moved to Callao since the early 1830s and there started their businesses: later, by process of «diffusion» and «feedback»³⁴², various people of Camogli started to orbit around the Peruvian economic system. Notwithstanding coastal cabotage, which the Ligurian migrant community rapidly seized and controlled throughout the nineteenth century, the foreign seaborne trade of Peru relied mainly upon guano exports to Europe. The «age of guano» represented a milestone within the history of Peru: at the end of the independence process, the country entered in serious financial troubles and declared bankruptcy in 1826. Consigned the national debt in the hands of foreign (British) investors, the discovery of the fertilising qualities of guano represented a crucial breakthrough for enabling the country to resuscitate financially³⁴³. The heyday of guano trade lasted roughly from the early 1840s to the late 1870s: the value of its exportation «routinely exceeded two million pounds sterling per year»³⁴⁴. The significant part of the exports was destined to

³⁴¹ Ivi, Sul naufragio del Brick Bark “Matteo”, 21 Febbraio 1869.

³⁴² See, J.D. Gould, “European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and «Feedback»”, *The Journal of the European Economic History*, 2, 1980, pp. 267-315.

³⁴³ Concerning the guano age, its exploitation and the importance to Peruvian foreign trade and national finances, see: E.F. Frank, “History of the Guano mining industry”, *Journal of Cave and Karst Studies*, 60, No. 2, 1998, pp. 121-125; W.M. Mathew, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-70”, 21, No. 3, 1968, pp. 562-579; Idem, “Foreign contractors and the Peruvian Government at the outset of the Guano Trade”, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 52, No. 4, 1972, pp. 598-620; Idem. “Peru and the British Guano Market, 1840-1870”, *The Economic History Review*, 23, No. 1, 1970, pp. 112-128; C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century Peru”, *The Journal of Economic History*, 69, No. 2, 2009, pp. 354-387.

³⁴⁴ C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment”, p. 368.

improve the British agricultural performances: in the year 1870, for instance, the UK imported 280.000 tons of guano³⁴⁵. Although the rights of exploitation were in the hands of the state, which reserved to British merchants and companies (i.e. the Anthony Gibbs & Sons) a sort of monopoly over its commercialisation abroad, it is reasonable to assume that the captains of Camogli were able to establish themselves into the carriage of this commodity. Already in 1865, the Italian consul of Callao invited his government to stimulate the arrival of national vessels to the Peruvian ports. In doing so, he praised guano cargoes for their profitability at the point that many ships travel on ballast from Europe to be satisfied with the sole return freight³⁴⁶. Alternatively, he noted, coal was the primary outbound cargo from the United Kingdom. Being, on the one hand, well-introduced in the British coal trade and, on the other hand, practical of the Peruvian market, owing to their deep-rooted presence in Callao, the establishment of Camogli's shipping within this back and forth route seems to be plausible. Lacking of further data, from the reading of the proceedings of the 1882 Inquiry into the conditions of the Italian merchant marine it was possible to withdraw numerous statements about the exploitation of the guano trade by Ligurian sailing vessels in the 1860s and early 1870s³⁴⁷. Most of the references to Peruvian guano lied into optimistic assumptions about the permanence of the sailing predominance over steam within this transport. They could not be more wrong: not only concerning the general evolution of sail against steam but also for the actual state of guano trade. As the extracting costs of guano rose, the Peruvian natural manure lost its competitive edge against nitrate of soda, abundant in nearby Chile³⁴⁸. Already in the 1870s, its

³⁴⁵ J. Glover, "Tonnage statistics for the decade 1891-1900", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 65, No. 1, 1902, p. 5, Table I – *Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900*.

³⁴⁶ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817, Lima, 1865.

³⁴⁷ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

³⁴⁸ W. M. Mathew, "Peru and the British Guano Market", pp. 119-128. For the Italian participation to the trade of Chilean nitrates see: J.P. Vallejos, "La presenza italiana nel ciclo del salnitro: Tarapacà, 1860-1900", in *Il contributo allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 197-225.

exportation sharply declined to negligible levels, being finally substituted by various competitors³⁴⁹.

Still in Peru was based another profitable trade to which Camogli's shipowners dedicated: the transport of Chinese indentured labourers (*coolies*) from Macao, destined to work either in guano mining or in plantations³⁵⁰. The origins of this trade lied in the Peruvian depressed demography as opposed to the increasing demands for cheap labour which both landowners (plantations) and the state (guano mining) sought to introduce in the country³⁵¹. In 1849, through the publication of the first *ley chinesca*, the afflux of Chinese labourers began and lasted until 1874 with some discontinuities (it stopped between 1856 and 1861). In slightly more than two decades, this traffic moved from the Asian to the Latin American shores of the Pacific almost ninety thousand human beings³⁵².

The outbreak of a conflict (the Chincha Islands War of 1865-1866), the intricacies of maritime fiscal and administrative jurisdictions and the passionate activism of the coeval Italian consul of Lima provided us with an insightful archival collection concerning the participation of Italian shipowners and seafarers to this «infamous trade»³⁵³. Among these categories figured Giovanni Figari, arguably the leader of Camogli's migrant community in Callao, owner of numerous ships devoted to both cabotage and high-seas shipping. Within a list compiled by the consul Pietro Castelli, Giovanni Figari emerged as the shipowner of a full-rigged ship (*Provvidenza*, 564 t.) and a barque (*Lima*, 255 t.) which from January 1865 to

³⁴⁹ *Ibidem*; C. Vizcarra, "Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment", p. 368, Figure 3 – Peruvian Guano Exports.

³⁵⁰ About coolie trade exists a vast bibliography. The most classical reference is: W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1849-1874*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970. More recent are: E. Young, *Alien nation. Chinese migration in the Americas from the coolie era through World War II*, Charlotte: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014; A.J. Meagher, *The Coolie Trade. The Traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America 1847-1874*, Philadelphia, Xilbris Corporation, 2008. See also: M. Foster Farley, "The Chinese Coolie Trade 1845-1875", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 3, No. 4, 1968.

³⁵¹ For the political framework underlying the coolie trade see: M.J. Gonzales, "Planters and Politics in Peru, 1895-1919", *Hispanic American Historical Review Comparative Studies in Society and History J. Lat. Amer. Stud.*, 62, No. 5, 1982, pp. 262–92.

³⁵² W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru*, pp. 74-75.

³⁵³ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869, b. 475, Lettera del comandante della Pirocorvetta Racchia, 30 luglio 1869.

June 1866 sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of 908 *coolies*³⁵⁴.

The allegation to Camogli as an Italian seafaring town of the business and activities performed by the migrant communities formed by its inhabitants represents a much more complicated discourse, which we will partially tackle in the last chapter. Indeed, the matter of the identification of migrant communities with their native social groups represents a broader discourse with which migration historians deal. Although in the methodology of the thesis, the general preference has been to treat as different the members of the original community from those who settled permanently abroad, in attaching *coolies* trade to Camogli, with no further evidence about the active participation of actual Camogli-owned ships (as opposed to those of migrants of Camogli's origins), the main purpose is to be clear and transparent on this argument. Indeed, the *coolies* trade has always represented a troublesome matter for the history of the Ligurian seafaring community: local historians, devoid of the mentioned methodological concerns, included *coolies* trade among the various enterprises to which the members of the community engaged with high profits. Nevertheless, in so doing, they transfigured the nature of the traffic, which was considered as standard passenger transport, notwithstanding all the implications deriving from coercion and the characteristics of the nineteenth-century indentured labour.

3.3.1.2. *Camogli's shipping and the alternatives to Suez*

After the abandonment of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes, Southeast Asia constituted another geographical area to which Camogli shipowners turned the attention for the first time. Surprisingly, the establishment of Ligurian sailing shipping in the area followed the inauguration of the Suez Canal (1869), which in standard literature is deemed to be crucial for granting steam shipping a decisive

³⁵⁴ ACS, Idem, b. 273.

leap forward in the competition with sail³⁵⁵. Instead, the earliest accomplishment of the Canal arguably consisted into the division of Indo-European trade into two sub-categories. On the one side, steamers navigated through the Canal with general cargoes composed of high-value commodities; on the other one, sail vessels belonging to second-comers merchant marines specialised into the transport of bulk merchandises around the Cape³⁵⁶.

As said, whereas Rubattino (the absolute leader of the Italian steam shipping sector) looked with interest at the construction of the Suez Canal and, through personal investments (the purchase of the Assab Bay) rapidly embarked upon the Canal business³⁵⁷, the vast majority of the Italian shipowning elites, who persevered in sailing constructions, lacked the structural characteristics to follow his lead along the same path. Therefore, the NGI ships limited to the transport of general cargoes: liner steamers dealt with domestic trade by carrying national products to India and withdrawing highly demanded valuable commodities from Asia to Italy³⁵⁸.

Meanwhile, in the second half of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of Italian ships called to the ports of the Far East. Indeed, although Suez had gradually absorbed most of the highly-profitable transports, the Cape route was still active, and numerous sailing vessels carried low nominal value cargoes

³⁵⁵ For a general account on the relationships between Italy and the Suez Canal, see: S. Bono, "Il Canale di Suez e l'Italia", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 8, 2006, pp. 411-422; U. Spadoni, "Il Canale di Suez e l'inizio della crisi della marina mercantile italiana", *Nuova Rivista Storica*, No. 54, 1970, pp. 651-672.

³⁵⁶ Although not specifically on the Italian merchant marine, but as an overall perspective, the delimitation of a market niche for sails after the construction of the Canal is exemplary outlined by Gerald S. Graham. See, G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the Sailing Ship: 1850-1885", *The Economic History Review*, 9, No. 1, 1956, pp. 74-88.

³⁵⁷ On Rubattino and his interests toward the Suez Canal, see: A. Codignola, *Rubattino*, Bologna: Licinio Cappelli, 1938, pp. 238-379. At pp. 280-281, the author reports the contract between Rubattino and the Italian State for the institution of a regular line of steamers connecting the Italian main port cities with Alessandria and Bombay. In 1877, then, the future *Navigazione Generale Italiana* obtained a more profitable contract which extended the line to the Southeast Asian ports and Hong Kong.

³⁵⁸ See, for instance, the 1887 logbook of the steamship *Manilla*: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1158/1. The outbound cargo included: wine, sulphur, almonds, national and foreign liquors, marmalades, marbles, silver bars, cement, coral, mirrors and jewellery. From Bombay, instead, the *Manilla* transported wheat, raw cotton (mainly), spices, china potteries, indigo and coffee to Naples, Barcelona and Genoa

(cereals, coal, timber) according to the 'old way'. Not only Cape Town retained its status of a crucial hub for Indo-European trade but was also part of a broader international framework. The participation of Italian shipowners (and of those of Camogli, in the first line) to this shipping movement arguably lied in their previous experiences as cross-traders, as in the last phase of the Black Sea trade. Again, the link with the success achieved in the previous decades seems to cover a primary role in determining subsequent developments. In the British ports and, in particular, in Cardiff, data evidence witnesses the development of high demands for sea transports to Cape Town, loaded with coal cargoes. In the biennium 1886-1888, for instance, approximately ninety Italian vessels left the British ports to the Cape, and more than 60% of them departed from Cardiff³⁵⁹. The reference to the following period is made out of the absence of archival sources referring to the previous one. Cross-quotations and secondary literature suggest the relative continuative presence of Camogli's ships in the area.

One of the leading causes underlying this coal movement lied into steamers' success in the Indian Ocean: in order to navigate, steamships needed significant quantities of coal, which was scarce in these regions. In broader terms, the Suez Canal increased the presence of steamships in Asia; then, steamships stimulated the regional demands for coal, whose transport, paradoxically, was performed on sailing vessels and passed through the Cape instead of the Canal. Somehow, steam navigation nurtured its sail counterpart by providing abundant and incessant coal freights. From the opposite perspective, the low operational costs met by sailing vessels constituted an indispensable factor for steam navigation to expand into peripheral markets, where its economic sustainability depended on the availability of low-cost coal supplies.

After their arrival to the Cape, some ships continued to the ports of the Far East to discharge coal or ballast and then reached Rangoon, Singapore, Batavia or Moulmein, from where most of them loaded rice or teak cargoes³⁶⁰. In the already

³⁵⁹ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. 57-61.

³⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

mentioned declarations of Italian shipowners at the Inquiry, rice trade played the same role of guano: in their perception, it represented a crucial transport to which sailing ships would have always succeeded over steam³⁶¹. Throughout the 1870s, the rice trade became so strategic for the Southeast Asia area that, in the coeval common understanding, the places of exportation of the eastern cereal were defined as «rice ports» ("*porti del riso*")³⁶². Once again, most of the rice cargoes were demanded by the British market: from 1860 to 1880, rice imports to the United Kingdom rose dramatically from 1.535.000 to 7.899.000 cwts³⁶³.

As a testimonium of Camogli's presence within rice trade, the Maritime Museum of Camogli kept some charter party receipts belonging to Emanuele Boggiano, a leading shipowner during the 1870s and 1880s³⁶⁴. The survival of this document is of fundamental importance for reconstructing the mechanisms of chartering vessels and, in general, to analyse the shipping practices of the period. The contract, dated to London, 5th April 1880, concerned the chartering of the barque *Quaker City* (872 t.) belonging to Boggiano³⁶⁵, by the G.B. Haynes company of London, under the mediation of the shipbroker company H. Clarkson & Co. The document prescribed a medium-term arrangement: at the moment of the agreement, the ship was said to be «at Rice Ports or left for Europe»³⁶⁶. Then, «after completion of present voyage it shall have option to load for the East, River Plate

³⁶¹ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

³⁶² About the development of the international rice market, in particular from Burma delta, see: M. Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier. 1852-1941*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. See also, P.A. Coclanis, "Distant Thunder: The Creation of a World Market in Rice and the Transformations it Wrought", *The American Historical Review*, No. 98: 4, 1993, pp. 1050-1078; Idem, "Southeast Asia's Incorporation into the World Rice Market: A Revisionist View", *Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, No. 24: 2, 1993, pp. 251-267.

³⁶³ J. Glover, "Tonnage Statistics of the decade 1880-1890", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 55, No. 2, 1892, p. 207, Table I - *Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1890*.

³⁶⁴ CMMC, *Contratti di noleggio e vari*, Contratto di noleggio "Quaker City" 1880.

³⁶⁵ The barque *Quaker City* was registered in the 1883 list of the *Mutua*. See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese. In that year, the *Quaker City* composed Emanuele Boggiano's personal fleet together with the *Rocco Schiaffino* (1030 t.) and the *Fedele* (478 t.).

³⁶⁶ CMMC, *Contratti di noleggio e vari*, Contratto di noleggio "Quaker City" 1880.

or Port on the way»³⁶⁷. Hence, therefore, the ship «shall sail and proceed as ordered at the port of discharge of the outward cargo of Akyab, or Elephant Point, Rangoon or Diamond Island, Bassein, for orders (to be given within 48 hours)»³⁶⁸. Finally, it «shall load from the said Charterer or his Agents, a full and complete cargo of Cargo Rice in Bags»³⁶⁹. On its way back to Europe, «being so loaded, it shall therewith proceed to Queenstown, Scilly, Plymouth or Falmouth for orders, to discharge at a good and safe port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent between Bordeaux or Hamburg»³⁷⁰.

Similar and somehow complementary in terms of geographic proximity was the teak trade, which took place in the same broader regional area and followed the same route pattern³⁷¹. Unfortunately, the paucity of available sources prevents us from delimiting the chronological limits within which the ships of Camogli devoted to this trade. In the proceedings of the Inquiry (1882), only the consul of Hamburg mentioned teak transports from the Burma delta: interestingly, however, he refers to teak as an unexploited opportunity, which could complement rice cargoes and enlarge the spectrum of available cargoes in the Southeast Asian region³⁷². Thus, although an earlier establishment in the 1870s might be farfetched, inevitably some ships of Camogli engage to teak trade in the late 1880s. It is the case, for instance, of the barques *Calunnia* (870 t.), *Draguette* (728 t.) and *Stella B.* (860 t.) which, between 1886 and 1890, were recorded in Moulmein and Samarang with teak cargoes to Europe³⁷³.

³⁶⁷ *Ibidem.*

³⁶⁸ *Ibidem.*

³⁶⁹ *Ibidem.*

³⁷⁰ *Ibidem.*

³⁷¹ For a general overview, see: C. Rai, *Control and Prosperity: the teak business in Siam 1880s-1932*, Hamburg: PhD Dissertation, 2016.

³⁷² *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. I, p. 290.

³⁷³ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. 57-61. The three ships were captained respectively by Prospero Schiappacasse, Davide Schiaffino and Antonio Figari.

3.3.2. THE RESILIENCE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (1890s-1914)

Differently from the conditions of the previous decades, the archival material to outline the maritime activities of Camogli from the late 1880s to 1914 is vast and offers a wealth of information. The primary source is embodied by the enormous archival collection of logbooks of the Ligurian merchant marine, which is kept in the State Archives of Genoa and covers the period from 1881 to the mid-twentieth century³⁷⁴. Among the Italian maritime historians, this source has rarely been exploited: only Paolo Frascani addressed, in a seminal article, the potential of logbooks to investigate the history of Italian shipping and seafaring during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century³⁷⁵. The lack of studies might be reconducted to the delays of the inventory process within the Italian archival system, as in the actual case of Genoa. Indeed, the State Archives of Genoa made available their vast collection of logbooks only in the last years.

The utilisation of logbooks within the Italian merchant marine was regulated by the 1879 *Regolamento che approva l'esecuzione del testo unico del Codice della Marina Mercantile*³⁷⁶. Despite within the 1866 "Code for the merchant marine" logbooks were mentioned, their usage in onboard bureaucratic practices was taken for granted³⁷⁷. In 1879, instead, from articles 345 to 361, it is possible to find all the instructions and regulations concerning logbooks. According to the law, there were three different typologies of logbooks: 1) general logbook; 2) navigation logbook; 3) hold logbook. The captain exerted absolute responsibility over the first one, which contained all the relevant information concerning the voyage, such as the crew lists, their payments, the eventual accidents and, more broadly, all the

³⁷⁴ The archival collection of logbooks kept in the State Archives of Genoa kept the logbooks of 2078 different ships, from the 1880s to the 1950s.

³⁷⁵ P. Frascani, "Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi a vela dell'800", *Società e storia*, 100, 2003, pp. 487-510. Some references can be found also in: Id., "Una comunità in viaggio: dal racconto dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane (1861-1900)", in Id., *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 114-115.

³⁷⁶ *Regio decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166*.

³⁷⁷ *Codice per la marina mercantile del regno d'Italia*, Milano: Fratelli Borroni, 1865, p. 32, art. 92.

data which the captain deemed needed to record³⁷⁸. The navigation logbook, instead, could be compiled either by the captain or the mate: it provided the information and measures concerning the route, with details about atmospheric events and manoeuvres³⁷⁹. Finally, the hold logbook was routinely updated by the mate under the captain supervision. Structured schematically, it contained valuable information related to the cargo, including the place and dates of loading and discharge, the nature and quantity of the merchandises and the names of charterers and consigners³⁸⁰.

Despite each type offers outstanding potential for maritime studies, having in mind to investigate the traffics carried out by Camogli's ships from the 1890s to the First World War, we opted for concentrating on the third type, the hold logbooks.

Cross-investigations allowed us to identify seventeen logbooks which are undoubtedly attributable to Camogli shipowners: their operations cover the chronological arc from 1881 to 1914, distributed into 408 different routes. In this case, we chose to define as «route» all the voyages from one port to another aimed to load or discharge the cargo in its majority (even if the ship was on ballast); therefore it does not include the eventual intermediate ports of call (which whatsoever are seldom recorded in the hold logbooks).

In the structure of our analysis, for each route, we noted the ports of loading and discharge and the nature of the merchandise. Owing to the great variety of these elements, both the ports and the cargoes were then grouped in broader categories. While the ports were naturally clustered into macro-areas according to geographical proximity, as far as the commodities were concerned, we decided to categorise them according to their functions and intended use. Thus, we obtained the following groups:

³⁷⁸ *Regio decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166*, art. 347-348.

³⁷⁹ *Idem*, art. 349-350.

³⁸⁰ *Idem*, art. 351.

Ports		Merchandises	
Category	Example	Category	Example
EUR (med)	Genoa, Marseille, Naples, Odessa, Barcelona etc.	CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL	concrete, bricks, stones, railway sleepers etc.
	EUR (atla)	Lisbon, Dunkerque etc.	FERTILISERS
EUR (north)	Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Stettin, Bremenhaven etc.	FOODSTUFF	wheat, sea salt, sugar, corn etc.
SA (east)	Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, Rosario, Santos, Rio de Janeiro etc.	FOSSIL FUELS	coal, petroleum, charcoal
NA (east)	Pensacola, New York, Philadelphia, Miramichi, St. John's etc.	INDUSTRY RAW MATERIALS	minerals, iron, pitch, lubrication oil
NA (west)	San Francisco	TIMBER	timber, pitch-pine, quebracho, cork
CA	Martinica, Guadalupa, Trinidad		
ASIA	Penang, Samarang, Moulmein, Singapore etc.		
AFR (med)	Algers, Tunis, Alessandria, Sphax etc.		
AFR (equa)	Aneho, Lomè		

AFR (south)	Capetown, Port Elizabeth
OCEA	Sidney, Bathurst, Queensland

Table 3.4. Categories of ports and merchandises.

3.3.2.1. *The geography of Camogli's sailing cross-trade*

During the period between 1881 and 1914, Camogli's specialisation into oceanic cross-trade of bulky cargoes reached its apex. In particular, the null correlation with domestic production considerably affected the first outgoing leg from the Mediterranean to the outer seas. Conversely, returning to the Mediterranean systematically implied the procurement of cargoes destined either to Genoa or Marseille. In tight continuity with the previous phases, beginning with 1885, many captains resorted to subsidised coal shipments as to return to Italian ports with cargo³⁸¹.

In general, although in the 1870s and 1880s Camogli had expanded its range to the outskirts of the Pacific Ocean, in the last period most of the activities seem to concentrate around a figurative triangle between Europe, North-America and Latin America. To outline more evidently the geographical patterns of Camogli's shipping, we chose to submit their whole scheme, with regard to the broader regional areas of loading and discharge. The difference between the two tables owed to our choice to distinguish between voyages with cargo and on ballast, in order to achieve a more refined understanding of the commercial and shipping networks to which Camogli seafarers participated. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 represent all the routes collected in Camogli's logbooks except for those belonging to the voyages of two steamers (counting to 109), which will be treated in a separate section.

³⁸¹ The issue of subsidised routes and the development of maritime protectionism within the Italian merchant marine, see Chapter 4; see also, S. Palmer, "The British Coal Export Trade, 1850-1913", in D. Alexander and R. Ommer, *Volume not Values: Canadian sailing ships and the world trade*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979, pp. 331-354.

		Area of discharge											
WITH CARGO		EUR med	SA east	EUR atla	NA east	AFR south	EUR north	ASIA	AFR med	OCEA	CA	AFR equa	NA west
Area of loading	NA east	30	26	17	1		2	2	2	1			
	EUR atla	10	17	3	9	9			1		1		
	EUR med	10	13	2	5	1	1			1	1		1
	SA east	11		10	9	1	4						
	AFR med			3	3								
	EUR north	2			2	1							
	ASIA			2		1	2						
	OCEA	2		1	1	1							
	CA	3											
	AFR south							1		1			
	AFR equa											1	
	NA west			1									

Table 3.5. Geography of Camogli's routes with cargo (1886-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

		Area of discharge								
		BALLAST	NA east	EUR atla	EUR med	ASIA	AFR med	CA	SA east	EUR north
Area of loading	EUR med	21	5	7						
	SA east	14	1		1					
	AFR south	6					1	1		
	EUR atla	6	1							
	EUR north	1	1		1				1	1
	NA east	2								
	CA	2								
	AFR med						1			

Table 3.6. Geography of Camogli's routes on ballast (1886-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

From a first general overview, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate two totally different patterns as to regard the interactions between the ports of loading and discharge. More broadly, however, it is possible to discern an absolute predominance of the Atlantic area – which can be reconducted to the broader categories of Atlantic Europe (EUR atla) and to the east coasts of North and Latin America respectively (NA east and SA east). Indeed, among the voyages with cargoes, these three areas taken altogether encompass 72,12% of the loading ports and 55,30% of the discharging ports. More precisely, the weighty role of Northern American region was much more considerable as far as loading ports were concerned, whereas the Latin American ports covered a primary role as cargo destinations; the contribution of Atlantic Europe was instead slightly balanced between the two³⁸². On the opposite side, an examination of ballast voyages highlights the purely exporting position of North America, where ended up 69,86% of the routes

³⁸² The North American ports accounted for 35,84% and 13,27% respectively, whereas Southern American ports for 15,04% and 24,78% and Atlantic Europe for 21,24% and 17,25%. See, ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1881-1914.

without cargo, as much as the total absence of exports from the Mediterranean area (45,21% of Camogli's voyages on ballast departed from the Mediterranean).

Furthermore, going deeper into the analysis of the trade relationships between specific areas, the North American outbound voyages towards Mediterranean Europe and Latin America cover the most considerable share of the routes sailed by the ships of Camogli, followed by those to Atlantic Europe and the ones from there to Latin America. In sum, Camogli's seafarers sailed with continuity across the Atlantic both in the horizontal and vertical directions, carrying out trades inside a sort of nineteenth-century version of the "Atlantic commercial triangle". Usually, the permanence of the ships outside the Mediterranean lasted from one year and a half to more than two years. For example, the barque *Edinburgh* (1299 t.), belonging to Biagio Mortola, remained from July 1901 to October 1903 outside the Mediterranean waters, after having carried out commercial operations in Cadiz, Buenos Ayres, Port Elizabeth (South Africa), Pensacola (US.), Hamburg and Pensacola again³⁸³.

Quite surprisingly, therefore, the presence of Camogli in the waters of the Pacific seems to rarefy in the last decade of the century and before the First World War: on the one hand, owing to the growth of Ligurian-born local merchant marines, which hoisted the Latin American flags, the actual Italians might have been cut off from the area. Furthermore, the gradual disappearance of the natural resources of guano and the subsequent loss of centrality of the Camogli-born community in Lima might have played a role in this regard³⁸⁴.

About the absence of Camogli from the Southeast Asian ports, instead, might be more complicated to find reasonable explanations with no further sources: perhaps, although rice and teak transports proved to be resistant to transition for an extended period after 1869, at the turn of the century such process was accomplished. To corroborate this assumption, we may underline that almost all

³⁸³ The logbook of the barque *Edinburgh* is exceptional within our sample even for its typology, being a general logbook (the hold logbook was nowhere to be found). Nevertheless, owing to the outstanding precision and abundance of details which the captains deployed in the composition of the general logbook, we were able to reconstruct the routes and cargoes of the ship even in absence of the apposite logbook. See, ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 602/1.

³⁸⁴ For a broader analysis, see Chapter 6.

of the shipments related to this area were concentrated between 1881 and 1892. Thus, the shrinkage of the chronological sample would result in a reasonably sizable 6,67% of Southeast Asian loading ports (1881-1892), as opposed to the 0,60% of the following period (1893-1914)³⁸⁵.

Now, after a brief introduction concerning the route patterns of Camogli cross-trade, the same argument will be outlined more extensively through the analysis of single trades under the lens of the specific commodity transported. In the end, the entanglements between different merchandises and distinct regional areas will allow us to reconstruct the subtle but coherent organisation of Camogli's international shipping in its last decades.

3.3.2.2. *Merchandises*

The following pages will target single commodities whose transport was central within Camogli's late-nineteenth-century shipping. Accordingly, the analysis will mainly deal with timber and wood products in general, fossil fuels and foodstuff, leaving to the broader discourse any noteworthy detail concerning the raw material for industries, construction materials and fertilisers.

For its overwhelming importance, the timber trade is the first commodity to taken into account. Out of 236 voyages with cargo, in 35,60% of the occasions the ships of Camogli transported timber of any kind.

TIMBER	EUR (med)	SA (east)	EUR (atla)	EUR (north)	NA (east)
NA (east)	22	24	12	1	
SA (east)	5		2	1	1
EUR (med)	6				
EUR (atla)					2
ASIA			1	1	

³⁸⁵ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

OCEA			1		
EUR (north)	1				

Table 3.7. Camogli's timber trade (1886-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

In representing the geography of Camogli's participation to timber trade, the Table 3.7 provides a first enlightenment about the predominance of North American ports within our previous figures. The absolute majority of shipments from this area, indeed, concerned timber trade, in particular in its pitch-pine version, which underwent a massive commercialisation in the second half of the nineteenth century³⁸⁶. More precisely, most of the exports of pitch-pine were concentrated in the Gulf area, along the coasts of the US states of Florida, Alabama and Mississippi³⁸⁷. From our data collection, evidence suggests the predominance of the port of Pensacola, followed by Gulfport and Mobile. According to an official statistic of 1913, these three districts – taken together – exported more than half of the US yellow pitch-pine lumber and two-thirds of sawed pitch-pine timber³⁸⁸. In the case of Camogli, the port of Pensacola corresponds to the most frequented port to load cargoes overall. Still in the early twentieth century, sailing vessels were a valid alternative to steam for timber and lumber shipments. Sails were favoured by the exporters because of the relatively less complex organisation required to load medium-sized sailing vessels in comparison with large steamers³⁸⁹. In particular,

³⁸⁶ See, E.E. Pratt (ed.), *The export lumber trade of the United States*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918.

³⁸⁷ J.A. Eisterhold, "Lumber and Trade in Pensacola and West Florida: 1800-1860", *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 51, No. 3, 1973, pp. 267-280; Idem, "Charleston: Lumber and Trade in a declining Southern Port", *The South Carolina Historical Magazine*, 74, No. 2, 1973, pp. 61-72; Idem, "Lumber and Trade in Lower Mississippi Valley and New Orleans, 1800-1860", *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, 13, No. 1, 1972, pp. 71-91; O. Clubbs, "Pensacola in Retrospect: 1870-1890", *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 37, No. 3, 1959, pp. 377-396.

³⁸⁸ E.E. Pratt (ed.), *The export lumber trade*, pp. 17-18. The distinction between lumber and timber is related to different processing degrees of the wood. Timber identifies cut and sawn wood, which still retains its original form; lumber involves more processes and corresponds to the wood exported in form of boards, planks and deals.

³⁸⁹ Idem, pp. 55-57.

the possibility to deal with smaller cargoes was seen with favour by single sewing enterprises rather than by large companies.

From Pensacola and, more broadly, the whole Northern American region, timber and lumber were transported either to Latin America or to Europe. Going to Europe directly meant seldomly the best option in terms of shipping productivity: since most of the westward crossings of the Atlantic were on ballast, European ships needed to obtain more than one freight to have a return from the operational costs. In this historical phase, Camogli's vessels practised pure tramp shipping. Thus, they rarely sailed along linear routes – back and forth within the same trade – but fancied more complicated trades. For example, at their first arrival to Pensacola from Europe, many ships opted for accepting freights to the Plata region, where pitch-pine was widely sought for internal constructional purposes³⁹⁰.

From Plata, Camogli ships were usually presented with two options: either returning on ballast to Pensacola (or the nearby ports) to resume pitch-pine trade or accepting freights to Europe. Interestingly, in some instances, the shipment of pitch-pine lumber to these ports was followed by the transport of a different variety of wood product, the *quebracho*. The commercialisation of this specific typology was connected to its unique characteristics, which made it widely appreciated in leather manufacturing as a natural dye. *Quebracho* was mostly shipped to Europe and especially to Genoa, thus representing one of the possible cargoes for Camogli ships to return loaded to the Mediterranean directly.

Nevertheless, among the goods which Camogli's vessels exported from Buenos Ayres and Montevideo to Europe, on more than one-third of the instances (34,29%) these were animal bones³⁹¹. This merchandise found employment in agriculture as a natural fertiliser, in the same fashion of Peruvian guano and Chilean nitrates. The ships of Camogli transported animal bones mainly to various ports of the UK (Glasgow and Berwick) and Northern Europe (Rotterdam,

³⁹⁰ Idem, p. 113. Between 1881 and 1914, pitch-pine cargoes arrived to Buenos Ayres (14), Montevideo (5), Rosario (2) and to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia Blanca and Santa Fé (1).

³⁹¹ The cargoes of animal bones from Buenos Ayres, Montevideo and Santa Fé were 11, 7 and 1 respectively. ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

Hamburg and Dunkerque). Only once, this type of cargo was brought to the Mediterranean, to Savona.

Calling to one of the Atlantic European ports could be followed either by the return to the Mediterranean, in order to change the crew and anchor the ship for maintenance, or by the continuation of tramping. The way back to Genoa, as said, was usually associated with the transport of coal cargoes. Starting from 1885, the shipment of coal from outside the Mediterranean to the Italian ports benefitted from public subventions granted in the wake of the maritime protectionist policy which the Italian state adopted to aid the national merchant marine³⁹². However, the premium, calculated in 1 lira per ton of coal, was reserved to ships built in the Italian shipyards (much state efforts targeted the protection and development of national shipbuilding)³⁹³. Therefore, as the shipowners of Camogli began to purchase their iron-hulled barques and full-rigged ships on the second-hand foreign market, the effectiveness of the incentive faded gradually. Nevertheless, even without subsidies, British coal remained a steadily sought option by the ships of Camogli, which – it might be worth reminding – had been sailing along this route since the early 1860s.

FOSSIL FUELS	EUR (med)	AFR (south)	SA (east)	AFR (med)	EUR (atla)	ASIA	CA
EUR (atla)	8	7	3	1	1		1
NA (east)	2		1	2	1	1	
OCEA	2						

³⁹² See, *Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile*. See, also its update: *Legge 23 luglio 1896, n. 318. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di costruzione e premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali*.

³⁹³ See Chapter 4 and also: E. Corbino, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885”, *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 61, No. 11, 1921, pp. 370-389; Idem, “Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia”, *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 62, No. 2, 1922, pp. 65-81; E. Giretti, “I succhioni della marina mercantile”, *Giornale degli economisti*, 30, 1905, pp. 37-59.

Table 3.8. Camogli's trade in fossil fuels (1886-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

As we have seen in the previous sections, British coal was also transported to different places than the Mediterranean. Being the most demanded merchandise of the globe, coal was shipped everywhere: not surprisingly, Table 3.8 illustrates how one-third of the coal shipments from Atlantic Europe were directed to South Africa (Cape Town and Port Elizabeth)³⁹⁴. Once again, by supplying with coal cargoes highly demanding areas, the ships of Camogli sailed along one of the most strategic routes for global shipping.

From the late 1880s, the success of a new typology of fossil fuel – oil – led to the creation of new route patterns and, in the following century, rose to wholly replace coal and, as a result, favoured the passing of the torch from the United Kingdom to the US as world-leading powers. The presence of Camogli in this trade is not intense and systematic: oil was loaded in three different ports (New York, Philadelphia and Savannah), all of them being along the US east coast. Oil, commercialised in tins or boxes, was shipped to the most different ports, Latin America (Montevideo), Southeast Asia (Batavia) and to the Mediterranean (Palermo, Catania, Alger and Alessandria).

Remaining in the discourse of fossil fuels, some Camogli ships transported shale oil from Sidney, on account of the Australian Kerosene, Oil and Minerals Company³⁹⁵. Shale oil was extracted from shale rocks through the application of various thermal and chemical processes. The final product showed qualities comparable to petrol. In general, the inclusion of Australia within the route pattern of Camogli took place from the 1890s, but it reached an actual continuity in the twentieth century. To the Australian ports, Camogli ships travelled either on ballast or with the rarest general cargoes; there, they retrieved shale, railway sleepers, chrome and timber. For example, in 1900, the barque *Andaman* (919 t.), ownership of Gaetano Olivari, reached Sidney after having discharged in Port Elizabeth (South Africa) a cargo of coal and concrete retrieved in London³⁹⁶. There,

³⁹⁴ See, A. Mabin, "The rise and decline of Port Elizabeth, 1850-1900", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, No. 19: 2, 1986, pp. 275-303.

³⁹⁵ See, ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 119/1.

³⁹⁶ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 119/1.

the captain embarked shale destined to Genoa. After a few years spent between Marseille and the French Caribs (Martinique and Guadalupe), in 1904, the *Andaman* left the French port with the load full of bricks to be discharged in Dunedin (New Zealand). Then, the return cargo was found in Queensland (Australia), where the captain filled the hold with chrome to Baltimore (1905). From there, not surprisingly, the *Andaman* returned to the well-known pitch-pine trade from Gulfport to Buenos Ayres and, finally, loaded *quebracho* to Genoa (1906).

Finally, turning back to the available cargo options for Camogli ships in the Atlantic area, it might be worth noting the few existing profitable freights for covering the passage from Europe to America. Indeed, in commenting Table 3.5 and 3.6, we underlined how most of the westward voyages to the Americas were on ballast. For Camogli, the lack of profitable outbound cargoes from Europe was associated with the absence of bulky merchandises. Indeed, the European countries exported to America mainly two cargo typologies: passengers, whose transportation was the first to be absorbed by steamships³⁹⁷ and general cargoes, which rapidly followed the same path. Therefore, it was natural that sailing vessels serving on tramping routes would hardly find outbound bulky cargoes to America. Nevertheless, the constant presence of Camogli's vessels in the port of Cadiz might unveil a different framework.

FOODSTUFF	SA (east)	EUR (atla)	NA (east)	EUR (med)	EUR (north)	AFR (equa)	OCEA
EUR (atla)	14	2	2				
EUR (med)	8	1	4	3	1		
SA (east)		5	1	2	1		
AFR (med)		3	3				
NA (east)		3					
CA				3			

³⁹⁷ R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

ASIA (rice)		1			1		
NA (west)		1					
AFR (equa)						1	
AFR (south)							1

Table 3.9. Camogli's trade in foodstuff (1886-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

As seen in Table 3.9, from 1889 to 1914, many ships called at Cadiz to load sea salt cargoes toward Latin America before engaging the Atlantic. The frequency and repetition of these cases might imply the inclusion of this trade within a more systematic route network in which reliability upon outbound cargoes to Latin America was fundamental to increase cost-efficiency. Among the merchandises included under the "foodstuff" category in Table 3.9, sea salt is indeed the most recurrent (42,62%). Although Cadiz covered the absolute majority of the cases, sea salt was loaded in Ibiza and Trapani as well: then, most of the shipments went to Montevideo (12) and Buenos Ayres (9). Less systematic seem to be the US demands for European sea salt, as it was possible to count only one cargo each for Portland and Halifax.

Another commodity which we labelled under the foodstuff category was wheat. As said, Camogli had a long history into wheat trade. However, following the loss of the commercial competition for the Black Sea grain with steam, the ships of Camogli were rarely seen engaging in this specific trade. Nevertheless, the transformation of the international wheat market and the integration of extra-European producers (United States, Argentina and Australia) provided new opportunities. Actually, the contribution of Camogli to these flows was never crucial; the load of wheat cargoes in the Americas (Montevideo, Buenos Ayres but also New York and Philadelphia) was still a rare event (2,65% of the total routes with cargo)³⁹⁸. The practice of wheat trade was completely a-systematic: as in many other cases, it was transported to Europe (mostly UK and Northern European ports) as an improvised return cargo, within the lack of organisation which wholly reflects the tramp shipping model.

³⁹⁸ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

3.3.2.3. *The steam fleet of Camogli: routes and shipping patterns*

As said, starting from the early twentieth century, some shipowners of Camogli attempted to transition from sail to steam and purchased, with the same attitude demonstrated for sail vessels, second-hand steamers in the foreign markets. Despite the relatively minor importance of steamships within the general framework of Camogli's shipping, the analysis of the primary features of their routes and the commercial use which the shipowners of Camogli made out of them might be somehow useful. On the one hand, it will serve to outline the sharp differentiation between the shipping markets for sail and steam; on the other hand, some features will help us to outline a sort of continuity in Camogli's approach towards the two.

Among the hold logbooks in our possession, the following analysis will draw from the ones of two steamers, *Deipara* (1402 t.) and *Luigino* (1321 t.)³⁹⁹. They belonged respectively to Gaetano Maggiolo and Emanuele Bozzo who, at the same time, owned also sailing vessels⁴⁰⁰. From our recognition of the logbook archival collection kept in Genoa, we also identified the hold logbook of a third steamer, the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.), ownership of Stefano Razeto. Due to its limited tonnage, it only engaged to Italian cabotage. Therefore, the inclusion of a ship presenting so strikingly different structural characteristics would have hindered the sample consistency: given that, the *Filippo Chicca* will remain outside of our analysis.

Firstly, the primary element to propose a distinction between sail and steam lies in the observation of the respective rates of voyages with cargo and on ballast. Indeed, whereas concerning sailing vessels the number of voyages on ballast reached almost one-fourth of the total (24,41%), the figure sharply decreases (11,01%) as far as steamers are concerned. In other words, even in the hands of shipowners who were traditionally bound to sail shipping, steamers productivity was higher than its counterpart.

³⁹⁹ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

⁴⁰⁰ According to the 1902 Italian register, Emanuele Bozzo possessed also the barque *Maria Madre B.* (744 t.) and Gaetano Maggiolo owned the barque *Caterina G.* (627 t.). See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

		Area of discharge				
		WITH CARGO	EUR (med)	EUR (atla)	AFR (med)	EUR (north)
Area of loading	EUR (med)	31	6	5	1	1
	EUR (atla)	30		1		
	AFR (med)	12	7		1	
	EUR (north)	1				
	SA (east)					1

Table 3.10. Geography of Camogli's routes with cargo – Steamers (1881-1914). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

Secondly, Table 3.10 outlines a totally different scenario with regard to route patterns. The analysis of the voyages with cargo underlines the dramatic discontinuity between sailing vessels, whose core point was the Atlantic ocean, and steamships. Indeed, most of the commercial activities concerned the Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe, with the substantial participation of Northern African ports. With the partial exception of Western Europe, all the mentioned regions covered a secondary role within the geography of Camogli's sailing tramp shipping. In the case of steamers, instead, they were central. In particular, concerning the loading ports, the share of the Mediterranean area, comprehending both the European and the Northern African shores, increased from 18,14% to 65,98%. In broader terms, the steamers of Camogli, notwithstanding their remarkable tonnages, engaged mostly to the Mediterranean cabotage.

Moreover, a comparative overview of the cargoes transported within their traffics might lead us to achieve a better understanding of the nature of these maritime activities.




Figure 3.7. Merchandises transported by *Deipara* and *Luigino*. Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

First of all, in contrast to the general trends of steam shipping, Camogli's steamers rarely transported general cargoes (10,30% of the total). Apart from the already mentioned *Filippo Chicca*, which engaged to national cabotage and established regular connections between Genoa and Naples, the rarest occasions in which *Deipara* and *Luigino* carried general cargoes (mainly composed of various foodstuff articles) either involved a passage to Buenos Ayres (in 1906, the first recorded voyage of *Deipara*) or were directed to Odessa and Alessandria. Indeed, rather than engaging to regular liner connections, the shipowners of Camogli opted for using steamers in the same manner of sailing vessels. Indeed, they were mainly deployed into the transport of bulky merchandises within the Mediterranean/Atlantic range, where sailing vessels had lost their competitiveness during the previous decades.

One of the leading indicators of such an approach might be identified in the return, after roughly three decades, to the Black Sea ports. Between 1900 and 1910, indeed, both *Luigino* and *Deipara* called at the wheat ports of Taganrog (5 times), Odessa (2), Braila (2), Berdyansk, Novorossiysk and Theodosia (1 time each). The commercial framework of the wheat trade was clear and well-known to the

shipowners of Camogli, who had built their fortunes on the Black Sea trade before turning to oceanic routes as a result of the transition. Therefore, there is no surprise about the fact that, after completing the transition, the ships of Camogli would have returned to the Black Sea ports. Then, owing to the mentioned global transformations of the cereal trade, all the wheat was discharged within the Mediterranean basin, mainly in Genoa, but also in Marseille, Venice and in Southern Italy.

Another traditional merchandise to which Camogli's steamers engaged was coal. As said, although it lost part of its importance, the transport of British coal remained essential within the tramp shipping system of Camogli as a fundamental resource to obtain return cargoes to the Mediterranean. For steamers, instead, coal transports from the British ports to Genoa and Savona (with the slightest participation of Alessandria, Syros and Piraeus) recovered their centrality (16,49% against 3,54% of sailing vessels). Interestingly, within the broader category of fossil fuels, also Camogli steamers engaged to oil transports (2,06% of the total voyages with cargo). However, instead of retrieving it from the United States, the *Luigino* loaded oil – in boxes – at the port of Batum, on the easternmost shores of the Black Sea⁴⁰¹. The *Luigino* called at Batum two times, firstly in 1900 and then five years afterwards. On the first instance, it brought it to Lisbon; on the second to Alessandria⁴⁰².

Moreover, throughout the first decade of the century, Camogli's steamships specialised into three specific types of transport of bulk merchandises: iron ore, pyrite and phosphate. To this regard, it is worth mentioning that, for handling these commodities, the steam fleet of Camogli showed wholly comparable

⁴⁰¹ For an overview about the easternmost region of the Black Sea area, see: G. Harlaftis, V. Konstantinova, I. Lyman, A. Sydorenko and E. Tchkoizde (eds.), *Between grain and oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: the port cities of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, late 18th – early 20th century*, Rethymon: Centre of Maritime History IMS-FORTH, 2020. In particular about oil trade, see: E. Tchkoizde, “Oil and soil: the role of Batoum’s economic development in shaping of political significance of the Caucasus”, in G. Harlaftis et al. (eds.), *Between grain and oil from the Azov to the Caucasus*, pp. 461-522.

⁴⁰² ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1133/1.

characteristics with the coeval British steam tramp shipping⁴⁰³. Iron ore was usually loaded in North African (Alger) and Italian ports (Rio Marina, in the Elba Island). Then, it was discharged in Venice (2 times), Ancona (2), Glasgow (2), Newport (2), Rotterdam and Genoa (1 each)⁴⁰⁴. Pyrite, instead, was mainly retrieved in the port of Huelva (14 times), in Spain, and, secondarily in Stratoni (2), north of Greece: the commercialisation of this mineral was usually associated with the production of sulfuric acid⁴⁰⁵. Finally, the steamers of Camogli loaded phosphate in Northern Africa, in Sfax (12 voyages), from where it was destined to Venice (6 times), Cartagena (2), Genoa, Galatz, Rotterdam and Belfast (1 each). Phosphate found intensive utilisation in agriculture for fertilising purposes.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to outline the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities in the age of the transition from sail to steam. During this historical phase, the application of technological improvements to navigation and the advent of steam shipping entangled with broader transformations which revolutionised the previous transport system. At the turn of the century, international shipping business was dramatically modified: in particular, it was divided into two distinct sectors, liner and tramp shipping, being the former specialised to general cargo and passenger transports and the latter to bulk cargo. In light of these global processes, in the same period the seafaring community of Camogli underwent an extraordinary growth (from the 1860s to the early 1880s) followed by a steady decline (late 1880s-1914) which culminated into the loss of the remaining fleet throughout the First World War. Although the economic roots of the rising phase lied into the successful establishment of Camogli's shipping within the Black Sea trade of the previous decades, the readjustment to the mutated conditions of the

⁴⁰³ R.S. Craig, "Aspects of tramp shipping and ownership", in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1978, pp. 207-228.

⁴⁰⁴ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibidem*.

international seaborne trade as a result of the onset of steam shipping is still remarkable. Not only Camogli shipowners survived to the loss of their prevalent source of income (the transport of the Black Sea grain), but also managed to increase shipping profits and, by investing them in shipbuilding, to enhance the position of their community within the international shipping world. In terms of economic shipping trends, the declining cycle begun in the early 1870s took the shape of a global freight crisis: then, the contraction of profits paired with the difficulties for Italian shipping to engage the path of transition pushed the Camogli's maritime activities to increasingly marginal routes. From the 1890s onward, Camogli shipowners entered into the resilience phase. The high rates of purchases on the second-hand market and the rise of the mean age of the fleet pointed out the qualitative decline of shipping in comparison with the previous period. Finally, the attempt to transition, marked by the creation of a modest steam tramp fleet might indicate, in its own configuration, the incipient structural collapse of the community.

PART II

THE MARITIME COMMUNITY “WITHIN”:

SHIPOWNERS AND SEAFARERS

4. SHIPOWNERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MARITIME BUSINESS IN CAMOGLI

Introduction

This chapter aims to outline the historical trajectory of Camogli's shipping business from the perspective of the shipowning elites composing the community. In particular, it highlights the relationships between the development of maritime activities from Tyrrhenian cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping and the mutations which modified the nature of shipownership. Similarly to what done for maritime activities, the present chapter aims to delineate the efforts of the Camogli shipowning elites to readjust to the transformations occurred within the shipping business.

In the first section, the chapter reconstructs the activities of some of the most influential shipowners and shipping families of Camogli.

Then, in the second section, the reliance upon the forms of shared-ownership and the cardinal role of family and community mechanisms in shaping Camogli's maritime success is at the centre of the analysis. Great emphasis is also on the formation of a collective maritime credit system. To this purpose, the role of Camogli's mutual maritime insurance association in developing forms of interdependence in the local shipping business is taken into account.

The third section focuses on the rising phase (1860s-1870s). It aims to correlate the development which Camogli underwent from the infrastructural, social and cultural points of view with the individual activism and collective dedication of the shipowners' class toward the whole community.

Then, reminding the critical role of the technological transition to alter the dynamics of the nineteenth-century shipping market, the fourth section will outline the shipowners' interests and decision-making in dealing with this issue. In particular, the section will primarily draw from the proceedings of the National Inquiry for the conditions of the merchant marine, to which Camogli's shipowners actively participated. To provide an insight into the troublesome conditions in which Camogli entered from the 1870s onwards, the chapter attempts to outline

the financial difficulties experienced by local shipowners. In particular, the crisis of the community is presented under the light of structural, conjunctural, communitarian and individual events. Indeed, the late-nineteenth-century shipping which Camogli underwent derived from factors which operated on various levels: structural, as the global transformations and the characteristics of small-scale shipping centres influenced the potential evolution of the Ligurian community; conjunctural, as the freight crisis hit Camogli's shipowners in the moment of their greatest weakness (late 1870s); communitarian, as widespread decisions accelerated or delayed crucial processes; individual, since personal choices, initiatives and business skills still played a decisive role in determining either the resilience or the catastrophe of single shipping enterprises.

4.1. Shipping families of Camogli (1853-1915)

From a methodological point of view, the chapter draws on the existing literature rather than the others. First, because local historians devoted rivers of ink to shipowners (not without confusion) and to the inner development of Camogli: on the one side, they mostly relied upon oral testimonies; on the other side, many of these works are the product of meticulous drills in the archives of the local institutions, the city-hall and the maritime museum (which are, indeed, relatively scarce). Secondly, since it was not possible to locate any private archive to shed some light on shipowners. The total lack of commercial correspondence, account books and any sort of business papers represented a severe obstacle for us to contextualise the great quantity of information retrieved in public archives.

Furthermore, referring to the naming system dominating the nineteenth-century Camogli, it might be fundamental to explicit the intricacies encountered in the preparation of the present chapter. First of all, the bulk of the shipowners of Camogli (e.g. to whom belonged more than 60% of the ships in 1883) can be reconducted to a list of ten family names: Schiaffino, Razeto, Olivari, Mortola,

Degregori, Bertolotto, Repetto, Cichero, Bozzo and Ferrari⁴⁰⁶. However, since the early modern period, most of them had divided into different branches: thus, within the communitarian system which will be outlined, the relationships between people holding the same surname were no stricter and more relevant than those with members of the whole community. In broader terms, arguing the existence of a sort of self-consciousness or a sense of belonging based on a surname distinction would have been hardly satisfactory to illustrate the social environment of Camogli. At the same time, the identification of single individuals and their direct kinship proved to be highly complicated: sticking to the previous example, in the list of ships of 1883, about 40-45 different individuals were holding the surname Schiaffino. To complicate even more the recognition, most of the inhabitants of Camogli held the same names (which can be mainly reconducted to local saints), such as Pellegro, Prospero, Gio. Batta, Giovanni and Fortunato. Thus, the paucity of details provided in the ship lists and in most of the other maritime sources (e.g. in crew lists, only the given name and the surname are mentioned as far as shipowners are concerned) made almost impossible the search for individuals, with a few exceptions corresponding to utterly exceptional cases. Therefore, we will adopt the subdivision based on family groups limitedly to general quantitative analyses. Then, we will attempt to frame individual trajectories within the broader discourse and in developing qualitative analyses.

1853			1883			1902			1915		
	N* ships	%		N* ships	%		N* ships	%		N* ships	%
Schiaffino	40	35%	Schiaffino	63	21%	Mortola	24	25%	Mortola	18	32%
Olivari	11	10%	Razeto	26	8%	Schiaffino	20	21%	Dapelo	5	9%
Mortola	9	8%	Olivari	19	6%	Razeto	17	18%	Olivari	5	9%
Degregori	8	7%	Degregori	16	5%	Bertolotto	7	7%	Bozzo	4	7%
Bertolotto	7	6%	Mortola	16	5%	Olivari	7	7%	Schiaffino	4	7%
Lavarello	7	6%	Bertolotto	12	4%	Repetto	5	5%	Degregori	3	5%
Razeto	6	5%	Repetto	11	4%	Figari	3	3%	Valle	3	5%
Brigneti	5	4%	Cichero	10	3%	Bozzo	2	2%	Bertolotto	2	4%

⁴⁰⁶ According to the period, to this list could be added Lavarello, Ottone, Ansaldo, Figari, Valle, Ferro, Oneto, Boggiano, Casabona, Maggiolo, Chiesa, Aste etc.

Ferrari	5	4%	Bozzo	10	3%	Degregori	2	2%	Figari	2	4%
Cichero	4	4%	Ferrari	8	3%	Casabona	2	2%	Razeto	1	2%

Table 4.1. Ten greatest shipping families of Camogli (1853; 1883; 1902; 1915). Source:

Table 4.1 illustrates the ten greatest shipping families found in Camogli from 1853 to 1915. The data reported outline the number of ships belonging to each group and, owing to the remarkable oscillations of numbers, their respective percentages over the whole fleet of Camogli. From the Black Sea period until the 1890s, the general trend delineates a relative predominance of the family Schiaffino over the others. Until the turn of the century, the large group of Schiaffino was followed by Mortola, Razeto and Olivari; also, Bertolotto and Degregori were able to maintain continued participation.

These family groups present different characteristics: on the one side, there were the Schiaffino, who gathered from 20 to 40 individual shipowners, hardly tied by kin relationships. On the other side, there were minor families, such as Bertolotto and Degregori, composed of less single households residing in Camogli, whose success was tied with the initiatives of single individuals and their closer kinship. In the middle, there were broader family groups, such as Mortola, Razeto and Olivari, whose establishment within local shipping was nevertheless dependent on individual entrepreneurship.

4.1.1. SCHIAFFINO

The primary differentiation, therefore, lies between the Schiaffino and all the other. The recurrence of identical and most ordinary names among the members of the family prevented us from discerning one from another. Furthermore, apart from a few exceptions, the same obstacles hindered cross-checking between different sources, thus impeding us to provide a broader contextualisation for any of them. Among the exceptions, however, it may be worth mentioning Erasmo Schiaffino (1790-1866), son of Giovanni, and founder of the local mutual marine insurance association in 1853 with his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino and Giuseppe

Degregori⁴⁰⁷. He owned the brig *San Carlo* (188 t.) and the barque *Erasmus* (1200 t.). As local historians narrate it, Erasmus's personal story is rather romantic: captured with his father by Algerine corsairs in 1805, he was sold as a slave to a local merchant who gave him an instruction and, at the moment of his death, freed him and donated to Erasmus a part of his wealth⁴⁰⁸. Back to Camogli, Erasmus married with Caterina Schiaffino: from their union derived two sons (Giovanni and Lorenzo) – who became shipmasters – and four daughters, Geronima, Maria, Rosa and Cecilia, who were married to local captains, some employed by Erasmus on board of his ships⁴⁰⁹.

Although it was possible to single out a few more individuals to whom belonged 2-3 ships as a maximum, this high dispersion of shipownership among the Schiaffino makes such operation negligible in terms of a broader analysis. In this light, even the loss of the predominance observed from the late nineteenth-century is hard to interpret. Indeed, from the 1850s to 1910s, there were no Schiaffino shipowners able to concentrate their resources into single shipping enterprises. The theme of capital dispersion (see, *infra*) is fundamental to explain both the success and decline of Camogli's shipping. Arguably, the dimension of this family group and the impressive numbers of single-ship shipowners – from the earliest stages – exacerbated its loose composition. Conversely, the other family groups were established more recently, as a result of the entrepreneurship of individual and more identifiable nuclear families.

⁴⁰⁷ About Erasmus Schiaffino, son of Giovanni, see: G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 138-141 and 406-407. For the *Mutua*, see *infra*. He must not be confused with Erasmus Schiaffino, son of Gio. Batta, born in 1802 and owner of the brigs *Idea* (288 t.) and *Stefano* (174 t.). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 2107 and serie 16, n. 9017.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁹ Some of these information were drawn from an unpublished manuscript of Gio. Bono Ferrari, *Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari*. Differently from his other works, this manuscript, composed in form of a diary, was intended for private use to hand down family memories to the new generations. We were able to read it by the kindest concession of Gianni Oneto, one of the descendants of the author. Geronima married with Gio. Bono Ferrari (1824-1918), who commanded for many years the *San Carlo* and then became a shipowner on his own: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4251. Maria married Giuseppe Pace (b. 1827). Rosa married Bartolomeo Chiesa: ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, b. 77, n. 44; Cecilia married Francesco Bisso.

4.1.2. OLIVARI

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, to the shipping family of Olivari belonged a relevant share of Camogli's fleet (see, Table 4.1). Most of the fortunes of this family were related to two different branches. The first was tied to Biagio Olivari son of Prospero; the second to Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari, son of Gio Batta (b. 1818). Both of them were active in the Camogli's shipping field since the early 1850s. In 1853, Biagio owned the brig *Lucchina* (272 t.), and the brig schooners *Imparziale* (117 t.) and *Zenobia* (101 t.)⁴¹⁰. Two years later, he built the brig *Emilia* (215 t.); with these ships, Biagio participated in the Black Sea trade. Then, in 1867 he commissioned the barque *Lucco* (515 t.); in 1870, followed the construction of the *Gio. Battista O.* (481 t.) and of *Lucchino* (793 t.) in 1876; finally, Biagio built the *Prospero e Davide* (892 t.) in 1881⁴¹¹. The latter one was named under his sons, Prospero and Davide Olivari, who succeeded to him as shipowners of the same barque and also purchased from abroad the iron-hulled full-rigged ships *Pellegrina O.* (1591 t.) and *Biagio O.* (2070 t.)⁴¹².

The individual trajectory of Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari (b. 1818) is comparable with that of Biagio. Active in the Black Sea trade since the earliest period, during the 1850s and 1860s, to Fortunato belonged the *Angiolina* (161 t.), *Aurelia* (320 t.), *Colombo* (135 t.) and *Protezione* (170 t.)⁴¹³. After the construction of the *Aurelia* in 1863, he commanded the brig in its inaugural voyage to Taganrog and then Belfast⁴¹⁴. Throughout the late 1860s, Fortunato added to his fleet the barques *Fortunata Camilla* (470 t.), *Giuseppe Revello* (489 t.) and *Teresa Olivari*

⁴¹⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6596-6928-8633.

⁴¹¹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴¹² *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902; Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*. The *Prospero e Davide* is still active in 1902; the *Biagio O.* was purchased later, before 1916.

⁴¹³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853) and ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 9631; serie 14, n. 2263-6891-9597; serie 16, n. 4630.

⁴¹⁴ *Idem*, serie 16, n. 4630.

(826 t.)⁴¹⁵. Still before his death, in 1902, Fortunato had transferred to his son Gaetano Davide Olivari his rights over the *Teresa Olivari*, to which Gaetano Davide added the iron-hulled barque *Andaman* (919 t.), employed in oceanic transports of bulk cargoes⁴¹⁶.

4.1.3. MORTOLA

The family group of Mortola, instead, presents a more complicated structure. Similarly to the Schiaffino, until the 1890s, their shipping properties were dispersed among numerous people, whose actual identities and relationships between each other are hard to define. In 1853, the Mortola represented the third group for the number of ships owned (9)⁴¹⁷; thirty years later – the peak for Camogli's shipping – they owned 16 ships and occupied the fourth rank, after Schiaffino (63), Razeto (26) and Olivari (19), having the same numbers of Degregori (16)⁴¹⁸. Few details are available about the Black Sea period. Nevertheless, the intriguing trajectory of Francesco Mortola might be worth noting; indeed, according to local reconstructions, throughout his traffics in the Black Sea, Mortola became friend with «a great wheat merchant of Russian origins»⁴¹⁹. Besides, the fact that, in 1864, his son Prospero Mortola named his new barque *Scaramanga* (391 t.) seems to corroborate such chronicle⁴²⁰. Of course, this is a remarkable witness about the relationships tied between the shipowners and captains of Camogli with Greek wheat merchants⁴²¹.

⁴¹⁵ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴¹⁶ *Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902* and see also: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, II9-I, which is the hold logbook of the *Andaman* and covers from 1900 to 1906.

⁴¹⁷ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853).

⁴¹⁸ Idem, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴¹⁹ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 359.

⁴²⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 8905.

⁴²¹ See Chapter 2.

However, the relative success of the Mortola began later, from the 1890s onwards. In 1902, they were the only family group to have improved the number of ships from the preceding period (21). From this moment on and until the First World War, the Mortola became the leading shipowners of Camogli. The most significant part of their fleet belonged to two different branches: on the one side, there were Biagio and Luigi Mortola (*'u liggia*) sons of Antonio Agostino; on the other side, there was Giuseppe Mortola (*sanrocchin*), son of Gio. Batta⁴²².

Biagio and Luigi were the founders of the *Fratelli Mortola* (Mortola Bros.) shipping company which, in 1902, counted eight ships⁴²³. Their fleet was composed of one full-rigged ship – the *Trojan* (1624 t.) –, four iron-hulled barques – the *Edinburgh* (1290 t.), the *Anna M.* (832 t.), the *Aline* (739 t.) and the *Scottish Chief* (706 t.) – and three wooden-hulled barques – the *Due Cugini* (1258 t.), the *Elmstone* (737 t.) and the *Angelo* (689 t.)⁴²⁴. Apart from the *Due Cugini* and the *Angelo*, they were all purchased second-hand on the foreign market. In line with Camogli's shipping business in the early twentieth century, the *Fratelli Mortola* company engaged to oceanic tramp shipping (e.g. between 1898 and 1903, the *Edinburgh* was very active in the trade of pitch-pine from Pensacola)⁴²⁵. In 1915, their properties were reduced to the mentioned *Anna M.* to which the iron-hulled full-rigged ship *Rosa M.* (1360 t.) was added⁴²⁶. The latter even survived to the First World War⁴²⁷.

Giuseppe Mortola (*sanrocchin*), son of Gio. Batta, was arguably the leading shipowner of Camogli between the 1890s and the First World War. His fortunes were tied to those of Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo, his brother-in-law, with whom he formed a partnership lasting even after the war. In 1902, taken together, Giuseppe

⁴²² In Camogli, nicknames and family names were fundamental to discern one group from another. In this case, both of them refer to the specific neighborhood of their origins.

⁴²³ *Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

⁴²⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁴²⁵ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 602-1.

⁴²⁶ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.*

⁴²⁷ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921.*

Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo owned a tramp fleet of thirteen elements, including a steamship – the *Luigino* (1321 t.)⁴²⁸. In 1915 only, the two shipowners owned twelve ships.

Register	Name	Tons	Type	Hull	Place	Year
1902	Luigino	1321	Steamship	Iron	Foreign	1879
1902	Elise	1290	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1869
1902	Indus	1111	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Sestri	1874
1902	Caldera	1574	Barque		Foreign	1884
1902	Ines Elisa	1495	Barque		Foreign	1879
1902	Dilbhur	1281	Barque		Foreign	1865
1902	Corona	1152	Barque		Foreign	1866
1902	Vermont	978	Barque		Chiavari	1874
1902	Bianchetto	944	Barque	Iron	Lavagna	1875
1902	Giuseppe P.	750	Barque		Sampierdarena	1876
1902	Maria Madre B.	744	Barque		Sestri	/
1902	Riconoscenza	609	Barque		Sestri	1872
1902	Gio. Batta Padre	597	Barque		Sestri	/
1916	Trentino	1283	Steamship	Iron	Foreign	1876
1916	Eurasia	1873	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1885
1916	Combermere	1717	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1881
1916	Loch Garve	1711	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1875
1916	Bianchetto	1669	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Macdiarmid	1624	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1883
1916	Blanche	1527	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Ortrud	1507	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1875

⁴²⁸ See for the *Luigino* the Chapter 3 and ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1133-1.

1916	Cognati	1505	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1880
1916	Merioneth	1395	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1875
1916	Herat	1332	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Roberto G.	587	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1881

Table 4.2. Fleet of Giuseppe Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo (1901-1915). Source: Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902; Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.

The fleet of Mortola and Bozzo was composed of large vessels suitable to engage to the oceanic tramp routes. Apart from the smallest barques (still measuring more than 600 tons), most of the fleet was purchased second-hand from the British market. This factor influenced the average age of the ships, mostly built throughout the 1870s and in 1885 at the latest. In addition, most of the full-rigged ships were iron-hulled as opposed to barques, which mostly presented a wooden structure. From a diachronic perspective, Mortola and Bozzo renovated their fleet entirely from the first to the second decade: this feature may indicate two different things. First, it underlines the short-term usability of the 1901 fleet, composed of vessels of more than 28 years old on average. Secondly, the changes might be interpreted as a sign of the relatively good shipping profits collected during the first period, which allowed these shipowners to renovate their fleet with few or none fixed capital in their hands (the value of forty years old vessels must have been proximal to zero). During the war, the submarine attacks of the German navy destroyed almost completely this fleet: already at the end of 1917, Mortola and Bozzo had remained with just four ships (the *Roberto G*, *Blanche*, *Herat* and *Eurasia*)⁴²⁹. Finally, at the end of the war, they had lost the *Blanche* too: in 1921 the fleet of Mortola and Bozzo counted three ships (being one of them the forty-one years old barque *Roberto G.*, which weighed only 587 tons)⁴³⁰.

⁴²⁹ Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1918.

⁴³⁰ Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921.

4.1.4. RAZETO

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the family Razeto (the alternative versions Razzeto and Razetto are rarely attested) is composed of different family groups dedicated to shipping and shipownership. Although various members of this family were already active in the early 1850s, these shipowners obtained the most successful results from the latest years of the Black Sea phase until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century⁴³¹.

Starting from the 1860s, Giovanni Razeto (1823-1896), son of Michele, was one of the most influential shipowners of Camogli. Owner of the barques *Dittatore Garibaldi* (307 t.), *Anita Garibaldi* (597 t.) and *Emilia M.* (678), Giovanni claimed to maintain friendly relationships with Giuseppe Garibaldi. He even donated one share of his first ship (built in 1861) to the «hero of the two worlds». The *Dittatore Garibaldi* sailed mostly from and to the Black Sea, engaging to the transport of the Russian wheat⁴³². Instead, the *Anita Garibaldi*, built in 1865, and the *Emilia M.*, in 1873, were both employed in oceanic routes. In 1883, the former was found in Haiti, under the command of Michele Razeto, son of Giovanni⁴³³. The latter anchored in Saint Helena in 1886, on its way back from Moulmein, where it was loaded with a teak cargo⁴³⁴.

Nonetheless, most of the data found in the notarial archives concerned one specific family group, whose first member was Prospero Razeto (ca. 1800-1876), son of Martino. In 1857, he wrote his testament in favour of his wife, Emanuela Mortola, from which Prospero had three sons, Francesco, Gaetano and Martino. In the period of the Black Sea trade, he owned the brig *Il Prospero* (170 t.), commanded by his son Martino⁴³⁵. In 1876, at the moment of his death, Prospero left to the heirs (Martino and Francesco's sons, dead before his father) his

⁴³¹ See Table 4.1.

⁴³² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 7933; serie 15, n. 6254; serie 16, n. 4588 and 8789.

⁴³³ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 352.

⁴³⁴ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, b. 57.

⁴³⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 5356 and 8207. Later, it was commanded by Fortunato Marciani: see, Idem, serie 14, n. 6815 and 8607.

properties, including the barque *Mio Padre* (442 t.), later named *Prospero Razeto* by Martino⁴³⁶. Thus, in 1883, Martino Razeto (b. 1822), son of Prospero, was a prominent shipowner with four vessels: the *Prospero Razeto*, the *Camogli* (466 t.), the *Boschetto* (602 t.) and the *N.S. del Boschetto* (625 t.)⁴³⁷. Meanwhile, his first son Stefano owned three ships, the *Gentili* (800 t.), *Martinin* (714 t.) and *Lorenzino* (906 t.)⁴³⁸. Twenty years later, Stefano was Camogli's second greatest shipowner after Giuseppe Mortola⁴³⁹. In that circumstance, he owned two steamers, two full-rigged ships and two barques. One of his steamships, the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.), was employed in regular connections between Genoa and Naples⁴⁴⁰. The rest of the fleet, among which figured the steamer *N.S. del Boschetto* (1401 t.) and the iron-hulled full-rigged ships *Annibale* (1582 t.) and *Stefano Razeto* (1909 t.) – the latter one was the biggest of Camogli – engaged to oceanic tramp shipping⁴⁴¹.

4.1.5. OTHER SHIPOWNERS (REPETTO, BERTOLOTTI AND DEGREGORI)

For absolute numbers and continuity over time, these four family groups were the leaders within Camogli's shipping sector. Nevertheless, the history of the community recorded various individual shipowners who, limitedly to specific conditions and historical phases, were able to compete and even to surpass them.

One of them was Gio. Batta Gaetano Repetto «Perrucca» (1804-1892), son of Agostino. His career as a shipowner began late, considering that in the Black Sea period Gio. Batta Gaetano still commanded the ship of his father Agostino and then of his brothers Prospero (b. 1809) and Fortunato, the *N.S. del Boschetto* (116

⁴³⁶ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 679, n. 330.

⁴³⁷ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴³⁸ Idem. In his works, Gropallo delineated the trajectory of Stefano Razeto son of Martino; however, more than once the author made confusion between him and Stefano Razeto son of Antonio, owner of the *Monte Tabor* and *Oriana*. See, G. Gropallo, *Il romanzo della vela*, p. 163.

⁴³⁹ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

⁴⁴⁰ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 763/1.

⁴⁴¹ See, for instance, the logbook of the barque *Martinin*, active between 1881 and 1906. Idem, n. 1252/1.

t.)⁴⁴². Then, in 1883, he appears in the list of the *Mutua* as the shipowner of eight vessels: the *Agostino Repetto* (517 t.), *Beppino R.* (615 t.), *Boschetto M.* (428 t.), *Fortunato Repetto* (717 t.), *Gaetano Repetto* (622 t.), *G.B. Repetto* (1244 t.), *Maria Repetto Figlia* (843 t.) and the *Stefano Repetto* (617 t.)⁴⁴³. The construction of this fleet began in 1865, with the *Boschetto M.*; then, it intensified between the late 1860s and early 1870s, when culminated in the *G.B. Repetto*, the biggest ship of Camogli at that time. Some of the ships were named under Gio. Batta Gaetano's sons, Fortunato, Prospero and Stefano, who became captains and shipowners. After the death of «Perrucca», his three sons entered into litigation between each other and with the heirs of their uncles, partners of Gio. Batta Gaetano in his business⁴⁴⁴. The litigation was settled only through the intervention of the Civil Court, which divided into four parts the real estates and the shipping properties of Gio. Batta Gaetano⁴⁴⁵. At the end of this troublesome phase, the three sons of «Perrucca» merged their shipping activities and founded the company *Fratelli Repetto* (Repetto Bros.). Arguably in virtue of the complicated inheritance, in 1902, the *Fratelli Repetto* company had lost all of the vessels received ten years before. In exchange, they owned three full-rigged ships, the *Gio. Batta Repetto* (1425 t.), *Prospero Repetto* (1181 t.) and *Beecroft* (1544 t.), all of them purchased second-hand abroad⁴⁴⁶. Neither these nor different ships belonging to any Repetto is found in 1915⁴⁴⁷.

Furthermore, also the family groups of Bertolotto and Degregori gave a decisive contribution to Camogli's shipping, though for limited periods. As seen in Table 4.1, their fortunes concentrated in the central years of Camogli's maritime history, between the 1860s and the 1880s. From the analysis of their evolution, these families present similar characteristics; in particular, both of them seem to rely on

⁴⁴² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 5360.

⁴⁴³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴⁴⁴ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 1615, n. 454.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, Allegato A.

⁴⁴⁶ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

⁴⁴⁷ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.*

the control of various activities beyond shipping, such as politics, banking and maritime insurances. Emblematic is, in this sense, the personal trajectory of Fortunato Bertolotto (b. 1814), son of Michele, shipowner, banker and mayor of Camogli in 1874. Although his dealings with politics and banking – fundamental to understand some critical features of Camogli’s evolution – will be developed in the following pages, his career as shipowner can be delineated in this section. The first news concerning this figure date to 1853, when Fortunato commanded his barque *India* (388 t.), in and out the Mediterranean, along the Black Sea routes⁴⁴⁸. The structural characteristics of the ship and its origins were exceptional: in that period, the *India* was the biggest ship of Camogli and the only one built abroad (Hamburg)⁴⁴⁹. A few years later (1861-1864), Fortunato owned the barques *Giovanni* (390 t.) and *Verità* (362 t.), commanded respectively by Pellegrino Schiaffino and Fortunato Cuneo⁴⁵⁰. These ships made enormous profits along the integrated wheat-coal routes from the Black Sea to the British islands, back and forth⁴⁵¹. As we will see in the following section, in 1872, he purchased a total of one-hundred and forty *carati* (shares). Thus, he became the major shareholder of ten ships: *Abele*, *Adelfide*, *Antonio*, *Favorito*, *Fortunato*, *Francisca*, *Maria Cichero*, *Nuova Verità* and *Teresa Ester* (average tonnage: 535 t.)⁴⁵².

Nevertheless, this massive operation was associated with more complicated affairs: for example, a couple of years later, most of them (all but *Nuova Verità*) were entitled to shipowners enlisted in the mutual insurance association of his foundation, the *Nuova Camogliese* (see *infra* and Table 4.5) – the *Abele* to his brother Diego Lorenzo Bertolotto⁴⁵³. Afterwards, limitedly to his shipping properties, there is no evident data until 1878, when he is defined as the owner of

⁴⁴⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4223. During its first voyage, Fortunato Bertolotto brought the ship from London to Theodosia, where he loaded wheat to Genoa.

⁴⁴⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853); see also: G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 9.

⁴⁵⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 7975 and 9560; serie 16, n. 4633 and 6203.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵² ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, 1964, n. 28-134.

⁴⁵³ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 889-900; 913-924; 937-948.

four barques, namely *Giovanni*, *Ninfa*, *Cassa marittima* and *Nuova Verità* (650 t.). About these ships, except for the already mentioned *Giovanni* and *Nuova Verità*, we possess few notions apart from the fact that, altogether, they were not sufficient to cover a debt of 322.000 lire⁴⁵⁴.

To the same broad family group also belonged Lazzaro Bertolotto (1818-1906), shipowner and, later, professor of Astronomy and Navigation at Camogli's nautical school. Active in the Black Sea routes until the early 1860s, at the command of his brig *Laura* (185 t.)⁴⁵⁵, Lazzaro abandoned his maritime career quite early⁴⁵⁶. Instead, Vittorio Bertolotto (1855-1934), his son, resumed shipping business. Already in 1887, he had purchased from Giacomo Schiaffino the barque *Gimello* (589 t.), which he renamed *Sirio*⁴⁵⁷. Fifteen years later, Vittorio Bertolotto owned the full-rigged ships *Narcissus* (1270 t.) and *Euphemia* (1338 t.) and the barque *Angela* (872 t.)⁴⁵⁸. In 1915, then, his fleet was reduced to the full-rigged ship *Andreta* (1755 t.)⁴⁵⁹.

The family Degregori unfolds similar characteristics: its most influential members were all involved in matters beyond shipping on its own. In particular, some of them covered a role in the direction of the local mutual insurance association and banking. For example, Giuseppe Degregori (b. 1796), son of Francesco, appears among the three founders of the *Mutua*, together with Erasmo and Niccolò Schiaffino. Already in 1836, he sailed to Odessa, at the command of his brig *Il Prudente* (169 t.), to retrieve grain cargoes destined to the Mediterranean

⁴⁵⁴ Idem, 944, n. 1220.

⁴⁵⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4021 and serie 14, n. 6811.

⁴⁵⁶ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 445-446.

⁴⁵⁷ See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883); *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1887*.

⁴⁵⁸ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*. Interestingly, the ship *Narcissus* is the setting at the centre of Conrad novel *The Nigger of the "Narcissus": A Tale of the Forecastle*: the author had embarked on the ship in 1887, many years before Vittorio Bertolotto acquired it in 1899.

⁴⁵⁹ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*.

ports⁴⁶⁰. In 1844, Giuseppe built the brig *La Gloria* (178 t.), employed in the same routes⁴⁶¹.

However, the most successful household among the Degregori can be reconducted to the activities of Bernardo and Agostino, sons of Gio. Batta, and their descendants. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, both of them owned various ships with which engaged to the Black Sea grain trade. Agostino owned the brig *San Rocco* (173 t.) and the barques *Dante* (278 t.) and *Italico* (369 t.), the last one built in 1863⁴⁶². Bernardo was the owner of a brig schooner, three brigs and two barques, the biggest one – *Conte Serra* (327 t.) – built in 1857⁴⁶³.

Agostino had six sons: Antonio (b. 1834), Bernardo (b. 1843), Fortunato (b. 1846), Francesco (b. 1845), Gio. Batta (b. 1832) and Luigi (b. 1838). Bernardo had two: Gio. Batta and Giuseppe. The business and professional relationships between the two brothers were deeply rooted and also involved the respective spawns. Apart from the fact that Agostino employed most of his sons on board of his ships (Luigi and Gio. Batta as captains, the other in minor positions⁴⁶⁴), even Bernardo resorted to his nephews to man his ships: for example, in 1862, Antonio commanded the brig *San Paolo* and embarked his younger brother Francesco as a cabin boy⁴⁶⁵.

Later, the second generation succeeded to their parents: despite is not possible to clearly distinguish between Gio. Batta, son of Agostino, and Gio. Batta, son of

⁴⁶⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 3, n. 4519.

⁴⁶¹ Idem, serie 14, n. 9571 and serie 15, n. 6242.

⁴⁶² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6739 (*San Rocco*); serie 14, n. 9498 (*Dante*); serie 16, n. 8959 (*Italico*).

⁴⁶³ The list of his ships comprehended: the brig schooner *Bayruttino* (105 t.), built in 1830; the brigs *N.S. del Carmine* (110 t.) and *San Bernardo* (143 t.), built respectively in 1854 and 1846; the barques *Conte Serra* (327 t.) and *San Paolo* (297 t.), the last one built in 1854. See: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4170 and 9927; serie 14, n. 2131 and 2213; serie 15, n. 2454; serie 16, n. 1669 and 4530.

⁴⁶⁴ See, ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 9498.

⁴⁶⁵ See, Idem, serie 15, n. 2454.

Bernardo, in 1883, the eight cousins owned a fleet of thirteen ships of a considerable average tonnage (ca. 760 t.)⁴⁶⁶.

NAME	TONS	YEAR OF CONSTRUCTION
BARON PODESTÀ	758	1874
BERNARDO	748	1876
BIAGIO	868	1876
DEGREGORI A.	830	1874
ESEMPIO	474	1869
FRATELLANZA	892	1878
MODERATO	544	1870
PROSPERINA	615	1864
RICORDO	781	1869
SEI FRATELLI	577	1870
SPEME	527	1867
UNICO	663	1872
ZEHLIMA	475	1860

Table 4.3. Fleet of the sons of Agostino and Bernardo Degregori (1883). Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

In addition, some of them occupied influential positions within the local society. Gio. Batta, son of Bernardo, engaged to banking and founded the *Cassa di sconto Camogliese*, active in the maritime credit sector. About this banking institution, there is no existing bibliography. Although G.B.R. Figari dates its foundation after 1880⁴⁶⁷, from an overview of the archival sources produced by the Commercial Court of Genoa, the *Cassa di sconto Camogliese* emerges in 1874 at the earliest⁴⁶⁸. His brother Giuseppe, instead, is repeatedly mentioned in the notarial sources as his proxy in the handling of various affairs, in particular for purchasing ships at public auctions⁴⁶⁹.

⁴⁶⁶ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴⁶⁷ See, G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983, p. 98.

⁴⁶⁸ See, ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, r. 889, n. 90 and 126.

⁴⁶⁹ See, ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 681, n. 1156-1212. For instance, in 1878, their partnership involved the acquisition of the barques *Rosa Lavarello* and *Francesco Borzone*.

Similarly, Luigi, son of Agostino, became very close to Fortunato Bertolotto and his own banking institution (the *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*), at the point to be appointed as its liquidator (together with Emanuele Boggiano)⁴⁷⁰.

Finally, Francesco was the director of the *Mutua* during the 1880s, until its first liquidation in 1888.

4.2. Individual ownership and communitarian shipping

Since the earliest stages, the shipping system of Camogli largely depended on forms of shared-ownership and collective entrepreneurial initiative. Such dependence derived from its specific economic and maritime environment: in other words, the nineteenth-century shipowners of Camogli had inherited long-standing traditional practices to share risks and investments which were typical of fishing communities⁴⁷¹. Indeed, shared-ownership and the other forms to reduce individual responsibilities fit the needs of low-capital enterprises suffering from scarce financial resources. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the long-established practices to finance, own and manage small vessels for fishing and coastal cabotage were transferred to high-seas shipping with no relevant discontinuities.

Still in 1853, from the examination of the fleet of Camogli emerges a fragmented framework, in which at least ninety-three people owned 142 ships⁴⁷².

⁴⁷⁰ See, *infra*.

⁴⁷¹ See chapter 1.5.

⁴⁷² See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). The ratio of ships per man might also be rounded up due to the faulty identification of some shipowners with identical names and surnames. For instance, under the highly common name of Prospero Schiaffino were registered seven ships: researching across different sources led us to identify at least two different Prospero Schiaffino, one son of Giacomo, owner of the brig *Industria* and the barque *Prosperoso*, and the other one son of Giuseppe, surely attested as the owner of the brig *Volontà di Dio*. Same procedure was followed to distinguish between Giuseppe Mortola son of Biagio, to whom belonged the brig *Due Fratelli* and Giuseppe Mortola son of Niccolò, who possessed the brig *Mercurio*. See: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1853-1865.

	<i>N ships</i>	<i>N shipowners</i>	<i>Ships per man</i>	<i>Average ton.</i>	<i>Ton man per man</i>
1853	142	93	1,52	176	269
1883	307	200	1,53	595	913
1907	109	55	1,98	1086	2154

Table 4.4. Ships and shipowners in Camogli (1853-1907). Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*,

The data reported in Table 4.4 analyse the dispersion of the shipping capital among family groups and individuals within the same households. The ratio of 1,52 ships per man (1853) indicates a remarkable fragmentation of shipownership. Few people possessed more than one vessel: for example, the case of Prospero Lavarello, to whom belonged five ships, is exceptional within the framework of the period⁴⁷³. More widespread was, instead, the presence of various relatives: this was the case, for example, of Prospero and Luigi Bertolotto, sons of Filippo and brothers between one another, respectively owners of the brigs *Le Grazie* and *Delia* which were active in the Black Sea trade from the early 1850s onwards⁴⁷⁴.

It was the household to represent the nuclear unit for engaging and sustaining shipping entrepreneurship. Before the definitive establishment of stock-companies in most of the productive sectors, the contribution of direct and acquired kinship in developing a business was essential. As seen in the previous section, in most cases, family members split their involvement and responsibilities according to age criteria: the older generation was in charge of ashore responsibilities and assumed the proper functions of shipownership; the younger generation, instead, covered one or more roles within the onboard hierarchy, on the top (captains and mates) or at the bottom (cabin-boys) depending on the age.

The family-based maritime business was not an isolated feature of small-scale places: on the contrary, even some of the most influent British tramp shipping companies shared the same background. However, not surprisingly, in the context of small communities, the households extended well beyond the borders of nuclear

⁴⁷³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). On this figure, see also: G. Gropallo, *Il romanzo della vela*, p. 124.

⁴⁷⁴ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853); ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4211 and 4300.

families up to overlap, instead, with the community itself. In this regard, the extensive and long-standing habit of using the ancient juridical institution of *carati* might be one of the neatest exemplifications of how communitarian business and private entanglements overcame the restricted boundaries of individual households.

4.2.1. THE "CARATI" SYSTEM

The adoption of *carati* to divide shipownership among different people is in clear continuity with the past of Camogli. Every ship was partitioned in 24 *carati*: at the end of the nineteenth century, however, source evidence reports the existence of various subfractions, like half, one-quarter or one-eighth of *carato*. During the ancient regime, the usage of this instrument to fraction shipownership was widespread all over Europe and still resisted in nineteenth-century sailing shipping.

Despite the similarities, the utilisation of *carati* must not be confused with the form of payment *alla parte*⁴⁷⁵. The former regarded shipownership; the latter was an alternative to salaries and a tool to ascribe labour costs to the profits of single voyages. Therefore, from a juridical and practical point of view, these concepts regarded different spheres of shipping activities, though it was possible for some crew members – in particular in fishing enterprises – to be also shareholders. The use of *carati* limited the impact of the initial and running costs of shipping on single individuals. The splitting of the expected profits counterbalanced this effect.

In the ancient regime, the reasons underlying the success of this form of shipownership lied into the extreme dangerousness of the Mediterranean navigation. By splitting the investments among more coparticipants, the entrepreneurial risk was proportionately reduced. Similarly and differently at the same time, after the European powers annihilated the threat of Northern-African piracy (from the 1830s onwards), the use of *carati* fit the needs for financial support of small-scale shipowners.

⁴⁷⁵ See chapter 1.4 and, for a more detailed analysis, chapter 5.

<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Wife/Widow of</i>	<i>N. Carati</i>
<i>Antola</i>	Francesco			0,5
<i>Boggiano</i>	Giuseppe	Prospero		0,5
<i>Denegri</i>	Giuseppe	Bartolomeo		1
<i>Ferrari</i>	Gio. Batta	Giuseppe		7
<i>Ferrari</i>	Niccolò	Giuseppe		1
<i>Figari</i>	Giuseppe			0,5
<i>Figari</i>	Fortunato	Gio. Batta		0,5
<i>Figari</i>	Maria		Schiaffino Diego	1
<i>Mortola</i>	Gio. Batta			1
<i>Olivari</i>	Fortunato	Gaetano		1
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Gio. Batta			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Prospero	Giacomo		0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Giacomo	Prospero		0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Antonio			0,5
<i>Senno</i>	Andrea	Rocco		0,5
<i>Senno</i>	Prospero			0,5
	Costantina		Schiaffino Rocco	0,5
	Antonietta		Brignati Lorenzo	0,5

Table 4.5. List of shareholders of the brig *Ulisse*, 1855. Source: CMMC, *Carature*, n. 3-19.

<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Wife/Widow of</i>	<i>N Carati</i>
<i>Benvenuto</i>	Teresa		Cordiglia Prospero	0,5
<i>Borzone</i>	Caterina		Schiaffino Domenico	0,5
<i>Capurro</i>	Filippo	Paolo		0,5
<i>Chiesa</i>	Maria			0,5
<i>Cichero</i>	Andrea	Niccolò		0,5
<i>Degregori</i>	Gio. Batta	Antonio		0,5
<i>Denegri</i>	Benedetta		Simonetti Niccolò	1
<i>Denegri</i>	Maria			0,5
<i>Gardella</i>	Giuseppe			0,5
<i>Massone</i>	Caterina	Pellegrò	Simonetti Batta	0,5
<i>Mortola</i>	Giacomo Agostino			0,5
<i>Mortola</i>	Erasmus			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Antonio			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Fortunato			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Giovanni	Gio. Batta		2
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Gio. Batta	Giuseppe		0,5

<i>Schiaffino</i>	Felicina	Erasmus	0,5
<i>Schiappacasse</i>	Fortunato	Giovanni	11
<i>Schiappacasse</i>	Maria		1
<i>Simonetti</i>	Andrea	Lorenzo	1
<i>Simonetti</i>	Prospero	Lorenzo	0,5

Table 4.6. List of shareholders of the barque *Aquila*, 1884. Source: ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 687, n. 2695.

The examination of Table 4.5 and 4.6 provides us with a glimpse of the extreme atomisation of Camogli's shipownership. The first case addresses the coparticipants in the construction of the brig *Ulisse*, belonging to Gio. Batta Ferrari, son of Giuseppe⁴⁷⁶. The list was reconstructed through the papers which shipowners consigned to shareholders to recognise their legal rights over the ship. Conversely, the second case is withdrawn from the sale agreement of a vessel, registered by a local notary. On 5th October 1884, Fortunato Schiappacasse (the shipowner) and the whole group of shareholders sold the barque *Aquila* (321 t.) to Camillo Reali, a shipmaster from Livorno. The transaction took place for 17.400 lire, 725 per *carato*⁴⁷⁷.

In both cases, family members and collaterals (as in the case of Niccolò Ferrari and Maria Schiappacasse) were in the list. However, the range of participants extended to a much broader spectrum of members of the community. According to the typical structure, one shareholder (Gio. Batta Ferrari and Fortunato Schiappacasse) possessed the relative or absolute majority of the shares; in the first case, the plenary of shareholders was required to appoint, by notarial deed, a shipowner to be responsible for the ship before the law⁴⁷⁸. The responsibilities and prerogatives of shipowners comprehended to find freights, to ensure the vessel, to contract loans in case of need, to maintain and repair “body and equipment” of the

⁴⁷⁶ CMMC, *Carature*, n. 3-19. He was brother to Gio. Bono Ferrari (grandfather of the homonymous founder of the local maritime museum), which we mentioned in the second chapter as the captain of the brig *San Carlo*, owned by Erasmo Schiaffino. More information about the brig *Ulisse* (203 t.) can be found in ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 1237 and 6800 and serie 15, n. 2526.

⁴⁷⁷ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 687, n. 2695. The notary was Angelo Doberti.

⁴⁷⁸ This type of document was called *Atto di dichiarazione di armatore*: some examples can be found in ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 679, n. 289 and 330.

ship, to hire and pay the crew, to appoint the captain, to file lawsuits and show up in judgment, to declare the abandonment of the ship and, finally, to sell it⁴⁷⁹.

By using *carati*, despite their primary aim, consisting of capital and risk sharing in single enterprises, the people of Camogli had a tool to diversify the investments into different ships. Diversification was essential for mid-nineteenth-century Camogli seafarers and shipowners. To illustrate the role of this economic practice within the shipowning framework of Camogli, the testaments proved to be remarkably useful, mainly when, due to the need to divide the legacy among different inheritors, the notary compiled inventories. A noteworthy example of the source is represented by the following list of the properties of Gaetano Schiaffino, son of Martino:

N Carati	Ship	Value (lira)	N Carati	Ship	Value (lira)
14,5	Martino	98580	0,33	Stella d'Oriente	266
2,75	Prospero	9443	0,33	Pellegro	326
2	Perseveranza	4443	0,33	Pietro	1055
1,25	Lucchina C.	3390	0,33	Meeting	631
1	Semplice	4000	0,33	Ottavia	789
1	Nipote	3000	0,33	Eva	466
1	Lucchino	10000	0,25	Gaetano S.	2640
1	Lucchino (1853)	400	0,25	Camogli	509
1	Maria Casabona	3650	0,25	Giorgina	625
0,5	Pellegra Figari	3000	0,17	Marequita	500
0,5	Monte A.	3500	0,17	Cognato	255
0,5	Zio Battista	4125	0,17	Temo	246
0,5	Maria Schiaffino	4553	0,17	Ascolta	277
0,5	Maria Madre	2068	0,17	David	350
0,5	Mio	2129	0,17	Po	313
0,5	Domenico	3079	0,17	Pellegro	210
0,5	Virginia	1505	0,17	Flora	116
0,5	Buoni Parenti	1088	0,17	Mio Padre	153
0,33	Duilio	2500	0,17	Beppino A.	738

⁴⁷⁹ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 678, n. 12.

0,33	Tre Fratelli	300	0,17	Michele Picasso	312
0,33	Stefano	100			

Table 4.7. List of *carati* belonging to Gaetano Schiaffino of Martino at his death, 16th June 1877. Source: ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 680, n. 556.

The impressive amount of *carati* shown in Table 4.7 provides us with an insight into the investment practices of Camogli shipowners. In total, Gaetano Schiaffino owned 35,60 *carati* belonging to forty-one different vessels, whose sum valued 175.630 lire. Contextualised within the assets and real estate transmitted to his underaged son Martino, the investments of Gaetano in shipping accounted for 80,22% of the total⁴⁸⁰. Most of the value derived from the activities of the ship *Martino*, of which Gaetano was the shipowner and primary shareholder. Meanwhile, he diversified his investments and purchased more than 20 *carati* from forty other ships. In addition, more accurate examinations suggest that the investments covered a broad chronological arc. For instance, the acquisition of a share over the brig *Lucchino* (272 t.), built in 1853⁴⁸¹, might have probably occurred a couple of decades before the one over the barque *Lucchino* (793 t.), built in 1876⁴⁸². Furthermore, the variation between different ship types (as emerges from the unitary values of the *carati*) allowed Gaetano to engage in various shipping markets. Sticking with our previous example, the maritime activities of a 20-years old brig of 272 tons must have been intrinsically dissimilar from those of a newly-built barque weighting 793 tons: such contrast is even more evident from the comparison of their unitary values, respectively 400 and 10.000.

Moreover, the *carati* presented a market value and, therefore, were subjected to market exchanges as ordinary assets. Not surprisingly, it is possible to observe the creation of speculative operations around *carati* trading. Single *carati* and their

⁴⁸⁰ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 680, n. 556. At the end of the inventory, the notary had calculated an active capital of 218.928,40 lire, of which 175.630 derived from *carati*, 36.300 from real estates and the remaining 6.998 from minor belongings.

⁴⁸¹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). The brig *Lucchino* belonged to Biagio Olivari. It sailed along the Black Sea routes, at least from 1861 to 1865: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6928 and serie 16, n. 4604 and 9078.

⁴⁸² CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883). Also the barque *Lucchino* belonged to Biagio Olivari.

subfractions demonstrated the rights of a person over a ship. Therefore, they could be sold both for need (like as debt repayments) and for speculative purposes. In this regard, the operations of the already mentioned Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, might represent a borderline case: in 1872, in only two months, (from 18th February to 24th April), Fortunato undertook eighteen transactions of *carati* (ten of purchase, eight of selling). Through these movements, he purchased 140 *carati* for 73.000 lire and sold 103 *carati* for 49.000 lire⁴⁸³.

Summing it up, in the nineteenth century, the use of *carati* satisfied numerous needs of small-scale maritime communities: firstly, it enabled low-capital entrepreneurs to compete with more structured and foreign maritime actors; secondly, the interchangeability of *carati*, within a vivacious shipping environment, offered the tools for investments diversification and financial speculation. Together with the local mutual maritime insurance institution, the *carati* facilitated the development of the local shipping business and contributed to its success within the international shipping market.

4.2.2. THE SOCIETÀ DI MUTUA ASSICURAZIONE MARITTIMA CAMOGLIESE (1851)

Although the adoption of the *carati* system entailed the implementation of risk-spreading strategies, the foundation of a locally-based mutual insurance society represented a step forward and prompted other forms of self-protection and mutual collaboration.

Recently, the history of maritime insurances has attracted the attention of several scholars, both stemming from the Italian and international environments⁴⁸⁴: with maritime insurance, according to the most extensive and

⁴⁸³ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, r. 1964, n. 28-134.

⁴⁸⁴ For the Italian scenario, apart from the more classica references, see: G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L'esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all'età contemporanea*, Genova: Sagep, 1984; V. Piergiovanni, "Le assicurazioni marittime", in Id, *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica tra Genova e l'Occidente medievale e moderno*, Genova: Atti della società ligure di storia patria, 2012, pp. 869-882; Idem, "L'Italia e le assicurazioni nel secolo XIX", in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 827-868. For a recent comparative perspective, still influenced by several essays of

straightforward definition, we identify every instrument used «to transfer the risks of navigation to a third party». Marine insurances could cover either cargoes or the ship itself (the modern hull and equipment): both of the applications are attested since the late Middle Ages⁴⁸⁵. From a geographical perspective, historians agree on the asynchronous diffusion between the Mediterranean area and the Atlantic and Northern Europe⁴⁸⁶. In the latter regions, indeed, the introduction of marine insurances is imputed to the presence of Italian merchants and shipping operators in the Flanders, from which insurances would have spread in the nearby regions⁴⁸⁷.

Until the nineteenth century, most of the marine insurances were premium-based: the contractor paid a percentage of the insured value to the insurer, in exchange for his risks coverage. Instead, mutual maritime insurances spread and established themselves as a reliable and profitable alternative only from the mid-nineteenth century onwards⁴⁸⁸. In particular, both Piergiovanni and Giacchero correlated the development of mutual insurance institutions to the specific historical and economic context of the Ligurian region under the Savoy domination. As said, the depression of Ligurian shipping in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars was then followed by a new expansive phase which, nevertheless, was not driven by the Genoese bourgeois, but found its vital spark in the small communities of the Rivas. There, mutual insurance institutions spread from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: for them, mutualism represented the alternative of the small scale to compete with big centres. Moreover, from a historiographic perspective, Giacchero and Piergiovanni reevaluated the mutual insurance institutions, which had previously suffered from prejudices of backwardness⁴⁸⁹.

Italian setting, see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 1300-1850*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

⁴⁸⁵ G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁸⁶ D. De Ruysscher, "Antwerp 1490-1590: Insurance and speculation", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 79-106; S. Go, "Amsterdam 1585-1790: Emergence, Dominance and Decline", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 107-130; G. Rossi, "England 1523-1601: The Beginnings of Marine Insurance", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 131-150.

⁴⁸⁷ See, . De Ruysscher, "Antwerp 1490-1590", p. 79.

⁴⁸⁸ G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 165-200; V. Piergiovanni, "Alle origine delle società mutue", in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

⁴⁸⁹ V. Piergiovanni, "Alle origine delle società mutue", in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

The primacy of the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese*, founded in 1851 as the first of its kind in Liguria, aroused most of the attention. Within historical discourses, the *Mutua* of Camogli was so crucial that historians coined the model of the nineteenth-century mutual insurances from this exemplar⁴⁹⁰.

In contrast with this attitude, before proceeding with the analysis of the *Mutua* and its role within the nineteenth-century shipping of Camogli, it is worth mentioning some antecedents of mutualistic forms of maritime insurances drawn from the international scenario, also in the attempt to stimulate the Italian historiography to re-discuss the theme under more comparative approaches.

Recently, many attentions were directed to the so-called «seamen's boxes» attested in various places from the early decades of the seventeenth-century. In particular, the role of these boxes is questioned in most works about the Dutch Republic in the early modern period, mostly when the geographic scale is set on maritime communities⁴⁹¹. Labelled as «seamen's boxes» or «insurance boxes», scholars have identified their core activity in mutual aid assistance for seamen who were captured at sea (in particular in the Mediterranean⁴⁹²) or fell sick during their service⁴⁹³. Conversely, Sabine C.P.J. Go noted that, in the case of Groningen, the «insurance boxes» of one of the leading guilds of the town (gathering «Great Skippers») served precisely for insuring purposes⁴⁹⁴. More specifically, unambiguous references to forms of mutual marine insurances can be found within the regulations of this mutual box. The formal mechanisms differed in

⁴⁹⁰ Both Giacchero and Piergiovanni, in the mentioned works, dealt with marine mutual insurances by the resorting to Camogli's exemplary institution: G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 165-200; V. Piergiovanni, «Alle origine delle società mutue», in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

⁴⁹¹ See: K. Davids, «Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe, c. 1300-1825», *International Review of Social History*, No. 39, 1994, pp. 145-169; Id., «Local and global: Seafaring communities in the North Sea area, c. 1600-2000», *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 27:4, 2015, pp. 629-646.

⁴⁹² See A. Zappia, *Mercanti di uomini. Reti e intermediari per la redenzione dei captivi nel Mediterraneo*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2018.

⁴⁹³ K. Davids, «Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe», pp. 151-156.

⁴⁹⁴ S. Go, «Mutual Marine Insurance in the Province of Groningen, c. 1605-1770: A case of financial innovation», *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 17:1, 2005, pp. 123-149.

various regards from the nineteenth-century counterparts (for instance, refunds were still premium-based); nevertheless, being the primary purpose to share risks among a list of associated shipowners, the case of Groningen still represents an intriguing basis for comparison deserving more accurate studies.

Turning back to Camogli's *Mutua*, the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese* was founded in 1851 by the initiative of Giuseppe Degregori, Erasmo Schiaffino and his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino, who became the first president of the association. About the *Mutua* arose various studies, of academics, such as the already mentioned Giacchero and Piergiovanni, and of local historians, like G.B.R. Figari⁴⁹⁵. Drawing from the rich archival collection kept in Camogli's maritime museum, Figari delineated the institutional development of the *Mutua*, from its foundation to its liquidation (1888), in proper research published in the series of *Quaderni del Museo*⁴⁹⁶. Figari commented on the original statutes of the association by adding notes and legal considerations; he also provided a general framework of the historical evolution of the *Mutua*, contextualised with local dynamics⁴⁹⁷. Therefore, the chapter is limited to a general overview and, when possible, it aims at filling some gaps through archival findings.

In its original form – composed of 18 articles – and published in 1853 (a couple of years after the foundation), the first statute of the *Mutua* lacked a clear definition of its associational purposes. Ten years later, these objectives were unambiguously declared in the second article: «the association has as its object the mutual insurance for every maritime risk, in deep-seas as in port, bay or coast, as

⁴⁹⁵ Apart from the already mentioned works of Giacchero and Piergiovanni, we must mention here the considerable and valuable production of G.B.R. Figari about the *Mutua*: G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, Quaderni del Museo, No. 4, 1976; G.B.R. Figari, S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983.

⁴⁹⁶ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, etc. The archival corpus concerning the *Mutua* is rather remarkable: the Museum possesses the original statute (1853) and its updates (1862 and 1868), plus the lists of the ships (1855, 1862, 1870, 1881) which we used sparsely in the text.

⁴⁹⁷ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, Quaderni del Museo, No. 4, 1976.

a result of fires, pirates, robberies or due to the captain's and crew's guilt or incompetence; smuggling, forbidden trade, and war risks are excepted»⁴⁹⁸.

The functioning of the *Mutua* was straightforward: at subscription, each member paid a fee of 1% of the insured value⁴⁹⁹. After that, unless of unfortunate events, he retained his membership for three years (then increased to six). In case of wrecks, the captain or the shipowner would order a professional assessment of the damages. Then, the results were communicated to the *Mutua*. This phase was critical, and in many cases, the *Mutua* contested the first assessment and pretended to appoint trusted assessors for a new evaluation⁵⁰⁰. Once all the disputes between the *Mutua* and the injured party were settled, the Director requested from the associates their respective shares to be paid within 15 days. Finally, within a month, the Director forwarded the sum to the damaged insured.

A core rule of the statute prescribed a minimum number of associates (70, then 100): the reasons underlying this article aimed at keeping the average payments within a threshold level, beyond which resorting to the *Mutua* would have been unbearable⁵⁰¹. Nonetheless, until the mid-1880s, the *Mutua* never suffered from reduced subscriptions; on the contrary, at its peak, the number of the associates exceeded three hundred.

In 1860, in a report in which the Genoese Chamber of Commerce examined the phenomenon of mutual insurance institutions, these were praised for being «so useful that, in a short time, [they] obtained the consensus of almost all of the Ligurian shipowners [the reference is to all the Ligurian associations], and the best

⁴⁹⁸ Personal translation from: Art. 2, Convenzione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese. Oggetto e condizioni della società, 1862, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 9-18.

⁴⁹⁹ Art. 10, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁰ See, for instance, the litigation between the *Mutua*, represented by its director Bernardo Degregori, and Antonio Cichero, owner of the brig *Il Camogolino*, wrecked nearby Liverpool. The captain had proceeded with a first assessment reporting that the damages exceeded the 75% of the value and, as a result, the shipowner declared its formal abandonment. The director of the *Mutua* went to the Genoese Commercial Court to ask a new assessment, which was, in the end, denied. ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 807, 68, 19 gennaio 1864.

⁵⁰¹ Art. 17, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 11.

ships and most skillful captains are inscribed to them»⁵⁰². More specifically, «the total value of the vessels enrolled within the two associations of Genoa and Camogli accounted for 22-23 million francs, over which shipowners saved, from insuring premia, mediations and commissions, more than 600.000 lire per year»⁵⁰³.

Notwithstanding the specific mechanisms, the restriction of the membership to shipowners and captains from Camogli represented a defining element of the association⁵⁰⁴. Even more pervasive was the rule according to which when shipowners formed the crews, they ought to give priority to captains born or living in Camogli; otherwise, the appointment of the captain was subordinated to the approval of the *Mutua* assembly⁵⁰⁵.

The exclusion of the exogenous elements and the circumscription of all the relationships within a specific community-based pool was, indeed, a key factor for granting the success to mutualistic institutions. Local exclusivity was the key to maintain the operations of the *Mutua* quick and effective. Being the members tied either by kin relationships or daily-basis acquaintances, infringing the rules, delaying payments or even refusing could lead to disasters. Negative behaviors could degenerate into the rupture of the business and commercial interactions with the whole community. Thus, the role of trust relationships in developing business, which was crucial in the early modern period, is perpetuated in small-scale and community-based associations. Mutual aid between ships and crews of the associates was mandatory in every situation (in addition to those cases for which consuetudinary laws already prescribed mutual aid, such as shipwrecks and rescues at sea); otherwise, the captain (we remind, forcibly from Camogli) would have been expelled from the association and «dishonoured»⁵⁰⁶.

⁵⁰² Relation discussed in the Genoese Chamber of Commerce (24th January 1860), in G. Giaccherio, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, p. 197.

⁵⁰³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰⁴ Art. 2, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁵ Art. 7, *Idem*.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibidem*.

For its crucial weight within the design of the local shipping, the examination of the historical evolution of the *Mutua*, in terms of numbers of ships, types and values, would represent a mere repetition of the previous chapters. Instead, turning the perspective to shipowners might offer some valuable insights on the distribution of tonnage among the members of the community and to isolate a few noteworthy individuals.

Also, some historians have exploited the list of agents of the *Mutua*. Scattered in the European and world ports, their presence is a strong testimonial of the expansion of the range within which Camogli's ships might have needed their assistance. Despite refraining from providing the whole lists, some key features must be noted.

In the early 1860s, the Black Sea trade absorbed the most considerable part of the fleet: the *Mutua* had agents in every relevant place, including Constantinople and Odessa, the ports of Azov (Kerch, Taganrog, Berdyansk, Mariupol) and Galatz. In this region, most of the agents were Italian resident merchants, not necessarily of Camogli's origins, but able to provide the required assistance to the captains (there are, among others, Dall' Orso, Tubino, Amoretti and Lanfranco). Moreover, the *Mutua* had its representatives at the opposite end of the trade, in the United Kingdom, since it had agents in London, Cardiff, Falmouth, Newcastle and Queenstown. Even there, except Gio. Bono Avegno, the agent in Cardiff, no people belonged to the community. Finally, the *Mutua* had agents in New York, Buenos Ayres and Lima, with Giovanni Figari (whose personal trajectory will be the object of more accurate treatise in the last chapter), being the only one from Camogli⁵⁰⁷.

Conversely, the list of agents dating to 1881 is a clear expression of the dramatic geographical expansion which Camogli's maritime activities underwent in a couple of decades⁵⁰⁸. First of all, the total number of representatives passed from 31 to 65. Then, their spatial distribution was utterly uprooted. First, we observe the gradual withdrawal from the Black Sea region, with the disappearance of Taganrog,

⁵⁰⁷ See, *Agenti della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese*, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 19.

⁵⁰⁸ See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Rappresentanti all'estero dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1881).

Mariupol and of the ports of Danube from the list. Secondly, there is an escalation of the number of agents in the British ports, with the addition of Belfast, Glasgow, Leith, Liverpool, North-Shields and Great Yarmouth. Such dramatic intensification of representatives in this area is just one more indicator of the increased dependence of Camogli's shipping on British cross-trade. Thirdly, also the American continent witnessed the inclusion of new ports, like Baltimore, the Island of Bermuda, Montevideo (which was previously covered by the agent of Buenos Ayres) and Savannah. Finally, the Far East appeared for the first time with Batavia and Rangoon: evidently, the *Mutua* had recognized the first attempts of Camogli shipowners to enter the Indo-European trade by taking over the bulk trades around the Cape⁵⁰⁹.

In conclusion, not willing to anticipate anything about the crisis of the *Mutua*, since it will be treated in a much more comprehensive analysis targeting the almost total collapse of the local shipping system from the late 1870s, we will conclude with few words concerning the short-lasting competitor of the *Mutua*, the *Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova Camogliese"*.

4.2.2.1. *The foundation of the Nuova Camogliese (1873-1878)*

In autumn 1872, thirty-three dissident members of the *Mutua* decided to withdraw and to gather in a new concurrent institution, the *Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova Camogliese"*, officially founded on the 5th January 1873⁵¹⁰. According to local reconstructions, both political and economic factors might have weighed in the determination of the rupture; in this perspective, the rebellious association was composed by the so-called *liberali*, as opposed to the conservative party of the *paolotti*, remained in the original *Mutua*⁵¹¹. Gio. Bono Ferrari repeatedly wrote

⁵⁰⁹ See, Chapter 3.

⁵¹⁰ To investigate the history of this institution, there are just a few and sparse documents: apart from the statute, reported by G.B.R. Figari, even in the notarial and processual sources there are few references.

⁵¹¹ The political rivalry between these two parties is mentioned in G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 418-421; 456-457.

about the existence of this political rivalry in order to outline the ardent political environment of the post-unitarian period. In particular, the conflict involved the figure of Garibaldi: the “Hero of Two Worlds” enjoyed broad support among the younger generations of Camogli, also because of his professional maritime background⁵¹². For example, Simone Schiaffino, expression of the *liberali*, participated in the “Expedition of the Thousand” and perished in Calatafimi⁵¹³. Giovanni Razeto, as said, named his two ships *Dittatore Garibaldi* and *Anita Garibaldi* and, allegedly, kept a regular correspondence with the “Hero of Two Worlds”⁵¹⁴. Finally, when the greatest Italian shipowners gathered in Camogli for the First General Conference of Italian Shipowners (1880), they dedicated their assembly to Garibaldi, who even sent his greetings to the participants⁵¹⁵.

Furthermore, in the opinions of G.B.R. Figari, the members of the group gathered in the *Nuova Camogliese* shared a cutting-edge vision of shipping business, based on single ship properties and the avoidance of *carati*⁵¹⁶. Until now, the absence of institutional sources produced by the association had prevented previous historians even from identifying the associates. Thus, there was no means either to support or to oppose these assumptions. Recently, an overview of the processual documents of the Trade Court of Genoa⁵¹⁷ allowed us to gather some of their data and, thus, to start with their identification.

Name	Surname	Ship	Name	Surname	Ship		
Fortunato	Ansaldo	<i>Alfa</i>	Antonio	Marini	<i>Adelfide</i>		
Gio. Batta	Ansaldo	<i>Mia Madre</i>			Giovanni	Mortola	<i>Marini A.</i>
		<i>Occidente</i>	Nicolò	Mortola			<i>Pontida</i>
		<i>Venti Settembre</i>					<i>Ida</i>

⁵¹² See, G.B.R. Figari and R. Buelli (eds.), *Camogli paese modello... : 1815-1915: uomini e storie del Risorgimento : catalogo [della mostra]: Camogli, Castello della Dragonara, 30 luglio - 30 ottobre 2005*, Genova: Corigraf, 2004.

⁵¹³ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 418-419.

⁵¹⁴ Idem, pp. 429-430.

⁵¹⁵ See, *infra*.

⁵¹⁶ G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese*, pp. 81-82.

⁵¹⁷ About this institution, see: G.S. Pene Vidari, “I tribunali di commercio”, in Assereto G., Bitossi C. and Merlin P. (eds.), *Genova e Torino. Quattro secoli di incontri e scontri*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2015, pp. 377-398.

Gio. Batta	Avegno	<i>Armida</i>	Filippo	Olivari	<i>Riconoscente</i>
		<i>Diadema</i>			<i>Favorita</i>
Fortunato	Bellagamba	<i>Matilde Bellagamba</i>	Prospero	Olivari	<i>Teresa Ester</i>
Diego	Bertolotto	<i>Abele</i>	Gio. Batta	Olivari	<i>Affezione</i>
Giuseppe	Bertolotto	<i>Virginia</i>	Luigi	Olivari	<i>Affezione C.</i>
Emanuele	Boggiano	<i>Fedele</i>	Gaetano	Pellerano	<i>Po</i>
Filippo	Boggiano	<i>Sperimento</i>	Giuseppe	Pellerano	<i>Adem</i>
Giuseppe	Bozzo	<i>Luigi</i>	Luigi	Pellerano	<i>Suez</i>
Andrea	Cichero	<i>Manin Cichero</i>	Emanuele	Schiaffino	<i>Ottavina</i>
Antonio	Cichero	<i>Mirra</i>	Filippo	Schiaffino	<i>Armonia</i>
Gio. Bono	Cichero	<i>Nuovo Dovere</i>	Gaetano	Schiaffino	<i>Amalia</i>
Fortunato	Cuneo	<i>Sì</i>			<i>Catterina</i>
Antonio	Degregori	<i>Sei Fratelli</i>			<i>Prospero</i>
Fortunato	Degregori	<i>Giulia</i>	Prospero	Schiaffino	<i>Catterina Doge</i>
Luigi	Degregori	<i>Semplice</i>			<i>Fratelli Doge</i>
Gio. Batta	Figari	<i>Po</i>			<i>Prospero Doge</i>
Maria	Figari	<i>Fortunato</i>	Prospero	Schiaffino	<i>Piccino</i>
Prospero	Figari	<i>Messina</i>	Andrea	Simonetti	<i>Simonetti</i>
Fortunato	Marini	<i>Fortunato</i>	Gaetano	Valle	<i>Memore</i>

Table 4.8. List of shipowners enrolled to the *Nuova Camogliese*. Source: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 889-900; 913-924; 937-948.

From 1874 to 1878, the shipowners listed in Table 4.8 were involved in processual litigations between the original *Mutua* and the *Nuova Camogliese*. The biggest group is composed of thirty-one shipowners who passed directly from the *Mutua* to the new one. They were brought to court by Prospero Schiaffino, Director of the *Mutua*, to be forced to the repartitions of the wrecks that occurred in the past year (1874)⁵¹⁸. According to G.B.R. Figari, the litigants found an elaborate agreement which involved a third party, the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "La Fiducia Ligure"*. The *Fiducia Ligure* was one of the most successful mutual marine insurance association of Genoa. Apparently, in virtue of private agreements with the direction of the *Nuova Camogliese* (in 1876, Giacomo Schiaffino is the

⁵¹⁸ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 894, n. 1120-1153.

Director⁵¹⁹) and with Fortunato Bertolotto, director of the credit institution *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*, the *Fiducia Ligure* offered to repay the pending debts left by the dissidents.

The involvement of Fortunato Bertolotto arose from the strict correlation between the *Nuova Camogliese* and his interests. The statute expressed in various articles a sort of financial dependency from the *Banco Bertolotto*. Indeed, all the cash operations ought to pass through the *Banco*. More specifically: the article 20 prescribed that, at the moment of associating, every member ought to pay to the *Banco F. Bertolotto* an anticipation fee equal to 1% of the insured value; the article 25 deputed the *Banco F. Bertolotto* to the collection of fines and financial interests which associates would be required to pay; finally, the article 51 recognised the right of the *Banco F. Bertolotto* to yearly withdraw 0,20% of the total insured values in exchange of the administrative services performed⁵²⁰.

Nevertheless, the fortunes of the *Nuova Camogliese* did not last long, albeit the involvement of wealthy and skilful shipowners (e.g. in the 1880s, Emanuele Boggiano owned one of the most modern and bigger fleets of Camogli), and the alliance with the most potent Fortunato Bertolotto (even elected mayor in 1874). The commitment to Bertolotto and his bank turned out to be decisive in determining its disaster when it was dragged to the bottom by the sudden collapse of Camogli's shipping finances.

4.3. The rising phase: the investments toward the community (1850s-1870s)

Notwithstanding shipping business, the period lasting from the frequentation of the Black Sea ports to the first ventures along the oceanic routes played a crucial role in the development of the community as a whole.

⁵¹⁹ Idem, 920, n. 1085.

⁵²⁰ See, artt. 20-25-51, Statuto Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Nuova Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 31-33.

Although a significant part of the maritime revenues was reinvested into new ship constructions – which led Camogli to gather one of the most important fleets of the Mediterranean – a great wealth remained within the community. It was destined to various projects and was instrumental to the development of the town under several regards. Within these designs, the active role of shipowners in the political, social and economic life of the community was essential.

As the most prominent members of the community, the class of shipowners engaged to local administration with continuity: some served as mayors, many as council members. As noted by Figari and Bagnato Bonuccelli, already in 1848, out of thirteen members of the town council, eleven belonged to the maritime elites, including the mayor, Francesco Schiaffino⁵²¹. Then, various families followed each other at the top of the city administration: Schiaffino, Bellagamba, Ansaldo, Mortola, Bozzo were all surnames of shipowners who became mayors in the 1850s and the 1860s. Then, in the mid of an expansive economic phase, the election of Fortunato Bertolotto in 1874 coincided with the most impressive achievements, right before a downward spiral led Camogli to its most profound crisis.

Unable to deal with all the projects, this section focuses on three subjects: the infrastructures (harbour and railway), the educational institutions (e.g. the nautical school) and the recreative places (in particular, the Social Theatre).

4.3.1. THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF CAMOGLI AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURES

There is one town, Camoglia, with its little harbour on the sea, hundreds of feet below the road; where families of mariners live, who, time out of mind, have owned coasting vessels in that place, and have traded to Spain and elsewhere. Seen from the road above, it is like a tiny model on the margin of the dimpled water,

⁵²¹ G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese*, p. 121. The town council was composed as such: Francesco Schiaffino, mayor; Gio. Batta Ansaldo, Antonio Olivari, Bernardo Olivari, Giacomo Brignati e Prospero Costa, regular councilmen; Giuseppe Olivari, Gio. Batta Olivari, Andrea Tassara, Bernardo Queirolo, Fortunato Bellagamba, Michelangelo Chiesa, Gerolamo Oneto, Gaetano Schiaffino, deputy councilmen. Among them, only Tassara and Queirolo were not shipowners.

shining in the sun. Descended into, by the winding mule tracks, it is a perfect miniature of a primitive seafaring town; the saltiest, roughest, most piratical little place that ever was seen. Great rusty iron rings and mooring chains, capstans, and fragments of old masts and spars, choke up the way; hardy rough weather boats, and seamen's clothing, flutter in the little harbour or are drawn out on the sunny stones to dry; on the parapet of the rude pier, a few amphibious looking fellows lie asleep, with their legs dangling over the wall, as though earth or water were all one to them, and if they slipped in, they would float away, dozing comfortably among the fishes; the church is bright with trophies of the sea, and votive offerings, in commemoration of escape from storm and shipwreck. The dwellings not immediately abutting on the harbour are approached by blind low archways, and by crooked steps, as if in darkness and in difficulty of access they should be like holds of ships, or inconvenient cabins under water; and everywhere, there is a smell of fish, and seaweed, and old rope.⁵²²

Inspired by his visit to Camogli in 1844, these words of Charles Dickens portrayed the Ligurian town in the period which preceded the shipping boom. Indeed, the vast urbanisation of Camogli took place from the 1850s onwards⁵²³. At that time, the positive results of maritime activities were directed to the improvement of the town infrastructures, both to the sea (the harbour) and to the countryside (vehicular roads and railway), the latter one described by an Italian traveller through «the immense number of fruit trees of any kind, which adorn the upper hills of Camogli»⁵²⁴.

⁵²² C. Dickens, *Pictures from Italy*, London: Bradbury and Evans, 1846, pp. 144-145.

⁵²³ See: A. Manzini, "Camogli città "moderna". Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città", *Bollettino Ligustico*, No. 22, 1970, pp. 137-157; C. Campodonico and S. Ferrari, "Camogli. Le vicende urbanistiche", in C. Campodonico and M. Doria (eds.), *Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un borgo di mare*, Milano: Motta Cultura s.r.l., 2009, pp. 10-19.

⁵²⁴ D. Bertolotti, *Viaggio nella Liguria marittima*, Torino: Tip. Eredi Botta, 1834, p. 42.

Already in the early 1800s, the structural improvement of the port of Camogli was considered as a priority⁵²⁵. The interests of the Napoleonic administrators toward Camogli and its port were framed within a broader design of reorganization of the Ligurian port system, including Genoa itself. Camogli was labelled as a «commercial scale of public interest»⁵²⁶ and, therefore, occupied a remarkable role within the French projects for the Ligurian maritime trade. The primary concerns of the administrators were: a) the reparation and prolongation of the dock; b) the drainage of the seabed from stones and other materials; c) the reinforcement of the breakwater.




Figure 4.1. Map of the port of Camogli (1809). Source: A. Pellegrini, “Napoleone e il porto di Camogli”, p. 154.

Despite the initial allocation of four thousand francs, already in 1806, the engineers quantified the needs in approximately more than forty thousand⁵²⁷. Most of the resources were then conceded to the director of works Giuseppe Bisagno and between 1808 and 1812 the works advanced considerably. The main endeavour

⁵²⁵ On the topic, see: A. Pellegrini, “Napoleone e il porto di Camogli”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 133-174.

⁵²⁶ *Idem*, p. 139.

⁵²⁷ *Idem*, p. 147.

involved the transfer of rocks and stones from the interior to the outer margin of the port, thus accomplishing the double purpose of widening and reinforcing the harbour.

Although the Napoleonic works decisively contributed to the improvement of the port width, access and protection, the small medieval harbour could not keep pace with the outstanding growth of Camogli's fleet observed throughout the nineteenth century. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the port underwent various adjustments, like the predisposition of a slipway (1821) or the construction of the inner quay (1824)⁵²⁸.




Figure 4.2. Map of the port of Camogli (1858). Source: A. Manzini, “Camogli città “moderna”. Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città”, p. 152.

Nevertheless, already in 1847, the port was undersized to satisfy the needs of local shipowners: according to the contemporary geographer De Bartolomeis, «one hundred and thirty big ships belonged to this port [of Camogli], which could hardly host ten of them»⁵²⁹. The activities, including that of repair and naval maintenance, were transferred to the port of Genoa and that of Camogli was downgraded to anchoring for smaller vessels. Nonetheless, the project of Gaetano Mortola, son of

⁵²⁸ A. Manzini, “Camogli città “moderna”. Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città”, pp. 152-154.

⁵²⁹ L. De Bartolomeis, *Notizie topografiche e statistiche sugli stati sardi dedicate a A.S.S.R.M. Carlo Alberto*, Torino: Tipografia Chirio e Mina, 1847, p. 1491.

Biagio, can still be dated in the early 1880s. In 1881, he wrote to the Parliamentary Commission for the Inquiry about the conditions of the merchant marine:

Since we lack a safe harbour where to repair our vessels, and because the port of Genoa is not suitable to allocate a specific area to these operations without incurring in various issues; and owing to the fact that there is no safe harbour along the coast between Genoa and Spezia for those ships which may need refuge under difficult weather conditions, I have done the technical studies for the construction of a breakwater in the place called *Giazze* [...].⁵³⁰

Then, Gaetano Mortola admitted that, despite having already obtained the authorization to form a society for the construction, the incoming crisis of the Italian merchant marine had discouraged him from embarking on such a costly enterprise (calculated in about 400.000 lire)⁵³¹. According to G.B. Ferrari, Mortola's project was markedly ambitious: the breakwater was designed to close the whole town from the easternmost neighbourhood (San Rocco) aimed at obtaining a port which could even rival with Genoa⁵³².

Then, local administrators carried out various projects to increase the total building area of the town and to improve land connections with the nearby communities. These efforts concerned the construction of vehicular roads at the back of the residential area, mainly: this strip of land was seldom populated, but the terrains were usually cultivated with fruit trees or olives. Thus, it is possible to observe various instances of expropriation of lands and pre-existing buildings for infrastructural purposes. The intricate negotiations between the town council and various shipowners (including Erasmo Schiaffino, founder of the *Mutua*) for the makeover of the «road at the back of Camogli», which was widened and straightened, might offer an example⁵³³.


⁵³⁰ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione parlamentare per l'Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4, f. 36, b. 2.

⁵³¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵³² G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 420-421.

⁵³³ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, b. 176, n. 42.

However, notwithstanding the efforts toward road transports, the real improvement of Camogli's communication network with the rest of the region passed necessarily through the construction of the railway⁵³⁴. When the first projects to build a railway line to connect Genoa with the towns of the Eastern Riviera were designed, the town council of Camogli struggled to obtain its passage through the town. The conformation of the area was not very attractive in terms of cost-effectiveness. Hills and heights closed the town both eastward and westward, a factor which complicated the construction and raised the costs. Since 1856, the mayors of Camogli and the neighbouring town of Santa Margherita concerted actions against the idea to bypass the two towns by connecting Recco and Rapallo directly⁵³⁵. Indeed, these towns opposed the realisation of this project, which would have hampered their growth and favoured the old-dominating centres of Recco and Rapallo.



⁵³⁴ About the construction of the railway in Camogli, see the monumental and well-documented essay of Vittorio Bagnasco: V. Bagnasco, “La ferrovia a Camogli: la locomotiva a vapore dopo la vela”, in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 21-86.

⁵³⁵ Idem, p. 22.

Map 4.1. Railway track between Recco and Rapallo and the alternative project.

Indeed, the expected costs of the two alternatives differed consistently: the inland track between Recco and Rapallo was almost flat and required few investments while comprehending Camogli and Santa Margherita would have raised the costs for excavating numerous tunnels. In 1861, the town council committed itself to contribute to the fixed capital with 110.000 lire to satisfy the requests of the construction company, which would have opted for the flatland track. Finally, the line was completed in 1868.

Notwithstanding the contributions to the construction, the town commitment to this enterprise can also be evaluated from the data of expropriations, whose costs reached more than 200.000 lire. The analysis of the nature of the expropriated land and their owners provided the following results: 64,81% of the land was cultivated with olive oils, 16,67% with vineyards and 10,18% was a chestnut grove⁵³⁶. In addition, the landowners belonging to the shipowning class covered almost 65%⁵³⁷.

Finally, few words should be spent on the utilisation of the railway by the community itself: due to the nature of Camogli's shipping business, already in the early 1870s railway connections took little or no part in the development of the local maritime activities. As said for the harbour, Camogli's shipping business was no more tied with the original environment of the community. The voyages departed from Genoa, and the practice of cross-trade kept the ships outside the Mediterranean for extended periods. Nevertheless, the daily railway connections with Genoa were instrumental to the transformation of traditional practices: already in the early 1870s, passenger traffic reached outstanding levels. It has been calculated that more than one hundred and fifty commuters moved every day to Genoa for work. The overwhelming inflow of people forced the railway administration to enlarge the station just three years after the inauguration

⁵³⁶ *Idem*, p. 32.

⁵³⁷ *Idem*, p. 36.

(1871)⁵³⁸. It is in this period that many shipowners settled their activities in Genoa, where they opened their own shipping offices; there, with the vital support of cable telegraph, the most various shipping operations were held.

4.3.2. THE INSTITUTION OF THE NAUTICAL SCHOOL (1874)

Still, in the 1870s, local shipowners and the administrative authorities decided to centralise the nautical education to Camogli, in order to provide continuity to the long-standing maritime traditions of the place. Before that, countless captains used to obtain an informal education in private schools⁵³⁹ or, otherwise, went to the nautical school of Genoa, founded at the beginning of the century.

Arguably, the decision stemmed from the positive shipping phase which Camogli was experiencing and was also in line with the proliferation of similar institutions in the surrounding towns, as in Recco, Rapallo or Chiavari. It was natural that Camogli's elites, aspiring to stand apart from the local milieu, conceived as overwhelmingly attractive the possibility to host a nautical school in their territory.

Thus, in 1874, the school was founded – the town administration being led by Fortunato Bertolotto – and the activities started the following year. In order to emerge among the many competitors, the town requested the Ministry of Education the “governmental” label, a prestigious formal recognition. Its obtainment, however, was slowed down by the high competition in the area. In 1878, the closure of the schools of Recco and Rapallo led the government to grant the demanded acknowledgement⁵⁴⁰.

⁵³⁸ Idem, p. 46.

⁵³⁹ Various information are reported about a school founded in 1780, which lasted until the end of the Napoleonic period. Then, the education of the future captains was administered on a private basis: there some testimonies about the activity of the local priest Erasmo Schiaffino and about other initiatives of this kind. See, M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima (1815-1921)*, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2005, pp. 352-353; G. Guidotti, “Il nautico di Camogli dalla Fondazione ai giorni nostri”, in *Il Nautico. 1875-1975*, numero unico a cura del Comune di Camogli e dell'Istituto Nautico “C. Colombo”, 1975, p. 9.

⁵⁴⁰ Idem, pp. 354-355.

Nonetheless, though the nautical school (in 1882 entitled to Cristoforo Colombo) was steered in a prosperous direction, the materialisation of various issues in the early 1880s put a strain on its development. Right after the creation of a program for naval engineers (1883) to attract more students, the town council lamented its inability to cover the costs and opted for suppressing the school.

Indeed, the economic conditions of the community had radically changed from the previous decade: the global adverse conjuncture for maritime freights together with more locally-based issues had impoverished the class of shipowners and, by extension, the community itself. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the government, the nautical school of Camogli had now become strategic and, therefore, received extraordinary contributions⁵⁴¹. From this moment onwards, however, it is possible to observe the following dialectic between the town and the central state: the former repeatedly threatened to shut down the institute, and the latter responded with the grant of extraordinary subsidies⁵⁴².

The pivotal studies of M.S. Rollandi about the life and activities of the institute delineate relatively good numbers. After the promising beginning in 1874, with 114 students, the school entered into a troublesome phase for a decade (1877-1887), during which the average enrolled students were slightly more than seventy (72,45). Then, in the wake of few remarkably positive years (in 1892 the number was 125), the institute entered again in a depressing trend (whose worst result corresponded to 57 students in 1895), from which recovered only with the turn of the century (an average of 143,5 students per year between 1900 and 1914)⁵⁴³. In addition, Rollandi outlined some qualitative analysis about the origins and the class into which the students enrolled (deck officials or engineers). This provides an even more accurate evaluation of the quantitative figure. The first noteworthy element corresponds to the percentage of the students residing in Camogli, which

⁵⁴¹ *Idem*, p. 356.

⁵⁴² Again in 1887, the town council decided for its closure just to be receive extraordinary subsidies from the Ministry. The suppression of the school of Chiavari, one of the last remaining in the area, convinced even more the government to sustain the institute of Camogli. *Idem*, p. 356-358.

⁵⁴³ Data drawn from: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo*, pp. 362-364.

passed from 82,36% (1875-1878) to 37,17% before the First World War. Throughout this period, the turning point occurred in the late 1890s, before definitively establishing in 1900s⁵⁴⁴.

Apart from the most proximal area (Recco, Sori, Pieve and Bogliasco), it is possible to observe how, in the twentieth century, the contribution of the province of La Spezia steadily increased until the 13,36%. On the same level, the rise of the group labelled as «other Italians» might be even more impressive, as it exceeded 15% in the last period.

These data provide an unconventional insight into the conditions of local shipping and about the interconnections between the nautical school and Camogli seafarers. In the beginning, the primary pool from which students could be gathered was that of Camogli: the fleet numbers and the characteristics of the labour system – defined as «endogenous» in the next chapter – allowed the school to count on significant and continuous inflows of students. The foundation of the nautical school was instrumental to the creation of a locally-based shipping system, in which the community itself provided the basic requirements for shipping (capital, maritime insurances, supplies of specialized seafarers and low workforce).

Later, the chain failure of the nearby competitors – though its fruits became substantial only from the new century – rendered Camogli a collecting centre for nautical education within the whole region lying eastward than Genoa.

Finally, the last key to interpreting the quantitative data of the school corresponds to the numeric comparison between the class of engineers and deck officials. In the most critical phase of sail shipping, engineers represented a suitable alternative to deck professions: from 1886 to 1897, the two categories almost rivalled with each other, and in 1887 and 1888 engineers outnumbered the class of deck officials⁵⁴⁵. In the twentieth century, however, captains and mates regained their primacy until 1913. Theoretically, the crisis of sail would have been a factor in pushing prospective seafarers to engine careers: in fact, few people from Camogli

⁵⁴⁴ Idem, p. 369.

⁵⁴⁵ Idem, pp. 362-363.

found employment aboard of steamers, almost none as engineers⁵⁴⁶. The sailing tradition of Camogli was too deep-rooted, and the entanglements between shipowners and deck officials were too robust for the system to leave valuable human resources who could pursue engineering careers.

4.3.3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEATRO SOCIALE OF CAMOGLI (1876)

Although a significant part of the efforts was aimed at improving the infrastructural and economic resources of the community, some energies were channelled into alternative projects. The case of the construction of the Social Theatre of Camogli⁵⁴⁷, for example, can be perceived as an attempt to raise the cultural level of the community and to consolidate the social status of its elites, transformed by the vertiginous economic escalation of the previous years. These social and educational purposes were made clear in the shareholders' first declarations at the moment of the foundation: the theatre was built «to embellish the city, to bring prestige to the promoters who associated their names to a magnificent work, and to be the vehicle to educate and instruct the population»⁵⁴⁸.

Started in 1874, the foundation of the Social Theatre involved many shipowners: among the leading personalities it is possible to recognize Fortunato Bertolotto, president and legal representative of the Society. Indeed, the foundation of a social theatre envisaged the creation of a formal association, composed of shareholders, who financed and administered the activities of the theatre.

Anna Pizzi Baroffio, relying on posterior sources and testimonies, ascribed the foundation of the theatre to the liberal faction of Camogli⁵⁴⁹. The examination of Camogli's notarial deeds, instead, disclosed an outstanding source, witnessing the formal partition of the theatre boxes, assigned to each shareholder by the draft

⁵⁴⁶ See, chapter 5.

⁵⁴⁷ The main bibliographical reference is constituted by the essay of Anna Pizzi Baroffio, who studied the activities of the theatre from its foundation to the second half of the twentieth century. See: A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli: eventi", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 86-132.

⁵⁴⁸ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235.

⁵⁴⁹ A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli", pp. 92-93.

process⁵⁵⁰. This source is remarkable for a double set of reasons: first, for its objective historical importance associated with the role which the Social Theatre played within the community; secondly, it is fundamental to identify some of the members of the mentioned liberal faction, which overlaps with the second generation of shipowners of Camogli and, for extension, corresponds to many subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese*.

The list of coparticipants was composed of sixty-one people, all shipowners born and resident in Camogli, except for the notary Marco Mosto, and the doctor Luigi Leale, born in Pozzolo Formigaro (Lombardy) but living in Camogli⁵⁵¹. During the operations, all the sixty theatre boxes belonging to the first three levels were distributed – by draft – to the associates in proportion with the number of shares. The primary shareholder was, not surprisingly – being president and inspirator – Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, to whom belonged four shares and, therefore, four boxes; then, apart from Giovanni Schiaffino, son of Erasmo, who had two shares, the remaining participants possessed only one share each; some of them even at half.

The juxtaposition of the list of shareholders of the Social Theatre with the members of the *Nuova Camogliese* led us to single out twenty-two recurring people. Given the incompleteness of the subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese* obtained through the Trade Court papers, the process might provide even more consistent results. Leaving aside Fortunato Bertolotto, some of the most prominent shipowners of Camogli appeared in both of the lists: still in 1881, in the mid of the crisis, ten of them possessed almost 20 ships. The list included Emanuele Boggiano, owner of the barques *Fedele* (478 t.), *Quaker's City* (872 t.) and *Rocco Schiaffino* (1030 t.); Andrea Cichero, who had inscribed to the *Mutua* his ships *Lucchina C.* (529 t.) and *Manin Cichero* (540 t.) and Antonio Degregori, son of Agostino, to whom belonged the barques *Ricordo* (781 t.) and *Sei Fratelli* (577 t.)⁵⁵².

⁵⁵⁰ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235. The notary was Angelo Doberti: the division took place within the hall of the theatre, on the 21st September 1876.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵² CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

To the Social Theatre also participated Fortunato Ottone, owner of three barques, the *Antonietta O.* (941 t.), the *Madre Rosa* (740 t.) and the *Ottone* (644 t.)⁵⁵³.

These people might be indeed reconducted to the so-called "second generation of shipowners", the descendants of those who guided the community through the Black Sea phase. They usually owned more than one ship and engaged steadily to the oceanic freight market, as emerged from the dealings of Emanuele Boggiano in London, mentioned in the previous chapter⁵⁵⁴.

Resuming with the economic organisation and the fortunes of the social theatre, this notarial deed allows us to advance the following considerations. Firstly, the ownership of theatre boxes constituted only one of the shareholders' benefits. The theatre had four rows, but only the boxes of the first three were distributed among the associates. The last one was reserved to outsiders, and the revenues from their selling and their hiring were divided accordingly⁵⁵⁵. Moreover, trading theatre boxes was allowed, both between members and to outsiders: the ownership could be alienated, but such operation did not lead to the automatic transfer of the relative shares. In this regard, a general survey of notarial sources led us to identify various transactions involving the purchase or sale of theatre boxes. According to these documents, the value of the boxes could vary depending upon their position: in 1891, for example, Assunta Schiaffino, daughter of Lorenzo, had inherited a first-line theatre box and sold it to Lorenzo Mortola for 300 lire plus 50 more for the furniture⁵⁵⁶. A few months later, Stefano Repetto, son of Gio. Batta Gaetano "Perrucca", purchased a second line box for 250 plus 50 lire from Gottardo Bertolotto⁵⁵⁷. In the same year, however, the liquidators of one of the local credit institutions, the *Banca operaia marittima*, assessed the value of the theatre boxes as «reduced to almost nothing»⁵⁵⁸.

⁵⁵³ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁵⁴ See Chapter 3.

⁵⁵⁵ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235.

⁵⁵⁶ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, b. 1614, n. 174.

⁵⁵⁷ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, b. 1615, n. 325. In this context, the notary also provides a brief description of the furniture, which consisted of «a golden mirror and four wooden chairs».

⁵⁵⁸ *Idem*, n. 173.

Indeed, after a promising beginning from the cultural and economic point of views, the activities of the theatre followed a downward trend. The economic crisis affecting the city from the early 1880s was reflected into the cultural programme: operas and dramaturgy gradually rarefied to be substituted by private feasts, conferences and public assemblies (in 1880, the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners took place in the hall of the theatre)⁵⁵⁹.

4.4. The shipowning class of Camogli and transition (1874-1888)

In the early 1870s, the favourable conditions of the international freight market, the gross revenues of maritime business and the abundant availability of credit created the conditions for a rapid expansion of the town of Camogli (which in 1877 was given the status of «city») under all regards: economic, infrastructural, political, and cultural. Nevertheless, the future decline for sailing vessels, the appearance of negative shipping cycles, in which the fall of freights played a critical role, were all factors in determining a radical inversion of the trend. The late 1870s crisis hit Camogli and its shipowners harshly and put a strain on the survivability of the local shipping system. Many factors, both endogenous and exogenous, contributed to the escalation of such crisis. First, resuming the personal trajectory of Fortunato Bertolotto, we will examine the hypertrophic growth of Camogli's shipping system, which led to the large chain of bankruptcies of 1878. Then, resorting to the activism of the local institutions to elicit a national discussion about the conditions of the merchant marine and the measures to be taken to improve them, we will evaluate the response of the local shipowners to the test of time. In broader terms, the last paragraph will try to identify and examine the attitudes and proposals of Camogli shipowners towards transition and, therefore, the reasons which brought them to opt for resilience within marginal sailing freight markets instead of converting to steam.

⁵⁵⁹ A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli", pp. 95-105.

4.4.1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNITARIAN MARITIME CREDIT SYSTEM (1878-1888)

The late 1870s represented a crucial breakthrough for Camogli's history. On the one side, the international freight market entered in a downward spiral, which hampered the development of Camogli. On the other side, local events brought the community at the edge of a collective bankruptcy, which damaged the local business structure severely and limited the shipowners' ability to react to the ongoing shipping transformations.

The role of Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, within this framework was critical. Leaving aside his shipowning career, as seen, Fortunato Bertolotto became a point of reference for many shipowners, as a banker, as a politician or, in general, as a leading member of the community⁵⁶⁰. In this case, the primary interest lies in the foundation and administration of the *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*, a credit institution which became hugely influential throughout the 1870s. As G.B.R. Figari reported, the *Banco Camogliese* was founded in 1870 as a limited partnership, with an initial capital stock of 800.000 lire, increased to 1.500.000 in the following year⁵⁶¹. As seen, the *Banco Camogliese* handled the administrative operations of the mutual insurance *Nuova Camogliese*, from which it retained 0,20% of the total insured value per year⁵⁶².

From notarial sources and the papers left by the Trade Court of Genoa, it is possible to infer how Fortunato Bertolotto – who, meanwhile, in 1874 was elected mayor, founded the nautical school and led the construction of the social theatre – played a critical role in financing and supporting the life of the community and,

⁵⁶⁰ See, above for his shipping properties. Compare also with his influence in the matters of the *Nuova Camogliese*, in the decision to found the Nautical School and as president of the Social Theatre. In general, about this fundamental figure for the history of Camogli, there are various contributions produced by local historians. Gio. Bono Ferrari, for instance, mentions his nickname “*Barbin*” and, furthermore, outlines his rather apologetic portray: G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 422-424. According to Ferrari, Fortunato Bertolotto enjoyed of an outstanding reputation among the society of Camogli's shipowners: nevertheless, most of the events and the characteristics of the role which Bertolotto covered in the years of crisis, which we reconstructed from archival sources, found implicit confirmations in Ferrari's account.

⁵⁶¹ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 29.

⁵⁶² See, above.

in particular, its shipping sector. Firstly, he exerted almost absolute control on the mutual insurance *Nuova Camogliese*; secondly, in his role of director of the *Banco Camogliese*, Fortunato Bertolotto supplied with outstanding amounts of maritime credit the community of Camogli and, in particular, the group of people of his closest acquaintance – most of them found in the *Nuova Camogliese* or as subscribers of the Social Theatre. The resources to sustain such a great endeavour consisted of stocks of the *Cassa Marittima*, a private credit institution located in Genoa. As seen in Chapter 3, in the early 1870s, the fleet of Camogli was systematically enlarged and transformed into a modern tramp fleet to engage in the oceanic markets⁵⁶³. Meanwhile, Bertolotto's financial operations must have provided a fundamental contribution to these processes, as confirmed by the numbers of his fleet (from four to nine vessels) and by those of his closest collaborators (see Table 4.8).

In 1877, however, the hypertrophic financial system set up by Fortunato Bertolotto started to waver. The first element to fall was the *Nuova Camogliese*, which had suffered from scarce subscriptions from the moment of its foundation. In 1862, the original *Mutua* had prescribed a minimum number of associates of one hundred members to cover the costs of possible wrecks and accidents and maintain the singular expenses to sustainable levels⁵⁶⁴. The *Nuova Camogliese* never reached these numbers and handled bigger ships, which naturally resulted in more expensive mutual repartitions. As liquidators were appointed Giacomo Schiaffino and Pellegrino Marciani, subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese*⁵⁶⁵.

Afterwards, it was the turn of the *Banco Camogliese* to collapse. In February 1877, Fortunato Bertolotto had mortgaged his real estates to cover loans for 120.000 lire: his properties were composed of a mansion, three apartments, two pieces of land – one cultivated with vineyards, the other with olives – and a

⁵⁶³ See Chapter 3.

⁵⁶⁴ See, footnote 98.

⁵⁶⁵ These two figures are mentioned in various litigations and liquidations concerning the *Nuova Camogliese* and its associates. For instance, see: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, r. 1603-1605; Idem, *Sentenze*, r. 941, n. 537.

building under construction, consisting of eight apartments⁵⁶⁶. Then, in autumn, the *Banco Camogliese* entered in liquidation: Emanuele Boggiano (shipowner), Gio. Batta Mosto (notary) and Luigi Degregori (shipowner), who represented the *Banco* in court against both its creditors (mainly the *Cassa marittima*) and debtors (half of the shipowners of Camogli and Fortunato Bertolotto himself). The obtainment of a neat picture of all the ongoing trials turned out to be impossible; nonetheless, the court papers shed light on some significant features.

Firstly, the *Banco* and many shipowners had contracted loans with the *Cassa marittima* for hundreds of thousands of lire. In collecting its credits, the *Cassa marittima* moved in two directions: on the one hand, it sought the condemnation of Fortunato Bertolotto for more than 500.000 lire in stocks, as director of the *Banco*⁵⁶⁷. The legal action involved the foreclosure and preservation of Bertolotto's private properties: then, he was condemned to the payment of 155.000 lire.

Secondly, the *Cassa marittima* sued many morose shipowners, who had indebted themselves through Bertolotto's intermediation. This processual course of action generated dozens of trials⁵⁶⁸.

Meanwhile, in virtue of their role, the liquidators of the *Banco* began analogous credit collections from the morose associates and called to trial Fortunato Bertolotto himself. Indeed, according to their conclusive report, Fortunato Bertolotto had alienated 2397 and a half shares of the *Cassa Marittima* from the *Banco* to his personal properties: thus, on 13th August 1878, Bertolotto was condemned to refund the *Banco* for 239.950 lire.

From a broader perspective, the meltdown of the financial bubble – in which it is impossible to deny Bertolotto's responsibilities – occurred within an already deteriorated framework (the freights contraction) and, thus, paved the way for

⁵⁶⁶ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 680, n. 404.

⁵⁶⁷ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, r. 944, 1220.

⁵⁶⁸ *Idem*, r. 937-948. For instance, we can mention the trials against Niccolò Mortola (15.000 It. Lira), Prospero Schiaffino and Gio. Batta Ansaldo (24.000 It. Lira), Santo Sanguinetti (8.000 It. Lira), Giuseppe Brignetti (17.000 It. Lira).

serial bankruptcies among shipowners. Indeed, just in 1878, nine shipowners bankrupted with an aggregate liability of 3.794.276 lire⁵⁶⁹.

This fact opens a stimulating window on the traditional arguments used by historians to explicate the unsuccessful transition from sail to steam of small-scale seafaring communities. Indeed, the lack of transition is often ascribed to the absence or insufficiency of maritime credit⁵⁷⁰. Quite the opposite, contemporary observers pointed out the dramatic effects of credit overabundance, which allowed improvised individuals to engage in shipping without possessing skills and a well-rounded knowledge of the international freight market. In this regard, it is possible to mention the words of Ulrico Risch (Director of the Risch-Eberle company, creditor) and Luigi Pescetto (Director of the *Cassa Marittima*, major creditor). In the pages of their conclusive report as liquidators of Antonio Olivari, son of Emanuele, bankrupted with 428.500 lire of passive, they lucidly expressed the reasons underlying the generalised crisis of Camogli's shipping:

[...] based on all these reasons, we can infer that a potential cause of disasters lied in the fact that those shipowners had built their ships counting on (we should say abusing of) the advantages provided by a large availability of credit. Often happens that, the value of the interests on these sums, besides granting the expected profits, added to the original debt, thus making it grows indefinitely. This assumption seems to find a confirmation in the bankruptcy of Antonio Olivari, since, from the inspection of his conditions, it was easily noted that he had undertaken the construction of his ships without no personal means or at least possessing a capital commensurate to the stature of the affair, but,

⁵⁶⁹ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, 1602-1604.

⁵⁷⁰ See, in particular, M. Doria, "Attività economiche e cambiamento nei secoli di un borgo rivierasco", in C. Campondonico and M. Doria (eds.), *Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un borgo di mare*, pp. 30-31.

on the contrary, relying on the abundant availability of credit, often awarded lightly.⁵⁷¹

The broad availability of credit was a recurring argument for liquidators to identify the underlying reasons for bankruptcies. In the case of Gio. Batta Ansaldo, son of Filippo, they denounced «the abuse of credit and the excessive range of operations»⁵⁷². Then, they added, «disposing of limited capitals, he [Ansaldo] engaged to seaborne trade on a large scale and, lacking the financial means, resorted to credit by exploiting the good reputation which the shipowners of Camogli enjoyed»⁵⁷³.

The list of their debts can highlight, once more, the prominent role of the *Banco Bertolotto* and the *Cassa marittima*. As emerges from Table 4.9, these institutions contributed to form the financial bubble denounced by most of the liquidators in their memories.

	<i>Antonio Olivari</i>	<i>Pellegro Schiaffino</i>	<i>Bartolomeo Figari</i>	<i>Cristino Razeto</i>	<i>Gio. Batta Ansaldo</i>	<i>Gio. Batta Demarchi</i>	<i>Prospero Schiaffino</i>	<i>Total</i>
Passive								
<i>Nuova Camogliese</i>	3.000	2.944		2.000		1.400	1.900	11.244
<i>Banco Bertolotto</i>	19.000			29.000	23.000	12.400	57.000	140.400
<i>Cassa Marittima</i>	100.000	6.274	11.152	117.000	25.000		87.000	346.426

Table 4.9. List of credits of *Nuova Camogliese*, *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto* and *Cassa marittima* toward bankrupted Camogli's shipowners. Source: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, 1602-1605.

In addition, another feature – limitedly to the cases of Pellegro Schiaffino, Gio. Batta Ansaldo, Gio. Batta Demarchi, Bartolomeo Figari and Prospero Schiaffino – related to the existence of a so-called «*giro di comodo*», namely the practice to

⁵⁷¹ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, r. 1602, n. 472, Deposito di relazione da parte degli stralcieri del fallimento di Antonio Olivari fu Emanuele.

⁵⁷² Idem, r. 1604, n. 799. Liquidators of this bankruptcy were Gio. Batta Patrone and David Viale.

⁵⁷³ *Ibidem*.

share among many people revenues and debts deriving from personal obligations⁵⁷⁴.

Despite apparently innocuous, it was labelled as a «malicious system of loans and traffic of promissory notes», a «reckless practice», because «whereas the revenues were divided among the informal associates, at the same time they contracted the whole debt personally»⁵⁷⁵. Resorting to the «*giro di comodo*» implied a direct correlation with the emergence of serial bankruptcies among the contractors.

The case of Bartolomeo Figari – inherently tied with that of Pellegrino Schiaffino – might be worth mentioning⁵⁷⁶. According to the liquidators, «after having struggled to make a fortune in America», Bartolomeo Figari, son of Gerolamo, «returned to his hometown and began to build, with the assistance of his friends, a ship»⁵⁷⁷. Then, they added, «it was notorious that Figari, illiterate, entrusted the management of his business to Pellegrino Schiaffino who, not only abused of his position, but also used Figari's signature to throw him in burdensome obligations and, as a result, to drag him down with him»⁵⁷⁸.

In its extremity, the illiteracy of Bartolomeo Figari – rare among Camogli's shipowners – links to another distinguishing feature reported by liquidators: the total absence or misuse of bookkeeping and accounting. The negative judgement about business records and account books was indeed widespread and targeted all the bankruptcies analyzed. For instance, about Pellegrino Schiaffino, his liquidators wrote that «[they] could not expect from the bankrupted to keep the books in the

⁵⁷⁴ See, *Ibidem*; *Idem*, r. 1605, n. 949 (bankruptcy of Pellegrino Schiaffino).

⁵⁷⁵ *Idem*, r. 1604, n. 799.

⁵⁷⁶ The same outcomes concerned the bankruptcy of Gio. Batta Demarchi, son of Antonio. According to his liquidators, «the declaration of bankruptcy of his brother-in-law, Pellegrino Schiaffino, affected severely his [of Demarchi] conditions, due to the fact that the suppliers of the *Rosa D.* [Demarchi's ship], also creditors of Schiaffino, refused to delay more and asked for immediate payments».

⁵⁷⁷ *Idem*, r. 1602, n. 428. Liquidators were Carlo Pantassi (agent of the *Banco di sconto e sete* of Turin) and Santo Monteverde (merchant living in Genoa).

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

strict sense, owing to his attitude and the long-established abuse, among the shipowners of Camogli, to consider this activity as an unnecessary luxury»⁵⁷⁹.

The analysis of the critical issues recorded within the shipping environment of the community, however, cannot obscure the role of the exogenous processes lying beyond the actual control of Camogli's shipowners. Undoubtedly, endogenous factors, such as individual and collective responsibilities, more familiar to local historians than academicians, played a crucial role in pushing shipping to overperform in comparison to their practical possibilities. In this way, the creation of a precarious system based on abstract credit rather than substantial shipping revenues led many shipowners to be financially exposed and unprepared to global transformations. This coexistence of exogenous factors with the mentioned malpractices can be found in the liquidators' accounts. For example, about the bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto, owner of *Delfino P.* and *Nuovo Rosina Canepa*, his liquidators observed:

It is well-known the widespread absence of freights and, likewise, it is well-known the miserable fate of shipowners who, often, rather than obtaining profits from shipping, they incur in losses, because of the disproportion between the operating costs and the freights collected.⁵⁸⁰

In the early 1880s, the shipowners of Camogli became aware about the ongoing conditions of the shipping market and focused on the role of transition from sail to steam in determining their crisis. These arguments became objects of various discussions, which culminated in the organization of the First General Congress of the Italian Shipowners (1880) and were then confronted with other realities in the context of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the conditions of the Italian merchant marine (1881-1882).

⁵⁷⁹ Idem, r. 1605, n. 949.

⁵⁸⁰ Idem, r. 1604, n. 696 (bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto).

4.4.2. THE PARTICIPATION OF CAMOGLI SHIPOWNERS TO THE NATIONAL MARITIME DEBATE (1880-1883)

As we saw in the third chapter, from 1874 ca. onwards, the effects of the global transformations and the decline of sailing shipping hit Camogli and his shipowners.

The shipowning elites did not remain passive in front of the upcoming crisis. Conversely, not only they stimulated an active debate among Italian shipowners, but also elicited the creation of a dialogue with the national maritime institutions. Thus, in 1880, in Camogli was organised the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners, an occasion to address and discuss the main issues of the Italian merchant marine⁵⁸¹. Afterwards, they took an active part within the 1882 Inquiry into the conditions of the Italian merchant marine, which was carried out by the congressman Paolo Boselli in all the major shipping centres of the country.

On 10th and 11th October 1880, the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners was gathered in Camogli. The purpose of the event, as expressed at the welcoming greetings, was to propose to the government the measures to rescue the Merchant Marine from its critically declining status. In this context, the primary causes of the crisis were identified in the diminution of traffics and in foreign competition, made incredibly unsustainable by the French laws, which introduced public subsidies to shipping⁵⁸².

More than three hundred shipowners (323) congregated to the assembly: Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor of Camogli, oversaw the operations as president of the Committee of Camogli Shipowners, to be intended as the first nucleus and promotor of the event. Among the main objectives lied the reform of the *Cassa Invalidi della Marina Mercantile* – to relieve shipowners from these subsidies – and the reduction of consular and maritime health customs, which weighed too much on the balances of shipping voyages⁵⁸³. The discussion then moved on the French

⁵⁸¹ See, P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori Italiani in Camogli*, Genova: Giovanni Sambolino, 1880.

⁵⁸² P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁸³ Idem, p. 11.

law about public subsidies to the national merchant marine (1879), which had completely upset the international shipping paradigm, forcing concurrent shipowners to develop and propose the measures to resist and oppose them.

The participation of the shipowners of Camogli was active and extremely knowledgeable: in particular, Francesco Schiaffino, son of Gaetano, and a member of the family Olivari (his name is never mentioned) raised their voices repeatedly. Another leading figure was David Viale, a shipowner and liquidator from Genoa, who had established long-standing acquaintances and private interests in Camogli to be almost included among that society (he was a member of the Committee of Camogli Shipowners). Viale was also among Camogli's participants to the Inquiry into the conditions of the merchant marine, taking place in Camogli on the 22nd August 1881. In that occasion, he was very active, provided many details about the state of his business and formulated various proposals⁵⁸⁴.

The declining status of the Italian merchant marine was always at the core of the discussions: indeed, according to the vivid expression proposed by Viale, «the disaster [was] blatant and self-evident»⁵⁸⁵. To corroborate with data his assumptions, the Genoese shipowner reported how, in the previous years, the shipping values insured to the Ligurian mutual insurance societies had fallen from 114 to 68,5 millions of lire and, thus, the yearly mutual repartition of damages had increased from 3% to 5%⁵⁸⁶. The reasons of the decline were reconducted to different spheres of interest: firstly, commercial, in connection with the international shipping trends; secondly, technological, addressing the correlation of the decline of sail shipping with the rise of steam navigation; thirdly, institutional, related to the unequal customs and tariffs system which the Italian ships underwent in comparison with foreign competitors.

⁵⁸⁴ The whole list of the people questioned in Camogli comprehended: 1) Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor of Camogli; 2) Filippo Schiaffino, son of Giuseppe, director of the *Mutua Assicurazione Camogliese*; 3) David Viale, shipowner and liquidator; 4) Antonio Carbone, shipowner and councilman of the *Cassa Invalidi della marina mercantile*; 5) Gerolamo Nossardi, shipowner and director of the *Mutua* of Nervi; 6) Gaetano Cavalli, shipowner; 7) Emanuele Boggiano, shipowner; 8) Gaetano Mortola, son of Biagio, shipowner. See, *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, vol. 1, pp. XXII-XXIII.

⁵⁸⁵ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, p. 18.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

Coeval observers, such as the economist Jacopo Virgilio, were well aware of the fall of freights, which, for instance, he had measured in a 35-40% decrease between 1875 and 1880, even on the marginal routes of the Far East rice (-38%), Peruvian guano (-40%) or U.S. wheat (-25%)⁵⁸⁷. Concerning the technological factor, instead, more than one shipowner of Camogli underlined the decisive role of technological improvements, such as the reduction of coal consumption (from 3 kg to 0,82 Kg per ton/mile), to increase steam competitiveness over the sail⁵⁸⁸.

In the eyes of Camogli's shipowners, the institutional framework was critical. In this regard, the adoption of a comparative perspective was fundamental to develop effective countermeasures to adapt to the international scenario. The suffocating taxation imposed by the Italian State over the shipping business was the primary target. The congress calculated the average customs and fees pending on Italian ships in comparison with the leading European countries:

Country	Tariffs (lire per ton)
Italy	1,40
Austria	0,92
France	0,95
Germany	0,50
United Kingdom	0,42

Table 4.8. Comparison of average maritime and consular taxes by flag. Source: P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori Italiani in Camogli*, Genova: Giovanni Sambolino, 1880, pp. 18-19.

The primary responsibility for the existing discrepancies between Italy and the rest of the maritime powers were identified in consular fees, which the assembly proposed to cut for 75% of their value⁵⁸⁹. Then it was the turn of the tax on movable properties, which resulted in a 13,20% yearly rise of shipping expenses⁵⁹⁰.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁸⁸ *Idem*, p. 28. See, Chapter 3.

⁵⁸⁹ See, *Idem*, pp. 68-71. The Congress expressed this measure in the ninth article of the proposal sent to the government.

⁵⁹⁰ About the so-called *Tassa sulla ricchezza mobile*, the shipowners of Camogli published a specific pamphlet to oppose against its application to ships. See, *Difesa degli armatori di Camogli*,

Many complaints also targeted the unsustainable bureaucracy which Italian ships suffered in comparison with foreign ships. The events involving the ship *Ricordo* – reported by Ravenna, president of the *Associazione marittima di Genova* – were emblematic to illustrate these issues. The ship left from Brazil, where it was forced by an incident to repair in a port contaminated by yellow fever; after a long route with no cases onboard, it arrived in Genoa. According to the national rules, having spent – in the crossing – more than a quarantine with no ill people, the ship ought to be subjected to a lighter and shorter version of quarantine. Instead, it was forced to the so-called «hard quarantine», which prescribed the discharge of the cargo in a dedicated place. Meanwhile, a British ship – to which the *Ricordo* had consigned part of the cargo in Brazil – arrived from the same destination to Genoa with one ill person. With some diplomatic pressure, the ship was rapidly freed from its obligations and discharged⁵⁹¹.

In addition, steamships were generally favoured over sailing vessels: for instance, they could load and unload the cargo during nights and were given priority to access the docks⁵⁹².

Finally, the most critical discourse regarded the opportunity to request shipping subsidies to support the Italian fleet in the wake of the French case. Therefore, the debate was transformed into a broader discourse about political economics and the subject of maritime protectionism; in this sense, it related to the gradual shift of the Italian political atmosphere from the free market to protectionism⁵⁹³.

Traditionally, the shipowners of Camogli opposed to protectionism, despite the many benefits enjoyed through flag privileges at the exordium of the Black Sea

attori contro le Regie Finanze convenute, per l'esonero dalla tassa di ricchezza mobile, Genova: Tipografia del commercio di Genova, 1879, in ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4, Camogli.

⁵⁹¹ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 32-33.

⁵⁹² *Idem*, p. 39.

⁵⁹³ E. Del Vecchio, *La via italiana al protezionismo: le relazioni economiche internazionali dell'Italia, 1878-1888*, voll. 1-5, Roma: Archivio Storico, 1979-1980. More specifically on the Italian maritime protectionism, see: E. Corbino, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 61, No. 11, 1921, pp. 370-389; *Idem*, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 62, No. 2, 1922, pp. 65-81; E. Giretti, "I succhioni della marina mercantile", *Giornale degli economisti*, 30, 1905, pp. 37-59.

period. Various people openly sustained the *laissez-faire* policies and requested from the State just to annihilate the bureaucratic and fiscal obstacles to free market and free navigation. Thus, the primary target of their requests naturally became the reduction of tax burdens. However, the French law on subsidies altered this situation: the need to compete against foreign protectionist policies pushed Camogli's shipowners toward maritime protectionism. To shed light on this process, the long intervention of Francesco Schiaffino is emblematic:

[...] until today, we were satisfied with requesting to the government to relieve us from the burden of taxes and customs affecting us; [...] then came out the French law about subsidies, which will strike the deadly blow to our marine which, aside from being subjugated to the usual vicissitudes which have already exhausted it, will be totally annihilated by the impossible competition with the ships of the mentioned country. [...] Given the law above, the total abolition of taxes to the flourishing marines of Sweden and Norway, the similar upcoming laws in Russia, the tangible facilitations and subsidies which, albeit not openly, are conceded to the Austrian ships, our committee, according to the famous saying *in extremis, extremity*, decided to gather together in order to identify the best measures to arm ourselves against the incipient ruin. [...] The lowering of taxes, which has been the object of all our requests so far, today would be just a disappointment, a medication applied to a wooden leg, as opposed to the grants of foreign marines and, in particular, of the French one.⁵⁹⁴

The French law granted to the national flag various typologies of subsidies, both for ship constructions and navigation. The subventions for national constructions aimed at stimulating and protecting national shipyards: on the one hand, every shipowner received an amount of money proportionated to ship tonnages, a great

⁵⁹⁴ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 15-16.

aid to reduce the impact of starting costs on shipowners; on the other hand, shipbuilding was concentrated into national shipyards, thus providing them large and incessant orders. Then, the second type of subsidies regarded navigation: they consisted of direct subventions of 1,50 Fr. per 1000 miles and 1,50 Fr. per ton, with little or no limitations. Through subsidies, French governors granted considerable advantages to the national flag, estimated to a 1/3 of a freight: in this way, French captains could lower the freights to unsustainable levels for Italians⁵⁹⁵.

As a reaction, the shipowners of Camogli claimed analogous subsidies to grant the Italian flag the same conditions of foreign competitors. These demands, however, moved past *laissez-faire* policies and took the form of open encouragements for maritime protectionism. The development of the proposals was long and laborious: in 1880 emerged a program articulated into ten points, which, during the 1881 Inquiry, the people gathered in Camogli substantially re-submitted in the same form. Notwithstanding various details, which underwent several modifications before the law became active in 1885, some features are worth noting to discuss the general disposition of Camogli shipowners and their understanding of the national and international scenarios.

The most debated argument, for example, consisted of identifying the beneficiaries. Naturally, this discourse opened much broader discussions about the evolution of the international market and the fate of sail and steam. Whereas the previous chapter addressed the competition between sail and steam through objective factors (coal consumption, market segmentation etc.), the next pages will focus on the subjective side of the same argument, formed by the partial perceptions of Camogli's contemporary observers.

The implementation of the economic concept of «path dependence» might be appropriate to delineate Camogli's general disposition in front of technological transition. By resorting to «path dependence», we intend to underline the role played by past events and decisions to influence later evaluations related to the

⁵⁹⁵ Idem, pp. 19-20.

adoption of new technologies⁵⁹⁶. In the case of Camogli, the «path dependence» can be reconducted to different processes: firstly, from a cultural and social perspective, it was correlated to the long-standing attachment to sailing traditions, which had made the fortunes of the community. Secondly, by stressing the economic factor, the «path dependence» materialized in the protection of the previous investments in sailing shipping, which had reached their peak in the early 1870s. These two elements, traditional thinking and investment protection, represent the primary endogenous factors in determining Camogli's slow transition from sail to steam.

In the sources, the «path dependence» was expressed through the refusal of the incipient decline of sail. Although some shipowners perceived iron and steam vessels as the future for shipping, many professed their faith into the profitable alternatives offered by marginal tramping routes: that was, in fact, the market sector to which most of Camogli's ships engaged until the First World War. There were also some intermediate positions, still involving path dependence, as in the case of Viale. During his intervention to the Congress – and in the oral and written memories produced for the National Inquiry – Viale articulated his discourse around the distinction between transformation to and creation of a modern iron-hulled steam-propelled fleet⁵⁹⁷. The conditions of the Italian merchant marine made impossible the «transformation» from sail to steam but required its «creation» from scratch. In the meantime, the Italian State ought to protect the interests of the existing sailing fleet, because sail still represented the wealth and the capital of Italian shipping. In other words, protecting the existing fleet and shipping capitals constituted the priority. The protection of sailing shipping was fundamental to endure the negative cycle; then, as soon as a positive phase occurred, the collection of abundant capitals would have gathered the resources needed to create a steam fleet.

⁵⁹⁶ For a general overview, see: P. Garrouste and S. Ioannides (eds.), *Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas. Past and Present*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.

⁵⁹⁷ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, p. 22.

Therefore, in Camogli's proposals, sail shipping still played a critical role. Indeed, the shipowners recognized the need to protect it in the short/medium run. Some even pushed for the complete equalization of sail and steam to benefit from construction and navigation subsidies. Olivari even proposed to grant an identical sum (50 It. Lira per ton) to wooden and iron constructions: he was optimistic about the future of wooden-hulled vessels and praised the plenty of wood within the Italian territory as opposed to the paucity of iron and steel⁵⁹⁸.

Then, in 1885, drawing from the copious set of proposals collected during the Inquiry, the Italian government opted for maritime protectionism, through the determination of subsidies to the national merchant marine⁵⁹⁹. In historical discourses, shipping subsidies are traditionally associated with steam navigation, used to finance strategic transports, such as postal services⁶⁰⁰. With the 1885 law, instead, the Italian State committed itself to the protection of the merchant marine in its entirety: in particular, it aimed at supporting it on the international stage and stimulating its modernisation. This involvement acted in three different regards: 1) construction subsidies; 2) navigation subsidies for coal transports; 3) general navigation subsidies⁶⁰¹.

The articles from 1 to 7 regulated the subsidies in favor of constructions: steamships and iron-hulled sailing vessels were aligned and received 60 lire per ton. Instead, wooden-hulled vessels were given 15 lire per ton⁶⁰².

The eighth article prescribed 1 lira bonus per ton of coal carried to the Italian ports from a place outside the Gibraltar Strait⁶⁰³. This measure interested both sail and steam vessels and reflected the Italian needs for this strategic transport: as

⁵⁹⁸ Idem, p. 55.

⁵⁹⁹ See, *Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile*, artt. 1-14 and its 1896 update: *Legge 23 luglio 1896, n. 318. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di costruzione e premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali*, artt. 1-18. See, also: E. Corbino, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885", pp. 383-389; Id., "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia", pp. 65-73.

⁶⁰⁰ See Chapter 3.

⁶⁰¹ *Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547*.

⁶⁰² Idem, art. 1.

⁶⁰³ Idem, art. 8.

seen in Chapter 3, some ships of Camogli exploited these subsidies to increase the cost-effectiveness of the return leg to the Mediterranean.

Finally, the tenth article granted 0,65 lire per ton and the same amount per 1000 miles to the vessels which navigated beyond Suez or the Gibraltar Strait⁶⁰⁴.

Summing it up, the efforts made by Camogli shipowners found satisfaction in the publication of the 1885 law. The inauguration of the protectionist phase for the Italian merchant marine was seen as a necessary evil to withstand foreign competition⁶⁰⁵. However, the characteristics of Camogli's fleet were subjected to more rapid changes: from the mid-1880s, and in particular, at the end of the century, most of the shipping investments were directed to second-hand foreign-built ships, which were not covered by the Italian state subsidies. Indeed, although intended to guide the Italian merchant marine to transition, the shipping subsidies obtained the most tangible results toward Italian iron and steam shipbuilding⁶⁰⁶. Thus, the subsidies never became a structural source of income for Camogli, which was progressively cut off from the Italian bounty system and relegated to a secondary role within the Italian merchant marine.

Conclusions

In 1888, even the original *Mutua* was liquidated. The shipping capital and the number of associates were no more sufficient to cover the expenses⁶⁰⁷. A few years before, in 1884, a group of shipowners had founded another mutual insurance, the *Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "Cristoforo Colombo"*⁶⁰⁸. The *Cristoforo Colombo* targeted a distinct shipping market, as the statute prescribed

⁶⁰⁴ Idem, art. 10.

⁶⁰⁵ Both construction and navigation subsidies were diminished by the law number 745 of the 13th July 1911. See: *Legge 13 luglio 1911, n. 745. Che approva provvedimenti a favore dell'industria delle costruzioni navali.*

⁶⁰⁶ E. Giretti, "I succhioni della marina mercantile", pp. 37-59.

⁶⁰⁷ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 39-41.

⁶⁰⁸ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Statuto della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "Cristoforo Colombo" in Camogli. 10 Luglio 1884.

the prohibition for the insured ships to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and to sail beyond Constantinople⁶⁰⁹. Thus, it concerned mostly cabotage ships, a factor confirmed by the introduction of a threshold value of 15.000 lire for coverage.

The disappearance of the *Mutua* and the gradual recovery of Camogli's shipping elicited various modifications to the statute of the *Colombo*. In 1907, it was wholly reformed: now, it accepted iron and steel vessels only and increased the maximum value of insurance to 150.000 lire. Those who survived to the 1880s crisis, indeed, began to purchase second-hand iron-hulled ships on the foreign market and engage to tramp shipping of bulk merchandises⁶¹⁰. Joint partnerships became the dominant pattern of business: the individualistic competition among the members of the same family – mitigated by the whole set of risk-sharing tools described above – was substituted by mutual collaboration and capital concentration. This was perceived as the only way to contrast the massive rise in costs determined by technological advance.

However, although Camogli's maritime activities slightly recovered in the 1900s, the flourishing past was over. The widespread community of shipowners, who exceeded two hundred elements in 1883, was reduced to few elements. Then, the First World War stroke the final blow. Even fewer survived to the war period; However, despite Camogli had lost its shipowning position within the international scenario, the community preserved its maritime projection through seafaring labour. Under this light, the foundation of the nautical school, with its 242 students of local origins between 1909 and 1913⁶¹¹, represented the most durable accomplishment of the «golden age of sail» of Camogli.

⁶⁰⁹ Idem, Articolo Addizionale del 3 Ottobre 1884.

⁶¹⁰ See, Chapter 3.

⁶¹¹ M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, p. 372.

5. MARITIME LABOUR IN THE AGE OF TRANSITION

Introduction

This chapter addresses Camogli seafarers' lives through the lens of the transformations which the transition from sail to steam triggered on the individual lives and collective structures of the community. Differently from the previous chapter, in the following pages the subject shifts from shipping business and the ship-owning elites to maritime labour and sea workers, in the attempt to grasp the impact of technological advancements from a social, more than economic, perspective of seafaring communities. In so doing, the resilience of Camogli's shipping will be reinterpreted under the light of maritime labour, that is, the evolution of vertical mobility, salaries, the duration and continuity of seafaring careers and the tensions within on board relationships and discipline. Whereas usually historiography tends to examine seafaring communities ashore in selected maritime towns and districts for studying seafarers' social tensions and dynamics, our primary point of research will be the ship, the seafaring community on board the vessel. Indeed, particularly concerning small seafaring towns, there seems to be an inherent link between worlds at sea and ashore, and ships can be viewed as entire microcosms reproducing all the dynamics and tensions belonging to the community. In other words, ships might be conceived as full-fledged «floating communities», social and human places where ashore communitarian dynamics are repeatedly transferred and evolve to new directions.

5.1. The sources

The chapter draws on a broad set of archival sources, which were produced in different moments and for different purposes and, therefore, entail different analyses.

The information on the career of the seamen from Camogli is drawn from the registry of the *Matricole della gente di mare*, kept at the State Archives of Genoa⁶¹². The material of this source is combined with data from crew lists and logbooks. These type of sources will provide evidence on questions such as the composition of the crews, the professions on board and their wages. Finally, more qualitative sources, withdrawn from the archival collections of the Italian merchant marine administration⁶¹³, will be fundamental to broaden the spectrum of information and to provide vivid samples of the realities, as on board and events such as tensions, insubordinations and desertion.

The *Matricole della gente di mare* was based on the French system of the *Inscriptions maritime*, adopted in the Napoleonic period and then preserved by the Savoy administration. Such classification of French sea workers into distinct categories dated back to 1689 *Ordonnances de la marine*, then updated in 1795⁶¹⁴. According to the regulations of the Sardinian Kingdom, later passed to Unified Italy, every seaman needed to register into the first or the second category of maritime professions in order to work. The former served for the on board professions within the national merchant marine and high seas fishing. The latter, instead, concerned ship-builders and coastal fishermen⁶¹⁵.

The Ligurian seafarers registered in the *Matricole* in the first category of seamen cover the period between 1843 and 1886, before and after the Italian unification.

The formal structure of these registrations varied over time due to several bureaucratic adjustments; nevertheless, the records contain comparable data, such as enrolment years, career advances and few necessary details concerning each embarkment along with the date and cause of the career's cessation. In light of the mentioned adjustments, the source presents two different serial progressions: the

⁶¹² ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁶¹³ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, 1860-1869.

⁶¹⁴ J. Captier, *Étude historique et économique sur l'inscription maritime*, Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1907; P. Villiers and P. Currelier, "Du système des Classes à l'Inscription Maritime", *Revue Historique des Armées*, 147/2, (1982), 44-53.

⁶¹⁵ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, Milano: Fratelli Bauroni, 1866, art. 18, pp. 11-12.

first begins in 1843, at the number 1192, and proceeds up to 1866 (number 25367). From that date onwards, due to the publication of a new Code for the Merchant Marine, the serial progression restarted from zero. Nevertheless, together with these bureaucratic transformations, the archival collection presents some gaps in terms of serial continuity. The Genoa State Archives possess only 15 registers of the second series, spanning from number 4324, in 1868, up to the 28423, in 1886. Despite such limits, nonetheless, the material preserved within this archival collection contains data of extraordinary value for more than thirty thousand seafarers.

The records were collected in registers, each of them embracing an average of six or seven hundreds individuals: then, each folio was divided into three horizontal sections, each of them reserved for different subscribers. Then, the lines were further divided into columns: the first displayed all the personal information, such as the serial number, name, surname, family details, place and date of birth, place of living, date of enrolment and the career advancements. Then, from the second column up to the end of the following page, we can find the list of embarkments, which provide the date of the beginning and end of service, the name and type of the ship, the captain's name and license type, the prospective destinations, some of the ports of call and the days of active service.

Despite their outstanding value for nineteenth-century maritime research, Italian academia never approached this material. Its problematic accessibility might be one of the reasons.⁶¹⁶ Another reason is probably the immense amount of available data that can discourage any single researcher, particularly in the context of wide-ranged and comparative studies. The existing literature has usually relied on aggregate data, tables and statistical analyses processed by the Italian public maritime administrations from the late nineteenth century onwards⁶¹⁷.

⁶¹⁶ For example, in Genoa these registers are kept in a peripheral storage house, accessible just once every two weeks under reservation. This is a general issue for nineteenth-century maritime sources, a problem which has not really changed since Paolo Frascani complained revealing this problem in the early 2000s: P. Frascani, "Una comunità in viaggio: dai racconti dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane", in Idem, *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 109-139.

⁶¹⁷ See, M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare. Economia e organizzazione del lavoro marittimo fra Otto e Novecento*, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XLII/2, 2002. In particular, we point at the fundamental source represented by the yearly statistical publication about the conditions of

Aggregate data, however, highly useful for analysis of geographic areas and overviews, conceal local development of specific places.⁶¹⁸ In this way, Camogli's unique case disappeared in the course of overall analyses which bring out Genoa's administrative district as the central statistical unit.

Even in a broader and comparative perspective, however, the use of career-length sources such as the *Matricole* seems to be rare in the literature on nineteenth-century maritime labour⁶¹⁹. Most scholars analyse by focusing only on the economic side, devoting considerable attention to wages and retributions. According to this perspective, which is indeed fundamental for the comprehension of broader dynamics, the existing international literature focuses on seafarers as a part of a collective, the crew, and, as a result, preferred crew lists, logbooks and crew agreements are used rather than career records⁶²⁰. Similarly to the Italian situation, these studies have also drawn mainly from aggregate and state-produced data to reconstruct the society of seafarers within specific national markets quantitatively. Furthermore, whereas concerning the Scandinavian countries there is no mention of archival material comparable to the Italian *Matricole*, Sarah Palmer and David M. Williams, in dealing with British maritime labour, confirm the existence of equivalent sources (the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen), whose utilisation was deemed as «a theoretical rather than practical possibility»⁶²¹.

the Italian merchant marine. *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1896-1914.

⁶¹⁸ There is some sparse reference to Camogli concerning the national distribution of tonnage by cities, which we mentioned in Chapter 3.

⁶¹⁹ See, P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?: European sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570 – 1870*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 1997; L.R. Fischer (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 2019; R. Gorski, *Maritime Labour: Contributions to the History of Work at Sea, 1500-2000*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007.

⁶²⁰ Y. Kaukiainen, *Sailing into Twilight*, pp. 102-104; K. Davids, "Maritime labour in the Netherlands, 1570-1870", in P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 41-72; S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, "British sailors, 1775-1870", in Idem, *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 93-118; M. North, "German sailors, 1650-1900", in Idem, *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 253-266.

⁶²¹ S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, "British sailors, 1775-1870", p. 107.

In contrast, in the French case, such archival material has been used: one example is the recent work of Nicolas Cochard⁶²². Cochard has used a similar spatial and chronological approach studying the seafarers of Havre in the nineteenth century, which represents the closest comparison to the present work. Indeed, part of his methodology provided inspiration for part of our analysis.

5.1.1. METHODOLOGY

From *Matricole*, we gathered a sample of three hundred seamen to represent Camogli's seafaring population for the period 1840s-1910s. We classified the archival material into three groups according to chronological criteria, e.g. date of birth⁶²³. The first group (1*) includes one hundred seafarers born from 1825 to 1835. These seamen undertook seafaring from the late 1830s to 1852. The second group (2*) encompasses seafarers born during 1845-1855: these began their professional career at sea between 1855 and 1871. The third group (3*) includes those born during 1865-1875 period which began from the late 1870s to 1886.

The chronological span depends on the chronological boundaries of the archival sources. Nevertheless, provided that each registration recorded seafarers' entire careers, the three groups embrace up to seventy years of Camogli's maritime history (from 1843 to 1914).

During data collection, we recorded both quantitative and qualitative information related to seamen; in particular, apart from biographical details concerning seafarers – including origin, service duration, and career advancements – the *Matricole* offered details regarding the career paths undertaken. The sources provide affluent evidence on all the ports of call or the prospective destination of each seaman. It would be impossible, however, to record and compare this

⁶²² N. Cochard, *Les marins du Havre: gens de mer et société urbaine au XIXe siècle*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2020. Enric.

⁶²³ In the analysis of the statistical sample, the sources taken into consideration will be referred to the database drawn from: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, from register 1 to register 39, n. 1788-28423, covering the period 1843-1888. In 1867, as a consequence of the publication of a new Code for the Merchant Marine, the serial progression was interrupted and restarted from zero. Therefore, there will be two serial progressions, each of them around thirty thousand registrations.

evidence for each seaman considering the thousands of services due to the following two reasons. Firstly, a doctoral dissertation has a time limit, and processing also this kind of data is practically unfeasible. Secondly, there are serious gaps and discrepancies in the level of details provided in the different registers. In this regard, our methodology involved the implementation of broader categories that include comprehensively different kinds of career paths which seamen followed through different embarkments. In this way, we adopted the Italian juridical classification of shipping, based on geographical range criteria. From the Code of the Merchant Marine (1866), we followed the distinction between *cabotaggio*, *gran cabotaggio* and *lungo corso*⁶²⁴. *Cabotaggio* – coastal or short-range navigation – corresponded to national sea routes; *gran cabotaggio* included «the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Azov Sea and, leaving the Strait of Gibraltar, along the oceanic coasts of Spain, Portugal, France and the British islands, the North and the Baltic Sea and the western African coast, up to Senegal»⁶²⁵; *lungo corso*, instead, was unlimited and encompassed all the routes outside the previously mentioned borders⁶²⁶.

5.1.2. MARITIME ACTORS

Our maritime actors, the seafarers, had different roles on board and different skills; we have followed further categorisations according to them in order to enrich and deepen our analysis on the different maritime trajectories. Some recent studies – addressing the technological and economic consequences of transition on nineteenth-century maritime labour – have produced a categorisation based on their professional level, their specialised skills and the execution of specific activities on board⁶²⁷. During the age of sail, such operation led to the adoption of

⁶²⁴ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 59, pp. 20-21.

⁶²⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶²⁶ See Chapter 3 for an extensive presentation of Camogli's traffics throughout the oceanic phase.

⁶²⁷ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751-1913", *Explorations in economic history*, 2016; S.M. Hynninen, J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical

three different categories of maritime workers: low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled seamen⁶²⁸. According to this model, the first category embraced cabin-boys, deck-boys and ordinary seamen: since their tasks were mainly physical, these profiles required little or no skills to fulfil their duties at sea. The second category included able-bodied seamen, stewards and boatswains who handled more complicated tasks, whose pursuit required routine skills and a certain degree of expertise. On top stood ship-officers – masters and mates – who combined practical experience with abstract knowledge to manage navigation.

The adoption of such categorisation in our work revealed to be substantially effective and quite representative of Camogli's seafaring professional trajectories. The main critical issue arose in the representation of the lowest category, that of cabin boys and ordinary seamen, in relation to the upper professional groups. According to existing studies⁶²⁹, low-skilled seafarers are distinguished from the other categories on the basis of a supposed labour competition, which shipowners triggered in their attempt to increase the share of low-skilled seafarers and diminish labour costs. In contrast, the case of Camogli – according to a model which might be replicable to other seafaring communities – does not seem to present such features. Shipowners, on the one hand, did require cabin-boys and ordinary seamen to handle low-skilled activities; it was only natural and expected that they would be trained by the other more skilled seamen. Therefore, in a closed and endogenous labour system as the one of Camogli, as we will see, the existence of labour competition between younger (below than eighteen years old) and older seamen seems hardly sustainable in the long term, as low-skilled professions represented more a formative step within the seafaring career than a class on its own.

Nonetheless, this skill-biased model seems to fit appropriately into the Italian legal and customary hierarchy on board, despite the low-skilled incongruence.

evidence from linked employer–employee data”, *Labour Economics*, 2013, 24, pp. 1-11; A. Chin, C. Juhn, and P. Thompson, “Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891–1912”, *The Review of economics and statistics*, 2006, 88:3, pp. 572-578.

⁶²⁸ J. Ojala et al., “Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail”.

⁶²⁹ See, footnote n. 620.

This model was first applied to the analysis of skill-premia, namely the wage differentials between skilled and unskilled seafarers⁶³⁰. Summing up, the model based on seamen's skills provided us with some of the most important critical tools for the analysis of the present chapter. The skill-focused model has been, of course, adjusted to the Italian maritime labour framework and legislation.

In order to be recognised as *marinaio* (sailor as a general reference, able-bodied seaman according to the broadly recognised British terminology), seafarers were required to reach the age of eighteen years old and to spend twenty-four months at sea⁶³¹. In the period before such legal requirements, Italian seamen were either *mozzi* (cabin and deck-boys) or *giovinotti* (ordinary seamen), depending on the experience acquired. During their first twelve months, cabin and deck-boys were engaged in basic physical tasks and learned more on ship handling and navigation by observing their more experienced peers. There was a thin line of distinction between work and apprenticeship: in slightly more than 8% of the cases, for instance, cabin-boys did not receive a salary throughout their period at sea⁶³².

Then, cabin-boys were upgraded to the rank of *giovinotto*. The sources, however, indicate discrepancies between the common shipping practice and the Maritime Law. On the one hand, the Italian Code of the Merchant Marine never mentioned the rank of *giovinotti* among the official ranks or statuses of the Italian seafarers. On the other hand, the Ligurian crew agreements included the rank of *giovinotto*, and the role of *giovinotto* is repeatedly found in Camogli's crew agreements from the 1830s to the first decade of the twentieth century⁶³³. What is more, to make things even more complicated, sometimes shipmasters tended not to distinguish them from cabin-boys in the compilation of crew agreements. Nonetheless, in terms of practice, this distinction seems to be fundamental to clarify some evident discontinuities in the earliest stages of seafarers' careers,

⁶³⁰ See the historiographical debate presented in S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums", pp. 1-2 and in A. Chin et al., "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution", pp. 572-573.

⁶³¹ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 21, p. II.

⁶³² See *infra*. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

⁶³³. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865; Idem, *Giornali nautici*.

concerning wages: evidence suggests, that ordinary seamen or, when this nomenclature is missing, more experienced cabin-boys, received almost double salary than their less experienced counterparts⁶³⁴.

Subsequently, after 24 months of experience at sea and when seamen reached the age of eighteen, the completion of the apprenticeship period on board led to the obtainment of the qualification of *marinaio* (able-bodied seaman), which meant a seaman with little or no professional education. This rank qualified seamen to handle routine tasks, for which a certain degree of expertise was required. A contemporary shipowner, with some exaggeration, asserted that «to become able-seamen takes at least ten years; they must begin as cabin-boys on sailing vessels, in order to acquire the expertise and bravery needed to fight against winds and seas»⁶³⁵. In the age of sail, able-bodied seamen represented the crucial productive workforce on board: handling the ropes and sails to manoeuvre the ship was their principal duty which required high expertise.

The rank above the able-seamen was the *nostromo* (boatswain) and the *dispensiere* (steward). Despite their widespread diffusion in the Italian merchant marine, both of them lacked a clear definition within the national maritime legislation. Theoretically, the *nostromo* (boatswain) ranked among petty officers, along with coastal pilots and master carpenters (whose influence was limited to their specific areas of competence): boatswains' were responsible for the ship equipment and their primary duties concerned to direct the execution of manoeuvring operations under masters' and mates' direct orders⁶³⁶. Also, the boatswain was the representative of the crew before officials and was the most experienced seaman (even more than the captains) on board.

Italian legislation was even less generous in describing the stewards (*dispensiere*). This profession is mentioned just in one instance where the lawmaker pointed to captain's responsibilities to «declare, during the enrolment,

⁶³⁴ See *infra*, Table 5.9.

⁶³⁵ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile*, vol. I, p. 56.

⁶³⁶ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 66, pp. 23-24.

the qualification of *nostromo* and *dispensiere*»⁶³⁷; all the other qualifications had specific legal requirements. Therefore, the Code for the Merchant Marine nowhere mentions the stewards' job description at sea. To worsen the situation, as far as the literature about nineteenth-century Italian maritime labour is concerned, the role of *dispensiere* received little or no attention, despite his broad recurrence in maritime sources⁶³⁸. Likewise, nautical vocabularies were short in details too: the *dispensiere* was generically considered in charge of the hold of provisions and their distribution to the crew⁶³⁹. Considering that cooks are never mentioned in sailing vessels' crew agreements, it seems that stewards were also in charge of cooking. Apart from that, it is not clear whether he received from the captain responsibilities on provisions and food supplies in ports or not, and to what extent he was also engaged in works on board as a regular sailor. Boatswains were required on board for their expertise; stewards for possessing collateral practical skills.

Finally, a group of highly-skilled, experienced and educated seafarers – masters and mates – stood above low and middle-skilled seamen. The role of formal education was crucial in determining the distinction of one group from another. Able-bodied seamen and boatswains were not required of any sort of theoretical education, apart from practical experience. It was only officers that were required to have a formal theoretical education. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Code for the Italian Merchant Marine differentiated shipmasters' into three categories: *padroni*, *capitani di gran cabotaggio* and *capitani di lungo corso*⁶⁴⁰. These labels were bound to specific geographical navigational limits in home waters corresponding to cabotage (*padroni*), great cabotage (*capitani di gran cabotaggio*) and deep-sea going shipping in international waters and high seas (*capitani di*

⁶³⁷ *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, art. 430, in M. Vocino (ed.), *Codice marittimo*, Firenze: G. Barbera, 1921, pp. 212-213.

⁶³⁸ For instance, in her work on the Italian maritime labour, Maria Stella Rollandi only mentions once the figure of *dispensiere*, without providing any detail: M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, p. 377.

⁶³⁹ See, *Dispensiere* in S. Stratico, *Vocabolario di marina in tre lingue. Tomo I*, Milano: Stamperia Reale, 1813, p. 171; *Dispensiere* in F. Piqué, *Dizionario di marina*, Milano: Natale Battezzati Editore, 1879, p. 160.

⁶⁴⁰ See, *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 57-65, pp. 20-23.

lungo corso). All the seaman aspiring to those positions needed to possess specific prerequisites: the *padroni*, at least at the age of 22 years old, were asked for a three-year experience at sea; the *capitani di gran cabotaggio*, had the same age requirements, but needed four years of navigation; the *capitani di lungo corso*, had to be of a minimum age of 24 years old, and had to comply with four years of navigation, with one year on sea voyages outside the Mediterranean⁶⁴¹.

5.2. The ships of Camogli: “floating communities”

This section will outline the main characteristics of Camogli’s maritime labour system, the mechanisms ruling its labour market, before and after the transition from sail to steam affected the evolution of local shipping and led to its marginalisation into the transport of oceanic bulk commodities. Moreover, we will focus on the persistence of family and communitarian structures within on board social relationships, a fundamental feature of Camogli’s shipping.

5.2.1. THE ENDOGENOUS LABOUR MARKET BEFORE THE 1880S

The existence of an endogenous labour market was a crucial characteristic of Camogli’s maritime labour system, before the geographical transfer of Camogli’s shipping from the Mediterranean and Black Sea routes to long-distance oceanic routes. The concept of “endogenous market” partially derives from the distinction proposed by Karel Davids in his seminal article about maritime communities⁶⁴²: according to his definition, maritime communities could be divided in endogenous and exogenous, depending on the relationship which the community of seafarers maintained with both the urban environment and with the other professional groups living there. Thus, old traditional seafaring centres, such as Marstal or

⁶⁴¹ Idem, art. 62.

⁶⁴² K. Davids, “Local and global: Seafaring communities in the North Sea area, c. 1600–2000”, pp. 631-634.

Scarborough⁶⁴³ – and, in this group, we can include Camogli – were defined as endogenous due to the high relative weight of seafaring within the economy of the community. In these places, maritime activities represented, at the same time, the most rewarding business and the most reliable source of employment. This combination of shipping and maritime labour in the same space and within the same human community is the groundwork for our conception of “endogenous labour market”, in which local demands and supplies for maritime labour tended to their mutual satisfaction. Data evidence withdrawn from crew lists and *matricole* seem to support this hypothesis – at least until Camogli’s shipping was marginalised to the oceanic outskirts as a result of technological advancements in navigation⁶⁴⁴.




Figure 5.1. Geographical origins of crew members of Camogli-owned ships (1850-1865). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

Figure 5.1 displays the origins of seafarers on board on Camogli-owned ships during 1831-1865. Among them, seamen born in Camogli cover nearly half of the figure and, in general, the Ligurian area provides 88% of the total maritime workforce. Out of this percentage, the high share of towns and villages along the

⁶⁴³ Idem, p. 631. On the analogies between Camogli and Scarborough, see Chapter 1 and C.R. Foy, “Sewing a safety net”, pp. 1-28.

⁶⁴⁴ See chapter 3.

Eastern Riviera, most of them around Camogli, might induce to enlarge the perspective to a broader sub-regional area, in which various neighbouring communities referred to Camogli as the primary source of maritime employment. Then, apart from Genoa, whose administrative borders blur the sources, the importance of the other categories like the “Other Italian States” and “other origin” is very low. Camogli’s maritime labour pool was entirely Ligurian.

This model presents some valuable differentiation according to specific professional categories (Figure 5.2). The share of high-skilled seamen (shipmasters and mates) from Camogli, living in Camogli, accounted for 67% of the records. The rest came from Genoa and the Eastern Riviera. Then, low-skilled seafarers (cabin-boys and ordinary seamen) from Camogli measured slightly beyond the average (43%). The origins of able-bodied seamen, boatswains and steward varied more; only 33% of them was born in Camogli.




Figure 5.2. Geographical origins by skill-levels. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

Aggregate data fails to effectively outline a large number of cases that are representative of this era. On the one hand, for example, on the brig *Alfa* (221 t.), in 1859, there were eleven seamen, all of them – from master to cabin-boys – from Camogli⁶⁴⁵. On the other hand, the crew of the brig *Regolo* in 1864, was composed

⁶⁴⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie I4, n. 2227.

only of three people from Camogli – the master, the steward and a cabin-boy –, whereas the others lived in nearby towns, such as Recco, Rapallo, Nervi and Portofino⁶⁴⁶.

The relatively high numbers of ship officials born in Camogli testifies the strong correlation between masters and ship-owners. As we will see later more clearly⁶⁴⁷, in the selection of shipmasters, kinship and trust relationships played fundamental roles. It was understandable, therefore, that the shipowners' preference targeted captains from a community-based labour pool market. An analogous discourse, then, ruled the recruitment of cabin-boys who, in several cases, were close relatives either of owners or masters.

Moreover, the results shown in Figure 5.1 might encourage us to widen the perspective. The rupture of the imaginative borders of Camogli's seafaring community and their enlargement to a broader sub-region suggest a new framework in which Camogli's leadership created relationships (in terms of seafaring demand and supply) with the neighbouring communities. In the nineteenth century, Camogli witnessed a demographic boom as a result of the extraordinary growth of its shipping activities – which created new labour opportunities. Demographic data are available from 1861 onwards: in 1881, the local population had passed from roughly eight thousand to more than ten⁶⁴⁸. In the decade between 1861 and 1881, the growth rate was of 19,2%, in contrast with a 6,8% average of the neighbouring towns⁶⁴⁹.

The evolution of Recco in the same period, for example, followed the opposite trend. From the times of the Republic of Genoa until the mid-nineteenth century, Recco had represented the hegemonic power in the area, whereas Camogli was a poorly populated fishing village. Still in 1859, according to the readjustment of Ligurian administrative units, Camogli was subordinate to Recco, although, in terms of population, the former outnumbered the latter. Then, the subsequent rise

⁶⁴⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 4684.

⁶⁴⁷ See, *infra*.

⁶⁴⁸ Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT), *Comuni e loro popolazione ai censimenti dal 1861 al 1951*, Roma: Azienda Beneventana Tipografica Editoriale, 1960, pp. 53-54.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

of Camogli found recognition only in 1877, when of its number inhabitants were double than those of Recco and was officially promoted as a city⁶⁵⁰.

Conversely, to understand the features of the endogenous labour market, we can overturn the perspective adopted in Figure 5.1. There, the geographical distribution of the seamen embarked on Camogli-owned vessels is shown; now, we address the analysis of the embarkments of the sailors from Camogli, whether they embarked on Camogli-owned vessels or not. The results outline how, before the late 1880s, the seamen of Camogli found employment in the domestic fleet, with little or no exceptions; only afterwards, as a result of the downgrading conditions of local shipping, some seafarers sought for further opportunities into different markets, particularly on cargo and passenger steamers⁶⁵¹.

As presented in the previous chapters about Camogli's maritime activities, in the 1840s and 1850s, most of the seamen began their careers in cabotage, pursuing long-standing local interests along the Tyrrhenian routes, especially those for the transport of charcoal⁶⁵². Then, they engaged on longer deep-sea going routes towards the Black Sea trade, which represented a trademark for most of them, before moving even further to oceanic navigation.

Throughout its rising phase, Camogli's shipping stimulated considerable demands for the workforce, which led shipowners and captains to expand to neighbouring towns labour markets. This phenomenon might also be an explanation for the low rates of cases of desertion aimed to embark on foreign ships, a well-established and widespread phenomenon in other merchant marines⁶⁵³, up to the late 1880s. Before the last decades of the nineteenth century, desertion, whose evolution will be further discussed in the next chapter, responded to different needs and was tied to migration flows, according to which some seafarers quitted the ships and sought for a new life in the Americas.

⁶⁵⁰ G.B. Roberto Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*.

⁶⁵¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

⁶⁵² See, Chapter 1 and the similarities with the 17th century British case outlined in: R. Davis, *The rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*.

⁶⁵³ See, Chapter 6.

Notwithstanding the last phase (the 1880s-1910s), therefore, the existence of an endogenous labour market – ruling local demand and supply of seafaring workforce – represents a fundamental characteristic of Camogli's maritime evolution. From a social perspective, this endogenous way to form the crews resulted in the persistence of the land features at sea. Family ties, kinship and, more broadly, all sorts of direct relationships established ashore were continued on board, into crew inter-relationships and in the mechanisms of keeping discipline during navigation. Life on board, therefore, was a sort of re-enactment of the life ashore. In a contemporary polemical pamphlet, these characteristics were neatly described through a metaphor, which compared every ship to a moving migrant family:

Since the ships were relatively scarce [in numbers and tons], their crews were composed by people from the same town, where also shipownership was concentrated; yet, the supply of sailors exceeded their demand. This led to limited and contiguous relationships, which never went beyond the local and narrow geographical and professional clusters. Also, this resulted in the fact that all these people, anxious for their livelihoods, had to remain bound, industrious and disciplined. Every ship, therefore, is like *a family that emigrates for some time*.⁶⁵⁴

In Camogli's case-study, however, this persuasive metaphor, which the author used to blame Ligurian backwardness in shipping, can be pushed further, from family to community. Indeed, under this light, the fleet of Camogli can be conceived as a multitude of "floating communities".

⁶⁵⁴ G. De Rossi, "La Marina mercantile italiana", *Nuova Antologia*, 1881, p. 5, in ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4.

5.2.2. KINSHIP AND COMMUNITY: ON BOARD RELATIONSHIPS IN TRADITIONAL SEAFARING

In Camogli, seafaring careers began rather early, soon after the completion of primary school, which represented the highest degree of education for most of the seamen (except the masters). Maritime culture and traditions played a crucial role in directing most of the boys towards seafaring. In broad terms, the most common behaviour consisted of taking service between age eleven and fourteen and for short voyages, in order to adapt to life at sea progressively.

Range of age	1* (1825-1835)	2* (1845-1855)	3* (1865-1875)
>11	3	14	0
11-12	47	54	21
13-14	38	20	53
15-16	11	11	24
16>	1	0	3
Average (y-d)	12 y - 240 d	12y - 36 d	13y - 259 d

Table 5.1 Age of first enrolment (series 1-3). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

In the years preceding the first official embarkments, several youngsters underwent their own informal “baptism of the sea”, in the context of seasonal fishing campaigns – like those for anchovies in Gorgona⁶⁵⁵ – where they learned the fundamentals of navigation. Afterwards, upon parental permission, which was mandatory for under-aged seafarers⁶⁵⁶, these prospective sailors enrolled within the first ranks of the Italian merchant marine as *mozzi*. The first steps of the cabin boys in the maritime world constituted a fundamental stage in the sailors’ practical education. Indeed, in sailing ship navigation, the transfer of seafaring knowledge was an intergenerational process involving all the members of the crew. Professional expertise was handed down from one generation to another, through observation and first-person repetition of the fundamental operations performed

⁶⁵⁵ See, Chapter 1.

⁶⁵⁶ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d’Italia*, art. 73, in M. Vocino, *Codice marittimo*, p. 25.

at sea. In broader terms, the ship – to be perceived as a communitarian human space – attended to its social responsibilities toward the younger members of the community rather than demanding cheap labour force. Cabin-boys represented a transitional workforce; they were active members of the community, and their participation in its maritime activities was part of their maturity to manhood and seamanship. In this framework, the dimensions of family and community overlapped, as testified by the broad recurrence of father-son relationships between masters and cabin-boys observed in the crew agreements of the Black Sea period. This was, for instance, the case of Giuseppe and Gio. Batta Bozzo, respectively shipmaster and cabin-boy, enlisted in the crew of the barque *N.S. della Concezione* (305 t.), which left Genoa in June 1859 to the Azov Sea⁶⁵⁷. The same pattern is seen for Giacomo and Diodato Schiaffino, on board of the brig *Genio* (338 t.) over which, however, Giacomo was both owner and captain⁶⁵⁸. In the selection of the crew members, shipowners and shipmasters coexisted and shared their control; yet, when these figures merged in the same individual, family relationships on board became the rule.

Apart from the need for the education of future captains and shipowners, which represented the most common typology of kinship relationships on board, the composition of the crews may consist in the transfer of entire families at sea. In 1862, this was the case of Agostino Degregori, owner of the brig *Dante* (278 t.), who appointed his two sons, Gio. Batta and Luigi, respectively as shipmaster and mate. Two years later, as soon as Luigi was licensed as captain, he was promoted to master, whereas his brother Gio. Batta was given the command of the barque *Italico* (369 t.), still owned by Agostino⁶⁵⁹. Moreover, on the brigs *Eto* (143 t.) and *Le due to marie* (144 t.), same family members on board were respectively three and four, shipmaster, mate and boatswain in the former, and shipmaster, mate,

⁶⁵⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 3783.

⁶⁵⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6803.

⁶⁵⁹ See, Idem, serie 14, n. 9498 and serie 16, n. 4631 and 8959. See also, ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 6, n. 6802 and Idem, register 10, n. 11920.

boatswain and a cabin-boy in the latter⁶⁶⁰. Besides, these extraordinary cases shed light on a noteworthy feature concerning the fluid definition of the role of boatswains on board. In the previous section, boatswains were defined as responsible for the ship equipment and the management of the more complicated operations at sea. Their duties required long-term experience in navigation, and boatswains were usually chosen among the most skilled seamen available. On the other hand, archival evidence suggests the existence of underlying mechanisms which complicated somehow the adoption of this straightforward paradigm. For instance, data concerning the age of boatswains returned a result of an average age of 34,5 years and, in some records, of less than 25 years⁶⁶¹. Such cases are the boatswains Luigi Olivari (on board *Eto*) and Fortunato Aste (on board *Le due to marie*), 20 years old, at the time of their embarkments⁶⁶². Both embarked under their respective fathers, who were shipmasters, and Aste Fortunato was even in his two brothers' company, who were enlisted as mate and cabin-boy. In the course of their careers, both Luigi and Fortunato became shipmasters after a few years⁶⁶³.

In these cases, the extension of family ties to crew members implied the partial reshaping of boatswains' character. This phenomenon is connected with overabundant supplies of high-skilled and educated seamen, in the context of seafaring communities which are distinguished for solid shipowning traditions. The absence of law requirements to embark as boatswain allowed underaged, but qualified, masters and mates to compete for the same position: the aim was to accumulate months of navigation and to spend the time intercurrent between the completion of the school and the minimum age to be officially mates and masters. Thus, the boatswains' professional profile, whose trademark was superior experience on board, was technically turned upside down: on board, the boatswain

⁶⁶⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4031 and serie 14, n. 6798, bricks *Eto* (143 tons.) and *Le due Marie* (144 tons.), both of them headed to Black Sea ports (Odessa and Galatz).

⁶⁶¹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

⁶⁶² *Idem*, serie 13, n. 4031 and serie 14, n. 6798.

⁶⁶³ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 6 and 11. Luigi Olivari (n. 7142) became master in 1861 and then upgraded his licence for oceanic routes in 1867. Fortunato Aste (n. 11482), was promoted to master in 1867 and in 1868 commanded the brick bark *Aste Giuseppe* (named after his father) along great cabotage routes. See, ACS, *Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea*, box. 436.

was no more the most experienced sailor but became a temporary position for young prospective deck officials.

Apart from increasing the control of shipowners over the ship's life at sea, through the imposition of family members, the communitarian dimension shaped the social attitude of shipowners towards sailors. Northern European and American scholars have used nineteenth-century literature to support evidence on a widespread and generalised negative stance of shipowners against seamen based mainly on the British and American societies⁶⁶⁴. Common seafarers are described as rude, uneducated, prone to drunkenness, to violence and all sorts of malicious behaviours; yet, owners needed them to man their ships and, therefore, devised any kind of measure to control and limit their "spontaneous" malice. Camogli's endogenous and community-based pool for recruiting sailors raises a striking contrast with this general interpretation. Shipowners and seamen are respected members of cohesive family communities with tight relations. There are no clues about shipowners' judgemental or harsh behaviour against crews; a sharp difference which can be related to the enclosed society and shared space where behaviour on board was immediately made known ashore.

Most of the shipowners' kinship was limited to the ruling ranks (plus cabin-boys, for the mentioned educational purposes): sons and relatives usually filled the best positions, such as those of shipmaster, mate and boatswain. Shipowners' direct relatives were rarely engaged to low and middle-skilled positions for long periods. There are some instances of close-relatives enlisted as able-bodied seamen, but these cases tend to be scarce and short-termed in the expectation of more qualified positions. This is the case, for instance, of Andrea and Filippo Razeto, cousins between each other and sons, respectively, of the shipmaster and mate of the brig *La Rosa*. They enlisted as AB seamen at age nineteen, but as soon as they acquired more experience, both of them obtained the licence of captain⁶⁶⁵.

⁶⁶⁴ G.J. Milne, *People, Place and Power on the Nineteenth-Century Waterfront. Sailortown*, Palgrave Macmillan: 2016, pp. 32-39.

⁶⁶⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6593; ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register II, n. 11355 and 11588.

In other instances, the concentration of relatives on board, could entail some drawbacks and produce problems within the hierarchy and the control of the crew. This might have been the case, for instance, of the events which took place on board of the ship *Nuovo Filadelfo*, where there was a conflict between the shipmaster Carlo Aste and his steward Gio. Batta Vaccarezza. In 1867, the latter was denounced by the shipmaster for violent conduct against the captain to the Italian consul of Cardiff. This fact triggered an official inquiry, performed by the consul who later transmitted it to the Ministry, to shed light on the events. According to the consul, the dispute had started because of the steward insubordination against the master, which led to a fight between the two parts. The captain had denounced the affair relying on his strong juridical position, as he had witnesses to his favour, the mate of the ship and the boatswain. However, since both the mate and the boatswain were brothers to the captain, the consul considered that their testimony was not impartial and, therefore, they were not accepted as witnesses⁶⁶⁶.

The same incident might also be worth noting and emblematic for another purpose. Indeed, the following events might represent a most convincing case of what was previously theorised as the transfer of the communitarian dynamics outside the geographical borders of the community. Every ship of Camogli was a small community and, with their voyages, they could transfer the community in foreign countries and ports. While the ship was anchored, as the procedures were still ongoing, captain Carlo Aste was approached by Giacomo Vaccarezza, master of the barque *Avola Pellegrina* – newly arrived in Cardiff – and brother of the above-mentioned steward. Informed about the facts, captain Vaccarezza verbally and physically attacked Carlo Aste, with the purpose to support his own brother's position on the quarrel. To intricate even more the situation, the consul reported that, in the previous years, captain Aste had served as mate under captain Vaccarezza's command.

⁶⁶⁶ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1860-1869, b. 436.

The *Nuovo Filadelfo* affair in Cardiff draws on just one of the several files kept in the Archives of the merchant marine. However, the mixture of personal and professional relationships, which involved five people belonging to two different families, is emblematic to outline the pervasiveness of the communitarian and family structures in Camogli's shipping, in different geographical areas in which all these events took place.

5.2.3. THE SEAFARERS OF CAMOGLI AND THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

As Camogli's maritime activities expanded to the oceanic shipping market, its locally-based and endogenous labour system gradually changed, losing some of its main features and entangling with international and global dynamics and tensions. Discussions about the existence, or its formation from the 1850s onwards, of a global and integrated maritime labour market have set against different historians, who have developed their analyses on this theme. Although most of the scholars agreed on the effective transformation of maritime labour as a result of technological advance and globalisation, remained wide range for dissensus whether it was possible to attach the label global to this new system or not. The main issue, raised among others by Lewis Fischer, concerned the existence of real integration in terms of wage differentials. In his work on Norwegian communities, Fisher contested the effective integration drawing on capillary archival research, which led the author to outline how even the existence of a national maritime labour market was debatable. His assumptions rooted in the persistence of substantial wage differentials between several Norwegian ports still in the late nineteenth-century⁶⁶⁷. The discourse addressing the effective integration within national maritime labour markets might also be translated to the Italian context, which, also owing to a recent national unification, presented several incongruences and discontinuities from one place to another. Whereas specific studies have targeted local labour markets, few have produced comparative analyses suitable

⁶⁶⁷ L.R. Fisher, "The efficiency of maritime labour markets in the age of sail: the post-1850 Norwegian experience", in Idem (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1994.

for an organic reconstruction of the Italian market for seafarers. M.S. Rollandi, in her original work on the Italian maritime labour, has been one of the few to address these subjects, drawing on the data provided by the Parliamentary Inquiry.

	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880
Genova	65	65	65	65	63	63	60	55	55	50
Livorno	54	57	60	59	59	58	59	55	51	56
Napoli	40	49	36	46	47	48	45	50	47	41
Castellammare	45	46	45	45	42	41	41	40	40	40
Messina	47	45	48	48	47	45	44	40	38	40
Palermo	46	48	48	55	55	56	53	41	46	46

Table 5.2. Comparison of AB seamen average wages in different Italian ports (1871-1880). Source: *Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. III, p. 188; M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Tabella 2. Medie mensili dei salari (in lire) dei marinai imbarcati nei porti italiani (1871-1880), p. 321.

The average wages reported in Table 5.2 represent a unique comparison tool provided by the Italian authorities in 1881. Out of it, none of the aggregated data and statistical tables produced and published up to the First World War contained reliable and useful information concerning the evolution of salaries in general and from one port to another. Nevertheless, Table 5.2 needs to be used in the awareness of its limited period and in the light of the international context, dominated by the fall of freight rates, which dramatically modified the price for maritime labour in all the merchant marines⁶⁶⁸. Therefore, though the relative convergence of salaries might indicate the progressive diminution of geographical wage differentials, the absence of data beyond this narrow period impedes further analyses. Lacking the tools of the classical economy to assess national and global maritime labour markets, we can investigate the influence of the increased geographical mobility of seafarers between previously self-governing worlds on maritime labour systems. Indeed, the discourse concerning the existence of an integrated global maritime labour market exceeds the purposes of this dissertation; yet, the encounters and

⁶⁶⁸ See chapter 3.

entanglements between the local and international markets for seafarers had their undeniable effects, which will be at the core of the following pages.

The intensification of seamen mobility can be included among the most evident results of the historical evolution of Camogli's shipping. As outlined in the previous chapters, since the last phase of the Black Sea trade, Camogli-owned vessels, accustomed to navigating within the borders of the Inner Sea, moved beyond them and established a firm foothold along northern European and, then, oceanic routes. These vessels were indeed manned by seafarers, who had been traditionally bounded to the Mediterranean in the same manner: this process began as intragenerational, with middle-aged seamen, reminiscent of their past along short-cabotage routes, embarking on new challenges. Then, it became intergenerational, as most of their descendants grew well-aware of their enlarged working environment and, perhaps, a little oblivious of their past.

	<i>cabotaggio</i>	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	<i>lungo corso</i>	fishing
1* (1825-1835)	65%	33%	2%	–
2* (1845-1855)	20%	76%	2%	2%
3* (1865-1875)	13%	42%	40%	5%

Table 5.3. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months 1-24). Source: ASGe, Matricole della gente di mare, registers from 1 to 39.

In Table 5.3, we divided Camogli's seafarers first embarkments (months 1-24) in three different categories (plus fishing) according to the type of trade routes. These categories were drawn from the Italian legislation which identified, respectively, coastal and short-cabotage, Mediterranean cabotage (including the Black Sea and Northern Sea) and oceanic navigation. The pre-eminence of short-cabotage observed among the members of the first row, in comparison to the increase of long-cabotage and oceanic navigation in the latter two, is an adequate reproduction of the different stages of Camogli's maritime activities. As argued in the previous section, first embarkments responded to educational purposes as much as to labour demands. Therefore, seafarers' initiation to navigation was more

likely conducted on shorter and safer voyages in comparison with mature and more experienced seamen, whose employment depended exclusively on the needs of the shipping market. However, the dramatic fall of short-cabotage emerging in the second and third cohorts is more or less in line with the market framework. Also, the high percentage of youngsters – from the third row – who embarked straight on oceanic voyages is a clear representation of the relative dismissal of the low-paced, discontinuous and staged formation onboard to the gain of a more rapid adaptation to high seas navigation.

	<i>cabotaggio</i>	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	<i>lungo corso</i>	fishing
1* (1825-1835)	27%	59%	13%	1%
2* (1845-1855)	7%	55%	37%	1%
3* (1865-1875)	8%	30%	58%	4%

Table 5.4. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months 25-400). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

Table 5.4 translates the same categorisation into the careers of both middle-skilled and high-skilled Camogli's seamen and takes into consideration all the embarkments from their twenty-fourth month to the end of their careers. These data derive from the approximation of seamen's embarkments, which has been based on the duration of employment: each seafarers' career was divided into a maximum of four sections, each of them corresponding to roughly one hundred months of service at sea. The first section comprehended the embarkments from month 25 to month 100; the second section, months 101 to 200; the third, months 201-300; the last section, from 300 months to over four hundred (only eight seamen out of our three hundred samples worked for more than four hundred months). Finally, every career section was labelled according to the category of relative majority within each timeframe. The outcomes, albeit rough from a statistical perspective, represent the achievable results which, moreover, reflect once more the robust correlation between the evolutions of maritime labour and shipping.

To the first cohort (1*) belonged the first generation of seafarers who underwent the progressive abandonment of Tyrrhenian cabotage in favour to the Black Sea trade (59,30%); in their latest years of service, a discrete group of them (12,98%) lasted as long as to move to the oceanic phase. The second cohort (2*) lived through the economic peak of Camogli's shipping: these seamen started on board of three-masted barques, sailing from the Black Sea to the British ports (54,68%) and ended up on iron-hulled "cape horners" (37,43%). The third (3*), instead, underwent the most troublesome shipping cycles of the 1870s-1890s and the progressive marginalisation of sailing vessels to peripheral markets (58,44%). The utilisation of inter-generational samples allowed us to observe the steady transition from local to global, which Camogli's seafarers underwent within the 1840s-1900s period. At the same time, the coexistence of different categories within the same cohort provides us with some clues about intra-generational transformations, which led seamen trained in short-cabotage to sail in oceanic waters. One of them was Gaetano Giovanni Figari, born in 1825 from Gio. Batta and Maria Morchio⁶⁶⁹. Gaetano Giovanni enrolled for the first time in 1843, rather late for Camogli's standards, six months before turning eighteen years old. In his first six years of service, he embarked continuously on short-cabotage vessels, where he matured 65 months of experience, most of them at the service of the same master Mortola⁶⁷⁰. Afterwards, he began to serve in the Black Sea trade, where he acquired more than 220 months of navigation until 1871. Only then, he turned to oceanic navigation, reaching ports such as Cape Town, Montevideo, Valparaiso and Rangoon. On 1st September 1883, after a whole career as an able-bodied seaman, Gaetano Giovanni embarked on board of the ship *Indus* (captain Bozzo) as boatswain. This was his last voyage as, in 1885, when he reached age 60, he moved definitively to Buenos Ayres, after 409 months of navigation.

⁶⁶⁹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 3741. Then, in 1863, he was passed to the a new serial number, in Idem, register 28, n. 19570.

⁶⁷⁰ In the sources, he is defined as *padrone* which identified masters who were allowed to navigate on short-cabotage routes only.

Different, instead, was the personal trajectory of Andrea Dellacasa, who was born in 1833⁶⁷¹. Having obtained his parents' permission, Andrea embarked as cabin-boy at age ten and collected more than 60 months of navigation, divided between short and Mediterranean cabotage, before turning eighteen. In 1855, after a few Black Sea voyages as a sailor, he suspended his services until 1860. Arguably, this period was devoted to studying for his shipmasters' exams, as in 1861 Andrea was licensed for great cabotage. In 1867, he received his first command on board of the brig *Luchino* (293 t.) toward the ports of Azov. In the same year, Andrea had obtained the license for unlimited navigation and, thus, from the early 1870s, engaged regularly in oceanic routes, in particular in North American timber trade, at the command of the three-masted schooner *Salvatore* (400 t.)⁶⁷². Finally, in 1889 he retired after 337 months of navigation.

These seamen – and all their peers – were first-person witnesses of the radical transformations occurred in Camogli's shipping throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Some of these changes began in the Black Sea phase, before ascending to further levels at the 'global turn'.

5.2.4. LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN CONFLICT

Uniformity and cohesion onboard were natural consequences of the resorting to local endogenous labour resources (see Figure 5.1). As said, during the Black Sea phase, the vast majority of seafarers was recruited in Camogli and then embarked in the port of Genoa; the main alternatives to this pattern were Marseille and Livorno, the two Mediterranean ports which were complementary to Genoa within the Black Sea trade framework. Sometimes, the captain of a ship headed to one of these two cities needed to replace some seamen or even to change the entire crew; the new crew was recruited in that place, in order to save time and not to call to Genoa unnecessarily. In some instances, due to the relative proximity of these ports to Liguria, the new elements were directly summoned from Camogli. This

⁶⁷¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 4020. Then, in 1879, he was registered in Idem, register 27, n. 20240.

⁶⁷² *Registro navale italiano*, 1887, p. 169.

was the case, for instance, of the brig *Mercurio* (180 t.) which changed the entire crew (except the master) in Livorno (1861). Among the nine new sailors embarking (including the mate, the boatswain, five AB seamen and two cabin-boys), seven of them were from Camogli, the remaining from other Ligurian towns⁶⁷³.

Nevertheless, in some instances, the need to replace sailors occurred in more distant ports. Death at sea, desertions or agreed discharges were frequent events within ship voyages. These resulted in more casual replacements, depending on the availability of sailors in that specific port. Priority was conceded to seafarers from Camogli and Liguria, but, in several cases, captains had to enrol foreign seamen. This is the phase when it is possible to observe the earliest entanglements between different national labour forces: despite the relatively negligible numbers, the advent of Greeks (1,12%), Austrians (0,64%) and English (0,47%) must have had an impact on previously rather homogeneous groups. However, more impressive was the number of seafarers from other pre-unitarian Italian states (6,77%), whose integration remained ineffective for an extended period⁶⁷⁴.

Therefore, there is no surprise if the expansion of Camogli's shipping range blew a significant hit on its traditional local system.

⁶⁷³ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6743. The brig *Mercurio*, owned by Giuseppe Mortola and captained by Luigi Mortola, arrived in Livorno in late November 1860, from Berdyansk with a grain cargo. The new crew was embarked on the 12th January 1861.

⁶⁷⁴ See *infra*.




Figure 5.3. Geographical origins of crew members of Camogli-owned ships (1885-1905). Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*

The main radical change emerging from Figure 5.3 in comparison with the Black Sea phase crews' composition (Figure 5.1) is the drastic fall of the share of Ligurian people from 88% to 63%. This gap was filled by the remarkable increment of the other Italian seafarers (from 7% to 25%) and, partially, from the more than double figure of foreigners (from 5% to 12%). Non-Ligurian Italians reached almost the same share of those from Camogli; their increased statistical weight on board is a sign of the broadening of Camogli's labour market, whose local and endogenous characteristics were gradually replaced by the opening to the national dimension.

Notwithstanding the discourse about wage differentials, the matter of national integration in the Italian merchant marine is crucial to advance our understanding of the nineteenth-century maritime labour transformations. Unfortunately, so far, no studies have been attempted to deal, organically and comparatively, with this issue, which remains, however, beyond the scopes and possibilities of the present dissertation⁶⁷⁵. Of course, the massive paperwork collected in the archives of the

⁶⁷⁵ The lack of an Italian perspective (together with the Greek one) in the most exhaustive attempt to study the European maritime labour market is somehow surprising: see, P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?: European sailors and the maritime labour*

Italian merchant marine witnessed the problematic relationships deriving from onboard dynamics, several of which involved Ligurians and southerners. Although clashes and fights among crew members and especially between higher and lower ranks were frequent in all the world merchant marines, even among individuals coming from the same place, the introduction of foreigners aboard could boost these tensions. Ligurian seafarers, for example, lamented the «unfair competition» engaged by southern Italian seamen seeking for employment in Genoa. Here, local demands for maritime labour was higher of the other national ports, a factor playing a crucial role in the uneven concentration of seafarers in the Ligurian city⁶⁷⁶.

Desertion, which will be the object of more extensive analysis in the next chapter, was another factor that affected the communitarian homogeneity onboard, then, concurred the widespread phenomenon of. Nevertheless, the rise of desertion among Italian seamen, in particular in the American ports, had severe implications on the formation of crews. In the owners' and captains' perspectives, desertion constituted a significant economic and social issue, because numerous sailors needed to be replaced in foreign ports. This practice, however, led to the increase of labour costs, since seamen were recruited according to the average salaries of the specific port in which they were needed, which were always higher than those of Italy. Such a dynamic is plainly outlined by the 1869 *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*:

Frequently, when captains reach foreign ports – in particular those of America – sailors jumped their ships; this causes the interruption of work [discharging and charging the cargo] and delays the departure. Therefore, new seamen needed, at higher costs; furthermore, these seamen often lack good reputation and ethical behaviour and, during the journey, they can easily

market, 1570 – 1870, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 1997; L.R. Fischer (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 2019.

⁶⁷⁶ M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, p. 350. A striking problem between North and South was on wage differentials, reported in every economic sector. See: V. Daniele and P. Malanima, “Regional Wages and the North-South Disparity in Italy after the Unification”, *Rivista di Storia Economica*, No. 33: 2, 2017, pp. 117-158.

endanger captain's life and the interests of shipowners and merchants.⁶⁷⁷

The increased mobility of seafarers and desertion, therefore, accelerated the nationalisation and, then, globalisation of the Italian crews. The presence of dense national communities in Latin American ports, such as Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, facilitated the recruitment of Italian seamen to replace deserters or legal emigrants. In some instances, these sailors embarked for shorter voyages, often limited to the American continent. This was the case, for instance, of the events involving the barque *Cadice*, which witnessed the desertion of seven sailors in Buenos Ayres. There, the captain recruited two Italians (from Palermo and Castellammare), three Britons, one Portuguese and an Argentinian citizen. Six of them, then, disembarked in Pensacola where, in order to sail back to the Mediterranean, the master was obliged to employ two more Englishmen, two Germans, one Danish and a man from New York⁶⁷⁸. The crew of *Cadice*, which in June 1897 had left Marseille with twelve Italians out of thirteen members (one Mexican), less than a year afterwards (February 1898) departed from Pensacola to the Mediterranean with more than half of the crew composed of foreign citizens. This example, and several other of the same kind, may provide a strong representation of the effects of globalisation on Camogli's crews.

5.3. Wages and professionalization: the evolution of upward mobility

The extension of the geographical range of the maritime activities, the dismantlement of the endogenous labour system, and the loss of communitarian cohesion on board might have been among the factors that transformed Camogli's maritime labour from the 1880s onwards. Furthermore, these broader processes

⁶⁷⁷ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, b. 474, folder 15.

⁶⁷⁸ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 353/1, *Cadice*.

had their impact on more measurable labour features, such as vertical mobility and wages, which will be at the core of the following pages.

First, vertical mobility and wages are deeply intertwined between each other. On a ship, higher wages are associated with higher positions throughout maritime professional ranks. Skill-premiums represent this correlation between wage differentials among crew members and labour expertise. The existence or absence of regulations to control vertical mobility from one rank to another and the transformation of the relative distribution of skilled labourers onboard are crucial factors to determine skill-premiums evolution overtime. Scholarly studies underlined how, whilst facilitating the growth of international trade and shipping, technological change and globalisation led to deskilling in maritime labour and, as a result, to the reduction of skill premiums and of relative demands for skilled labour⁶⁷⁹. If this assumption has been repeatedly validated for steam navigation⁶⁸⁰, Jari Ojala transferred the theory in the context of Scandinavian sailing fleets, with valuable findings⁶⁸¹. In this section, we will attempt to test such analysis on Camogli's sample, in order to validate or discuss the potential transferability of this theory within a Mediterranean seafaring community specialised in sail shipping.

5.3.1. FROM "SHARE" TO SALARY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

To investigate the evolution of wages and the utilisation of other forms of payment will be crucial to assess skill-premiums and, in broad terms, to measure the economic value of vertical mobility. Throughout Camogli's maritime labour history, wages became the prevalent form of remuneration only from the 1860s onwards (still in 1859, wages were used in 43% of the instances⁶⁸²), when they

⁶⁷⁹ A. Chin et al., "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891-1912", pp. 572-583; S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer-employee data", pp. 1-11.

⁶⁸⁰ S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer-employee data", pp. 1-11.

⁶⁸¹ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751-1913".

⁶⁸² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

substituted the previous method to distribute single-voyages profits among crew members, in accordance to predetermined proportions (called *alla parte*). The form of payment *alla parte* was rooted into long-standing traditions dating back to Middle Age; from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, it represented the customary way to provide remunerations for seafarers, in particular concerning small communities devoted to coastal cabotage and fishing⁶⁸³. In 1692, in describing all the coeval forms of remuneration, Carlo Targa, a Genoese jurist, defined the one *alla parte* as «the most utilised method in the context of small ships, [...] which consisted in halving the freight revenues and the profits collected by the vessel in its voyages, after having subtracted common expenses»⁶⁸⁴. In general, it consisted in a share-system – which was clearly distinguished from share-ownership tools (*carati*⁶⁸⁵) – and was tied to single-voyage enterprises, at the end of which all the profits were distributed in proportion to previous agreements. The purpose underlying this system was to adopt risk-sharing mechanisms to cover single enterprises; in this way, shipowners were required fewer investments which were limited to hull and equipment supplies and maintenance. Then, at the end of the voyage, profits were divided according to roles onboard; during the 1850-1865 period, Camogli's crew list witness this average distribution:

	Shares (1850-1860)
Shipmasters	2,00
Mates	1,50
Boatswains	1,25
Stewards	1,15
AB seamen	1,00

⁶⁸³ Several references might be found in scholarly literature about Ligurian shipping in early modern era. For instance, see: L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo. La vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi nel XVIII secolo*, Roma: Carocci, 2016, pp. 108-III; P. Calcagno, “A caccia dell’oro rosso. Le comunità del Ponente ligure e la pesca del corallo nel XVII secolo”, *Rives méditerranéennes*, No. 57, 2018, p. 29; E. Grendi, *Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il modello ligure di antico regime*, Torino: Einaudi, 1993, p. 191.

⁶⁸⁴ C. Targa, *Ponderazioni sopra la contrattazione marittima*, Genova, 1803, pp. 203-204.

⁶⁸⁵ See Chapter 4.

Ordinary seamen	0,70
Cabin-boys	0,33

Table 5.6. Shares distribution in Camogli's vessels to the Black Sea. Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*.

Afterwards, beginning with the late 1850s, the allocation of monthly salaries gradually replaced the usage of share systems. Such transformation might have stemmed from the geographical expansion of the trade routes, which increased voyage durations, or from Camogli's establishment on multi-purposes enterprises, as in the case of wheat-coal integrated routes with British ports. Both of these factors contributed to the dismissal of shares' system and the definitive establishment of wages. Nevertheless, the traditional forms of payment remained long associated with short-range maritime activities, as fishing or coastal-cabotage, whereas progressively disappeared along international and oceanic routes. According to David Viale, in 1882 «share system was limited to coastal cabotage to an almost negligible extent, being absent even in a great part of coal transports from Sardinia and Maremma»⁶⁸⁶.

Profession	1850-1865	1885-1905
Shipmasters	107,67	161,50
Mates	87,81	107,18
Boatswains	76,69	78,90
Stewards	68,33	73,57
AB seamen	56,12	55,00
Ordinary seamen	40,53	34,86
Cabin-boys	20,88	18,03

Table 5.7. Average salaries within Camogli's merchant marine (1850-1900). Sources: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

⁶⁸⁶ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 158.

The data provided in Table 5.7 illustrate the evolution of average salaries from the Black Sea phase to the edge of the century. Due to the lack of data, we were not able to provide reliable information regarding the 1865-1885 decades within which Camogli's shipping business reached its peak before the international freight crisis hampered it. Although, in the proceedings of the Parliamentary Inquiry concerning the national merchant marine, the Italian government provided some data covering the 1870-1880 timespan, albeit limitedly to able-bodied seamen.

1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880
65	65	65	65	62,5	62,5	60	55	55	50

Table 5.8. Average monthly wages of Italian sailors in Genoa (1871-1880). Source: *Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. III, p. 188.

The evidence of Table 5.8, if compared with Camogli's data, confirms the occurrence of an upgrading trend until 1874, followed by a dramatic downturn from which Italian shipping recovered only at the beginning of the new century⁶⁸⁷. These figures were corroborated by some oral interventions in which shipowners and captains reported the drastic fall of shipmasters' average salaries which had risen to 300 Italian lire «in the age of prosperity»⁶⁸⁸, before falling again into the 150-200 Italian lire range in 1882⁶⁸⁹. The fall of freight rates had a vigorous impact on market salaries, but, in the long term, its consequences did not hit all the professional categories with the same strength. In Table 5.9, the lack of evident mutations of middle and low-skilled seamen's wages in comparison with the exceptional growth of high-skilled salaries might be crucial to introduce an analysis of relative salaries' historical evolution.

⁶⁸⁷ See, Chapter 3.

⁶⁸⁸ *Inchiesta parlamentare sulla marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 160.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

	1850-1865	1885-1905	+/-
Shipmasters	192	294	102
Mates	157	195	38
Boatswains	137	143	6
Stewards	122	134	12
AB seamen	100	100	0
Ordinary seamen	72	63	-9
Cabin-boys	37	33	-4

Table 5.9. Relative crew wages in relation to AB seamen salary (AB Seamen=100). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*

Table 5.9 illustrates the relative salaries of crew members in relation to able-bodied seamen's ones. This table was achieved by using AB seamen wages as a constant reference to evaluate variations in relative salaries and the relative evolution of skill-premia. The divergence between high-skilled professions and AB seamen increased remarkably (+102 for shipmasters and +38 for mates); skill-premia within the same middle-skilled group show a slight growth for boatswains and stewards; ordinary seamen (-9) and cabin-boys (-4) relative wages, instead, decreased to a limited extent.

5.3.2. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND DESKILLING

Since the first approaches of maritime history to nineteenth-century shipping, scholars have investigated the correlation existing between technological advance and labour productivity⁶⁹⁰. Despite the reasonable criticism of Lucassen and

⁶⁹⁰ See: J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, "Labour productivity in ocean shipping, 1450-1875", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 12, 2000, pp. 127-141; Idem, "Shipping, productivity and economic growth", in R.W. Unger (ed.), *Shipping and economic growth, 1350-1850*, Leiden: Brill, 2011; J. Van Lottum and J.L. Van Zanden, "Labour productivity and human capital in the European maritime sector of the eighteenth century", *Explorations in economic history*, 2014. For shipping productivity in general, see Chapter 3.

Unger⁶⁹¹, the ratio of tons per man on board has remained the most practical tool for measuring labour productivity. As anticipated in Chapter 3, where the impact of improvements in nautical technology have been correlated to the productivity of the maritime business, the enhancement of labour productivity played a decisive role to cut the costs and to make shipping more efficient. As said, such discourse cannot be limited to steam navigation, since also sailing shipping underwent serious transformations, in particular in terms of average tonnage. The fleet of Camogli, for instance, passed from 176,3 tons average in 1853 to 456,4 in 1896⁶⁹². As a result, the analysis of crew lists and logbooks suggests that ton-man ratios fell, approximately, from 6,99 (for 100 tons) to 1,83 in the same period⁶⁹³.

	<i>Total tonnage</i>	<i>Ton/man ratio (100 t.)</i>	<i>E seamen employed</i>
1853	25.045	6,99	1.751
1861	49.060	5,03	2.468
1879	182.774	2,25	4.112
1896	79.407	1,83	1.453

Table 5.II. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man ratio per total tonnage). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1883.

⁶⁹¹ J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, "Labour productivity in ocean shipping", p. 127.

⁶⁹² ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1883.

⁶⁹³ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; 1831-1865; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896.




Figure 5.4. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man ratio per total tonnage). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896.

Within an endogenous labour market, therefore, the increase in labour productivity might have affected the equilibrium between demand and supply on which Camogli's shipping system was grounded. As we can see, in Table 5.II we estimated Camogli's demands for maritime labour in correlation with the comparative evolution of total tonnage and of labour productivity (ton/man ratio): the estimated outcomes (Figure 5.4) draw a curve which reached the peak at the end of the 1870s, to decline then to the 1850s levels at the end of the century. Substantially, these data and estimations allow us to measure the direct consequences of the improvements in labour productivity on sea workers. From the 1880s onwards, although shipowners showed resilience and were able to resist and adapt to the needs of the international freight market, their resilience might have led to a severe occupational crisis among Camogli's sea workers. The effects of this crisis included the transition from sail to steam shipping, the abandonment of maritime labour and emigration, as we will see in the following pages.

However, the analysis of labour productivity, notwithstanding the shipowner's perspective to reduce labour costs, can be approached from another point of view, which substitutes place of work (the ship, and the ton-man ratio) with time as the primary focus. With the adoption of a more social and labour approach, indeed, labour productivity can also be measured in terms of working days in a year, to

evaluate the social impact of maritime labour within seafarers' lives. In this direction, for instance, the rapid transition from cabotage to the Black Sea and, finally, to oceanic routes had an undeniable social price in terms of more qualitative aspects of maritime labourers' lives, such as the time spent within the community and familiar environments. In this regard, a systematic analysis of workdays through different cohorts did not show remarkable discrepancies between each other (the percentage of months spent in navigation out of the total career measures about 62-63% in the three cohorts⁶⁹⁴). These results might be related to two different issues: first, to the relatively high degree of approximation of the data, which take months into account instead of days; secondly, to the fact that all the shipping categories (cabotage, great cabotage, oceanic navigation) cross the three cohorts, thus diminishing the effects of such distinction.

Nevertheless, with the purpose to illustrate what we perceive as a fundamental trait of seafaring – the ratio between the time at sea and ashore – we opted for individual surveys on three different subjects (one from each cohort), which possessed various shipping typologies within their careers.

				Qualify as AB		
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman		
1*	Schiaffino	Giuseppe	17-03-1825	07-07-1843		
	Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Working Months	Workdays / Year (%)
	1 <i>cabotaggio</i>	30-06-1847	16-07-1849	6	14	58%
	2 <i>gran cabotaggio</i>	17-12-1849	20-10-1873	30	238	86%
	3 <i>lungo corso</i>	31-07-1874	18-06-1883	11	80	75%
	4 <i>cabotaggio</i>	07-01-1884	01-07-1887	3	12	25%
				50	344	72%
				Qualify as AB		
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman		
2*	Olivari	Gio.Batta	17-03-1855	14-07-1877		

⁶⁹⁴ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, cohorts 1-3.

Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Working Months	Workdays / Year (%)
1 <i>gran cabotaggio</i>	14-10-1877	25-10-1879	3	20	83%
2 <i>lungo corso</i>	13-01-1880	10-06-1892	12	128	86%
3 <i>gran cabotaggio</i>	12-12-1892	29-10-1897	5	53	91%
4 <i>lungo corso</i>	06-12-1897	17-11-1909	12	122	85%
			32	323	84%
Qualify as AB					
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman	
3*	Figari	Lorenzo	11-01-1871	26-06-1890	
Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Working Months	Workdays / Year (%)
1 <i>lungo corso</i>	17-11-1890	30-05-1893	3	27	90%
2 <i>lungo corso cabotaggio</i>	12-01-1894	09-01-1902	4	87	90%
3 (steam) <i>gran cabotaggio</i>	05-06-1902	30-10-1906	5	43	82%
4 (steam) <i>lungo corso</i>	27-11-1906	11-08-1912	2	64	92%
5 (steam)	13-08-1912	10-11-1915	3	34	89%
TOT			19	258	86%

Table 5.12. Individual careers of three Camogli's seamen. Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, cohorts 1-3.

The findings shown in Table 5.12 are fundamental to deepen our analysis on able-bodied seamen work performances and, meanwhile, give us some insights concerning the evolution of Camogli's maritime labour market. The first sample, Giuseppe Schiaffino, was born in 1825⁶⁹⁵: in his years as cabin-boy and ordinary seaman, Giuseppe acquired more practice than needed (61 months), while later, albeit qualified for the profession, waited until 1847 to reembark as a sailor. After brief service on coastal-cabotage vessels, in 1849 began to work on longer routes, spending more than half of his career in the Black Sea trade. Then, he was employed on ocean-going vessels for a decade, before returning to small cabotage in sight of retirement. Gio. Batta Olivari⁶⁹⁶, instead, born in 1855, divided his career

⁶⁹⁵ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 4174 and register 28, n. 19657.

⁶⁹⁶ Idem, register 14, n. 12846 and register 39, n. 28374.

between great cabotage (Black Sea and North-European routes) and ocean navigation in which he collected most of his embarkments (24) and spent the vast majority of his career (250 months). Finally, Lorenzo Figari⁶⁹⁷ experienced a peculiar professional trajectory; until 1902, at age 31, he worked on the latest Camogli's ocean-going vessels. Then, Lorenzo moved to steam navigation and, on board of steamers, crossed all the typologies⁶⁹⁸.

The working-days in a year of two out of three samples are higher than the mentioned averages. Both Gio. Batta Olivari and Lorenzo Figari present several and continuative services on ocean-going vessels, which seem to be an upgrading factor of working days per years. Oceanic voyages lasted for several months, sometimes more than two years; however, in time of occupational crisis and downgrading salaries for sea workers, to remain more than a couple of months at home might have been an option.

Finally, in recent literature, deskilling has been included among the most evident consequences of technological advancement applied to navigation. The increase of labour productivity (measurable through men-tons ratio) have also been interrelated to labour efficiency. Within sail shipping, the main transformations entailed a simplification of rigging and, therefore, of all the operations underlying their handling and management. These changes, which have been poorly studied, might have led to middle-skilled seamen gradual substitution with unskilled workers. Relative labour shares emerged as one of the primary measures to analyse this phenomenon. For instance, evidence from Scandinavian marines suggested an increase of unskilled labourers relative shares, which ascended from 22,7% to 49,5% in a century (1791-1913)⁶⁹⁹. Within this vast period, the most substantial increase occurred between the 1830s and 1850s (from 30% to 49%)⁷⁰⁰, before the advent of Camogli's oceanic cross-trade and the ton-man escalation associated to this shipping phase. Indeed, similar surveys of Camogli's merchant marine led to

⁶⁹⁷ Idem, register 39, n. 28005.

⁶⁹⁸ More details about Camogli's seamen working on steamers are found in the 5.4.1 paragraph.

⁶⁹⁹ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751-1913", Table 2, p.7.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

profoundly different results in terms of relative labour shares among skill-biased groups.

	High-skilled (captains, mates)	Medium-skilled (boatswains, able seamen)	Low-skilled (ordinary seamen, cabin boys)
1850-1865	9,56%	66,66%	23,77%
1885-1905	9,52%	57,82%	32,65%

Table 5.13. Skill-groups relative labour shares (1850-1905). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

From Table 5.13, we can assume that relative labour shares among different skill-groups maintained a rather continuous distribution between the 1850s and 1890s. Moreover, despite the adoption of the same categorisation, the absolute values of each category seem highly divergent from those of Scandinavian marines⁷⁰¹. There is, in fact, a slight increase of low-skilled seamen shares at the expense of medium-skilled workers; nevertheless, the absolute values are nowhere near to almost half of the shares as in the Scandinavian benchmark.

Concerning Camogli, we can assume the role of traditional labour structures into mitigating the impact of deskilling on relative distribution onboard. Indeed, within the framework of seafaring communities, practical experience was accessible to all the members willing to spend their lives at sea. The social composition of the crews was substantially different from those merchant marines opened to agricultural and industrial workers, attracted into seafaring by economic needs. In Camogli, vertical mobility was achievable through expertise, which impacted on able-bodied seamen relative weight onboard in comparison with other realities. The presence of unskilled labourers onboard of Camogli's vessels responded to educational needs and to promote the intergenerational transmission of practical skills and manual know-how rather than stemming from shipowners' business decisions to reduce labour expenses and increase relative cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, we may argue the substantial inconsistency of any division between low or medium-

⁷⁰¹ In coincidence with the same period, Ojala records these relative shares.

1850-1865: high-26,9%; medium-26,0%; low-47,1%.

1881-1895: high-28,7%; medium-23,5%; low-47,8%.

skilled seafarers within Camogli's merchant marine, due to efficient upward mobility, as confirmed by the low rate of abandonment in the age of cabin-boys (4,2%)⁷⁰².

5.3.3. PROFESSIONALISATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MASTERS

Within the maritime studies, the role of shipmasters and captains has attracted a great deal of attention, both for the relatively high availability of sources concerning this figure in comparison with common seafarers and for the ruling and representative (of the shipowner) position which captains covered onboard and ashore. During the nineteenth century, captains underwent various changes which concerned their prerogatives, activities and their relationships with shipowners, a wide set of transformations which recent historiography have categorised under the label of «professionalisation»⁷⁰³.

In addition to experience and age requirements, prospective shipmasters' (and mates) necessitated of public licences, granted from local and central institutions after completion of a mandatory theory examination. In the Mediterranean maritime societies, the historical roots of these state-controlled tests dated back to the seventeenth-century, a highly distinguishing feature from the British and Dutch environments where public examinations became active only in the nineteenth century⁷⁰⁴.

⁷⁰² ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*. The fundamental discourse about abandonments will be treated in the following sections.

⁷⁰³ K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", *Colectanea maritima*, 1991, 5, pp. 282-303; V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, 1990, 1:1, pp. 97-118; Garcia, E., "Losing Professional Identity? Deck Officers in the Spanish Merchant Marine, 1868-1914." *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 3, 2014, pp. 451-470; R. De Oliveira Torres, "Handling the Ship: rights and duties of masters, mates, seamen and owners of ships in nineteenth-century merchant marine", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 3, 2014, pp. 587-599.

⁷⁰⁴ K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", *Colectanea maritima*, 1991, 5, pp. 282-303; V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, 1990, 1:1, pp. 97-118.

In the Republic of Genoa, the first steps of this public overtaking onto maritime education concerned the institution of exams (1698) which prospective masters ought to do in order to be recognised as capable of directing a ship⁷⁰⁵. This decision was inspired by the French *Ordonnance de la Marine* of 1681, the leading international reference, in maritime matters, of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Genoese lawmakers. However, the institution of public exams was not associated with the implementation of formal education. Still in the last decades of the following century, the principal and sufficient requirements to command a vessel were ship-ownership or official appointments by shipowners – through a notarial deed⁷⁰⁶. Indeed, the absence of binding educational requirements allowed uneducated seamen to the rank of the shipmaster. Ship-ownership, share-ownership or either mere kinship could be more relevant than specialised know-how and advanced skills in the art of navigation.

As said, in the days of the Republic of Genoa, apart from examinations, there was no evidence about the existence of formal institutions to impart education to prospective shipmasters'; instead, the exams were prepared upon private initiative. Something changed after Vienna's Congress when, due to the imposition of Savoy rule onto Liguria, the publication of a new *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile* in 1816, and its update in 1827, led to the foundation of state-driven nautical schools for prospective masters of all sorts⁷⁰⁷.

This decision was in line with the gradual extension of public control over shipmasters' education, which was spreading in several European countries⁷⁰⁸. In this way, the increasing professionalization of these occupations affected long-standing traditions, which were transformed in favour of a progressive passage from private to public control. These schools were intended to impart the

⁷⁰⁵ L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo*, pp. 37-63. The author reports that, from 1698 onwards, Genoese captains were required to pass an exam in order to be patented.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰⁷ *Nuovo Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, 1827, Cap. V, art. 32-34. In general, see: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, p. 268.

⁷⁰⁸ See, England: V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", pp. 99-100; Low Countries: K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", pp. 284-285.

theoretical education for shipmasters; their organisation varied through the second half of the nineteenth century due to several reforms, which, however, did not alter too extensively the general schedule⁷⁰⁹. In 1865, the diploma for cabotage and great cabotage masters took only one year, whereas that for ocean-going masters extended up to three years⁷¹⁰. Then, in 1873, great cabotage degree widened to two years, while the duration of the second degree remained unscathed. Several subjects were common to all the courses, like Italian, geography, history, trade law, arithmetic, geometry, hydrography, marine equipment and manoeuvring (French and English language courses were elective)⁷¹¹. In general, prospective ocean-going captains were taught more complicated branches of each subject, as spherical trigonometry, applied astronomy and nautical calculations. Nevertheless, the educational programmes might be useful to outline the figure and role of shipmasters' in the Italian merchant marine. Masters' know-how was mainly theoretical: their advanced education was aimed at the acquisition of general knowledge and highly specialised skills to handle navigation in open seas. Along with technical and scientific advancements (for instance, Maury's contribution to oceanography⁷¹²), masters' monopoly of navigational skills on board increased accordingly, accruing social and professional distances between crews' top and bottom.

The coexistence of theoretical education and practical experience represented, however, one of the most troublesome matters for the organisation of these learning paths. For instance, Edoardo Salviati, professor of mathematics and astronomy at the nautical school of Camogli, in 1882, expressed his criticism toward the existing system and raised his concerns about the need of finding a

⁷⁰⁹ See, M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, pp. 241-278.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹¹ *Idem*, p. 253.

⁷¹² M.F. Maury, *The Physical Geography of the Sea*, New York: Harper & Brothers publishers, 1858. His fundamental role in developing the modern oceanography and, as a result, in the optimization of oceanic shipping, is recognized by the Italian economist Epicarmo Corbino: E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, p. III.

compromise between theory and practice⁷¹³. Nautical schools admitted students from age nine onwards and, therefore, licensed prospective shipmasters at a maximum of age 15, almost a decade before they became eligible for these positions. As a result, well-educated seamen were forced to enrol as cabin-boys until age 18 and able-bodied seamen between age 18 and 21, when they were finally entitled to be mates. Among the consequences of such feature, apart from the already mentioned issue concerning underaged boatswains, we may also report the institution of the so-called «flag captain» (*capitano di bandiera*). This figure responded to the need of the shipowner to appoint licenced captains to handle navigation, whereas another person, less experienced, managed most of the economic operations. In 1881, while arguing with Giuseppe De Rossi, author of an inflammatory pamphlet concerning the backwardness of Ligurian shipping, David Viale outlined this figure and provided a practical explanation for its institution:

Mr De Rossi refers to flag captains, who take responsibility for navigation, whereas another person, of lower rank, is entrusted with economic management. There's nothing wrong in it, and it happens when the shipowner has a relative on board, who, even though he has already obtained his licence, does not fulfil the necessary age requirements.⁷¹⁴

The diminution of shipmasters' authorities on board, deriving from the introduction of an intermediate figure to handle the managerial business, generated however multiple problems and led sailors to file various complaints. For instance, the crew members of the barque *Adele*, in 1866, denounced the wrongful food administration which they underwent during a trip between Pernambuco and Cardiff (the ship had departed from Marseille on the first haul)⁷¹⁵. Right in the British port, seamen complained to the Italian consul for having been

⁷¹³ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. III, pp. 53-58. More details on his figure can be found in: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, pp. 478-484.

⁷¹⁴ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 159.

⁷¹⁵ ACS, *Direzione generale della marina mercantile*, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, box 361, folder 118.

administered poor-quality food and blamed the mate's unusual interference into the affairs of the ship «at the point that the same captain was denied to have a say on food administration⁷¹⁶». Another interesting case concerned the actions of Carlo Dapelo, mate of the barque *Cadice* and relative to its shipowner⁷¹⁷. In 1897, Dapelo, licenced for great cabotage, commanded the ship from Cadiz to Marseille. There, while signing the crew agreement, he declared himself as shipowner of the barque (presumably, he was just shareholder and legal representative of the shipowners). Then, unable to sail across the Atlantic, Dapelo appointed his mate, Gio. Batta Caprile (who possessed the required license), as navigating captain. The following events shed light on a more complicated scenario. Once in Santos, after several sailors complained about Dapelo's short-tempered behaviour and bad administration, captain Caprile denounced its mate (and employer) before the consul, specifying that he «had always tried to hide the evil actions of Dapelo in respect of his family»⁷¹⁸. Finally, following a harsh fight with Caprile, Carlo Dapelo left the ship and never returned on board, at the point that the captain was forced to denounce him as a deserter.

Interestingly, although motivated by age requirements and the shipowners' need of trusted representatives on board, the institution of «flag captains» anticipated the evolution of captainship into an ultra-specialised navigational profession, with little or no involvement in the commercial and economic management⁷¹⁹. On the contrary, traditionally shipmasters' role extended well beyond the art of navigation; in a society characterised by slow information flows and little or no communications, masters were in charge of all the managerial and commercial operations, as contracting freights, negotiating loans, handling

⁷¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹⁷ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, giornale generale, Cadice, 353/1.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹⁹ See, as an element for comparison, the study of Apostolos Delis about the introduction of «directors» on board of the Syros fleet: A. Delis, «Le rôle du capitaine et la figure du «directeur» de navires dans la marine à voile à Syra au milieu du XIXe siècle», in G. Buti, L. Lo Basso and O. Raveaux (eds.), *Entrepreneurs des mers: capitaines et marinières du XVIe au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Riveneuve éditions, 2017.

incidents in the open sea and ports, administering justice and, in general, embracing all the necessary decisions on shipowners' behalf.

The evolution of shipmasters inspired extensive and well-reasoned historiography, which developed specific research axes involving onboard authority⁷²⁰, professionalisation, and the overturn of customary owner-captain relationships, by introducing the figures of managing owners⁷²¹. In *ancient regime* societies, captains were commonly owners or shareholders of the ship: due to the impossibility to communicate at long distances, masters carried out managerial actions and exerted their control over all the commercial and operational decisions. Then, due to nineteenth-century technological advancements in logistics and communications⁷²², together with the transition from share-ownership to the advent of shipping stock-companies, masters progressively forfeited some attributions of their traditional «power near to God⁷²³» and were reduced to high-skilled employees. The primary responsibilities of the latter were confined to safe navigation.

If these developments are taken for granted concerning the significant part of the nineteenth-century shipping world, the “sheltered” environment of a seafaring community, as Camogli, might represent a remarkable observatory. In analogy with other maritime communities, Camogli had several owning-captains, who naturally merged economic management and navigation in a single figure. In the first half of the century, the relative share of owning-captains was elevated (44% in 1831), whereas, in coincidence with the geographic leap from the Black Sea to oceanic navigation, it fell dramatically (15% in 1865)⁷²⁴. Moreover, by combining owning-captains with the figure of direct familiar relationships between

⁷²⁰ J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 13, No. 2, 2001, pp. 165-194.

⁷²¹ H. Doe, “Power, Authority and Communications: The Role of the Master and the Managing Owner in Nineteenth-Century British Merchant Shipping”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 25, No. 1, 2013, pp. 103-125; R. Craig, “Printed guides for master mariners as a source of productivity change in shipping, 1750-1914”, *The Journal of Transport History*, 3, 1982, pp. 24-35.

⁷²² See Chapter 3.

⁷²³ J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»”, pp. 166-184.

⁷²⁴ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

shipowners and captains (identical surnames), evidence suggests an even neater decline from 81% to 35% (1831-1865)⁷²⁵. Besides, relationships of acquired kin (as in case of sons-in-law commanding fathers-in-law's vessels) remained out of our evaluation, owing to material obstacles to conducting analytical surveys on almost a thousand individuals.

Nevertheless, the extensive recurrence to such feature, drawn from notarial sources, might have probably increased the figure. In fact, in a communitarian environment, marriage was a fundamental tool for bonding relationships, as in the case of Erasmo Schiaffino, who married his four daughters to as many shipmasters who served on his vessels⁷²⁶. Finally, when considering the end of the century, owning-captains almost disappeared (5%)⁷²⁷. Therefore, in the framework of Camogli's shipping, the progressive demise of owning-captains might be reconducted to various factors: among them, we might include the increase of the amount of capital needed to start shipping business, which delayed and hindered the most sought «transition from employee to employer»⁷²⁸, one of the main life-objectives of Camogli's shipmasters.

Based on the mentioned findings, the trend observed in the case of Camogli may allow us to enter the debate about the proletarianization of maritime labour⁷²⁹. In this regard, the first crucial breakthrough might be recognised in the abandonment of the forms of shared remuneration in favour of wages. Whereas pre-industrial seafarers actively participated in maritime enterprises, being directly related to profits and losses of a single voyage, the introduction of wages set sea workers apart from the entrepreneurial section of the shipping business. Thus, seafarers renounced to their direct participation to the earnings in favour of more reliable

⁷²⁵ Idem.

⁷²⁶ See Chapter 2.

⁷²⁷ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*. The only one is Dapelo Carlo, commanding the barque *Cadice*: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, *Giornale generale e di contabilità*, Cadice, 353/1.

⁷²⁸ K. Davids, "Technological change and professionalism", pp. 299-300.

⁷²⁹ E. Sager, "Seafaring Labour in Maritime History and Working-Class History", *International Journal of Maritime History*, II, No. 1, 1990, pp. 259-274; B. Beaven, "From Jolly Sailor to Proletarian Jack: The Remaking of Sailortown and the Merchant Seafarer in Victorian London", in B. Beaven et al. (eds.), *Port towns and urban cultures. International Histories of the Waterfront, c.1700—2000*, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, pp. 159-178.

fixed payments which, at the same time, allowed shipowners to manage their business more cost-effectively. Within the balance of single-voyage enterprises, maritime labour became a fixed cost, whose relative weight fell gradually in the nineteenth century as a result to the decrease of the ton-men ratios and, therefore, to the improvements of labour productivity.

Furthermore, although all the categories of maritime workers underwent serious transformations in this period, not all the groups were affected to the same extent. Despite shipmasters lost their peer-to-peer relationship with shipowners, and their vertical mobility was severely affected by the shrinkage of the shipowning ranks, on the other hand, from an economic perspective, professionalization raised their average wages, both in relative and absolute terms (see Table 5.9).

On the contrary, technological improvements hit more severely Camogli's middle and low-skilled maritime workers, both socially and economically. Although deskilling might not be as effective as in other merchant marines, the growth of labour productivity affected sailors' wage retribution, whose relative ratio in comparison with high-skilled seafarers decreased of more than one-third (Table 5.9). Moreover, as we will see in the next pages, while masters' highly-specialised know-how and skills allowed them a smoother transition to more advanced labour markets (steam shipping), middle and low-skilled seafarers faced more obstacles in reconverting to steam or enduring within the maritime labour sector.

5.4. Abandoning Camogli's fleet

The clash between local and global markets, the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities into oceanic tramp shipping and the broader process of transition from sail to steam created the ground for the gradual dismantlement of the local communitarian structures upon which Camogli's shipping system was founded. The loss of the occupational consistency between local labour demand and supply resulted into various behaviours: some seafarers sought for employment at national steam shipping companies, such as NGI (Navigazione

Generale Italiana); others quitted navigation or transferred abroad in search for maritime or even land-based jobs. Whereas the first two groups (those who moved to steam and who abandoned navigation) will be dealt with in the following pages, to the latter will be dedicated the sixth and last chapter of the present thesis, due to the crucial entanglements between geographical transfer, desertion and migration flows which compose a fundamental part of the history of Camogli.

5.4.1. THE TRANSITION FROM SAIL TO STEAM OF CAMOGLI'S SEAMEN

As seen, the extraordinary dimensions of Camogli's sailing fleet prevented most of the local manpower to switch to steam navigation. Camogli's maritime labour market was endogenous and self-sufficient; shipping absorbed local labour supplies and even extended to the labour markets of the nearby communities to meet its manpower demands. These conditions lasted for decades until the fall in freight rates and the progressive marginalisation of sail vessels to peripheral markets led to the reduction of Camogli's fleet. As seen, the impoverishment of local shipping business and the increase of labour productivity diminished the demands for sea workers dramatically (see Table 5.11 and Figure 5.2) and, for the contraction of job opportunities available to seamen, some sought for employment into a separate labour market, in the steam merchant marine⁷³⁰.

	1* (1825-1835)	2* (1845-1855)	3* (1865-1875)
Unskilled (cabin-boys, OS)	0	0	100%*
Medium-skilled (AB, boatswains, stewards)	1,50%	3,70%	25,75%
High-skilled (mates, captains)	0	4,16%	64,71%

Table 5.14. Percentage of sailors and officials with at least 12 months of service on board of steamships (cohorts 1-3). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*. *There is only one unskilled seaman who quitted his career before completing his 24-month apprenticeship⁷³¹.

⁷³⁰ See, chapter 3.

⁷³¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 38, serial number 25986. The career of Luigi Bertolotto (n. 25986) is exceptional within our sample: enrolled in 1884 at age of fourteen, he

The impressive rise of sail-to-steam mobility, which Table 5.14 describes, among the members of the third cohort is clear evidence of the crisis which Camogli's traditional labour system underwent from the late 1880s onwards. Although the earliest steamers' services of Camogli's seamen dated to 1888, most of them took place at the turn of the century. From the observation of data, we were able to point out some distinguishing traits. First, the extraordinary rise of the passages to steam in the third cohort in comparison with the previous two: this trend might find a consistent explanation in the influence of the international scenario on the communitarian shipping system. Second, the sharp difference shown in the percentages of high-skilled seamen (64,71%) as opposed to middle-skilled ones (25,75%). Third, no seaman from Camogli engaged to the steam shipping new professions (engineer, stokers, coal trimmers), but maintained the same sailing shipping roles when employed on steamers. Finally, once transferred to steam, few reconverted to sail – and no one definitively.

First, the timeframe, within which labour transition occurred, has been primarily anticipated in the previous paragraphs. The decades between the 1880s and 1900s represent the real breakthrough for Camogli's maritime history and, although shipping survived on marginal routes, the combination of the financial crisis and technological improvements stroke a decisive hit on maritime labour. As said, the transfer from sailing vessels to steamers was among the decisions available to counterbalance the decrease of labour demands on Camogli's sailing ships.

Then, the discrepancy emerging from the comparison of high and middle-skilled seamen's rates of conversion might be fundamental to outline some distinguishing features of the Italian maritime labour market. From a technical point of view, indeed, shipmasters could engage either to sail or to steam

embarked as cabin-boy on a short-cabotage journey (23 days) and, then, on a long-cabotage ship to Swansea, where got ashore after just 56 days at sea. Three years later, he enrolled as fifth engineer on the Italian steamship *Robilant*, where travelled for more than seven months among long-cabotage routes. Between 1884 and 1887, Luigi must have performed some theoretical studies in order to enrol as fifth engineer, which corresponded to engine room operators (*fuochista*) within Italian engine ranks. In the following years, he never embarked again. The uniqueness of his career, however, impedes us to adequately evaluate the effects of transition on unskilled seamen.

navigation without any distinction. According to the existing legal framework, captains were not required to have additional skills or knowledge when commanding steamers, since the engine room was under the engineer's full responsibility. This feature, on the one hand, gave engineers immediate recognition of their high degree of specialisation, which was often associated with highly attractive salaries⁷³². On the other hand, since, for the navigational part, shipmasters were still needed, such system facilitated the transition of high-skilled and publicly licenced seamen from sail to steam. In describing Camogli's trend, Table 5.14 witnesses the extraordinary capability of local captains to adapt and reconvert to the new market. However, despite the smooth transition suggested by the data, this passage from sail to steam had its implications from a more qualitative perspective. First of all, the remunerations for captains and deck-officials on steamers were levelled down in comparison to sailing vessels: for instance, the data provided by M.S. Rollandi⁷³³ show that, between two equivalent class of vessels (in terms of tonnage), masters could lose up to 30% of the salary on steamers (from 207 lira average to 139). Secondly, in turning to steam, some experienced sailing captains retroceded to ship-officials for a certain period, a backstep in their careers, which had obvious repercussions both on the prestige of their occupation and from an economic point of view. This tendency, for example, is shown in the case of Captain Prospero Schiaffino (n. 26194) who, after having commanded Camogli's vessels for more than one hundred months of navigation, when engaged to steamers in 1891 was embarked on the *Giovanni M.* as the first mate⁷³⁴. The same happened to Antonio Marini (n. 26292) who, immediately after his first command on the barque *Battistina Madre* in 1893, switched to steam and spent almost fifteen years as a second or first official, until he received his second command in 1907, on the steamship *Città di Palermo*⁷³⁵.

⁷³² See, R.G. Milburn, "The emergence of the engineer in the British merchant shipping industry, 1812-1863", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 28, No. 3, pp. 559-575. For the administrative framework within the Italian merchant marine, see: *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, artt. 206-213, in M. Vocino (ed.), *Codice marittimo*, pp. 161-163.

⁷³³ M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

⁷³⁴ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 38, n. 26194.

⁷³⁵ *Idem*, n. 26292.

Meanwhile, in the case of middle-skilled seamen, source evidence underlines a remarkable continuity between sail and steam about their roles on board. Indeed, until the First World War, most of the steamships retained rigging and sails, thus giving meaning to the presence of experienced deck-sailors on board. The case of Camogli, in this sense, is noteworthy, because all the AB seamen, stewards or even boatswains maintained their qualifications on steamers. This feature sheds light on some characteristics of the Italian late-nineteenth-century maritime labour market. Middle-skilled seamen's competences and the lack of formal education pushed them towards the equivalent jobs in the steam merchant marine, whose demands for experienced sailors, however, were progressively contracting.

Furthermore, the presence of medium-skilled seamen lost centrality: this is evident both in terms of numeric presence on board and wages. On steamers, the employment share of sailors, in line with the considerations which Chin, Juhn and Thompson have outlined on British data⁷³⁶, fell dramatically from 60-70% (depending on the period) to around 25%⁷³⁷. Likewise, middle-skilled seamen wage share fell accordingly, from 65% to 20%⁷³⁸. The lack of competences suitable to the steam maritime labour market limited the range of job opportunities to which Camogli's seafarers could engage. Apart from engineers, whose extraordinary skills and know-how positioned almost at the same level of deck-officials and even captains, a significant part of the crew could also be drawn from the agricultural and urban unskilled proletariat, due to the low level of specific competencies required to work in the engine room. As a result, stokers, coalmen and coal trimmers received lower salaries on average⁷³⁹, which experienced middle-skilled seafarers seemed not willing to accept. As we will see both in the next paragraph and in the following chapter, rather than engaging to steam professions several

⁷³⁶ A. Chin, C. Juhn, and P. Thompson, "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891-1912", Table 1. Composition of the crew: sail voyages versus steam voyages, p. 575.

⁷³⁷ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1886-1914; M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

⁷³⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁷³⁹ See M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

seafarers from Camogli, in particular the middle-skilled group, decided either to quit the maritime career or to leave the Ligurian community, to sail in foreign merchant marines or to settle abroad.

5.4.2. QUITTING A MARITIME CAREER

If the passage from sail to steam allowed Camogli's seafarers to retain their occupation within the Italian merchant marine, other solutions could lead to an anticipated end of their professional paths. Professional continuity throughout the ranks of Italian sea workers was fundamental, for instance, to preserve their rights over the public social security fund for the merchant marine, the *Cassa degli invalidi per la marina mercantile*. Founded in Genoa in 1816 (under a different denomination, as *Cassa di risparmio e beneficenza di Genova*) as ideal prosecution of the *Magistrato per il riscatto degli schiavi*, this fund was aimed, on the one hand, at providing economic aid to invalid seafarers, widows and orphans and, on the other hand, supported retired sea workers, from age sixty-five⁷⁴⁰. Then, in 1851, the starting age to benefit from this fund was lowered to sixty years old⁷⁴¹. Ten years later, willing to uniformise the national social security system for seafarers, Cavour created the *Cassa degli invalidi della marina mercantile* – divided into regional independent administrative units – which lasted in its new configuration until 1913. According to law regulations (limitedly to Genoa's fund, since every local fund followed its own rules), every seaman of age sixty with a minimum of twelve years of service onboard could enjoy of a yearly pension of a variable entity, depending on the overall years of employment and professional ranks⁷⁴².

⁷⁴⁰ *La Cassa degli Invalidi della marina mercantile con sede in Genova. Origine e svolgimento: note storiche – giuridiche – amministrative*, Genova: Stabilimento Fratelli Pagano, 1906, pp. 19-20.

⁷⁴¹ *Idem*, pp. 28-32.

⁷⁴² See, *Regio Decreto 15 novembre 1868*, n. 2081.

Years of navigation	Ocean-going captains	Great cabotage captains	Coastal cabotage captains	Sailors
12	100	80	65	54
15	125	100	80	72
20	250	200	130	103
25	300	240	160	133
35	400	330	215	183

Table 5.15. Pension subsidies (in Italian lira) in favour of the members of the *Cassa degli invalidi della marina mercantile di Genova*. Source: Regio Decreto 15 novembre 1868, n. 2081, art. 42, Tabella I.

As seen in Table 5.15, at the maximum level, the yearly value of the subsidies accounted for less than a fourth of the average salaries (15,23 lira compared with the 55-60 lira average in the 1860s-70s). Furthermore, since the contribution to the social fund was charged on shipowners, none or little improvements were achieved in this direction until the early twentieth century: conversely, in several occasions, its sheer existence was endangered by shipowners' protests against what was perceived as an unnecessary additional expense on labour⁷⁴³.

The analysis conducted on Camogli seafarers about the length of their careers shows an increasing pattern of quitting maritime professions throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, whereas in the first cohort almost half of the sailors (49%) abandoned the navigation in the proximity of their retirement age, or after the 400 months of service required for pension subsidies, in the following cohorts the share of sea workers who pursued a maritime career until its natural end gradually decreased up to the 19% of the third group⁷⁴⁴. The reasons behind this impressive phenomenon might lie into a wide array of factors, including transition and the global crisis of freights which, from the 1880s onwards, endangered the sustainability of Camogli maritime system. The loss of reliable sources of employment provided by locally-owned ships ruled according to the endogenous labour market characteristics shown in the previous pages, affected careers continuity in the long run.

⁷⁴³ See, for instance, the debate developed during the Parliamentary Inquiry on the merchant marine. *Inchiesta sulle condizioni per la marina mercantile*, vol. II, pp. 256-260. Also, Chapter 4.

⁷⁴⁴ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

	% OF SAILORS NAVIGATING UNTIL PENSION	AVERAGE AGE OF QUITTING
1*	49%	37y 255d
2*	26%	29y 329d
3*	19%	27y 278d

Table 5.16. Percentage of Camogli's sailors employed until pension and average age of quitting (cohorts 1-3). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Furthermore, the average age of quitting navigation might be another valuable parameter to measure this tendency, as it fell from 37 years and 255 days for the seafarers born between 1825 and 1835 to an average of 27 years and 278 days as far as the 1865-1875 group is concerned⁷⁴⁵. In general, the overall analysis for abandonments underlines the correlation between local demands for maritime labour and the contraction of global and local shipping economies occurred in the 1870s-1890s period.

Moreover, apart from the quantitative examination of the retirement – abandonment ratio among Camogli's sea workers, the necessary step forward in our analysis would be to evaluate the subsequent occupational destinations of the latter group, to improve our understanding about their professional trajectories outside – and beyond – the working environment of Camogli. However, the registration model provided in the *Matricole* lack further details regarding the activities to which sailors dedicated after the abandonment of navigation, with the partial exception of those living until 1909 when the state censuses findings were attached to every single record.

To captains, for instance, quitting life at sea could epitomise the most sought accomplishment of this social class, namely the “promotion” to shipowners, as in the case of Prospero Schiaffino, son of Gio. Batta, who was born in Camogli in 1868⁷⁴⁶. Embarked for the first time in 1884 on board the brig *Schiaffino Padre* under the command of his father, Prospero was soon transferred on the brig

⁷⁴⁵ Idem.

⁷⁴⁶ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

Draguette (728 t.) along oceanic routes carrying rice, teak and sugar⁷⁴⁷. From 1890 onward, Prospero sailed to Asian and American destinations at the command of *Draguette* until July 1898, when he shipwrecked offshore from Tamatave (Toamasina, Madagascar)⁷⁴⁸. Then, after a few years of service as deck official on the brig *Castello Dragone* (663 t.), owned by Adeodato Schiaffino from Camogli⁷⁴⁹ and some embarkments on NGI steamers, in 1902 Prospero Schiaffino retired from the navigation. Before that, he had collected 186 months of service (116 as ocean-going master), being at sea for 82% of the time between his first and last embarkments. Then, Prospero's life choices are unknown until 1909, when he is registered in the Italian census as «shipowner settled in Camogli»⁷⁵⁰. Nevertheless, his career as shipowner did not last long – and, probably, was not successful – since, in 1911, he began again to sail on Italian steamers for a couple of years⁷⁵¹.

For sailors, instead, the information is more varied and sparse, to the extent that it might be impossible to draw veritable statistics about the types of employment following their retirement from the navigation. Some of them moved to local craftsmanship (i.e. Agostino Domenico Mortola, who abandoned fishing for shoemaking in 1888), but most of the details for these workers could not be collected. Although at the end of the nineteenth century Camogli underwent an expansive phase under different parameters, its economic and social structure was not able to absorb the increasing unemployment originated from the crisis of the local shipping sector. The transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant marine, developed in the previous chapter, constituted a reliable alternative for Camogli's high-skilled seafarers, slightly less for the medium and low-skilled groups (more than 20% in the last cohort). The rate of abandonments finalised to the change of occupation ashore in Camogli, Genoa or different Italian regions

⁷⁴⁷ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, b. 61, Moulmein (1887).

⁷⁴⁸ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

⁷⁴⁹ RINA, 1902, p. 233, n. 38. Despite Prospero and Adeodato had the same surname, any direct kinship is unknown.

⁷⁵⁰ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

accounted for the 21%, 28% and 30% of the respective cohorts. These figures, however, were almost evenly matched by the percentage of Camogli sea workers who decided to leave their country to settle, either temporarily or permanently, in foreign countries (see Table 5.17).

	PENSION	ABANDONMENT (ITALY)	ABANDONMENT (FOREIGN COUNTRIES)	DEAD AT SEA	OTHER
1*	49%	21%	19%	6%	5%
2*	26%	28%	23%	11%	12%
3*	19%	30%	31%	8%	12%

Table 5.17. Reasons behind career end among Camogli sea workers (cohorts 1-3). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Therefore, in the case of Camogli, the local shipping sector crisis intermingled with broader historical processes, such as Italian migration waves to the Americas and led to different results depending on a wide array of factors. The outcome developed into a multi-faceted phenomenon, in which the shortage of maritime employment was critical to intensify underlying trends in general migration, which had experienced a preliminary phase before the crisis but, later, increased to unprecedented extents.

Among the seafarers of Camogli who, in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, left their hometown to settle abroad, we can isolate various groups depending on different criteria. First, as far as the means of abandonment are concerned, we can distinguish between legal and illegal measures, with a particular emphasis on desertion. Secondly, the same argument can be approached from different angles, aiming to underline the professional fields which sea workers engaged in the destination context. The theme of desertion, crucial to Camogli seafaring lives as well as to the whole Italian shipping, will be treated to contextualise this «social plague» – in the eyes of the national merchant marine – within the coeval economic and social context, and in the attempt to individuate push factors, at home, and pull factors, abroad. Then, we will adopt the latter approach and propose a distinction between those who pursued seafaring careers

abroad and those who definitively quitted navigation for a multitude of different types of employment.

Conclusions

From the ancient regime period, and in analogy with several small seafaring communities, Camogli's shipping had inherited an endogenous maritime labour system, according to which local labour supply and demand found mutual satisfaction. Furthermore, the identarian origins and spirit of Camogli's crews led to a remarkable transposition of the communitarian structures in the onboard life. Familiar ties and trust relationships ruled the appointment of crew members, in particular as far as the upper ranks were concerned. Although being fundamental to the sorts of local shipping, the first historical phase of expansion to the Black Sea did not alter labour significantly and enrolment mechanisms which, even more interestingly abroad, remained inherently connected with the members of the community. From the sailors' perspective, as far as the maritime activities of the community expanded and local shipping business developed, the seafarers of Camogli could rely on a growing labour market for their employment. Then, the accrued national and international competitiveness owed to the transition from sail to steam, the fall of freights and the progressive marginalisation of sailing shipping into peripheral markets undermined this system. Whereas, as seen in Chapter 3 and 4, maritime activities *per se* and shipping business were able to resist or, at least, to be resilient to the ongoing global transformations, from the 1880s Camogli's maritime labour fell into a downward spiral. The loss of occupational perspectives hit more severely the lower ranks (low and middle-skilled sailors), who resisted more to the conversion to steam than their highly-skilled counterparts. Shipmasters and officials, on their hand, owing to the higher levels of professionalization acquired throughout the century, seemed to be more capable of adapting to the new demands of the shipping market. Although most of them failed to the long-sought transition from employee to employer (from captain to shipowner), several reconverted to the steam shipping sector.

On the other hand, among the seamen born in the last generation (1865-1875), few worked until pension, whereas more than sixty per cent of them left either navigation or the country. Either way, their abandonments testified the collapse of the endogenous locally-based maritime labour system. The direction of their careers and their following activities will be the main subject of the following chapter.

6. LEAVING THE COMMUNITY: PROFESSIONAL TRANSFER AND LABOUR MIGRATION

Introduction

After having treated shipping business and maritime labour and its protagonists, the present chapter will deal with the foreign projection of the people of Camogli who, for various reasons, decided to leave the community to settle more or less definitively abroad. Differently from the first three chapters, where Camogli's fleet and shipping were at the core of the analysis, this chapter focuses on the people movements independently from shipping business.

The turning point is represented by the abandonment of Camogli's endogenous shipping system, by desertion or legal emigration: from that moment onwards, the seafarers discarded their affiliation to Camogli's shipping to embrace different roles; maritime labourers within foreign merchant marines or of migrants. This distinction draws a basic line to understand the aim of the present chapter.

Nevertheless, in particular in the case of migrants, the origins and connections with the native town are fundamental to shape the outward community abroad, its nature and distinguishing features. The reference to Baily's «village-outward» methodology⁷⁵², classical among migration scholars, is essential to comprehend Camogli's external projection and to analyse the creation of social and labour networks in the contexts of destination. Furthermore, the outgoing movement of Camogli seafarers will be examined through the existing dialectic between migration and maritime professions, which determined unique patterns of integration within the hosting societies.

The first section analyses the distinguishing features of desertion and emigration as the primary gateways to flee from the community. In so doing, it

⁷⁵² S.L. Baily, "The Village-Outward Approach to Italian Migration: A Case Study of Agnonesi Migration Abroad, 1885-1989", *Studi Emigrazione* 29, No. 105, 1992, pp. 43-68.

aims to provide a methodological framework to consider desertion and emigration as parts of distinct but entangled processes.

The second section analyses Camogli's maritime labour transfer to the fleets of other European countries and calls for major research on the diffusion of Italian seafarers into the international merchant marines.

The third section draws on the dense argument of Camogli's migration to Latin America. It provides an historical and methodological background to contextualise the position of Camogli within the broader Ligurian phenomenon. Then, it analyses the individual trajectories and careers of some immigrants from Camogli: firstly, in continuity with maritime labour; secondly, in the attempt to reconstruct a model of migrant entrepreneurship.

Finally, the fourth and last section will delineate the exceptional case-study of the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to the remotest island of Tristan da Cunha. Their story constitutes an exemplar case-study for maritime-related migrations after shipwrecks, an understudied phenomenon which rarefied with the nineteenth-century shipping improvements and globalisation. Nevertheless, it still represents a remarkable feature to characterise seafaring, its risks and its opportunities.

6.1. Emigration and desertion of Camogli's global seafarers

The first paragraph will try to sketch out the figure of late nineteenth-century Camogli seafarers and, thereafter, illustrate the relationship between pull and push factors and the different ways for seamen to emigrate. During the nineteenth century, the nature of seafaring put sailors in a unique position among all the professions in relation to geographical movement. However, although seamen have been long considered as transnational characters *par excellence*⁷⁵³, not all the

⁷⁵³ See, in particular, the arguments provided by Maria Fusaro in identifying the connections between maritime history and global history: M. Fusaro, "Maritime History as Global History? The Methodological Challenges and a Future Research Agenda", in M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), *Maritime History as Global History*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2010, pp. 267-282. For a contemporary comparison, see: I. Acejo, "Seafarers and Transnationalism: Ways of Belongingness Ashore and Aboard", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, No. 33: 1, 2012, pp. 69-84; M. Borovnik, "Are

seafarers were effectively subjected to long-range voyages and to foreign encounters. Having compared the routes of Camogli's late-eighteenth-century sea workers with those of one hundred years afterwards, for instance, we provided clear evidence of how nineteenth-century technological advancements and the adaptation of Camogli to the evolution of the shipping market had changed dramatically seafarers' relationship with the international scenario. The enlargement of the range of shipping produced undeniable effects on the social and economic position of Camogli's seamen. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, they frequented highly internationalised ports and confronted with foreign crews on salaries, onboard discipline and further fundamental aspects of the life at sea. Together with shipping business, in less than fifty years, Camogli seafarers passed from the local to the global dimension⁷⁵⁴. As outlined in the previous chapter, the same characteristics of their professional routines changed along with the geographical expansion. These transformations and the maturation of transnational identities were, in some instances, channelled into quit behaviours from Camogli's endogenous labour market, such as desertion and migration, in response to various pull and push factors.

For seafarers, among the several ways to abandon a maritime career and flee abroad, desertion was one of the most common and, at the same time, troublesome. According to the Code of the Italian Merchant Marine (art. 264), «any crew member who, both in national or foreign ports, jumped ship or did not embark on the day of departure, with no authorisations of maritime and consular authorities, is declared deserter»⁷⁵⁵. Then, in the following article, the law prescribed that, when caught, deserters could end up in prison for a variable period of time – up to one year – and must pay a fine from 50 to 200 lira⁷⁵⁶. Therefore, Italian nineteenth-century maritime workers were aware of the legal interpretation of desertion, which represented a severe crime, punishable with jail reclusion;

Seafarers Migrants? Situating Seafarers in the Framework of Mobility and Transnationalism”, *Geographer*, No. 60:1, 2004, pp. 36-43.

⁷⁵⁴ See, chapter 5.

⁷⁵⁵ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 264.

⁷⁵⁶ *Idem*, art. 265.

nevertheless, in particular throughout the second half of the century, countless Italian seafarers chose to desert whatsoever. From 1860s to the First World War, desertion became an endemic phenomenon for oceanic voyages, in spite of the various efforts made by the State to put an end to this continuous drain of sea going personnel.

The post-unitarian administration of the Italian merchant marine tried to control desertion since its earliest establishment: in December 1868, indeed, the King Vittorio Emanuele II appointed a special committee to «develop measures to remedy the extremely serious inconvenience of many desertions which occur too frequently»⁷⁵⁷. Interestingly, the members of this committee were all from Genoa or Liguria, and among them appeared the count Andrea Danovaro, «shipowner»⁷⁵⁸, and Pietro Badaracco, captain. Among the papers delivered from the committee to the Minister of the Marine – whose proposals will be discussed further – some statistical tables represent, already in the late 1860s, the weight of desertion within the Italian maritime framework since, in the 1868-1870 period, almost two thousands sea labourers deserted. Their analysis also tried to individuate the typologies of seafarers who were more likely to desert, both with regard to their regional provenience and from a professional point of view.

Firstly, commissaries highlighted the considerable rate of Ligurian sailors, which composed 52,8% of the total, among Italian deserters. In fact, a fundamental share of the Italian seafaring personnel came from Liguria, in particular from the maritime communities lying on the western and eastern sides of the region. Few years after the national unification, Liguria provided 37.287 seamen out of 149.563 (24,8%)⁷⁵⁹. Therefore, the weight of deserters was much more significant in terms of proportion than the Ligurian share of sailors. The primary reason for such discrepancy lied in the earlier establishment of Ligurian shipping in the oceanic

⁷⁵⁷ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b. 474, 6th December 1868.

⁷⁵⁸ It is with high certainty the same Andrea Danovaro mentioned in Chapter 2 as one of the main Black Sea grain buyers. Interestingly, in the first draft of the decree, Andrea Danovaro was labelled as both merchant and shipowner.

⁷⁵⁹ See, *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, pp. LVIII-LIX.

freight market: their fleet measured more in terms of both average and total tonnage⁷⁶⁰.

In addition, the existence of a correlation between desertion and migration, which will be discussed further, might associate Ligurian outstanding numbers for deserters with the first migration wave to Latin America, of which Ligurian middle-skilled and educated migrants (often with maritime and commercial backgrounds) were essential components, as opposed to the later agricultural low-skilled waves in which much more people from Southern Italy participated.

Secondly, the public inquiry underlined how desertion concerned mainly able-bodied seamen, who reached the outstanding figure of 89,95% of the total, followed at great distance by ship-boys (9,62%), whereas shipmasters and mates deserted in the rarest occasions (respectively 0,16% and 0,27%)⁷⁶¹. Likewise, the sources material on Camogli seafarers illustrate analogous outcomes, since among the whole group of deserters (9,66% of the sample), no one was mate or master at the time of desertion. Inter alia, the case of Gio. Batta Fravega is worth noting: in 1866, he deserted in Genoa (probably he did not present himself at the time of the embarkment), one year prior the obtainment of his license as mate⁷⁶².

The absolute concentration of cases among low and middle-skilled sea workers is in line with most of the historiographical interpretations of such phenomenon. In particular, the identification of onboard conflicts with class struggles, between low «proletarian» ranks and shipmasters, had stimulated various studies which dealt with desertion more or less in conformity with the Marxist theories⁷⁶³. Within this

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶¹ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b. 474, *Quadro statistico delle diserzioni avvenute nella marina mercantile durante il triennio 1868-69-70*.

⁷⁶² ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 19, n. 15053.

⁷⁶³ See: A. Cabantous, *La Vergue et les fers. Mutins et déserteurs dans la marine de l'ancienne France*, Edition Taillerand, 1984. Very influential was also the work of Marcus Rediker: M. Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. See also, the roundtable discussions related to this volume and published within the *International Journal of Maritime History*: M. Rediker, "Reviews of Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750*", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 311-336; Idem, "The Common Seamen in the History

ideological framework, desertion was a mean for seafarers to express their class-conscious dissensus against masters' and owners' (representants of authoritarian societies) dominance onboard. Accordingly, deserting was a constructive action which sailors took to re-exert their control over their own labour. The correlation of desertions with working conditions, in general, and with professional and economic subordination, in particular, found fertile ground in the analysis of masters' absolute authority over the crew⁷⁶⁴.

Conversely, other scholars tried to contextualise desertion in a broader economic and sociological framework, in which class struggle made space to more individualistic and market-driven causes⁷⁶⁵. With regard to Finnish shipping, for example, the research of Jari Ojala and Jaakko Pehkonen provided a fundamental toolset to analyse the reasons of desertion from a wider perspective, which included wage differentials, navigational conditions (mean tonnage, length of voyage, destinations) and purely individual characteristics (as marital status or age)⁷⁶⁶. Moreover, this exercise on Finnish sailors was in clear continuity with Lewis Fischer's work on deserting seamen within St. John's merchant marine, where desertion was tested, with contrasting results, in light of wage differentials and market-driven opportunities⁷⁶⁷.

The Italian case, as it emerges from state inquiries and Camogli's sample, can be compared with the Finnish situation, due to various similarities in the respective geographic and shipping conditions. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the Italian and Finnish merchant marines engaged to cross-trading as their

of Capitalism and the Working Class", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 337-357.

⁷⁶⁴ See, J.M. Witt, "«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century", pp. pp. 165-194.

⁷⁶⁵ See, for instance: L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", in R. Ommer and G. Panting (eds), *Working Men Who Got Wet*, St. John's Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, pp. 51-70.

⁷⁶⁶ J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 18:1, 2006, pp. 25-53; J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", *European Review of Economic History*, No. 17, 2013, pp. 122-140.

⁷⁶⁷ L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", pp. 51-70.

dominant form of shipping. Likewise, despite all due differences, their typical routes were comparable: both began in peripheral waters, with little or no outbound cargoes available, and called to British ports as the real point of departure. These analogies affected the working conditions of seafarers in similar ways, in particular with regard to the voyage length and the subsequent prolonged distance from home. Furthermore, both the seamen populations suffered from negative wage differentials in relation to market averages, which implied a comparable disposition to desert in favour of foreign employments.

Ojala and Pehkonen quantitative analyses, for example, revealed that below-average aged and unmarried seamen were keener to desert than their more mature and engaged counterparts; in Camogli, despite lacking serial information concerning seafarers' marital status, the average age of deserters was 23 years and 101 days⁷⁶⁸. In this regard, the relative youth of deserters might have correlated with draft evasion, which the 1868 Commission included among the most critical reasons for desertion⁷⁶⁹. Indeed, in the contemporary perception, military service represented an undesirable duty, which wealthier families were able to circumvent more easily than the lower ranks: normally, at the moment of the draft, most of the seafarers had already selected their substitutes. Usually, the shipowners allotted part of their legacy to exonerate their sons from service in case of a positive draw in the draft: this was the case, for example of Prospero Razeto, who, in 1856, destined 4000 lire to this specific purpose⁷⁷⁰. Instead, the absence, for aged sailors, of draft evasion among the factors to determine desertion might have favoured regular emigration. According to the Italian laws, indeed, seamen under the draft age were forbidden to legally settle abroad, whereas elder seafarers were more easily authorised.

Furthermore, a great deal of emphasis was put on the correlation between desertion and long-term oceanic routes, measured through the analysis of average tonnages, voyage durations and destinations. Whereas the Finnish sample targeted

⁷⁶⁸ See, ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁷⁶⁹ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁷⁷⁰ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, r. 174, n. 75.

seafaring communities and towns devoted to both coastal and trans-oceanic shipping, the maritime evolution of Camogli from the mid-nineteenth century onwards makes the Ligurian town an excellent case-study to evaluate the impact of the enlargement of shipping routes on desertion patterns. The evolution of desertion rates followed the progressive abandonment of the Mediterranean and increased in the period of oceanic tramp shipping.




Figure 6.1. Seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (1840-1914). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*

Figure 6.1 compares the quantitative evolution of desertion and legal emigration among Camogli seafarers from 1840s to 1910s. Firstly, the curve of desertion shows two periods of rising discontinuity, the first during the 1860s and the second in the 1880s. Taking into consideration just the economic perspective, these two periods present opposite characteristics: between 1860 and 1870, the shipping business of Camogli underwent its most rewarding and profitable phase; in the following decades, the global freight crisis, the competition with steam shipping and the local financial collapse stroke an heavy blow on Camogli's maritime system⁷⁷¹. However, whereas the respective economic factors differed, the two periods have

⁷⁷¹ See, Chapter 3 and 4.

something in common: the geographic escalation of Camogli's maritime activities, from the Mediterranean to the British Isles in the former case (1860s), and from the European waters to the oceanic setting in the latter (1880s)⁷⁷².

Also the 1868 Commission – targeting the whole country – outlined the correlation between desertion and the widening of the Italian shipping range to the Atlantic environment: in their statistics, the overwhelming majority of Italian sea workers deserted in Latin American ports (66%), followed by British territories (7%) and the U.S. (6%)⁷⁷³. The extraordinary amount of desertions in Latin America is a distinguishing feature differentiating Italian seafarers from those of the anglophone and Northern countries. In the literature on St. John's and Scandinavian deserters, the percentage of Latin American destinations never exceeded 10%, whereas British and U.S. ports accounted for most of the cases⁷⁷⁴.

The case of Camogli, instead, represents a junction point between the two worlds: because of Camogli's outstanding accomplishments in international shipping, its characteristics stood out from the Italian average.

	Latin america	British and northern european ports	North america	Other
DESERTION	38,71%	41,93%	12,90%	6,45%
LEGAL EMIGRATION	64,58%	14,58%	12,50%	8,33%

Table 6.1. Destinations of seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (1840-1914). Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*

Indeed, the data provided by Table 6.1 seem to align the case of Camogli to the international standards. Differently from the Italian trend, Camogli seafarers

⁷⁷² See, Chapter 2 and 3.

⁷⁷³ Data drawn from: ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁷⁷⁴ L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", p. 58; J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", p. 45.

deserted more in the British and Northern European ports than in Latin America, thus showing similar characteristics to those of Scandinavians. In broader terms, some Camogli seafarers acted more in line with international than national trends for deciding the ports where to desert.

Furthermore, the place of desertion affected the occupational prospects of deserters, as we will delineate in the next section. The unique character of Camogli's data within the Italian framework invited us to broaden the analysis to compare desertion with the legal emigration flows to America. The widening of the perspective is crucial to move forward with the analysis of the exogenous reasons for desertion, which require a much wider contextualisation within migration movements⁷⁷⁵.

Behind the choice to desert either in Cardiff or in Buenos Ayres lied highly different individual and environmental reasons: naturally, the desertion led also to opposite results. In the first case (British and Northern European destinations), deserting was usually aimed at prosecuting the maritime career: seafarers sought for more rewarding employments and decided to disembark, even illegally, in ports where it was possible to satisfy their expectations. In the second case (Latin American ports), desertion usually resulted into stable settlements abroad, sometimes connected to the abandonment of a maritime career or, at least, to its reconfiguration (e.g. from oceanic routes to cabotage). Although the former situation is almost exclusive of desertion, the latter one forced us to inscribe the deserting behaviours in a broader framework which comprehended migration itself.

Under a chronological point of view, legal emigration follows a similar pattern to desertion: 65,11% of the migrations occurred between 1880 and 1899 (see Figure 6.1). The most contrasting results emerge under the geographical perspective: migrating seafarers chose the Latin American ports in 64,58% of the instances (as opposed to the 38,71% of desertion), whereas only 14,58% opted for British or Northern European ports (as opposed to 41,93% of desertion).

⁷⁷⁵ Ojala and Pehkonen have already attempted to analyse desertion through migration models: see, J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", pp. 130-132.

These data imply a fundamental element of distinction: for deserters, professional continuity played a decisive role in determining the abandonment of the community. This feature could also be associated to the sudden nature of desertion as opposed to the meticulous planning allowed to migration.

The next section, therefore, examines the diverging trajectories of those who continued a maritime profession according to the nature of their abandonment of the community, either by desertion or migration.

6.2. Different flag, same sails: maritime labour migration to the European merchant marines

As seen in the previous chapter (Table 5.17), notwithstanding the method adopted, almost one third (31%) of the sample of Camogli seafarers born between 1865 and 1875 decided to leave the community to settle abroad. Although maritime labour sources are mostly silent toward foreign employments or activities abroad, the utilisation of more qualitative sources might shed some light on them. The present analysis will begin by taking into account those who continued into maritime professions: in this sense, we will sketch out a sharp contraposition between high-seas and cabotage foreign careers.

While the transfer from sail to steam shipping was a late phenomenon which impacted severely on Camogli's shipping crisis from the late 1870s onwards, the abandonment of the «floating communities» in favour of foreign sailing vessels anticipated the crisis and the gradual dismantlement of the communitarian economic system. Immediately after Camogli's ships crossed the Mediterranean borders and reached out more attractive maritime labour markets (such as the British one), the local Italian consuls began to record countless desertions of seafarers⁷⁷⁶. Among the places where Camogli's seamen chose to jump ship, British ports were much likely related to the decision to embark on foreign vessels.

⁷⁷⁶ See, ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

Interestingly, scholarly literature indicates that serving on foreign merchant marines was not as common for Italians as for other nationalities. For example, the pivotal studies on the Scandinavian merchant marines have long established how switching flag was a common behaviour among Northern European sea workers⁷⁷⁷, whose professional and ethical qualities were of great appreciation in the most labour-demanding fleets, such as the British one. For instance, according to the data retrieved from a sample database of British crew agreements, the Scandinavians provided 19,09% of the deck personnel and, thus, constituted the second regional group (after the Britons, 56,56%) within the British merchant marine⁷⁷⁸. The comparative success of Scandinavian sailors reached even Camogli's fleet: in 1898, when the ship *Edinburgh* was anchored at Pensacola, in order to replace a couple of Southern Italian deserters, the captain embarked a Finnish able-bodied seaman and a Danish ordinary seaman⁷⁷⁹.

On the other side, despite the relatively low labour costs – which the British consuls praised and blamed at the same time – Italian sailors were less demanded within foreign merchant marines⁷⁸⁰. In particular, historiography tends to relate this trend to moral prejudices which blamed most of the Southern-European countries⁷⁸¹. Until now, maritime scholars have completely ignored the presence of Italian maritime labourers in the foreign merchant marines. Conversely, a thorough research on the vast archival corpora (particularly in the British case) might contribute to the reconsideration of this neglected aspect of the Italian and European maritime history and, perhaps, shed light on unexpected entanglements. In particular, a systematic research on foreign crew lists might be fundamental to

⁷⁷⁷ This element arose within the discussion concerning the integration of Northern European sailors within the international maritime labour market: L.R. Fischer, "The Efficiency Of Maritime Labour Markets In The Age Of Sail: The Post-1850 Norwegian Experience", in Idem (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, pp. III-140. The same phenomenon is repeatedly mentioned in: J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", pp. 123-125.

⁷⁷⁸ The database is outlined and discussed in M.Cooper, "Maritime Labour And Crew Lists Analysis: Problems, Prospects And Methodologies", p. 190.

⁷⁷⁹ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, Giornale generale, Brigantino a palo *Edinburgh*, 602/1.

⁷⁸⁰ See, chapter 2.

⁷⁸¹

evaluate, with more awareness, the effective attractiveness of the foreign maritime labour market on Italian seamen and, thus, its correlation with desertion.

Lacking such data and owing to the fact that, after desertion, the individual career records were naturally interrupted, we resorted to a tentative analysis of the most frequent places of desertion and to the usage of more qualitative sources, in the attempt to discuss the occurrence of Camogli seafarers working on foreign vessels.

As pointed out in the previous paragraph, about 41% of Camogli deserters chose to jump ship in British or Northern European ports. This figure is outstandingly high in comparison with the Italian average (less than 10% total)⁷⁸². Therefore, Camogli seafarers seem to represent an exceptional case-study within the Italian maritime context; whereas most of the Italian deserters aimed at Latin American countries to settle there, a remarkable share of Camogli's seamen deserted in ports where embarking on foreign vessels represented the most attractive option. Within this framework, the most favourite places for sailors to desert were Cardiff, Newcastle and Liverpool, not surprisingly among the leading ports for the Atlantic sea borne trade. There, the comparison with British (or American) working conditions and salaries might have encouraged displeased, young and unmarried seamen to secretly disembark with the purpose to sign new employments aboard of foreign ships.

The absence of a clear legislation and, in particular, of bi-lateral and international agreements on desertion – as the 1868 Commission noted – facilitated such misconduct⁷⁸³. Furthermore, the relative absence of Camogli's legal migrants to the UK ports, as opposed to the high figure of desertion in the same area, suggests a correlation between desertion and the continuation of maritime careers in foreign merchant marines. To this group can be added those sailors who decided to stop legally in the British ports and never embarked again on Italian vessels (2,3 % of the total sample, 10,6% of foreign abandonments, see Table 5.12).

⁷⁸² See, ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁷⁸³ *Ibidem*. To the same argument refer also Ojala Pehkonen: J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", p. 39.

In sums, the reemployment within foreign oceanic merchant marines suggests the existence of professional continuity. Camogli' sailors engaged to foreign international shipping to achieve better salaries and ameliorate their working conditions. Although these subjects abandoned Camogli's endogenous labour market, they remained within its broader container, the international maritime labour market. The high level of mobility associated with high-seas careers prevented sailors from permanently settling abroad.

All these features draw a thick line of distinction between pursuing a maritime career in foreign merchant marines and engaging to cabotage. The decision of jumping ship to engage to foreign vessels was inherently less durable and one-way than a professional readjustment to cabotage in another country. As we will see, the latter option was usually pursued in Latin America, in the broader context of permanent or semi-permanent migration to this continent. For these reasons, before tackling the argument of Camogli's readjustments to Latin American cabotage, we will first proceed with a brief digression about the characteristics of Ligurian migration to two specific areas, Peru and the Plata region, where most of Camogli's seafarers directed in the second half of the nineteenth century.

6.3. The Ligurian Migration to Latin America (1830s-1914)

In the reconstruction of the Italian migration flows to Latin America, there is wide consensus in representing the Genoese people as a definite group holding some distinctive traits. Firstly, in connection with Ligurian chronological primacy within the Italian migration flows to Latin America; secondly, because of the unique push and pull factors determining their emigration.

Various scholars noted how cultural factors carved a role within this Ligurian primate⁷⁸⁴. The Genoese people grew in the «mobility culture»⁷⁸⁵ and possessed a natural predisposition to geographical movement, rooted into centuries of shipping and commercial practices. These traits lied at the basis of their earlier settlement in the Latin American continent and deeply influenced the characteristics of their establishment within the social and economic framework of the hosting societies. The inclusion of Camogli within this paradigm is however a late accomplishment. As seen in the previous chapters, its shipping developed a transnational dimension only from the 1830s onwards: previously, the geographical context to which they referred was restrained within the narrow borders of the Tyrrhenian sea and rarely Camogli's vessels sailed outside the Mediterranean. «Mobility culture» did play a role in bringing Latin American countries closer to Genoa, but within a more intricated framework where long-standing interests and durable entanglements intervened.

The relationships between Liguria and Latin America before the eighteenth century had been a neglected field of studies until the recent volume of Catia Brilli⁷⁸⁶ shed light on the Latin American side of the centuries-old business entanglements which the Genoese merchants maintained with Spanish monarchs. In this context, the greater relationships with this area manifested from the second half of the eighteenth century under the direction of the group of Genoese traders settled in Cadiz⁷⁸⁷. The penetration of Genoese entrepreneurs in Latin America can

⁷⁸⁴ See, for instance the literature concerning the first waves of Italian emigration to Argentina and Uruguay: M.C. Crescimbene, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", in *La popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987, pp. 209-242; F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", in *L'emigrazione italiana e la fondazione dell'Uruguay moderno*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 1-35.

⁷⁸⁵ The same terms are used in: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana. Una visione storica*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999, p. 32. See, also: G. Chiaramonti, "Italiani in Perú fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure", *Zibaldone. Estudios italianos*, p. 57.

⁷⁸⁶ C. Brilli, *Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700-1830*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

⁷⁸⁷ Idem, p. 95.

be contextualised within the Spanish designs to enhance and develop the colonial trade, in particular with the surroundings of Buenos Ayres. Thus, various individuals settled there and opened trade activities, in particular in the retail sector (*pulperias*); some of them became successful and survived to the dramatic transformations observed at the turn of the century⁷⁸⁸.

After the commercial and shipping crisis determined by Napoleonic Wars, the Genoese recovered their communications with Plata, which assumed continuous characters from the 1830s onwards. Meanwhile, since the early 1820s, several members of the Ligurian community settled around the Plata basin engaged to maritime-related professions, in particular river navigation and shipbuilding⁷⁸⁹, to which were gradually added the newcomers establishing in the same area from the 1830s onwards. For this group of immigrants – among which it is possible to include those from Camogli – shipping business represented the gateway to migration. First, it provided the means and the occasion to migrate; whether deserting or regularly leaving the ship, many of these migrants presented a maritime background which concurred to their arrival to the American continent. Secondly, shipping business and its affiliated industries were underdeveloped sectors in the area: thus, countless Ligurians were able to fill the void and engaged to river navigation, coastal cabotage and shipbuilding⁷⁹⁰.

The same pattern is observed on the opposite shore of the Latin American subcontinent, in Peru and Chili where, for being less numerous, the Italian communities were even more evidently related to maritime emigration⁷⁹¹. There, Ligurian immigrants started to arrive with continuity from the early nineteenth century, in the wake of their independence.

⁷⁸⁸ Idem, pp. 89-134.

⁷⁸⁹ Idem, pp. 164-202.

⁷⁹⁰ See: F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, pp. 1-15.

⁷⁹¹ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 29-35; G. Chiaramonti, “Italiani in Perú fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure”, p. 61; J. Worral, “Italian Immigrants in the Peruvian Economy, 1860-1914”, *Italian Americana*, No. 2:1, 1975, pp. 50-63; V. Maino, “I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX”, in *Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 157-195.

In general, the Ligurian emigration to Latin America has been interpreted as an early chain migration. Early, because it took place before the effective development of the Italian mass migration flows to the same area. Still in 1871, the immigrants of Ligurian origins represented the 53% of the Italian population settled in the American continent⁷⁹². Therefore, migration historians have naturally decided to label the pre-1870 migration wave as the Ligurian phase⁷⁹³. Then, with the growth of the emigration flows from other areas of the country, the Genoese component lost its dominant role in terms of relative participation; nevertheless, Ligurian people continued to transfer to Latin America in the following decades. Indeed, despite the characteristics of Ligurian migration were tailored on the mid-nineteenth century context, the same features can be seen throughout the subsequent period.

Within this framework, the history of Camogli's emigration to Latin America can be explicated through a three-step process. First: the immigrants arrived there as seafarers and decided to abandon the ship – either by deserting or under permission of the captain/shipowner. Second: they found employment within local cabotage and prosecuted with their maritime careers. Third: at the top, shipping business was gradually associated with investments in trade, agricultural production and industry; at the bottom, it was abandoned for the retail and wholesale sectors. Indeed, this pattern underwent an intergenerational differentiation: usually, first-comers (arrived between 1830s and 1860s) reached the third step at the top; instead, late-comers (1870s-1910s) – arrived as a result of mechanisms of chain migration – were employed in already-established activities and were rarely able to climb the Latin American social ladder.

⁷⁹² *Statistica generale del Regno d'Italia - Censimento degli italiani all'estero (31 dicembre 1871)* Roma: Stamperia Reale, 1874.

⁷⁹³ M.C. Crescimbene, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", pp. 209-242.

6.3.1. CAMOGLI'S MARITIME LABOUR MIGRATION TO LATIN AMERICA

When arrived to Latin America, the main tools at disposal of the people of Camogli were the maritime background and the related professional expertise. Despite many specificities, the same characteristics were shared by most of the immigrants of Ligurian origins. As a result, they successfully integrated within all the shipping-related industries, in particular cabotage and shipbuilding. Within the wide range of opportunities offered by the fluid Latin American societies, the places of origin of the “Genoese” influenced their choices. Camogli's people, like many from the Eastern Ligurian Riviera, founded shipping companies and engaged to local cabotage. On the other side, immigrants from places with deeply-rooted traditions in the shipbuilding industry were more likely to open shipyards. Several shipwrights and carpenters from Varazze, one of the leading shipbuilding centres of Liguria, arrived in Buenos Ayres and Montevideo and founded shipyards there⁷⁹⁴. Instances like these are emblematic to highlight the professional continuity tying the hometown with the migrant environment.

In the aftermath of the Latin American independence process, the extant political and social climate was favourable for Europeans to make great profits within societies under construction. In Peru, since the mid-nineteenth century, «the Italians owned almost all of the cabotage under the Peruvian flag»⁷⁹⁵. According to the Italian consul in Lima, «in order to practice fishing and cabotage, and to be equalised to locals» many Ligurian emigrants «had inscribed themselves in the Peruvian rolls»⁷⁹⁶. In 1853, the only data available to analyse the mid-

⁷⁹⁴ See the case of the brothers Franco, Giuseppe and Luigi Fazio and Giuseppe, Vincenzo and Gio. Batta Cerruti reported in: F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, pp. 5-6. See also, the case of Matteo Amico, from Loano to Peru: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 85-88. For Buenos Ayres, see: M.C. Crescimbeni, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)”, p. 246.

⁷⁹⁵ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, b. 271, Lettera di Pietro Castelli al Ministro della Marina (1866).

⁷⁹⁶ AMAE, *Ministero degli affari esteri*, b. 817, Lima, 1865.

nineteenth century Peruvian merchant marine, record at least eighteen vessels – out of one hundred twenty (6,66%) – belonging to Ligurian shipowners⁷⁹⁷.

Scholarly reconstructions underline how, at the beginning of its independent history, the Peruvian society lacked both the means and the know-how to create its own merchant marine and, accordingly, favoured foreign investments in this sector⁷⁹⁸. The Ligurian shipowners engaged mainly to the Latin American cabotage, where they imposed their rule, and more rarely adventured to international trade: in that sector, for the outstanding success of guano trade, British, American and French were powerful and resourceful competitors.

Thus, Peru turned into an attractive maritime labour market for Ligurian seamen. However, the enrolment of Italian citizens within the Peruvian rolls and the transfer to the foreign flag was perceived as a problematic drain of resources by the Italian authorities. From the consular correspondence, for instance, it is possible to observe the efforts to achieve bi-lateral agreements with the Peruvian state aimed at obtaining the fiscal equalisation between the Italian and Peruvian merchant marines⁷⁹⁹. This type of agreement would have diminished the drain of resources and, perhaps, would have pushed the resident shipowners to return to the Italian flag. In addition, consular correspondence shed light on another factor of attractiveness of Peru in the eyes of Italian seafarers: to contrast desertion, the consul proposed the introduction of a minimum salary within the Italian merchant marine – equal to the local market level. Such proposal underlines the existence of considerable salary differentials between the two maritime labour markets and their role to determine desertions and labour migration to Latin America.

⁷⁹⁷ R. Melo, *Historia de la Marina del Perú*, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, 1907, p. 217-220. The figure might indicate an overestimation of the Ligurian penetration within Peruvian shipping business: however, later sources and historiography identified many more Italian-owned ships in Peru, in particular of Giuseppe Canevaro and Gio. Bono Figari. See, M. C. de Mendoza, *El transporte marítimo en la Inmigración China*, Lima, 1989, p. 68, mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 70.

⁷⁹⁸ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 64-66.

⁷⁹⁹ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817. In the proposed treaty, the consul aimed at obtaining free fishing and free cabotage for the Italian flag. However, he was not optimistic about the fact that this action on itself could prevent Italian citizens from enlisting into the Peruvian rolls.

Moreover, another advantage of the Peruvian labour market in comparison with the Italian one involved the mechanisms of upward professional mobility. Several low and middle-skilled seamen deserted in the Pacific Latin American country to obtain, in short time, remarkable and profitable commands within the local merchant marine⁸⁰⁰. Interestingly, the consul pleaded their case, inviting the Italian public authorities to acknowledge a de facto situation and regularise their positions, in order to let them serve for the national fleet as well⁸⁰¹.

In Peru, as well as in the Plata region, Camogli's migration inscribes into the chain migration model. By means of «diffusion» and «feedback»⁸⁰², the mechanisms of chain migration led to the creation of communitarian-based clusters, in which kinship and shared origins played a fundamental role.

Bartolomeo Figari is an example of this migrating pattern⁸⁰³. Born in 1831 from Gio. Batta and Rosa Ottone, he began his maritime career in Tyrrhenian cabotage routes at age twelve. From 1850 to 1854, Bartolomeo served in the Peruvian merchant marine for more than forty months. In Peru, he sailed on the ship *Santiago*, captain Giacomo Gotuzzo, and on the ship *Carmen*, under the command of captain Giuseppe Garibaldi. Interestingly, the latter embarkment, on board of *Carmen*, is related to one of the most famous voyages of Garibaldi as shipmaster, because of the long-standing debate about Garibaldi's alleged participation to the coolie trade⁸⁰⁴. Nevertheless, both the *Carmen* (owned by Pietro Denegri⁸⁰⁵) and the *Santiago* surely employed a lot of Italian-born maritime personnel. In Latin America the integration of newly-arrived immigrants within the already-existing

⁸⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰² J.D. Gould, "European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and «Feedback»", *The Journal of the European Economic History*, 2, 1980, pp. 267-315.

⁸⁰³ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 3, n. 3166.

⁸⁰⁴ The main elements of this debate can be followed in: F. Capece Galeota, "Il «secondo esilio» di Giuseppe Garibaldi", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 14, 2008, pp. 651-666. The main voice raised against the idea that the "Hero of Two Worlds" had engaged the coolie trade can be found in: P.K. Cowie, "Nuova luce su Garibaldi in Perù (1851-1853)", *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, 1981, pp. 325-331.

⁸⁰⁵ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, I. According to the consul Giuseppe Canevaro, his brother-in-law, Pietro Denegri was born in Casella (Liguria). He was arrived in the Peruvian port in the early 1830s and had accumulated substantial fortunes with trade and shipping.

Italian activities responded to a common pattern for Ligurian emigration. The individual trajectory of Bartolomeo Figari was in line with this model: in Lima, he had relatives orbiting around the business of Giovanni Figari, one of the foremost members of the Italian community in Peru⁸⁰⁶.

From the sources, it is also possible to reconstruct some unfortunate cases, which, nevertheless, can say something about the characteristics of Camogli's chain migration to Peru. For example, this was the case of the shipmaster Carlo Cichero who, for «his extremely miserable conditions»⁸⁰⁷, repeatedly demanded to the Italian consul in Callao to be repatriated at state expense. In this circumstance, the existence of a “supporting network” based on communitarian ties was even more important since it allowed the consul to find at least temporary employment to the captain, as a second pilot on the Italian ship *Dominga*⁸⁰⁸.

Similar conditions facilitated the integration of Camogli' seafarers in the area surrounding the Plata basin. There, the characteristics of Camogli's migration are hardly distinguishable from the Ligurian microcosm crowding the alleys of Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. Indeed, the conditions predisposed by the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-1852) in Argentina attracted several Ligurian seafarers to Buenos Ayres⁸⁰⁹. Rapidly, a great part of the cabotage fleet and the navigation along the river Plata came into the hands of Ligurian shipowners⁸¹⁰. In analogy to what it has been observed in the Peruvian case, the cabotage fleet hoisted the Argentinian and Uruguayan flags. The adoption of local flags was particularly effective for engaging to the navigation of the internal rivers (Paraná, Uruguay and

⁸⁰⁶ See, *infra*.

⁸⁰⁷ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, 881.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰⁹ See, N. Cuneo, *Storia dell'emigrazione italiana in Argentina, 1810-1870*, Milano: Garzanti, 1940, pp. 351-352; M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)”, pp. 209-213; F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, pp. 4-5.

⁸¹⁰ Official data are not available for this period: as Crescimbene reports, the Ligurian dominance in cabotage fluvial navigation is widely recognized by specialists. For instance, between 1845 and 1848, 43% of the vessels leaving the port of Buenos Ayres to cabotage destinations hoisted the Sardinian flag. See, M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)”, p. 222.

even Paraguay), accessible to national vessels only⁸¹¹. Indeed, as a general feature, the Plata region was a transnational space for Ligurian immigrants: through fluvial navigation, they moved incessantly between different national states back and forth⁸¹². This trait is fundamental to understand the unique characteristics of the Ligurian presence in the area as opposed to the later Italian migration flows which need to be forcibly contextualised in the consideration of the receiving societies.

After the turbulent last years of Rosas, the Ligurian dominance within cabotage and fluvial navigation regained its momentum at the point that, in 1865, the Italian consul described the current situation with these words:

From high-seas vessels to port rafts, from shipowners, importers and exporters to captains, sailors and ship-boys, to shipbuilders, caulkers and sailmakers, almost all of them belong to one Ligurian riviera or to the other.⁸¹³

In this phase, however, it is not common to find people from Camogli in this area. As seen, the first sizable waves of immigrants from the Ligurian town date from the second half of the nineteenth century onward and were deeply interrelated with the worsening conditions of the local shipping business. It is in that moment that the mechanisms of chain migration gradually increased the number of immigrants. Nevertheless, the earliest news of Camogli's people in the Plata basin fit the characteristics of Ligurian immigration and, by witnessing the continuity to maritime labour and shipping, coincide with the above-mentioned second step of Camogli's immigration pattern. For example, it is possible to mention the cabotage captain B. Schiaffino, who, in 1853, left the port of Montevideo to Gualeguaychu at the command of the ship *Sole*⁸¹⁴.

Indeed, the most noteworthy period to analyse Camogli's immigration to Buenos Ayres and the nearby cities took place from the late 1870s onwards. In

⁸¹¹ F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", p. 5.

⁸¹² Idem, p. 8.

⁸¹³ L. Chapperon, "La Repubblica Orientale dell'Uruguay. Cenni geografici, statistici e commerciali", in *Bollettino Consolare Italiano*, 1865, p. 540.

⁸¹⁴ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres, b. 2.

these years, both desertions and legal migrations reached the zenith in Latin American countries, with Buenos Ayres (34,8%) and Montevideo (7%) being the foremost destinations for Camogli seafarers either deserting or settling abroad⁸¹⁵. There, the seamen from Camogli, both deserters and regular immigrants, found regular employment in the maritime sector. In 1885, more than 54% of the tonnage of the Plata, despite covered by Latin American flags, belonged to Italian shipowners⁸¹⁶. Such considerable amount of vessels, albeit of limited dimensions (most of them weighted below 150 tons), could obviously provide a vast source of maritime labour for several Italian migrants settled abroad. These are the cases, for instance, of Carlo Oneto, sailor, found in Buenos Ayres in 1881: part of a numerous family composed of six male brothers, Carlo was emigrated to Argentina in the previous years, whereas three brothers of him were still employed on board of Camogli's vessels and two were farmers⁸¹⁷. Another one was Benedetto Figari, captain, who appeared as witness in a notarial deed from Buenos Ayres together with Fortunato Cichero, owner of a *pulperia*⁸¹⁸. A decade later, Camogli's notarial sources witness the presence in Buenos Ayres of Cesare Gotuzzo and Fortunato Maggiolo, captains⁸¹⁹. Most interesting is the case of Giuseppe Caprile, who, in 1885, had found employment as a coalman⁸²⁰.

More rare, but still present, is Camogli's maritime labour migration to Chile. There, with different dimensions, the gradual integration of Ligurian captains and seafarers within the Chilean merchant marine can be observed from the 1820s⁸²¹. Already in 1835, the English consul in Valparaiso recorded six Italian captains (Schiattino, Viale, Ferrari, Garassino, Allao and Capurro) as opposed to only eight

⁸¹⁵ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁸¹⁶ AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 3, Buenos Ayres.

⁸¹⁷ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 501, n. 255.

⁸¹⁸ *Idem*, b. 503, n. 631.

⁸¹⁹ *Idem*, b. 1616, n. 544 and 658.

⁸²⁰ *Idem*, b. 688, n. 2852.

⁸²¹ V. Maino, "I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX", in *Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 157-195.

Chilean captains⁸²². Others could be added to this list and even more followed afterwards⁸²³. Between 1851 and 1865, 17% of the captains and 19% of the vessels of the Chilean fleet were Italian⁸²⁴. Among them, it is not easy to distinct those from Camogli from those who arrived from the nearby communities, such as Santa Margherita and Recco. Surnames like Bozzo, Capurro, Chiesa, Cichero, Ferrari and Viacava can be equally reconducted either to Camogli or to those places. Thus, widening the perspective adopted to embrace this broader trans-communitarian area seems to be a necessary operation to shed light on the characteristics of Camogli's maritime immigration to Chile. Within this group, Gio. Batta Cichero owned the major numbers of ships, five⁸²⁵. Similarly to Emanuele Bozzo, Benedetto Capurro, Antonio Chiesa, Niccolò Ognio, B. Repetto and Gio. Batta Viacava, he was also shipmaster, employed despite his several ownerships⁸²⁶. These captains and ships mostly engaged to cabotage along the Pacific coast of the Latin American subcontinent and seldomly went beyond this borders⁸²⁷.

Although being employed in the maritime sector represented a common fate for most of the seafarers who, from Camogli, arrived in Latin America, the duration of their maritime careers was usually limited within the first years spent in the hosting societies. Afterwards, on the one hand, the most successful collected enough resources to found shipping firm and, in a certain perspective, followed a parallel evolution to their counterparts in Camogli. They relinquished the role of owning-captains and sought for social and economic recognition in shipownership. On the other hand, many abandoned shipping to engage to other activities. Within this framework, the case history is multifaceted. In general, most

⁸²² Idem, p. 169.

⁸²³ *Ibidem*. The author reports the names of Giuseppe Ferro, Niccolò Revello and Geronimo Costa.

⁸²⁴ Idem, p. 182.

⁸²⁵ Idem, p. 184, Tabella 1 – *Armatori Italiani della flotta cilena, 1850-65*.

⁸²⁶ Idem, p. 187, Tabella 2 – *Capitani Italiani della flotta cilena, 1850-65*. The same Gio. Batta Cichero can be found in L. Pandolfini, “Emigrazione italiana al Chili”, *Bollettino consolare italiano*, 1868, p. 141.

⁸²⁷ The author mentions extraordinary exceptions to this general rule, such as in the case of Pietro Alessandri, but it seems that none of the captains reported above actually engaged to international trade. V. Maino, “I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX”, pp. 171-177.

of them went upstream the supply chain, from transport to distribution up to production: firstly, they opened retail shops (*pulperias*), then passed to wholesale commerce (*almacen*) and, finally, acquired land for cultivation or engaged to industrial production.

6.3.2. CAMOGLI'S SHIPPING BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA

As said, from a chronological perspective, the bulk of Camogli's migration to Latin America is not in line with the analogous broader Ligurian movement. This factor covered a role in determining the integration of the people of Camogli within the Italian and receiving societies. The practice of maritime occupations represented a common trait to delineate the first steps of Camogli's people into the new world; instead, the subsequent entrepreneurial success was largely dependent on environmental factors and on the opportunities available. For example, in the age of guano (1840s-1870s), Peru was flourished and highly attractive to prospective emigrants; later, in particular after the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), which deprived the country of most of its nitrate deposits, it entered in a downward economic spiral. Thus, when taking into account long-term entrepreneurial trajectories, a crucial differentiation between the few first-comers (1830s-1860s) and the more extensive group of late-comers (1870s-1910s) is needed.

Indeed, at the mid-nineteenth century, the opening of the Black Sea trade and the overall evolution of local shipping represented a source of attractiveness from which few people of Camogli refrained. One of them was Giovanni Figari (1810-1873), who emigrated to Callao (Peru) in 1832⁸²⁸.

Although several references will be made to other characters from different places, the unusual abundance of sources about the life and business of Giovanni Figari allow us to reconstruct his activities and discuss his model of successful entrepreneurship in comparison with other cases.

⁸²⁸ See, AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, 1842; G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 43-44.

Arrived in 1832, Giovanni Figari was able to collect a discrete fortune in less than ten years, as he was included in a short list of the thirteen most wealthy persons of Italian origins in Peru⁸²⁹. The Sardinian consul in Lima, Luigi Baratta, described him as a «merchant settled in Lima, married and with family for more than twelve years, who is not willing to return to his native country, and who holds a fortune of more than thirty thousand *pezzi*»⁸³⁰. Within this ranking, the position of Giovanni Figari followed those of Giuseppe Canevaro (150.000 *pezzi*), the Mazzino bros. (80.000 *pezzi*) and Pietro Parodi (50.000 *pezzi*). Then, at the same level of Giovanni Figari, appeared also Antonio Boggiano (from Chiavari), Pietro Denegri (from Casella), Giuseppe Saccone and Angelo Macera⁸³¹. These people were at the top of the Ligurian community of Peru: in particular, Giuseppe Canevaro and Pietro Denegri, merchants and shipowners, became the most influential of them, along with Figari⁸³².

Apparently, Giovanni Figari did not settle abroad on his own: he was probably accompanied by his brother, Angelo, who owned a *pulperia* (retail shop) in Lima⁸³³. Probably, other members of the family Figari moved to Peru: for example, within a list of the Peruvian fleet in 1853 a certain Hilario (Ilario) Figari is reported to be the owner of the schooner *Diana* (136 t.)⁸³⁴.

In 1842, Giovanni Figari was defined as a «merchant» and still in 1853 he does not figure among the Peruvian shipowners: arguably, soon after his arrival, Figari had collected his fortune through trade, as owner of a *pulperia* or even an *almacén* (wholesale shop). Afterwards, he surely returned to shipping and became one of the leading shipowners involved in the transport of *coolies* from China. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 3, Giovanni Figari was reported as the owner of the full-rigged ship (*Provvidenza*, 564 t.) and a barque (*Lima*, 255 t.) which from January 1865 to June

⁸²⁹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, 1842.

⁸³⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸³¹ *Ibidem*.

⁸³² Giuseppe Canevaro was the Sardinian and later Italian consul between 1847 and 1864. See, G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 295.

⁸³³ *Idem*, p. 69.

⁸³⁴ R. Melo, *Historia de la Marina del Perú*, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, 1907, p. 219.

1866 sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of 908 coolies⁸³⁵. In 1872, to the company *Figari & Hijos* belonged five out of twenty-six ships which arrived to Callao loaded with *coolies* between January and October 1872⁸³⁶. Finally, according to a calculation of Mario Castro de Mendoza – reported by Giovanni Bonfiglio – Giovanni Figari had deployed twenty-two ships to the *coolie* trade throughout the whole period, second to Giuseppe Canevaro only (43 ships)⁸³⁷.

The considerable revenues collected through this activity strengthened even more Figari's position within the Italian community of Lima. His commitment to the communitarian social institutions found recognition in 1862, when Giovanni Figari was elected president of the *Società Italiana di Beneficenza* of Lima (Italian Mutual Aid Society)⁸³⁸. The next year, Rocco Pratolongo succeeded to him in the same position and Figari was appointed treasurer, still a prestigious role⁸³⁹. The foundation of mutual aid societies and hospitals was a cornerstone for the consolidation of the Italian immigrant communities in Latin America⁸⁴⁰. These societies were intended to provide social and economic services to the associates: the membership fees and the incomes deriving from collateral activities were gathered into a social fund destined to support infirmed or indigent members. Furthermore, after they gathered sufficient capitals and assets, these societies performed additional services, tied with the construction of «schools, medical clinics, hospital care, pharmacies, restaurants»⁸⁴¹. They also provided job

⁸³⁵ See, Chapter 3 and: ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869, b. 273.

⁸³⁶ W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru*, p. 83; G. Chiaramonti, "Italiani in Perù fra Otto e Novecento", p. 72.

⁸³⁷ M. C. de Mendoza, *El transporte marítimo en la Inmigración China*, Lima, 1989, p. 68, mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 70.

⁸³⁸ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 104.

⁸³⁹ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 881, Lima, *Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione amministrativa pel corrente anno 1863, Elenco dei soci*.

⁸⁴⁰ See, for instance: S.L. Baily and A. Scarli, "Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, 1858-1918", *Desarrollo Economico*, No. 84, 1982, pp. 485-514; S.L. Baily, "The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York, 1870-1914", *The American Historical Review*, No. 88, 1983, pp. 281-305; F.J. Devoto, "Las sociedades italianas de ayuda mutua en Buenos Ayres y Santa Fe. Ideas y problemas", *Studi Emigrazione XXI*, No. 75, 1984, pp. 320-342.

⁸⁴¹ S.L. Baily, "The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York", p. 293.

placement services, working as the operational arm of the Italian immigrant societies and the basic element of its social networking.

From 1862 to 1881, the number of associates to the Italian mutual aid society of Lima increased from 121 to 1125⁸⁴². Among the subscribers of 1863, it is possible to single out the components of Camogli's community within the broader Italian group: besides Giovanni Figari, the list records three more members of the same family, Luigi, Bartolomeo and Andrea, to which must be added Giovanni's sons, Bartolomeo and Giovanni Figari-Rosas⁸⁴³. In addition, other associates might originate from Camogli, such as Gio. Batta Bozzo, Bartolomeo Schiaffino, Giuseppe Olivari and Michele Razeto⁸⁴⁴.

Then, in 1881, the mutual aid society gathered the funds to construct the Italian Hospital of Lima, founded on 20th September⁸⁴⁵. Less than a decade later, the company *Giovanni Figari & Hijos* hold ten shares of this institution⁸⁴⁶.

Although his active participation to mutual aid societies and, more generally, to the social networks of the community, the figure of Giovanni Figari cannot be easily restricted to the mainstream endogenous character of Ligurian immigrant communities in Latin America. Indeed, the networking role of these institutions compensated for the troublesome integration of foreign elements within the hosting societies. The emergence of this factor is evident in Peru, where several Italians were subjected to vexations by the authorities and suffered from complicated relationships with the natives. Illegal imprisonments, beatings and murders were commonplace: in 1864, for instance, a thirteen years old boy, Giacomo Figari (whose kinship with Giovanni is not clear) was strangled⁸⁴⁷. In the same period, an old man Schiaffino was assassinated in Lima. In Callao, two *pulperos* were murdered: one, named Garibaldi, was shot and the other had his

⁸⁴² G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 104-105.

⁸⁴³ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 881, Lima, *Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione amministrativa pel corrente anno 1863, Elenco dei soci*.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁴⁵ AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 80, Lima, *Società Italiana di Beneficenza in Lima – Relazione del presidente sulla gestione dell'anno 1888 all'assemblea generale*.

⁸⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁴⁷ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817, Lima.

throat cut⁸⁴⁸. The climate of hostility was even fostered by clergymen, who contributed to flare the tempers of the Peruvians against the Italian community, whose members were labelled as «thieves and bandits»⁸⁴⁹.

Therefore, having in mind long term projects, it was natural to feel the need to integrate as much as possible within the Peruvian society or, at least, to expand outside the borders of the Italian community. Thus, it was natural that, in 1838, Giovanni Figari married Eulalia Rosas Barragan, daughter of Nicolas Rosas (probably of Italian origins, but in Peru since 1807 at least) and of a local woman⁸⁵⁰. Between 1840 and 1854, the couple had nine sons, five boys and four girls. Then, Giovanni Figari carried out a careful marriage policy aimed at spreading the familiar connections in various directions. Bartolomeo (1840-1915), Pedro (b. 1851) and Manuel (b. 1847) married women of local descents; Juan Jacinto (Giovanni, 1843-1912) and Luis Lucas (Luigi, 1854-1934) married women of Italian origins, descendants of Luigi Figari and Pietro Denegri respectively; Maria Dolores (1846-1919) and Clorinda (d. 1919) were given to Emile and Jules Fort, French merchants living in Lima⁸⁵¹; finally, Carmen (1844-1916) married Adolphe Harismendi, merchant of Basque origins. Then, these unions resulted into thirty-one grandsons from the original household of Giovanni Figari.

Besides the unique case-study of Giovanni Figari, although with fewer details, it is possible to reconstruct alternative trajectories of Camogli's immigrants in Peru. According to scholarly reconstructions, a great deal of the Italian business in Peru was severely damaged by the outbreak of the Pacific War and the subsequent Chilean invasion of the country (1880-1883) which turned into a widespread lawlessness targeting foreigners in particular. For example, G.B. Ferrari reports about the considerable damages suffered by Giovanni Diego Schiaffino, Gaetano

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁴⁹ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 1384, Lima.

⁸⁵⁰ The genealogy of Giovanni Figari was made available online by Francisco Javier Carbone Montes, a distant descendant. It can be seen at:

<https://gw.geneanet.org/fracarbo?lang=es&n=figari+olivari&oc=0&p=giovanni>

⁸⁵¹ This information is corroborated by Teodoro Hampe Martinez: see, T.H. Martinez, "Una dinámica de integración social: Inmigrantes europeos y norteamericanos en Lima (siglo XIX)", *Ibero-amerikanisches Archiv*, No. 17:4, p. 358.

Figari and Emanuele Cevasco, seemingly all proprietors of retail shops⁸⁵². In the same period, it was in the valley of Chinchá that the Italian residents lamented the greatest damages⁸⁵³. There, some other business activities belonging to individuals from Camogli were founded and, then, flourished in the following decades. The settlement of members of the families Mortola and Oneto provides an emblematic example.

The first penetration to this vast agricultural region took place between 1850 and 1870: first, it regarded the port area (Tambo de Mora), where several Ligurians founded cabotage shipping companies. Afterwards, in compliance with the mentioned pattern from transport to production, many opened retail and wholesale shops to handle the distribution of the most commercialized local commodity, wine. After that, some moved to the countryside and purchased lands cultivated with vineyards. The relative backwardness – in terms of agricultural exploitation and production – of the area delayed of a couple of decades the closure of the access to new immigrants within this business. It is in this context, for example, that, before 1879, Niccolò Oneto managed to acquire a piece of land and founded a wine-producing enterprise in Chinchá Alta: then it was improved by his wife Elisa Mortola until a Genoese collateral acquired it in 1916⁸⁵⁴. To the name Mortola, but probably a different branch of the family, was tied another wine-making firm: it is reconducted to the entrepreneurship of Anna Massa, widow of a

⁸⁵² G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 306. The author reports confusing data concerning both locations and time. First, he locates the shop of Gaetano Figari, son of Niccolò, in «Barranquerra Alta», which is not a Peruvian toponym, but most likely corresponds to an Argentinian town. Secondly, he dates the attacks to the Italian properties to an alleged «Peruvian Revolution» occurred on 12th March 1875, an event which is never reported by the historiography. Some elements might suggest that he referred to the 1895 Revolution – which took place during the Caceres' overthrowing by Piérola – when riots and attacks to the Italian community were repeated in the same fashion of the Chilean occupation (1880-1883). See, G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 191. However, some data about age (Gaetano Figari arrived at Callao in 1859 at age 38, so he was 74 in 1895) and other internal textual references make us not incline toward this option. Most likely, G.B. Ferrari made confusion and wanted to refer to the years of the Chilean occupation (1880-1883).

⁸⁵³ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 213-215.

⁸⁵⁴ The Italian entrepreneurship in the valley of Chinchá is deeply analysed in: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 210-239.

Mortola, whose success allowed her to expand to other sectors, including a banking institute and a constructions company⁸⁵⁵.

Conversely, the width and variety of the Italian community on the other side of the Latin American subcontinent (the Plata basin) complicated the identification of Camogli's entrepreneurs. To this specific regard, the news provided by local historians and the scattered references found in academic literature delineate a pattern of business in line with the dominant model of Ligurian immigration, given the chronological delay of Camogli's emigration and its results. Since maritime labour was the gateway to migration, the earliest immigrants invested mainly in shipping. Apart from several single-ship enterprises engaging to fluvial cabotage, which are hardly identifiable from the sources, the people of Camogli invested also in collateral activities connected with port service. For example, Gio. Batta Lavarello (d. 1869) founded a tug boats company operating in the port of Buenos Ayres⁸⁵⁶. Already in 1862, Lavarello met Nicolas Mihanovic (born nearby Dubrovnik, in the Austrian Empire), destined to become one of the most important shipowners of the Argentinian capital⁸⁵⁷: after the death of Gio. Batta, his wife Caterina Balestra offered to Mihanovic the direction of the company together with her elder sons, Francesco and Elia Lavarello. A few years later, in 1872, Nicolas married Caterina⁸⁵⁸. Since Gio. Batta's death, it is possible to follow the participation of his six sons throughout the business evolution of Nicolas Mihanovic, culminated in the foundation of the *Sociedad de Navegación a Vapor*

⁸⁵⁵ Idem, p. 218.

⁸⁵⁶ He is mentioned with no further details in: M.C. Crescimbene, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", p. 246. Then, see: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", *Historia Unisinos*, No. 9:3, 2005, pp. 198-210.

⁸⁵⁷ On this figure: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", pp. 198-210; L.G. Caruso, "La Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal en las primeras décadas del siglo XX", *Trabajadores*, No. 2, 2011, pp. 128-156; B. Kadic, "Los hermanos Mihanovich, fundadores de la Flota Mercante Argentina", *Studia Croatica, Revista de Estudios Políticos y Culturales*, No. 2, 1961.

⁸⁵⁸ L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", p. 201.

Nicolás Mihanovich in 1888⁸⁵⁹. The structure of the firm, indeed, reflected the co-participation of the family Lavarello to Mihanovic's business, despite it hold the name of its founder. Elia was vice-president and managing director, whereas Giovanni and Luigi were directors⁸⁶⁰. The *Mihanovic* company engaged also to shipbuilding: Carlo Lavarello was the director of this branch and Giovanni and Luigi were council members⁸⁶¹.

Apart from the specific case of the Mihanovic-Lavarello, the Ligurian fluvial entrepreneurship in the area rarely led to the creation of big shipping companies. Limitedly to Camogli's case, for example, it is possible to observe a line of continuity in terms of shipping business practices between the hometown and the migrant communities. Chain migration was primarily on familiar basis and then expanded to the town; occasional partnerships with exogenous members were possible (e.g. G.B. Ferrari speaks about the *Mortola & Canevaro*, in Buenos Ayres or the *Risso & Schiaffino* at Montevideo)⁸⁶², but they rarely acquired permanent character. Thus, the shipping activities of Camogli's expatriates in this area lacked capital concentration and, therefore, the means to sustain foreign competition on the long run.

Finally, several seafarers from Camogli, settled in Argentina and Uruguay, having retired from a maritime career, sought for new opportunities in different markets: some remained in the shipping sector and opened ship-chandler shops, many hold *pulperias* at the Boca, others went to the inner regions of these countries. Unfortunately, the research conducted in the sources kept in the archives of the Sardinian and Italian Foreign Affairs was rather unsuccessful⁸⁶³. Five members of the family Schiaffino were registered within the Sardinian population in Rosario (1855): Antonio, Gaetano and Francesco were defined as

⁸⁵⁹ L.G. Caruso, "La Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal", p. 131.

⁸⁶⁰ L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", p. 202.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶² G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 428.

⁸⁶³ The papers related to the Sardinian period can be found in Turin: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres,

traders, Prospero was a painter and Rocco was labelled as merchant and owner⁸⁶⁴. Another Schiaffino, Niccolò, is mentioned among the subscribers of the construction company to construct the Italian Hospital in Buenos Ayres, in 1863⁸⁶⁵. Then, Antonio Capurro, Giovanni Cichero and Eugenio Ferrari appear in the list of the Italian citizens who were damaged during the siege of Paysandù, an Uruguayan city attacked by the Brazilian troops in 1864⁸⁶⁶.

Nevertheless, these scattered data are incomplete and unsystematic. Therefore, in this case, a brief reference to the sparse news provided by local historians is needed, at least to delineate a general framework of Camogli's entrepreneurship in Argentina and Uruguay.

In 1894, at age 12, Gio. Bono Ferrari, the major local historian of Camogli, migrated to Buenos Ayres personally to reach his father, Giuseppe Ferrari (1859-1933), son of Gio. Bono. Giuseppe had spent his first years embarked on the brig *Geronima Ferrari*, owned by his father, but he never obtained the captain's license. He married young, in 1881, and, in the following year, left Camogli to make fortune in Argentina: after a short period in Bahia Blanca, Giuseppe was employed on board of the steamer *Carhué*, commanded by his uncle Francesco Bisso and, then, was embarked on sailing vessels engaging to fluvial navigation in the Paraná. Afterwards, he founded a trade company with an acquired cousin from Recco (Gaetano Cavalli): this business earned good profits, as during the 1890s it consisted of three shops and employed various people. Finally, in 1904, Giuseppe Ferrari decided to return to Camogli⁸⁶⁷.

As said, his son Gio. Bono reached him to Buenos Ayres in 1894: until 1904, the future founder of Camogli's maritime museum worked in the familiar business. Afterwards, not willing to continue in retailing, Gio. Bono moved to the interior,

⁸⁶⁴ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres, b. 2, *Primi elementi pel censo italiano a Rosario, Paraná, Santa Fé e Diamante, nella Confederazione Argentina*.

⁸⁶⁵ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 867, Buenos Ayres, *Commissione edilizia dell'Ospedale Italiano*. On this argument, see: D. Sacchi, "I consoli e l'ospedale: le prime collette per la fondazione dell'ospedale italiano di Buenos Ayres (1853-1858)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 41:3, 2006, pp. 639-669.

⁸⁶⁶ AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 3, *Elenco dei reclami presentati alla Regia Delegazione Consolare d'Italia a Paysandù dai sudditi italiani ivi stabiliti*.

⁸⁶⁷ Part of these information come from: Gio. Bono Ferrari, *Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari*.

to work as accountant in a grain trade company settled in the region northward than Santa Fé. On these bases, there is a deep methodological difference between the representativity of Gio. Bono Ferrari's accounts on Camogli's history, based on the collection of oral witnesses, and the sections about the late nineteenth-century Buenos Ayres, grounded on first-person knowledge.

According to G.B. Ferrari, the number of the owners of *pulperias* (retail shops) and *almacen* (wholesale shop) from Camogli was almost uncountable: surnames as Antola, Olivari, Mortola, Repetto, Maggiolo, Massa, Schiaffino, Valle and Simonetti are all reported in his account⁸⁶⁸. Then, for their limited numbers, the author is more detailed when describing the activities of those who engaged to the productive sectors. There were small-scale industrials, such as Aurelio and Eugenio Ferrari: the former founded a factory of textiles, the latter one engaged to wooden and iron manufactures. Lorenzo Schiaffino, instead, opened a lumbermill. Samuele Ansaldo explored the mines of Catamarca, in the Andin region, at the north-western borders of Argentina. Salvatore Ferro embarked on a colonization process in Patagonia; Federico Valle became a wheat merchant in Santa Fé; a Mortola tried to set up a mulberry plantation in an island along the Paranà river⁸⁶⁹.

6.4. A case of migration by accident: the foundation of the Camogli's community in Tristan da Cunha (1892)

This last and short section deviates from the systematic analysis of Camogli's migration flows and aims at reconstructing the unique case-study of the permanent settlement of two sailors from Camogli, Andrea Repetto and Gaetano Lavarello, in the island of Tristan da Cunha, in the Atlantic Ocean. For its exceptionality, the event is well-known in Camogli and local historians reconstructed it in details. Most of the information arises from the personal

⁸⁶⁸ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 427.

⁸⁶⁹ Idem, p. 428.

memory of the sailor Agostino Lavarello, cousin to Gaetano, who, in 1892, shipwrecked together with him on the Atlantic island⁸⁷⁰.

Indeed, the origins of Camogli's community in Tristan da Cunha were rooted on a specific event, the shipwreck of the barque *Italia* (1074 t.), built in 1882 by B. Cerruti in the shipyards of Varazze⁸⁷¹. The barque belonged to the Michele and Andrea Dall'Orso, shipowners of the Ligurian city of Chiavari, ca. 20 kilometres distant from Camogli. As seen in Chapter 2, during the first half of the nineteenth century, several members of the Dall'Orso family had engaged into the Black Sea grain trade, both as merchants and carriers. In the following years, some of them continued to practice shipping (in 1890, Michele and Andrea owned seven barques)⁸⁷². It was not uncommon for Camogli's seafarers to be employed on board of ships belonging to the nearby communities, especially because of the crisis which Camogli's shipping was experiencing in the last decades of the century. Indeed, at the moment of the departure, in May 1891, the crew of the barque *Italia* was composed of seventeen people: the captain Orlando Perasso (from Chiavari), a Genoese mate, five seaman from Camogli (including the boatswain), seven seamen from Grottamare, on the Adriatic side of Central Italy (including the steward, two ordinary seamen and a ship-boy), another ordinary seaman from Lavagna, and two cabin-boys, one from Genoa and the other from Milan.

The group from Camogli included: Fortunato Schiappacasse (boatswain), Agostino Lavarello (able seaman), Gaetano Lavarello (able seaman), Antonio Gardella (able seaman) and Andrea Repetto (able seaman).

The research throughout the *Matricole* allowed us to reconstruct the careers of Gaetano Lavarello and Andrea Repetto, the founders of Camogli's community to Tristan da Cunha. Gaetano Lavarello, son of Gio. Batta and Cecilia Oneto, was born on the 9th December 1867; Andrea Antonio (his second name) Repetto, son of Agostino and Maria Lagno, was born on the 13th January of the same year.

⁸⁷⁰ CMMC, *Il naufragio del Brigantino a Palo "Italia"*. The memory was then published into the second publication of Camogli's maritime museum: A. Bertolotto (ed.), *Agostino Lavarello. Ultimo viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel 1892*, Camogli: Quaderni del Museo 2, 1973.

⁸⁷¹ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1890*.

⁸⁷² *Ibidem*.

Gaetano's first embarkment took place in 1879, as ship-boy on board of the barque *Paola Revello*, where he remained for almost one year engaging to the Black Sea and British trades. After four services along these routes, Gaetano's first transoceanic voyage occurred in 1883 (as ordinary seaman), on the barque *Paola R.* to Montevideo. Then, he continued his maritime career along the oceanic routes; finally, on the 5th May 1891, Gaetano embarked on the barque *Italia*, from where he disembarked in Tristan da Cunha on the 3rd October 1892, as a result of the shipwreck⁸⁷³.

Andrea began his maritime career in September 1880; throughout the first two years, Andrea collected less than four months at sea, as ship-boy in voyages of Tyrrhenian cabotage. Then, between 1883 and 1887, he engaged to transoceanic routes, in particular to North American destinations. Finally, in 1891, he resumed navigation and got on board of the barque *Italia*⁸⁷⁴.

The written memory left by Agostino Lavarello offers many details useful to describe the routes and the traffics of the barque *Italia*. Departed from Genoa with a mineral cargo, the barque arrived thirty-five days later to Swansea. There, it loaded coal and embarked upon a long voyage – it lasted one-hundred and six days – to Penang. After a brief passage on ballast to Rangoon, the barque *Italia* was chartered with a teak cargo to Greenoch, in Scotland. The passage lasted one-hundred and forty-seven days. Finally, on the 3rd August 1892, it received a coal cargo to be consigned at Cape Town⁸⁷⁵.

On the 28th September, the crew noticed that the coal cargo had caught fire. After several unsuccessful attempts to extinguish the fire, the captain opted for controlling it in order to endure as much as possible and to sail toward Tristan da Cunha. During the night of the 2nd October, then, the hold exploded without destroying completely the barque, which was still 50 miles far from Tristan da Cunha. On the following day, they were able to disembark on the desert and rocky side of the island and, therefore, spent there the next eight days before being able

⁸⁷³ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 27, n. 19781.

⁸⁷⁴ Idem, r. 30, n. 21917.

⁸⁷⁵ A. Lavarello, *Ultimo viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel 1892*, pp. 2-3.

to find help from the local community. Finally, on the 14th October, the crew arrived to Edinburgh of the Seven Seas, the only inhabited site of the island⁸⁷⁶.

At the time of the arrival of the Italian shipwrecked, Tristan da Cunha was populated by forty-seven people. The earliest permanent settlements to this remote island date to 1816-1817, when the English navy sent a garrison to prevent any possible attempt to free Napoleon from Saint Helena. After 1821, most of the garrison left, apart from a small number of people, among which was William Glass, who became the first governor of the island. In the following years, groups of black women from Saint Helena and South Africa were sent to Tristan da Cunha to integrate with the dominant male population. In 1836, an American schooner shipwrecked, and three of the people on board decided to stop. Among them, there was the Dutch Peter William Groen (later Green), governor in 1892. The population was mainly composed by women: in 1885, male inhabitants represented only 14,67% of the total.

The economy of the island was obviously based on subsistence: farming, fishing and potato crops provided to the population the means for survival. Since Tristan da Cunha was located outside the average routes, it was rarely reached by vessels. The only exception was represented by American whalers, which anchored there for provisions in exchange of clothes and textiles⁸⁷⁷. Thus, before being completely rescued (apart from Gaetano and Andrea, who decided to remain there), the Italian crew was hosted for four months by the residing community. Actually, the first group (the mate and some sailors) embarked, after fifteen days, on an American barque directed to Adelaide (Australia): the lack of sufficient provisions impeded to the whole crew to do the same⁸⁷⁸. In the following weeks, various whalers arrived to the island but refused to take the Italian sailors to Cape Town in order to not waste the hunting season. Meanwhile, the remaining sailors gradually integrated with the local community: since the island was prevalently populated by women, the presence of strong young males was naturally more than welcomed.

⁸⁷⁶ Idem, pp. 4-16.

⁸⁷⁷ Idem, p. 20.

⁸⁷⁸ Idem, pp. 22-23.

Furthermore, their manual skills were highly appreciated: according to Agostino, «the people of the island regarded us as people fell from the sky, due to the fact that we were able to do anything and we were hard workers»⁸⁷⁹. For instance, they made potato sacks with the remaining sails and the boatswain, being a decent carpenter, was able to repair the chariots⁸⁸⁰.

Seemingly, it was during these months spent as members of the community that Gaetano Lavarello fell in love with a local, «Gini Glass»⁸⁸¹ and decided to marry her and settle in the island for his future days. The same decision was then taken by Andrea Repetto. Finally, the rest of the group, including Agostino Lavarello was embarked on the schooner *Wild Rose* (250 t.) on the 21st January 1893⁸⁸².

Conclusions

The present chapter aimed at reconstructing the actions of those who abandoned the community of Camogli to establish abroad.

The analysis of desertion rates outlined how occupational continuity was crucial in determining the choices of Camogli seafarers. The remarkable rates of desertion observed in a positive period for the local shipping business and the pattern of deserting ports make Camogli an exceptional case-study within the Italian framework. In the 1860s, the seafarers of Camogli implemented a market-driven professional choice at the moment of desertion: they disembarked in the British ports, where it was easier to find more profitable employments in the same sector. Thus, they demonstrated market awareness and to be able to move within an international maritime labour market, pointing out an approach more similar to that of Northern Europeans than to those of their fellows Italians.

The examination of Camogli's migration patterns to Latin America, instead, inscribed our case-study within the broader Ligurian model. The predominance of

⁸⁷⁹ *Idem*, p. 21.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁸¹ *Idem*, p. 23.

⁸⁸² *Idem*, pp. 23-25.

maritime-related occupations in the countries of destination is as fundamental for Camogli's outward migration as for several nearby communities (e.g. Recco, Santa Margherita, Chiavari, Sori etc.). Moreover, apart from few exceptions, Camogli's immigrants arrived in already-existing Ligurian communities, which favoured their integration. Thus, from a general perspective, the pattern of Camogli's migration was consistent with the Ligurian model, albeit some peculiarities. Firstly, Camogli's immigration started at least with a gap of one generation in comparison with the Ligurian average (1820-1830), due to Camogli's exceptional success in shipping which deprived its inhabitants from most of the push factors until the 1870s. Secondly, the correlation with maritime activities was even stricter than in the case of Ligurians, at the point that it is hardly possible to find newly-arrived immigrants employed in different occupations than shipping.

These characteristics led the way to propose a positive business model for Camogli's immigrants in Latin America: after their arrival as seafarers, they were firstly employed in the shipping business, mostly in cabotage (Peru) and fluvial navigation (the Plata basin). Then, the most successful among them became shipowners and integrated with the upper ranks of the Italian migrant societies (Giovanni Figari and the Lavarello Bros.): these people covered important positions within the social and economic networks of the Italian community (e.g. mutual aid societies and hospitals). Others decided to definitively abandon shipping and devoted themselves to alternative businesses: in general, the sources delineate an upstream movement through the supply chain, from transport (shipping) to retail (*pulperias*), from wholesale (*almacén*) to production (wine factories, wood and iron manufactures, cultivation etc.).

Finally, we provided an account on an extraordinary case-study for the underdeveloped theme of migrations determined by shipwrecks. This kind of events became progressively rarer, because the development of world shipping enhanced the sea borne connections with the remotest places of the globe. Nevertheless, the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to Tristan da Cunha, occurred at the end of nineteenth century, might represent one of the most emblematic results of the globalisation process to which the Ligurian community actively participated.

CONCLUSIONS

From charcoal cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping, the trajectory of Camogli throughout the nineteenth-century is emblematic for the history of Mediterranean sailing shipping communities. The passage from the first phase (late eighteenth century – 1830) to the second one (1830-1870) is related to the improvement of market integration and the enlargement of the geographic range. The causes of such step-forward can be identified in the inner potential belonging to the community and in the capability of the shipping elites to concentrate the investments in a profitable venture, the Black Sea grain trade.

There, before the Crimean War, Camogli's specialisation into shipping provided the Genoese merchants with a strong and trustworthy fleet, manned by experienced seafarers who visited the Black Sea ports with unbroken continuity. In the 1860s, the opening to foreign merchants and the access to Greek networks determined the transition from the Mediterranean to the British markets. The arrival of Camogli ships to the ports of the United Kingdom represented a decisive breakthrough in the history of the Ligurian community: from the creation of an integrated wheat-coal route in and out the Mediterranean, the captain-shipowners of Camogli established initial contacts with the British freight market. Afterwards, when steam competitiveness rose and steamships seized the Black Sea grain trade, the people of Camogli were ready to expand to oceanic shipping. Each step-forward of Camogli was determined by previously established relationships: similarly to a chain, every phase was preliminary to the next one. The transport of grain for Ligurian merchants was needed to mature expertise of the Black Sea market; the integration with the Greek networks was pivotal to access the British freight market; the establishment of a wheat-coal route opened to Camogli the coal trade; later, the international demands for coal unlocked other trades, particularly South-Eastern Asian rice and North-American timber. Until the late 1870s, the spatial enlargement corresponded to the rise of the community shipping business; afterwards, the direct correlation between geographic expansion and economic growth ceased. From the 1880s, the fleet of Camogli was gradually marginalised into low-profitable transports, whose scarce viability inverted the curve and

exacerbated the decline of the community. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Camogli lost its position within the international shipping world. At the turn of the century, the attempts to realise the transition from sail to steam represented the last backlash. Since the previous period, the shipowners of Camogli had replenished their fleets by operating on the second-hand market: the same pattern was followed for the construction of the steam fleet, whose outdated structural characteristics and tonnage prevented these shipowners from retrieving remarkable profits.

Throughout these processes, the community itself changed dramatically. Firstly, it underwent a demographic boom, as a result of the generally improved economic conditions and of the new position which the old fishing village had acquired within its sub-regional area. Secondly, the shipping revenues favoured the promotion of a modern shipping elite, which invested in the amelioration of the local infrastructures, and founded educational and cultural institutions which survived to their fortunes. Thirdly, Camogli became a point of reference for the Italian maritime sector: in 1880, the city hosted the First Congress of the Italian Shipowners and, on the following year, the local shipowners partook to the National Inquiry over the conditions of the merchant marine. In these occasions, from Camogli emerged economic policies of national interest which shaped the Italian maritime world for the next decades. Fourthly, Camogli's maritime labour underwent dramatic transformations. The old-fashioned mutualistic structure based on «share» payments was substituted by modern salaries and, to a certain extent, to the proletarianization of seafarers. The ranks of shipownership were gradually closed to newcomers from below: the professionalisation of masters and the increased business volume required to engage to shipping curbed vertical mobility. The optimisation of labour productivity and the contraction of the fleet concurred to disrupt the pre-existent endogenous labour market by curtailing the demands for maritime labour. In force of this, several seafarers abandoned either navigation or, physically, the community itself. The most qualified made the transition to steam: based on the local nautical school, Camogli produced deck and engine officials for the Italian merchant marine long after its demise as a shipping centre. Others abandoned the community and the Italian shipping to found more

profitable employments abroad: among them, a first group embarked on foreign European fleets, following career paths comparable to those of the Northern European seafarers. A second group, instead, transferred to Latin America. There, they found reception among the pre-existent Ligurian communities, to which also belonged a restricted list of early-comers from Camogli. At first, they were employed in maritime-related businesses, such as cabotage or fluvial shipping; afterwards, several quitted navigation to dedicate to commerce and production.

Throughout this century-old history, the effects of global-scale processes, such as the transition from sail to steam and the globalisation, played a crucial role in the configuration of the community. From the desertion of the Black Sea trade onwards, the trajectory of Camogli's shipping was determined by the global competition of sail against steam. Momentous events occurring on the broader scale, such as the construction of the Suez Canal, exerted their impact on Camogli and his seafarers. Besides, other technological innovations, such as the invention of cable telegraph, transformed the nature of maritime professions and disrupted the previously established social and power relationships.

The present thesis aimed to provide a contribution to the analysis of the global transformations which invested the nineteenth-century maritime world. The representation of the case-study of Camogli glanced at an understudied area for the nineteenth-century maritime studies, the Mediterranean Sea. Under this light, the Ligurian community served as a privileged observatory to the world. However, the accent on the global scale must not obliterate the local dimension. The community of Camogli was integrated within the global transformations but, at the same time, was responsible for its unique responses, reactions and readjustments. The establishment in the Black Sea trade, the 1860s-1870s massive campaign of constructions and the financial bubble of 1878 – only to mention some of the most distinguishing events – compose a unique picture, which cannot be found elsewhere with identical characteristics. Camogli is not a paradigm; it is a case-study, which may hopefully stimulate comparable research.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

ASGe, Archivio di Stato di Genova

- Camera di commercio (13)
 - o 36; 39; 40; 43; 45; 63; 84; 99; 537; 538; 540; 565; 566.
- Giornali nautici (36)
 - o 35/1; 119/1; 277/1; 303/1; 353/1; 438/1; 557/1; 594/1; 595/1; 602/1; 761/1-2; 763/1; 764/1-3; 805/1; 826/1-2; 930/1; 1061/1; 1066/1; 1133/1; 1158/1-3; 1252/1; 1413/1; 1571/1-2; 1677/1; 1832/1; 1876/1; 1877/1; 1879/1; 2017/1.
- Magistrato di Sanità (31)
 - o 433; 468; 469; 590-513; 826; 1687-1689.
- Matricole della gente di mare (40)
 - o 1-39.
- Notai II Sezione (24)
 - o Gio. Batta Degregori (1849-1864): 171-178.
 - o Marco Musto (1863-1878): 1957-1972.
- Notai III Sezione (51)
 - o Angelo Doberti (1864-1889): 677-693.
 - o Tommaso Ageno (1856-1888): 483-511.
 - o Giuseppe Lavarello (1889-1895): 1613-1619.
- Ruoli di equipaggio (568)
 - o Non-inventoried (1828-1866)
- Tribunale di Commercio (74)
 - o Fallimenti: 1602-1605.
 - o Sentenze: 807-835; 889-900; 913-924; 937-948; 1667-1671.

AST, Archivio di Stato di Torino

- Consolati nazionali (16)
 - o Consolati nazionali per A e B: 2.
 - o Algeri: 2.
 - o Buenos Ayres: 2.
 - o Cairo: 2.
 - o Calcutta: 1.
 - o Città del Capo: 1.
 - o Costantinopoli: 25; 32.
 - o Galatz: 1.
 - o Gibilterra: 6.
 - o Lima: 1.

- Malta: 3.
- Odessa: 5-6.
- Smirne: 1.
- Valparaiso: 1.
- Guerra e Marina (5)
 - Materiale: 323; 651-652.
 - Personale: 145; 725.

ASN, Archivio di Stato di Napoli

- Affari Esteri (9)
 - 2916-2918; 5256; 7138-7142.

ACS, Archivio Centrale dello Stato

- Direzione generale della marina mercantile (40)
 - Commissione Parlamentare (1881-1882): 1; 3; 4; 6.
 - Miscellanea Uffici Diversi (1861-1869): 271; 274; 287; 291; 293; 333; 342; 343; 361; 405; 436; 474-477; 481; 493.
 - Porti e demanio marittimo: 32; 94; 285.
 - Premi, compensi e tasse: 35; 37-46; 57-61.

AMAE, Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Esteri

- Affari Esteri (9)
 - 817; 830-831; 867; 877; 881; 895; 911; 1384.
- Serie Politica A (5)
 - 1-3; 80; 106.

ACCM, Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille

- Fonds Rocca (17)
 - 22-24; 67-69; 76; 96-99; 101-102; 109; 113; 119; 134.

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